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ABSTRACT 
 
RENOVATIO 
MARTIN LUTHER’S AUGUSTINIAN THEOLOGY OF HOLINESS 
(1515/16 AND 1535—46) 
 
by  
 
The Reverend Phillip L. Anderas, B.A., M. Div. 
 
Marquette University, 2015 
 
 
 
In this book I argue that much of mainstream Luther scholarship (and 
Lutheran theology) is quite wrong to think that Martin Luther downplayed, denied, 
derided, or just plain ignored “the holiness without which no one shall see the Lord” 
(Heb. 12:14). In fact, from the first inklings of his “Augustinian turn” c. 1514 to his death 
in 1546, Luther held and taught a robust theology of progressive renewal in holiness, 
carefully calibrated to the sober reality of residual sin and the astonishing gospel of 
grace in Jesus Christ. As it is set forth in the works that embody his most considered 
judgments (c. 1535—46), this gospel-centered and irreducibly trinitarian dogmatics of 
real renewal in holiness is “Augustinian” and “evangelical” in equal parts. As such, it 
commands the regard of theologians who stand in the tradition of the Church’s doctor 
gratiae. The argument proceeds in three steps: first, an exposition of the mature 
Reformer’s dogmatics of sin, grace, and holiness; second, an investigation of the roots 
of this dogmatics in the theology of the “420s Augustine,” with whom a younger 
Luther was busily engaged c. 1514—16; third, an account of the continuities and 
discontinuities that characterize the development of Luther’s theology from its 
embryonic state in the mid 1510s through the breakthroughs of the 1518—21 period to 
the settled position of the old Doctor.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“LUTHER ON HOLINESS? THAT WILL BE A SHORT BOOK” 
 
 
Deep into his trenchant 1525 reply to Erasmus of Rotterdam on the great themes of 
Reformation theology—sin and grace, bondage and freedom, human choice and 
divine election, law and gospel, justification by faith, claritas scripturae, etc.1—Martin 
Luther took up a challenge which many would assume did not quite strike at the heart 
of the matter. For Erasmus had asked Luther this: 
If the whole man, even when born again through faith, is nothing but ‘flesh,’ 
where is the ‘spirit’ that is born of the Spirit? Where is the child of God? Where 
is the new creature?2  
 
—and is not the very asking of this question all the evidence a convinced Lutheran 
needs to prove just how little this moralizing humanist grasped the radical nature of 
the gospel? For in the form of this question, Europe’s leading man merely renews the 
familiar charge that Luther’s theology militates against real renewal of life, reformatio 
morum, piety, virtue, good works, sanctification, holiness. But this misses the whole 
point of the Reformation, cheapens grace by making discipleship costly, and cuts the 
nerve of evangelical freedom. For the Reformation gospel of free justification leaves 
the forgiven sinner just that—a sinner, “flesh” in St. Paul’s terms, in the Reformer’s 
peccator totaliter et totus simul iustus. And this principled disregard for the 
cultivation of morals and the eradication of vice is the gospel’s special virtue, the 
paradoxical proprium that sets it apart from every scheme of moral betterment, 
                                                        
1 “My good Erasmus! … You, and you alone, have seen the hinge on which all turns, and aimed for 
the jugular.” WA 18.786.21, 30, cf. Packer, 319. Cf. Hans Joachim Iwand: “Whoever puts this book 
down without having realized that evangelical theology stands or falls with the doctrine of the 
bondage of the will has read it in vain.” In Bruno Jordahn, ed., Vom unfreien Willem (Munich, 1954), 
cited and translated by Packer, p. 58. 
2 WA 18.744.30-1, cf. Packer, 254. 
 2 
ascetic ascent, and metaphysical advance which the fallen filii Adae have ever devised, 
from Babel to Rome, Plato to Pelagius, Eckhart to Oprah. The law only makes matters 
worse! But where sin abounded, grace abounded all the more. Once justified, the 
righteous sinner has nowhere to go—for there is nowhere he needs to go. The way of 
the pilgrim is over; Christ is the end of the law for everyone who believes. The ladder 
to heaven need no longer be scaled to the heights, for the Son of God climbed down it 
himself to meet us here in the depths. By faith in this Christ, the believer has already 
reached his destination, already tasted the powers of the age to come, already passed 
out of death and judgment into eschatological righteousness and life.  
In short: Erasmus’ question is flawed, as modern theologians like to say, by a 
“category mistake,” for the gospel of Jesus is sui generis and so is Luther’s evangelical 
theology.3 
If, then, there is no real space in Lutheran theology for the doctrines of new 
creation, regeneration, renovation, sanctification—that is, for holiness—that is only 
because there is no longer any need for them. To be sure, a locus de operibus bonis 
might smuggle its way back into the Lutheran Confessions, Orthodoxy, and Pietism; 
and misplaced regard for holiness will always afflict Roman Catholics and the 
Reformed. But for his part, Luther did not trouble himself with trying to fit together 
something as pedestrian as progressive sanctification with the volcanic 
                                                        
3 “Luther’s approach to sanctification is unlike any other, sui generis.” So Robert Kolb and Charles 
P. Arand, The Genius of Luther’s Theology: A Wittenberg Way of Thinking for the Contemporary 
Church (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 125. Kolb and Arand acknowledge their dependence 
upon Gerhard O. Forde, “Forensic Justification and the Christian Life: Triumph or Tragedy?” in A 
More Radical Gospel: Essays on Eschatology, Authority, Atonement, and Ecumenism, ed. Mark C. 
Mattes and Steven D. Paulson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004) and, behind him, Wilfried Joest, 
Gesetz und Freiheit. Das Problem des tertius usus legis bei Luther und die neutestamentliche 
Parainese (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968 [1951]). 
 3
Rechtfertigungslehre of genuine Reformation theology. Besides, at the end of the day 
his heart just wasn’t in it, overflowing as it was with the liberating truth of the gospel. 
“Be a sinner and sin boldly, but believe and rejoice in Christ more boldly still!” That’s 
the real Luther, uncut, unapologetic, bold. No offhand remark, the pecca fortiter 
possesses the force of an axiom in evangelical ethics,4 for it embodies the pith of the 
Reformer’s insights into the boisterous freedom of the Christian sine lege et supra 
legem.5 
                                                        
4 Luther to Melanchthon, 1 August 1521, #424, WA Br 2.372.82-93: Si gratiae praedicator es, gratiam 
non fictam, sed veram praedica; si vera gratia est, verum, non fictum peccatum ferto. Deus non facit 
salvos ficte peccatores. Esto peccator et pecca fortiter, sed fortius fide et gaude in Christo, qui victor 
est peccati, mortis et mundi. Peccandum est, quamdiu hic sumus; vita haec non est habitatio iustitiae, 
sed exspectamus, ait Petrus, coelos novos et terram novam, in quibus iustitia habitat. Sufficit, quod 
agnovimus per divitias gloriae Dei agnum, qui tollit peccatum mundi; ab hoc non avellet nos 
peccatum, etiamsi millies, millies uno die fornicemur aut occidamus. Putas, tam parvum esse pretium 
redemptionis pro peccatis nostris factum in tanto ac tali agno? Ora fortiter, etiam fortissimus 
peccator. In my mind, Pfarrer Martin’s counsel to scrupulous Master Philipp is an obvious case of a 
skilled pastor using exaggeration to drive home a point, not unlike the rabbinic hyperbole we hear 
in the Lord Jesus’ command to pluck out the lustful eye. Luther is not telling Melanchthon to go 
ahead and begin fornicating and murdering with impunity in the name of the gospel any more than 
Jesus intends his lustful disciples to actually gouge out their eyes. Rather, his ramped-up rhetoric is 
intended to magnify the glory of the Lamb, who died precisely to take away the most grievous sins 
imaginable. This is wise and indeed sober counsel for the kind of soul Melanchthon suffered from, 
inclined as he was to think too much of his sin and too little of Christ’s redeeming blood. Certainly, 
what was medicine for Melanchthon would become poison for a different kind of soul. The best 
interpretation of the pecca fortiter remains Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s in his 1937 Nachfolge: “If we are to 
understand this saying of Luther’s, everything depends on applying the distinction between the 
data and the answer to a sum. If we make Luther’s formula a premise for our doctrine of grace, we 
are conjuring up the specter of cheap grace. But Luther’s formula is meant to be taken, not as the 
premise, but as the conclusion, the answer to the sum, the coping-stone, his very last word on the 
subject. Taken as a premise, pecca fortiter acquires the character of an ethical principle, a principle 
of grace to which the principle of pecca fortiter must correspond. That means the justification of 
sin, and it turns Luther’s formula into its very opposite. For Luther ‘sin boldly’ could only be his 
very last refuge, the consolation for one whose attempts to follow Christ had taught him that he 
can never become sinless, who in his fear of sin despairs of the grace of God.” The Cost of 
Discipleship, trans. R. H. Fuller (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 52. 
5 WA Tr 1.204.30-205.3, LW 54.78 (#469, spring 1533): “Almost every night when I wake up, the 
Devil is there and wants to dispute with me. I have come to this conclusion: when the argument 
that the Christian is without the law and above the law doesn’t help, I instantly chase him away 
with a fart. The rogue wants to dispute de iustitia although he is himself a knave, for he kicked God 
out of heaven and crucified his Son.” 
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This “Lutheran”—and at the same time oddly “Erasmian”—interpretation of 
Luther as theologian of justification sans holiness makes for real ecumenical 
convergence. Simul iustus et peccator, after all: this is the Luther known in the 
churches, and this is the Luther assumed in much historical and most dogmatic 
theology.6 To be sure, Catholics, Calvinists, Pietists, Anglicans, and Wesleyans side 
with Erasmus’ criticisms and censure the lawless Luther for abandoning the pursuit of 
holiness.7 Others, mainly though not exclusively Lutheran,8 hail the evangelical Luther 
as God’s chosen instrument for the abolition of legalism hapax, indeed, as the angelic 
bearer of the eternal gospel.9 But regardless of whether the great Reformer plays the 
villain or the hero, the heretic or the saint, in one’s ecclesiastical history, most all tend 
to agree with Alister McGrath’s high-profile judgments in The Oxford Encyclopedia of 
the Reformation about Luther’s “aversion to the language of renewal and spiritual 
growth,” his “suspicion of the concern for personal holiness,” and his “reluctance to 
                                                        
6 Wolf-Dieter Hauschild, “Die Formel ‘Gerecht und Sünder zugleich’ als Element der 
reformatorischen Rechtfertigungslehre – eine Entdeckung des 20. Jahrhunderts,” in Theodor 
Schneider and Gunther Wenz, eds., Gerecht und Sünder zugleich? Ökumenische Klärungen 
(Freiburg: Herder and Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 303-349. 
7 See, e.g., John Wesley (Sermon 107.1.5.), whose heart, once strangely warmed upon reading Luther 
on Romans, had since turned cold to Luther on holiness: “Many who have spoken and written 
admirably well concerning justification, had no clear conception, nay, were totally ignorant, of the 
doctrine of sanctification. Who has wrote more ably than Martin Luther on justification by faith 
alone? And who was more ignorant of the doctrine of sanctification, or more confused in his 
conceptions of it?” In the same vein, alas, is the 1947 report to the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
written by the likes of Gregory Dix, T.S. Eliot, Austin Farrer, Michael Ramsey, and Lionel Thornton, 
entitled Catholicity: A Study in the Conflict of Christian Traditions in the West (London: Dacre 
Press, 1947).  
8 For example, the Episcopalian Paul F. M. Zahl, Grace in Practice: A Theology of Everyday Life 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), esp. pp. 51-4, or the Presbyterian Tullian Tchividjian, One Way 
Love: Inexhaustible Grace for an Exhausted World (Colorado Springs: David C. Cook, 2013), esp. 224-
5. 
9 St. John’s vision of “an angel flying directly overhead, with an eternal gospel to proclaim to those 
who dwell on earth” (Rev. 14:6) figured in hagiographic representations of Luther as early as 1522. 
See Robert Kolb, Martin Luther as Prophet, Teacher, and Hero: Images of the Reformer, 1520—1620 
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 1999), 10, 29-30, 124-5 
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employ any form of terminology that suggested a ‘growth in holiness’ or ‘being made 
righteous.’”10 To his great credit or his everlasting shame, holiness wasn’t Luther’s 
strong point. On this point at least, Erasmus’ polemics hit the target. 
 The trouble with this “Lutheran” and “Erasmian” interpretation of Luther’s 
theology as a theology indifferent to or even inimical towards holiness is that Martin 
Luther himself was revolted by it. Here is his reply to Erasmus in de servo arbitrio: 
I myself would be glad of information as to when I ever taught what you thus 
freely and publicly lay to my charge. Who would be so crazy as to say that he 
that is born of the Spirit is nothing but flesh? Manifestly, I myself separate 
“flesh” and “spirit” as things opposed to each other, and I say, with the divine 
oracle, that the man that is not born again through faith is flesh. But one that is 
born again I no longer call flesh, except in respect of the relics of the flesh 
which oppose the firstfruits of the Spirit that he has received. I do not think 
that you meant to fabricate this charge with a view to raising prejudice against 
me; otherwise, what could you accuse me of that would be more wicked? 
Either you understand nothing of my position, or else you find yourself 
unequal to matters of such magnitude.11 
 
In this book, I have set myself to argue that much of twentieth-century Luther 
research has misunderstood the Reformer’s position along just these “Erasmian” lines. 
Luther was not, in fact, so “crazy”—or so wicked—as to say that those reborn of the 
Spirit were nothing but flesh. Ego carnalis sum, totus caro, totaliter peccator, the 
“simul,” and the like are vital but rhetorically-charged phrases that stand in need of 
careful interpretation. Whatever exactly these phrases may mean—and determining 
their real significance lies at the heart of my argument in this book—by Luther’s own 
testimony in de servo arbitrio (!) they do not mean that the regenerate Christian nihil 
nisi carnem esse. Indeed: to take his paradoxes to mean that the baptized saint is a 
                                                        
10 Alister E. McGrath, “Sanctification,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation, vol. 3, ed. 
Hans J. Hillerbrand (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 480-482, here 480f. 
11 WA 18.745.4-12, cf. Packer, 254-5. 
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total and categorical sinner and the spiritual man nothing but flesh is to take Luther 
not just for an erroneous but for an evil teacher in the Church. “What could you 
accuse me of that would be more wicked?” In that case, Luther would be one of the 
“ungodly people” in Jude’s prophecy, “who pervert the grace of our God into sensuality 
and deny our only Master and Lord, Jesus Christ” (v. 4); or, as in St. Peter’s 
admonition, one of the false teachers who “twist” Paul’s hard-to-understand writings 
to their own destruction by the false doctrine of lawlessness cloaked as free grace (2 
Pet. 3:15-17; cf. Rom. 3:5-8, 6:1-2). This is, of course, how Erasmus, John Tetzel, John 
Eck, John Cochlaeus, and other Roman Catholic theologians interpreted Luther as a 
man and as a theologian in the sixteenth century, and how Heinrich Denifle read him 
in the early twentieth. But Luther will have nothing of it. He asserts that not he but 
Erasmus is the anemic theologian of holiness: “What rebirth, renewal, regeneration, 
and the whole business of the Spirit are, he does not see at all.”12 And to be bleary-eyed 
in regards to matters as great as these is nothing to joke about. In 1539, engaged in 
protracted controversy with John Agricola—arguably the first “radical Lutheran,” and 
as such a theologian whose misadventures tended in just the opposite direction of 
Erasmus’ moralism—the Christian “should either have the Holy Spirit and lead a new 
life, or know that he has no Christ.”13  
 No Holy Spirit, no renewal of life, no Christ. What happened to pecca fortiter? 
Is this a flash in the pan? Or a failure of nerve? No, in fact it is neither. In his sermons 
                                                        
12 WA 18.693.8-9, cf. Packer, 180. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds for scholastic theologies which 
affirm the integrity of fallen humanity’s natural faculties and eo ipso reduce nature-renovating 
grace to an alien gift superadded on top of one’s intact capacities: Item, regenerationem et 
innovationem spiritus premunt, ac velut externe auxilium illud alienum illi affingunt. WA 18.666.10-
11, Packer, 143. Farther on this point below in chapter 1. 
13 WA 50.600.11-12, LW 41.115. 
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of the 1530s and 40s, Luther increasingly urged upon the largely impenitent flock at 
Wittenberg the utter inseparability of redemption by the blood of Christ and renewal 
through the work of the Holy Spirit, the latter manifested in lively faith, deep 
repentance, and concrete acts of obedience and love. For example, taking up 1 Thess. 
4:1-7 in March 1539, Luther proclaimed: “Know what Christ ought to mean for you, 
who has set you free from death. He is called the Savior, who has set his people free 
from sins for righteousness. Therefore, Christians should not remain in sins but be 
intent on living in chastity and holiness (heiligkeit), with kindness toward the 
neighbor.”14 He continued: “Christ did not come to set you free so that you could cheat 
and steal. If you do, this preaching that Christ died for sinners, etc. does not help you. 
People who do such things are like the heathen who do not know God.”15 Likewise: 
“Christ died for those who let their sins be forgiven, cease committing them, and then 
become daily more perfect. Otherwise this sweet preaching is a vain, lost word, since 
those who hear it say, ‘Indeed! He is a comforting preacher,’ just so he doesn’t add: ‘If 
you are in sins, you will be damned,’ etc.”16 Yes, you read that right. Redeemed 
Christians must repent of their sins and become intent on holiness. Failing this, the 
gospel is of no use to them. In the end they will be damned, for Christ only died for 
the sins of those who seek daily increases in perfection. It would seem the old Prediger 
is full of surprises! He certainly wasn’t pulling any punches.  
In 1544, preaching Matt. 3:13-17 on Epiphany I, Luther reiterated essentially the 
same doctrine in relation to holy baptism: 
                                                        
14 WA 47.671.16-9 [A], cf. LW 58.21. 
15 WA 47.671.25-672.2 [A], cf. LW 58.22. 
16 WA 47.672.19-23, cf. LW 58.22. 
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When we preach, baptize, pray, the Son is there among us, the Father speaks, 
the Holy Spirit hovers. There we learn to fear our Lord God. Why do you want 
to lie? Do you not believe that Christ is with you, that the Holy Spirit, the 
Father is present? “No, but because of him who so richly graces me and always 
forgives sins.” If you believed this, you wouldn’t commit so many sins as 
otherwise. But where does this license for sin come from? It’s because we don’t 
believe that these things happen every day, that the Trinity is present. These 
people who do not acknowledge their baptism are not Christians. They forget 
baptism and wallow in sin like pigs. There are few who rightly value their 
baptism and keep in mind that God is present. Therefore learn your holy 
baptism and your glorious name [i.e., den Christlichen namen] in your own 
person! We have been clothed with sheer grace and mercy, with freedom from 
sins and an evil conscience—precious garments indeed. Do not lie down in 
filth wearing such a garment! If you can protect your fine silk and velvet 
garments, can you not do the same for your heavenly garment? If you do 
otherwise, know that you have lost all grace and mercy.17 
 
Die Antinomer have become die Sawtheologen! This, as students of Luther’s 1515 
scholia on Rom. 4:7 are well aware, is a deep irony indeed.  
Consider one last sermon: the 7 June 1545 exposition of 1 John 4:16-21. About six 
weeks before he left town, decided he’d had enough of Wittenberg’s avaricious 
burghers and promiscuous youth, and wrote Katie to pack up their things and prepare 
to move18—“Just away, out of this Sodom! … I would rather eat the bread of a beggar 
than torture and upset my poor old age and final days with the filth at Wittenberg”19—
Luther did his unambiguous best to admonish his sinful sheep about the great danger 
they were in if they kept on sinning boldly while claiming to believe more boldly still: 
Not all are Christians who boast faith. Christ has shed his blood. Sola fide, 
without works, we are justified. “I believe this.” Ja, that’s hellfire! You’ve 
learned the words you’ve heard the way mockingbirds learn to repeat things. 
Where are the fruits showing that you believe? You remain in sins; you’re a 
usurer and more. Surely Christ did not die and shed his blood for the sins that 
                                                        
17 WA 49.315.8-21 [A], cf. LW 58.77-8. 
18 H. G. Haile, Luther: An Experiment in Biography (New York: Doubleday, 1980), 316-18; Martin 
Brecht, Martin Luther: The Preservation of the Church 1532—1546, trans. James L. Schaaf 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 262-4. 
19 WA Br 11.149.1—150.34 (#4139). 
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you are intent on committing continually, but so that he might destroy the 
works of the devil (1 John 3:8). If you were a usurer, say like Zacchaeus: “I will 
give half of my goods, and if I have defrauded anyone, I will restore it fourfold” 
(Luke 19:8). The blood of Christ kills sin; it does not make it alive, which is the 
work of the devil, who inflames the desire that makes human beings murderers 
and adulterers. Christ did not die so that you might remain such a sinner, but 
so that sin, having been slain, might be blotted out, and you might henceforth 
love God and your neighbor. Faith takes away sins and puts them to death, so 
that you might not live in them but in righteousness. Therefore, show by your 
works and your fruits that there is faith in you. If not, the blood of Christ 
doesn’t help. If you are a usurer, disobedient, negligent in your station, you’ll 
see whether you believe. For faith is victorious, triumphant, conquering the 
world (1 John 5:4). If you truly believed, you would not commit usury or 
adultery; you would not be disobedient. Let each one think: “I became a 
believer, washed in baptism with the blood of God’s Son, so that my sins might 
be dead. I will not be disobedient and I will declare this with my deeds.” 
Otherwise, give up the boast of being a believer. You know that you are a 
disobedient son, an adulterer; do not boast about faith and the blood of Christ. 
You’re the devil’s, the way you are going, etc. Ja, you’re putting your own self to 
shame and Christ himself, you who say you believe, and you’re bringing the 
name of the LORD into shame and yourself to eternal damnation. Love follows 
true faith … If you will reform yourself, good; if not, then in truth I cannot 
tolerate it, for you are acting contrary to the Word. Thus there must always be 
rebuking, ja, not one daily sin is to be endured.20 
 
Not one daily sin! Christ’s blood avails nothing for usurers, adulterers, and unruly 
children, whose hard-hearted continuance in concrete, plain, visible sins shows that 
they belong to the Devil not Christ and forebodes their eternal perdition in hell. This, 
despite the fact that they are well-catechized, gnesio-Lutherans in their “faith”: solus 
Christus, sola fide, etc.—hellfire! What are we to make of this? What has become of 
the joyful freedom of a Christian man? Has the senescent Luther degenerated into a 
curmudgeon—a kind of pious Walter Matthau, an old man grumpy about “the way the 
girls were wearing their blouses cut so low and twirling their skirts at the dances”?21 
Has he lost confidence in the power of the gospel? Pressured under mounting waves of 
                                                        
20 WA 49.783.21-784.16 [A], 786.13-15 [A], cf. LW 58.237-8, 240. 
21 Haile, Luther, 317. 
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popular lawlessness, nascent capitalism, greedy noblemen, and theological 
antinomianism, has the miles emeritus effectively admitted that the exuberant 
evangelical faith of his youth was unrealistic, changed the course of his Reformation, 
and altered his theology? Kierkegaard, enraged by the complacency of his age, once 
claimed that if Luther had lived to see the decadence of nineteenth-century Denmark 
he would have preached just the reverse of the doctrines he fought for in sixteenth-
century Saxony. Did the exasperated Reformer beat him to the punch in the 1540s? 
 Exhausted and disillusioned as he may well have been, in this book I argue that 
the sort of practical admonitions and dire threats issued in these late sermons cohere 
tightly with the mature Luther’s deepest theological convictions about the gospel (not 
just the law!) and about the nature, necessity, source, means, course, and ends of 
evangelical holiness. The argument proceeds in three steps. In the first Part of the 
book, I exposit what I refer to as Luther’s “dogmatics of holiness” as he sets it forth in 
the works of his maturity c. 1535—44. Chapter 1 sets the stage for my main object by 
studying the doctrines of creation, fall, and promised redemption as the old Doctor 
unfolds them in his 1535 lectures on Gen. 1-3. This is essential for understanding 
Luther’s theology of holiness, for the Spirit’s gift of holiness in Jesus Christ consists 
principally in the restoration of fallen and vitiated human creatures to the original or 
“natural” perfections which the unfallen Adam and Eve once enjoyed in the 
gladdening presence of God. This foundation laid, I proceed in chapter 2 to exposit 
Luther’s creedal dogmatics of residual sin, grace in Jesus Christ, and the gift of renewal 
by the Holy Spirit on the basis of four signal works from this period: the Smalcald 
Articles (1536/7-8), the first, second, and third Disputations against the Antinomians 
 11
(1537-8), On the Councils and the Church (1539), and the lectures on Genesis 24:1-4 
(1540) and 42:7 (1544). This I take to be the first major contribution of this book: a 
careful exposition of Luther’s enduringly “Augustinian” theology of holiness, set in 
intimate relation to his doctrines of “sin” in the saints and of free grace and 
justification through the blood and righteousness of Jesus Christ.  
In Part II, I justify the adjective “Augustinian” through close readings of 
passages from the 1515/16 Lectures on Romans that feature Luther’s appropriation of 
extracts from the old Augustine’s works against Julian of Eclanum. I refer to the 
definitively orthodox theologian whom Luther discovered in these late anti-“Pelagian” 
works by the device, “the 420s Augustine,” in subtle but significant contrast to the 
earlier and in comparison relatively underdeveloped “410s Augustine” who wrote 
against Pelagius and Caelestius. (I will explain this distinction farther in its place 
below.) In chapter 3, I study the emergence of the young Luther’s “Augustinian simul” 
in the scholia on Rom. 7. Then in chapter 4, I examine the interrelation of residual 
affective sin, renewal through healing grace, and the mercy of non-imputation as it 
stands in the scholia on Rom. 4:7. The reversed order is important. To grasp Luther on 
Rom. 4:7, one has first to understand the Augustinian doctrines of affective “sin” and 
healing grace which he sets out in full in the course of exegeting Rom. 7. In practice, 
Luther scholars who start out in Rom. 4 never quite make it to Rom. 7: the Totalaspekt 
that imbues the former overwhelms the Partialaspekt of the latter; and then the latter, 
together with the theology of embattled renewal it comprises, is dismissed as a 
remnant of Luther’s Catholic past that doesn’t really fit with his radical new insights 
into total sinfulness and relational justification. On the other hand, if we start with the 
 12 
Catholic/“Augustinian simul” in Rom. 7, the Protestant paradoxes of Rom. 4:7 (and Ps. 
32!) fall nicely into place as well, without being swallowed up. This increased 
explanatory power is enough, I think, to justify the reversal in order; but if you prefer, 
read chapter 4 first and then come back to chapter 3—I take no offense. Regardless, 
my aim in Part II is this: against the scholarly mainstream, which tends to assume the 
“410s Augustine” as the standard by which to assess the adequacy of Luther’s 
interpretation of the Church’s doctor of grace and love, I argue that the young 
Augustinian read the old Augustine’s works contra Iulianum quite well, and 
appropriated them fairly in the formation of his own dogmatics. This, I hope, will 
prove to be the second major contribution of this book.  
In Part III, the “big picture” comes into view as I put the pieces together and 
assess how the mature, Augustinian, and evangelische dogmatics of sin, grace, and 
holiness essayed in Part I relates to the embryonic, Augustinian, but not-yet-fully-
evangelical dogmatics set forth in Part II.  
I am thus undertaking a twofold venture: in one respect more “systematic” (in 
the German sense current within Lutherforschung) vis-à-vis Luther’s mature 
dogmatics of holiness, in another more “historical” and aiming to specify the nature, 
extent, and depth of his dependence upon Augustine. Neither side of the argument 
can stand apart from the other; but then, the soundness of this intuition is itself part 
of what I need to demonstrate in the argument. I will unpack this twofold claim in 
greater detail briefly here, but I’m afraid it will take a bit longer to prove in the rest of 
this book. 
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My twofold, systematic-and-historical argument about the nature of Luther’s 
mature theology of sin, grace, and holiness comes to this: 
(1.a) First, I argue that the mature Luther taught a robust doctrine of 
progressive renewal into real holiness of life through the “gift” of the Holy Spirit. He 
alternately names this spiritual reality sanctification, “justification” (Gerechtmachung), 
the healing, renewal, or restoration of nature, new creation, the firstfruits of the Spirit, 
deification, and so forth. But since the words (verba) Luther uses to describe the 
reality of this gift vary freely, it is more useful to attend to its dogmatic substance 
(res). This centers on the restoration of vitiated human nature in the saints to its 
original perfections through Jesus Christ, the Last Adam, by the renewing operations 
of his Spirit.22 Hence the title of this book: renovatio. For Luther, this Spirit-given 
renewal of life in Christ is real, inchoate, progressive, and unfinished, i.e., it begins in 
baptism/regeneration and advances in fits and starts over the course of the Christian 
life. Perfection in holiness, or the complete restoration of Adam’s fallen children to 
radiant and eternal life with God in Christ by the Spirit, is increasingly approximated 
but never attained this side of eschatological glory.  
                                                        
22 In his lecture on Gen. 4:7, Luther suggests that his ubiquitous juxtaposition of “words” and 
“things” is rooted in a maxim of Hilary’s (trin. 2.5) cited frequently in Peter Lombard’s Sent., and he 
asserts that this insight fits well with a similar one by the philosopher, an allusion to Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric 3.1-2 that should not be peremptorily dismissed as a “Melanchthonian” redaction. WA 
42.195.3-9, LW 1.263: Porro natura sic ordinatum est, ut verba testante etiam Philosopho debeant 
servire rebus, non res verbis. Et nota est Hilarii sententia, quam etiam Magister in sententiis citat, 
quod verba intelligi debeant secundum materiam subiectam. Igitur in omni expositione primo 
subiectum considerari debet, hoc est, videndum est, de qua re agatur. Hoc postquam factum est, 
deinde verba, si ita fert grammatices ratio, ad rem ducenda sunt, et non res ad verba. On the 
distinction in Hilary, with different verba (!), cf. WA 18.728.15-16, Packer, 231: Ex causis enim dicendi 
intelligentia petenda est, ait Hilarius, non ex vocabulis solis. The verba/res distinction will recur 
frequently in this book. Cf. WA Tr 3.491.14-17, #3654b, 25 Dec. 1537 (cf. LW 54.249): both Andreas 
Osiander, who is the main personality under discussion, and the sophists “sweat over the grammar 
and the words (in grammatica et verbis), not over the realities (in rebus), while they ought to make 
the words subject to realities and not the realities to words. When I set out from the realities (Wan 
ich auß den rebus kom), the words (verba) are various.” And they are! 
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(1.b) But if I were to argue this thesis alone, the presentation of Luther’s 
teaching about renewal and holiness of life would be incomplete to the point of 
obscuring it entirely. For his doctrine of renewal by the Spirit’s “gift” (donum) cannot 
be rightly grasped apart from its intimate correlation to the doctrine of the “grace” 
(gratia) which is in Jesus Christ, on the one hand, and on the other to his teaching 
about the nature of residual affective “sin” in the saints of God (the “simul”). When it 
comes to calibrating these three doctrines, historical Luther-interpretations and 
dogmatic theologies of all stripes both tend to err in opposite directions. Some so 
emphasize the necessity of renewal in holiness that the humbling reality of enduring 
sinfulness in the Christian is obscured, and with it the infinitely greater reality of grace 
and forgiveness in Christ. Others so exaggerate the sinfulness of the Christian, and so 
separate the grace of free justification from the gift of that repentance which leads to 
life (Acts 11:18, 2 Tim. 2:25), that one would think St. Paul expected an affirmative reply 
to his leading question, “Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound?” (Rom. 6:1). 
St. Paul and the fishermen, in concert with the prophets of old, steer a middle course 
between these imbalances, which seem to afflict the theologians of the Church in 
every generation. For, on the one hand, in point of the evangelical facts God’s grace in 
Christ is so infinitely perfect and strong that where our sin increases, his grace does 
indeed abound all the more (Rom. 5:20). The saints of the Church are the first to 
confess that real growth in holiness is ever attended by an increasing sense of utter 
dependence upon the miracle of this free and strong grace: 
In the evening of this life, I shall appear before You with empty hands, for I do 
not ask you, Lord, to count my works. All our justice is blemished in your eyes. 
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I wish, then, to be clothed in your own justice and to receive from your love the 
eternal possession of yourself.23 
 
But to confess this, as all true saints do, is not to deny the reality of the newness of life 
which the Holy Spirit works within them. Buried with Christ in baptism into death, 
and buried ever more till the final day they die,24 the saints are united with Christ in 
his resurrection life (Rom. 6:3-11). Therefore, what remains of the first Adam’s sin in 
their flesh need not reign over them as it once did: and, having been set free from sin’s 
enslaving power, the saints of God present their members as slaves of righteousness 
leading to sanctification. This is the good fruit they get, and its end is the free gift of 
God in Christ Jesus our Lord—eternal life (Rom. 6:12-23). So far the Apostle: and I will 
argue in this book that upon close inspection, Luther’s mature teaching appears to be 
every bit as rich, multi-dimensional, nuanced, sober-minded, hopeful, and glad as St. 
Paul’s, Peter’s, John’s, David’s, Isaiah’s, etc., and as such a faithful rendering of 
apostolic doctrine. Taken together, the “systematic” exposition of these dogmatic 
themes in Luther’s mature theology is the grand object of the first Part of this book. 
(2) In the second place, I contend that the mature Reformer’s theology of sin, 
grace, and holiness is rooted in the young Luther’s sound interpretation of the late 
Augustine’s writings against Julian of Eclanum. In a real way, this is the heart of this 
book’s historical-theological argument: if it fails, all the blood and vigor that might 
otherwise pulsate through the rest of the book will be drained. In my judgment, the 
mature Luther’s theology of holiness is unintelligible apart from a solid grasp of its 
                                                        
23 Thérèse of Lisieux, “Act of Offering,” in Story of a Soul, cited in the Catechism of the Catholic 
Church § 2011. 
24 Switchfoot, “Where I Belong,” #12 in the album Vice Verses (lower case people records/Atlantic, 
2011). 
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roots in the theology of the old Augustine. But in the works of Luther’s maturity, those 
roots are for the most part hidden beneath the surface, as are all good and strong roots 
in ordine naturae. By contrast, in the 1510s the Augustinian roots of Luther’s theology 
lie open to view in the form of explicit (and often quite long) quotations from the 
newly produced 1506 Amerbach edition of Augustine’s works.25 In fact, if I may extend 
the image of a tree and its roots it will, I think, prove fruitful here for explaining what 
is going on in Luther’s dogmatics, exegesis, and spiritual teaching c. 1514—16. 
Imagine an uprooted tree transplanted from a nursery and in process of being 
replanted in new soil. The tree is Augustine’s mature theology of sin and grace; the 
material nursery is the new edition of his works; the rather rich soil is composed of 
Luther’s own spiritual life as a struggling monastic disciple of Jesus and as a fledgling 
pastor and teacher in the Church. Brother Martin’s bitter Anfechtungen dug a deep 
whole in his soul (cf. Ps. 40:6). The Psalter, John Staupitz, and the Bible—I suspect in 
that order, but how would one prove this? or disprove it?—provided life-giving 
streams of water for the sapling. But the theology of the “420s Augustine” that Luther 
read out of the eighth volume of the Amerbach edition is itself the tree that will be 
planted in the young Luther’s mind and heart and then nourished by these other 
streams of influence for the rest of his life. Since the fragile plant is still being set in 
the soil in the 1510s, the roots are exposed: and for this reason, the Romans lectures 
especially are an indispensable resource for understanding not just the young, but the 
mature Luther’s theology. For later on, when the young sapling has grown up into a 
sturdy old “Lutheran” oak (cf. Isa. 61:3), its Augustinian roots are for the most part 
                                                        
25 Arnoud S. Q. Visser, Reading Augustine in the Reformation: The Flexibility of Intellectual Authority 
in Europe, 1500-1620 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 13-27. 
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hidden from the eye. A surprisingly great number of readers, who apparently don’t 
know much about trees, have inferred from their inability to see any roots that 
Luther’s Reformation theology stands all on its own. Not so, I will argue, not so! For 
much, much of the strength and vigor of the old oak lies in the depth and extent of its 
subterranean roots.   
This spade-work is the task of Part II. Then, having confirmed the permanent 
impact of Luther’s readings in Augustine upon his mature “Augustinian” theology of 
holiness at the start of Part III, I attend to a handful of major points of development in 
Luther’s teaching from 1518 on. In this panoramic account of the discontinuities-in-
continuity that characterize Luther’s theology over time, I aim to show how he carries 
forward the old Augustine’s central insights about sin, grace, and renewal in holiness 
in a fresh, creative, and “evangelical” way. This, too, is a primarily “historical” 
endeavor, which assumes the argument about the mature Luther’s dogmatics in Part I 
with an eye to making sound judgments about how the old Doctor’s theology draws 
on, departs from, and advances the positions he arrived at in the mid 1510s under the 
tutelage of the “420s Augustine.” 
In sum: I shall argue that much of mainstream Luther scholarship (and 
Lutheran theology) is quite wrong to think that the Church’s great doctor 
iustificationis downplayed, denied, derided, or just plain ignored “the holiness without 
which no one shall see the Lord” (Heb. 12:14). In fact, from the first inklings of his 
“Augustinian turn” c. 1514 to his death in 1546, Luther held and taught a robust 
theology of progressive renewal in holiness, which he carefully calibrated to the sober 
reality of residual sin and the astonishing gospel of free grace in Jesus Christ. As it is 
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set forth in the works that embody the Reformer’s most considered judgments, this 
gospel-centered and deeply creedal theology of holiness is Augustinian and 
evangelisch in equal parts. As such, it commands the admiration and regard—if not 
the total assent; I for one disagree with Luther in a few major points—of those catholic 
and evangelical Christians, pastors, and theologians who read the Bible, pray, think, 
teach, preach, write, and confess in the tradition of the doctor gratiae.  
 Theology is, of course, a great and ongoing conversation; and it behooves those 
of us who join in later on in the evening to listen quietly before we speak, and then, 
when we dare open our own mouths, to give some indication that we have been 
paying attention rather than boorishly suffering our friends’ company and impatiently 
waiting our turn. In historical-theological scholarship, this means careful interaction 
with the work of my teachers and peers, and good footnotes; and in what follows I will 
try not to disappoint the reader on this score. I have found it more suitable to my aims 
to engage the work of other scholars en route, rather than supplying a long and 
tedious review of the massive body of research on the major themes of this book, e.g.: 
Luther’s dogmatics of creation, sin, grace, justification, and holiness; the nature of his 
debt to Augustine and, therefore, the nature of Augustine’s own theology; the nature 
of his spirituality; the relative weight of patristic, monastic, scholastic, 
Frömmigkeitstheologische, philosophical, and humanistic influences on his thought; 
the development of the Reformer’s theology over the course of his career; the “young” 
and the “old” Luther; und so weiter. That being said, I think it fitting to say a brief 
word here about my major opponents in this contest, and also about a few my closest 
friends. 
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 As for my opponents: at first, not having read too deeply in twentieth-century 
Luther scholarship, I was aware of the “problem” of holiness in Luther’s theology 
mainly by hearsay, through the ignorant prejudices of Anglican theologians and 
church historians, and then the popular work of Gerhard Forde. (I first learned of the 
pecca fortiter as a freshman at Wheaton College, when the rebellious coxswain of my 
rowing shell used it to justify his plans for that Friday evening.) But a quick glance at 
the footnotes shows the extent of his dependence on the 1951 book by Wilfried Joest, 
Gesetz und Freiheit.26 Forde even copies out Joest’s little diagrams of the Christian 
oscillating, tennis-ball-like, between total sinfulness, total righteousness, and back 
again.27 Through a few pointers from Michael Root and David Yeago, I read Joest, and 
much about modern Lutheran theology began to make sense. Any given paragraph in 
Joest’s book may shift effortlessly from WA 56 to WA 39/1 and back again—a flaw by 
no means limited to the Finns—but I attend mainly to his interpretation of a few 
passages in the Disputations against the Antinomians which have set the tone for the 
“total simul” and its ascendancy in the interpretation of Luther’s theology of holiness, 
or lack thereof. In the presentation of Luther’s mature dogmatics, Joest is my main 
opponent: but the reader is advised that in challenging Joest, I am challenging Forde 
too.  
                                                        
26 Wilfried Joest, Gesetz und Freiheit. Das Problem des tertius usus legis bei Luther und die 
neutestamentliche Parainese. 
27 Gerhard Forde, “Eleventh Locus: Christian Life,” in Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, eds., 
Christian Dogmatics vol. 2. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 391-469, here pp. 432, 435, and 437. Cf. 
Robert Kolb and Charles P. Arand, The Genius of Luther’s Theology, 123-6—but better on pp. 127-8. 
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 In regards to the Luther—Augustine problem, my main nemeses are Rudolf 
Hermann28 and Leif Grane,29 and behind them both, Heinrich Denifle.30 In the 
introduction to Part II, I argue that the very Lutheran Hermann’s Lutherdeutung is 
really a mirror image of the ferociously anti-Lutheran interpretation produced by 
Denifle in his applecart-upsetting Luther und Luthertum (1904-6). Denifle argued that 
Luther misunderstood Augustine and wrongly appropriated the Catholic father to his 
own devious ends, vainly claiming heilige Augustinus as patron for the self-serving 
theology of invincible concupiscence and forensic justification which he built around 
the “simul” in order to excuse his uncontrollable need for sex. Hermann agreed about 
Luther’s mistaken reading of Augustine, but championed the new evangelical theology 
which the Reformer’s auspicious misunderstanding of Augustine gave rise to. Grane’s 
1975 Modus loquendi, a very good book in many respects, effectively picks up where 
Hermann left off in 1930. In chapters 3 and 4, I cross swords with these formidable 
scholars and argue just the reverse: Luther read Augustine—that is, the “420s 
Augustine”—well, and appropriated him with real insight and skill. In arguing against 
them and in favor of the “Augustinian” character of Luther’s theology, I see that I am 
also arguing for the catholicity of the Reformation. This was not an explicit intention 
of mine at the outset, but in the process of writing I have come to the conclusion that 
it is inevitably bound up with the subject matter. Against Hermann and Grane’s 
inflated assertions of evangelical novelty, and against Denifle’s mean-spirited 
                                                        
28 Rudolf Hermann, Luthers These “Gerecht und Sünder zugleich.” 2nd ed. (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960). 
29 Leif Grane, Modus Loquendi Theologicus: Luthers Kampf um die Erneuerung der Theologie (1515-
1518) (Leiden: Brill, 1975).  
30 Heinrich Denifle, Luther und Luthertum in der ersten Entwickelung, 2nd ed. (Mainz: von 
Kirchheim & Co., 1904-6), esp. I/2.438-519. 
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aspersions of uncatholic heresy, I argue for a deeply Augustinian and in this sense 
“catholic” Luther, newly evangelical in some major respects to be sure, but 
substantially and permanently traditional as well. In this vein, and as a segue toward 
my comrades-in-arms, it is fitting at this point to mention the dean of German Luther 
research, Oswald Bayer. Promissio has stood the test of time; forty-plus years after its 
publication, it remains a brilliant and richly rewarding work.31 But I shall have to argue 
here that its argument is flawed in some key respects. Perhaps it can be said that in 
general Bayer is right in what he affirms and wrong in what he denies. The 
promissio—fides—fiducia nexus was hugely important for the genesis of Reformation 
theology; but it did not signal as clean a break from the Catholic past, especially in its 
Augustinian and “mystical” streams, as Bayer has contended for. To say the same thing 
a little cryptically: the evangelical Luther was a reformed Augustinian, a Finnish 
Worttheologe. 
 As for my friends: I have already noted the significance of Root and Yeago for 
my argument. In particular, Yeago’s 2004 essay on renewal and the “simul” helped 
awaken me from my dogmatic slumbers, and brought Joest to my attention.32 
Similarly, Root’s 2008 lecture at Concordia Seminary on “The Deconstruction of 
Twentieth-Century Lutheranism” led me to Hermann.33 I gladly acknowledge their 
work, and I hope they will find to their satisfaction the way this book advances 
insights gleaned from them. In terms of actually digging into the substance of Luther’s 
                                                        
31 Oswald Bayer, Promissio: Geschichte der reformatorischen Wende in Luthers Theologie (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971). 
32 David Yeago, “Martin Luther on Renewal and Sanctification: Simul Iustus et Peccator Revisited,” 
in Sapere teologico e unita’ della fede. Studi in onore Prof. Jared Wicks (Rome: Gregorianum, 2004): 
655-74. 
33 “The Work of Christ and the Deconstruction of Twentieth-Century Lutheranism,” read at 
Concordia Theological Seminary, Fort Wayne (17 January 2008), esp. pp. 7-8. 
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teaching about sin, grace, justification, and holiness, for my money Julius Köstlin has 
yet to be surpassed.34 In the nature of the case, my own insight into Luther’s 
exposition of these great matters has been shaped especially by the work of my 
teachers: Dr. David Steinmetz, in his books but perhaps especially in lectures and 
seminars at Duke; Reinhard Hütter, mainly through a book written while he was still a 
Lutheran,35 but also in seminars engaging Augustine, Luther, and Thomas Aquinas; 
and Prof. Mickey Mattox, who kindly agreed to supervise a reading course on the 
Reformer in spring 2011, suggested the theme of holiness as a focus for my research, 
and has taught me much about Luther in the process of directing my Marquette 
dissertation.36 Amongst the proliferating articles and books in Luther scholarship on 
dogmatic, spiritual, and philosophical themes pertinent to my argument, in addition 
to the above-mentioned theologians I have found the work of Regin Prenter,37 Erwin 
Iserloh,38 Jarod Wicks,39 Simo Peura,40 Theodor Dieter,41 Volker Leppin,42 and Risto 
                                                        
34 The Theology of Luther in its Historical Development and Inner Harmony, esp. II/4. 
35 Reinhard Hütter, Bound to Be Free: Evangelical Catholic Engagements in Ecclesiology, Ethics, and 
Ecumenism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 111-67. 
36 Mickey L. Mattox, “Defender of the Most Holy Matriarchs”: Martin Luther’s Interpretation of the 
Women of Genesis in the Enarrationes in Genesin, 1535—45 (Leiden: Brill, 2003); “Martin Luther’s 
Reception of Paul,” in R. Ward Holder, ed., A Companion to Paul in the Reformation (Leiden: Brill, 
2009), 93-128; “From Lutheran to Catholic—Justification and Holiness,” in idem and A. G. Roeber, 
Changing Churches: An Orthodox, Catholic, and Lutheran Theological Conversation (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2012), cp. 1. 
37 Regin Prenter, “Luthers Lehre von der Heiligung,” in Vilmos Vajta, ed. Lutherforschung heute: 
Referate und Berichte des 1. Internationalen Lutherforschungskongresses, Aarhus, 18.-23. August 1956 
(Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1958), 64-74. Note well that Prenter’s argument in this paper marks a 
fundamental shift away from positions held in his earlier work (as a student of Hermann), Spiritus 
Creator.  
38 Erwin Iserloh, “Gratia und Donum, Rechtfertigung und Heiligung nach Luthers Schrift ‘Wider 
den Löwener Theologen Latomus’ (1521),” in Luise Abramowski und J. F. Gerhard Goeters, eds., 
Studien zur Geschichte und Theologie der Reformation. Festschrift für Ernst Bizer (Neukirchener 
Verlag, 1969), 141-156. 
39 Jarod Wicks, S.J. Luther’s Reform: Studies on Conversion and the Church (Mainz: von Zabern, 
1992), esp. cp. 4, “Living and Praying as simul iustus et peccator: A Chapter in Luther’s Spiritual 
Teaching,” and cp. 9, “HOLY SPIRIT—CHURCH—SANCTIFICATION: Insights from Luther’s 
Instructions on the Faith.” 
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Saarinen43 especially useful. In regards to Luther’s engagement with Augustine, 
though he is influenced somewhat by Hermann, Adolf Hamel is more a friend than a 
foe.44 Despite a few significant differences in method and interpretation, my argument 
for the depth of Luther’s “Augustinianism” in the doctrines of sin, grace, and 
justification finds a real (and more recent) ally in Dr. Jairzinho Lopes Pereira, a 
Portuguese Roman Catholic theologian who followed up his master’s thesis on 
Augustine at Coimbra with a thorough dissertation on Augustine and Luther written 
under Saarinen at Helsinki.45 As for the theology, and moral psychology, of the great 
African himself, I am especially indebted to my teacher at Marquette, Prof. Michel 
René Barnes. If the argument of this book against my eminently worthy opponents 
proves to be compelling, it is in large part because of such wise and learned friends as 
these. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
40 Simo Peura, “Die Teilhabe an Christus bei Luther,” in Simo Peura and Antti Raunio, eds., Luther 
und Theosis: Vergöttlichung als Thema der abendländischen Theologie (Helsinki and Erlangen, 
1990), 121-61; Mehr als ein Mensch? Die Vergöttlichung als Thema der Theologie Martin Luthers von 
1513 bis 1519 (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1994); Simo Peura, “Christus als Gunst und Gabe. Luthers 
Verständnis der Rechtfertigung als Herausforderung an den ökumenischen Dialog mit der 
Römisch-katholischen Kirche,” in Oswald Bayer, Robert W. Jenson and Simo Knuuttila, eds., 
Caritas Dei. Beiträge zum Verständnis Luthers und der gegenwärtigen Ökumene. Festschrift für 
Tuomo Mannermaa zum 60. Geburtstag (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft, 1997), 340-363. 
41 Theodor Dieter, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles: Eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung 
zum Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001). 
42 Volker Leppin, “‘Omnem vitam fidelium penitentiam esse voluit’—Zur Aufnahme mystischer 
Traditionen in Luthers erster Ablaßthese,” ARG 93 (2002), 7-25; Martin Luther (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006). 
43 Risto Saarinen, “Klostertheologie auf dem Weg der Ökumene: Wille und Konkupiszenz,” in 
Christoph Bultmann, Volker Leppin, and Andreas Lindner, eds., Luther und das monastische Erbe 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 269-90; idem, Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation 
Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), esp. 23-6, 119-27. 
44 Adolf Hamel, Der junge Luther und Augustin. Ihre Beziehungen in der Rechtfertigungslehre nach 
Luthers ersten Vorlesungen 1509-1518 untersucht. I. Teil: Der Sententiar von 1509/10 und Exeget der 
Psalmen von 1513-15 in seinem Verhältnis zu Augustin. II. Teil: Der Exeget des Römerbriefes 1515/16, 
des Galaterbriefes 1516/17 und des Hebräerbriefes 1517/18 in seinem Verhältnis zu Augustin (Gütersloh: 
Verlag C. Bertelsmann, 1934/5 [Reprint: 2 Teile in 1 Band. Hildesheim/New York: Georg Olms 
Verlag, 1980]). 
45 Jairzinho Lopes Pereira, Augustine of Hippo and Martin Luther on Original Sin and Justification of 
the Sinner (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013). 
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 And now: to business. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I 
 
LUTHER’S MATURE DOGMATICS OF 
HOLINESS (1535—44) 
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1. FIRST THINGS: CREATION, FALL, AND PROMISSIO IN THE 1535 
LECTURES ON GENESIS 1-3 
 
 
Werner Elert begins his widely influential 1931 Morphologie des Luthertums with a 
chapter on the wrath of God under which sinful humanity stands condemned; he then 
proceeds to an exposition of the Gospel relentlessly focused on forensic justification.46 
In the same vein, Oswald Bayer’s recent Vergegenwärtigung of Luther’s theology 
builds on the definition of theology’s proprium subiectum given by the Reformer in his 
1532 lecture on Psalm 51, to wit: “The proper subject of theology is man guilty of sin 
and condemned, and God the Justifier and Savior of man the sinner.” Luther adds, 
with typical aplomb: “Whatever is asked or discussed in theology outside this subject, 
is error and poison.”47 I will return to Luther and Ps. 51 in a moment. But must we not 
admit at the outset that with claims as stark as these, Elert and Bayer are right to 
regard the restoration of the lost human creature to real holiness of life as either an 
absent or anemic theme in Luther’s evangelical theology?  
                                                        
46 Werner Elert, The Structure of Lutheranism. Vol. 1. The Theology and Philosophy of Life of 
Lutheranism Especially in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Trans. Walter A. Hansen (St 
Louis: Concordia, 1962 [= Morphologie des Luthertums, 1st edition 1931-32]). 
47 WA 40/2.328.17-20, LW 12.311. Oswald Bayer, Martin Luther’s Theology: A Contemporary 
Interpretation. Trans. Thomas H. Trapp (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), chapter 2: “The Topic of 
Theology: The Sinning Human Being and the Justifying God.” In the new Oxford Handbook of 
Martin Luther’s Theology, two of the chapters begin with this same line from the lecture on Ps. 51: 
Steven Paulson’s on “Luther’s Doctrine of God” and L’ubomír Batka’s on “Luther’s Teaching on Sin 
and Evil.” See Robert Kolb, Irene Dingel, and L’ubomír Batka, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Martin 
Luther’s Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 187 (Paulson) and 233 (Batka). 
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My argument in this book is, in effect, a sustained “No” in response to this 
question, and it is no accident that I begin my argument with Luther’s 1535-45 Lectures 
on Genesis. For unlike much of modern Lutheranism, the mature Luther, the reader 
and teacher of the biblical story, knew that he could not begin with the wrath of God 
against the sinner for the simple reason that the Bible begins with the creation of Man 
in the image of God, with God’s glad blessing upon Adam and Eve, and with his 
pronouncement of their real goodness in his sight.48 As a theology that takes its point 
of departure from das Urerlebnis of God’s wrath can only really terminate in the 
removal of that wrath through judicial pardon and acquittal, so a theology that begins 
with God’s joy in his creation of creatures able to share his divine life cannot arrive at 
any real completion without passing through the proximate end of acquittal to the 
final goal of restoration to life in communion with God.49 Elert cannot have a theology 
of holiness, because he does not have a theology of creation. Luther has such a 
theology, because he is basically a biblical theologian whose vision is shaped 
definitively by the canonical and trinitarian drama of God’s generous creation ex 
nihilo, of Adam’s fall into death through sin, of redemption in Jesus Christ, and of 
restoration to newness of life—by the Spirit’s power—in sanctification and in the final 
                                                        
48 The great nineteenth-century Luther scholar, Julius Köstlin, saw this point very clearly. See his 
The Theology of Luther in its Historical Development and Inner Harmony, trans. Charles E. Hay 
(Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society, 1897), II/4, 217: It might be thought that a systematic 
presentation of Luther’s thought should begin with sin and grace, law and Gospel. “But Luther’s 
discussions of Law and Gospel rest upon the doctrines of God, of the nature and destiny of man, of 
the general and original relation between the Creator and the creature, especially man, as objective 
premises.” Recently David Yeago has urged essentially the same point; see esp. “Gnosticism, 
Antinomianism, and Reformation Theology: Reflections on the Costs of a Construal,” Pro Ecclesia 
2/1 (1993), 37-49. 
49 For a concise dogmatic exposition of this claim, see John Webster, “Rector et iudex super omnia 
genera doctrinarum? The Place of the Doctrine of Justification,” in Michael Weinrich and John P. 
Burgess, eds., What is Justification About? Reformed Contributions to an Ecumenical Theme (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 35-56. 
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glory of the resurrection.50 This is why, in his 1535 lecture on Gen. 1:26, Luther declares 
that through the Gospel of Christ the imago dei lost through Adam’s sin is restored 
(reparetur).51 It is also why, in the first of his Disputations against the antinomian 
theology of John Agricola in December 1537, Luther teaches that the Old Testament 
saints looked expectantly to the promised Messiah who would “restore everything 
(omnia restiturum) that had been lost in Adam.”52 For in the New Testament, the 
promised Christ is given in order that he might “restore (restituat) the corrupt nature 
to its integrity,” that the “disease” (morbus) infecting Adam’s nature may be “healed” 
(medeatur).53  
 Does this mean that Luther, the theologian of creation’s restoration and 
healing in Christ, indulges in subject matters outside the bounds of genuine theology, 
indeed, in error and poison? One might at this point seek to ameliorate Luther’s 
famous remarks on the subject of theology in the Ps. 51 lecture by appealing to his 
penchant for exaggeration, but I prefer to leave its full force intact through a twofold 
explanation. My interpretation has to do first with the Psalm lecture itself, but it also 
touches more generally on the character of Luther’s theology. 
In the first place, the sentence that immediately follows Luther’s rejection of 
anything outside the theology of sin and justification as error and poison reads as 
follows: “All Scripture points to this, that God commends His kindness to us and in his 
Son restores (restituat) to righteousness and life the nature (naturam) that has fallen 
                                                        
50 His insistence on this point is a real strength of Ulrich Asendorf’s book, Lectura in Biblia. Luthers 
Genesisvorlesung (1535-1545) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), e.g., 11, 13, 19, 69-73. 
51 WA 42.48.11, LW 1.64. 
52 WA 39/1.403.28-404.2, ATD, 66. 
53 WA 39/1.386.8-11, ATD, 53. 
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into sin and condemnation.”54 He then explains that the “life” in question in not the 
mere biological existence of man as animal; rather, “the issue here is the future and 
eternal life; the God who justifies, repairs (reparante), and makes alive; and man, who 
fell from righteousness and life into sin and eternal death.”55 The great kindness of 
God does not stop at pardoning man’s guilt through the atonement that is in Christ 
crucified; God restores, repairs, and gives life to the nature that fell in Adam through 
his incarnate and risen Son. Luther adds: “Whoever follows this aim in reading the 
Holy Scriptures will read holy things fruitfully.”56 So it is only through violence to 
Luther’s own lecture text that a theology of restoration would be excluded from what 
he means by the God who justifies the sinner. And in fact, shortly later in his 
comments on Ps. 51:2, Luther explains that the “grace” (gratia) that brings peace with 
God through trust in his mercy in Christ, on the one hand, and the “conferring 
(donatio) of the Holy Spirit with his gifts (donis)” on the other, are “the two parts of 
justification (duae partes iustificationis).”57 Here we have Luther’s robust theology of 
grace and gift, reconciliation with God in Christ and renewal by the Spirit’s 
operation—to which I will return often in this study; but for now, as we prepare to 
enter into his lectures on Genesis, I note simply that Luther sees this basically creedal 
theology as vital to reading the “holy things” of Holy Scripture fruitfully.  
 In the second place, I would like to strengthen Bayer’s own hand by 
incorporating his emphasis on the sinful man and the justifying God—or Elert’s, or 
Robert Kolb’s, theology of law and Gospel—within this overarching theology of grace 
                                                        
54 WA 40/2.328.20-2, LW 12.311. 
55 WA 40/2.328.26-8, LW 12.311. 
56 WA 40/2.328.28-9, LW 12.311. 
57 WA 40/2.357.35-7, 358.19-26, 357.35, LW 12.331. 
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and gift, of creation redeemed and restored. We must keep in mind that Luther is 
lecturing on Ps. 51, whose Sitz im Leben is David’s plea for mercy after his fall into 
grievous sin (cf. 2 Sam. 11-12). This is a basically pastoral setting, and Luther the pastor 
is concerned above all to bring comfort and consolation to the grieving penitent, the 
bruised reed and faintly burning wick of Isa. 42:3.58 In this specific situation, where the 
pastor (or the brother with the Word) discerns in wisdom that the sinner’s heart is 
broken and contrite and then speaks the Gospel of free mercy, grace, and forgiveness 
through Jesus Christ—that is, when the pastor rightly handles the Word of truth by 
rightly dividing law and Gospel (2 Tim. 2:15)—then the only proper subject of true and 
evangelical theology really is the depth-reality of sin and the infinitely greater reality 
of gracious justification in Christ. But as I have shown from this very lecture, this is by 
no means the only moment in which the pastor/theologian is called to speak, nor are 
the twin truths of God’s judgment against sin and his free justification of the sinner 
the only truths he is called to understand and to teach in the Church of Jesus Christ. 
The Lectures on Genesis are uniquely suited to demonstrate this claim, because 
the biblical text itself summons Luther to present the whole scope of the Holy 
Trinity’s creative, redemptive, and restorative work in grace and in glory. The bulk of 
the present study explores how the living God brings about the restoration of his lost 
and vitiated human creatures through the Gospel, that is, the renewal of the sinner 
                                                        
58 On Luther as pastor, see Timothy J. Wengert, ed., The Pastoral Luther: Essays on Martin Luther’s 
Practical Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 1: “Martin Luther was, more than anything 
else, pastor and preacher for his Wittenberg flock.” This, Wengert rightly insists, applies far beyond 
specifically “pastoral” acts like preaching in the parish or Seelsorge, 13: “No matter what else Luther 
was doing, he was always at the same time Wittenberg’s pastor.” Cf. Franz Posset, The Real Luther: 
A Friar at Erfurt and Wittenberg (St. Louis: Concordia, 2011), 9: “The historical Luther is the pastoral 
Luther.” Asendorf, Lectura in Biblia, 79, speaks of “the thoroughly seelsorgerlichen character” of the 
Lectures on Genesis in particular. 
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into real holiness of life. To grasp this evangelical restoration in the fullness with 
which Luther presents it, we must first attend to what was lost, how it was lost, and 
what ensued for mankind after this loss. Hence the four subsections of this chapter 
examine, primarily on the basis of Luther’s 1535 lectures on Gen. 1-3, the Reformer’s 
teaching regarding: 1. the original, unfallen state of human nature as God’s creature 
fashioned in his image for his glory; 2. the nature of the trial established by God’s good 
command at Gen. 2:16-7, and of the temptation suffered by Eve and Adam at the 
Serpent’s malicious instigation in Gen. 3—to which, alas, they succumbed; 3. the 
consequent undoing of human nature by sin and death; 4. and finally, the first 
proclamation of the saving Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Serpent-Crusher, who restores 
what was lost in Eden through his grace and gift. 
 
1. What are people for? 
 
We begin with the nature of the “image of God.” In what did it consist? Simo Peura, 
David Yeago, and Antti Raunio have drawn attention to the presence of theosis-related 
themes in Luther’s lectures on Gen. 1-2.59 Lecturing on Gen. 1:26, for example, Luther 
proposes in thesis-like fashion: “My understanding of the image of God is this: that 
Adam had it in his being and that he not only knew God and believed that he was 
good, but that he also lived a life that was wholly divine (vitam vixerit plane 
divinam).”60 Thus Luther imagines God addressing Adam: “This is my Image, by which 
                                                        
59 Simo Peura, “Die Teilhabe an Christus bei Luther,” 121-61; David S. Yeago, “Martin Luther on 
Grace, Law, and the Moral Life: Prolegomena to an Ecumenical Discussion of Veritatis Splendor,” 
The Thomist 62 (1998), 163-91; Antti Raunio, “The Human Being,” in Olli-Pekka Vainio, ed., 
Engaging Luther: A (New) Theological Assessment (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2010), 27-58, here esp. 34-
8. 
60 WA 42.47.8-10, LW 1.62f. 
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you are living just as God lives (qua vivitis, sicut Deus vivit).”61 Still handling Gen. 1:26, 
the Reformer states that Adam and Eve were “completely engulfed (absorpti essent 
toti) by the goodness and righteousness of God.”62 This mystical-sounding claim finds 
an echo in a more theoretical comment at Gen. 2:18, to the effect that “man is a 
singular creature and pertains to participation in divinity and immortality 
(participationem divinitatis et immortalitatis).”63 Though Luther does not draw the 
causal connection explicitly, the inference is clear enough: because of his creaturely 
participation in (or absorption by) God’s divinity, goodness, righteousness, and life, 
Adam leads a divine life. This participatory sharing in the divine life is what it means 
for Adam to exist in the image of God. In a moment, I will explain how the “divine life” 
of the imago very much comprises goodness and righteousness. But in the few cases 
where Luther speaks overtly in the terminology of deification, the concrete shape of 
Adam and Eve’s divine life is more typically characterized by utter fearlessness and 
astonishing joy: image-bearing Eve is not intimidated by the Serpent, and deified 
Adam is “drunk with joy toward God” (ebrius esset leticia erga Deum).64  
 Yet Luther’s bold declarations regarding Adam’s deifying participation in the 
divine life are as striking as they are sparse. More often, he explains the meaning of 
the “image” in terms of Adam’s psychological (and physiological) faculties in their 
original perfections. I will argue this point as a friendly corrective of an overemphasis 
on theosis in Luther’s protological anthropology, but the claim also cuts against the 
                                                        
61 WA 42.47.15-6, LW 1.63. 
62 WA 42.50.29, LW 1.67. Cf. WA 42.71.27: absorptus totus in bonitate creatoris. 
63 WA 42.87.16-8, LW 1.115. 
64 WA 42.47.11-12, LW 1.63 (Eve) & WA 42.71.31-2, LW 1.94 (Adam). For further references to Adam’s 
fearless joy, cf. WA 42.47.10-1, LW 1.63; WA 42.47.22-3, LW 1.63; WA 42.49.29-30, LW 1.66; WA 
42.97.37-8, LW 1.130; WA 42.42.31, LW 1.56. 
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grain of much inherited wisdom in (mainly German) Luther scholarship. Bernhard 
Lohse, drawing on the work of Bengt Hägglund, Wilfried Joest, and Gerhard Ebeling, 
asserts that Luther’s non-psychological, “personal” interpretation of the image 
constitutes a real point of contrast between the Reformer and scholastic tradition.65 In 
a similar way, Bayer’s presentation of Luther on the image—which leans heavily on 
Ebeling’s work on the 1536 Disputatio de homine—denies that it refers to “a quality 
that resides within the human being in and of himself,” and is rather a “relational 
term.”66 In point of fact, the university lecturer on Genesis 1-2 is keenly interested in 
Adam’s psychological faculties. Their perfections engage Luther’s admiration and 
fascination, and stand at the center of his teaching regarding the character of the 
divine image.67  
This holds true with respect to the vital, “thesis-like” proposition I quoted 
above: “Therefore my understanding of the image of God is this: that Adam had it in 
his being (in sua substantia) and that he not only knew God and believed that he was 
                                                        
65 Bernhard Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology: Its Historical and Systematic Development. Trans. Roy 
A. Harrisville (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999), 244; Bengt Hägglund, “Luthers Anthropologie,” in 
Leben und Werk Martin Luthers von 1526 bis 1546 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983), 1:63-
76, 2:747-48; Wilfried Joest, Ontologie der Person bei Luther (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1967); Gerhard Ebeling, “Der Mensch nach seiner geschöpflichen Bestimmung,” in Lutherstudien, 
vol. 2/3 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1982), 92-108. 
66 Bayer, Luther’s Theology, 157. 
67 Because of Ebeling’s dominance, research into Luther’s philosophical psychology is still in its 
infancy. Thus, e.g., Notger Slenczka’s recent essay on Luther’s anthropology treats it only when 
discussing Luther’s scholastic background, then effectively leaves it behind for the novum found in 
the 1536 disputatio de homine and the new relational/existential self-understanding bestowed in 
justification—which Slenczka, with rare honesty of intention, links directly to Schleiermacher. See 
his “Luther’s Anthropology,” in OHMLT, 212-32, p. 217 for the reference to Schleiermacher, as well 
as pp. 230-1. For a glimpse of better prospects in this area of research, see Pekka Kärkkäinen’s 
report from the 2012 Luther Congress, “Philosophical Psychology in Luther’s Theology,” 
Lutherjahrbuch 80 (2013), 268-70. In its discussion of the image, the seminar concluded that for 
Luther “the image of God is to be found in the powers of the soul,” but “only after the light of grace 
illuminates them,” 269. This tantalizing but necessarily brief comment is very near the position I 
am arguing for in this chapter. Cf. idem, “Psychology and the Soul in Late Medieval Erfurt,” 
Vivarium 47 (2009), 421-443. 
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good, but that he also lived a wholly divine life.”68 Pace Bayer and other non-
ontological interpretations, Luther expressly states that Adam had the image “in his 
being.” But at the same time, the substantial reality of Adam’s “divine life” should not 
be set against his knowing God and believing his goodness. Rather, this knowing and 
believing God provides the spiritual means sine qua non of Adam’s deifying 
communion—his intimate relationship—with God. He leads a divine life because he 
knows and trusts the divine goodness that absorbs and intoxicates him. He is able to 
know and trust God thus, because he possesses, as the unique and originally perfect 
kind of creature God made him to be, the faculties requisite to this form of spiritual 
action. 
Consider the context of Luther’s “thesis.” The eye-catching theosis-proposition 
is embedded within two virtually identical discussions of the perfections of Adam’s 
natural faculties (potentiae). In the preceding paragraphs, Luther explains: “His 
intellect (intellectus) was the clearest, his memory (memoria) was the best, and his will 
(voluntas) the most straightforward—all in the most beautiful tranquility of mind, 
without any fear of death and without any anxiety.” (Note that Adam’s “divine” 
fearlessness is here attributed to the perfections of his psychological faculties.) In 
addition, the image includes Adam’s physical perfections: his eyes sharper than an 
eagle’s, his strength greater than a lion’s, his ability to eat enhanced beyond our 
imagination, and his sex-life unembarrassed, ordered, and pure. Luther concludes, 
marveling: “No one can picture how much better nature (natura) was then than it is 
                                                        
68 WA 42.47.8-10, LW 1.62f. 
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now.”69 Luther’s ergo imaginem Dei sic intelligo and “theosis”-proposition follow on 
the heels of this conclusion. In other words, the comprehensive perfection of Adam’s 
nature as originally created is summarized in the claim that he led a wholly divine life.  
The succeeding paragraphs confirm this interpretation and take it one step 
further. There was in Adam, Luther states, “an enlightened reason, a true knowledge 
of God, and a most sincere desire to love God and his neighbor.”70 In other words, he 
both possessed rightly functioning mental and volitional faculties and actually 
exercised these faculties as they were created to be used, knowing and loving both 
God and his neighbor. Here lies the real solution to Luther’s qualified rejection of a 
simple identification of the image with psychological faculties per se.71 Raunio takes 
this to involve a shift away from scholasticism toward “theosis” in much the same way 
Lohse, Bayer, and others envision a shift to existential personalism. In fact what 
Luther is saying is that the image consists not merely in man’s (or an angel’s or 
demon’s) possession of psychological faculties, but in the complete vivification of such 
faculties as they engage in their proper actions toward their appointed end, namely, 
knowing, trusting, and loving union with God. But to return to the text under 
discussion: Luther continues to add “other lesser but exceedingly important gifts” that 
pertain to Adam and Eve’s dominion over the other creatures which parallel the 
physical perfections treated above. “If all these qualities are combined, do they not 
                                                        
69 WA 42.46.11-47.7, LW 1.62. 
70 WA 42.47.33-4, LW 1.63. 
71 WA 42.45.1-23, LW 1.60. 
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make up and produce the sort of man in whom you would think that the image of God 
shines (relucere)?”72  
In a later comment on Gen. 5:1 (“On the day which God created man, He made 
him according to the similitude of God”), Luther again stresses that Adam’s likeness to 
God consisted not in the mere possession of psychological faculties, but in their right 
use ordered to intimate fellowship with God. He had “such” (talem) a will and 
intellect, as by them to understand God and to will what God wills.73 Thus created “in 
this perfect image and similitude of God,” had Adam not fallen “he would have lived 
forever, happy and full of joy, and he would have had a will that was glad (hilarem) 
and ready to obey God.”74 These are the very qualities that mark Adam’s “divine life.” 
Adam is full of joy and leads a divine life because his psychological faculties are fully 
engaged in the actions for which God created them: at Gen. 1:26, knowing God and 
believing that he is good; here at Gen. 5:1, understanding God and willing what he 
wills with a readiness prompted by gladness and joy.  
The “image,” then, does consist in the divine life that was Adam’s by nature, 
given him to enjoy through participation in God. But Luther’s predominant interest 
vis-à-vis the image seems to lie elsewhere, namely, in the perfection of Adam’s 
faculties that made him naturally capax of the gift of participation in God’s goodness, 
divinity, righteousness and life. Knowing God, believing his goodness, loving him with 
pure affection: these are descriptions of the fully vivified psychological faculties that 
explain—from Adam’s side—the original, “natural” reality of his deifying and 
                                                        
72 WA 42.47.33-48.5, LW 1.63-4. 
73 WA 42.248.9-14, LW 1.337.  
74 WA 42.248.14-6, LW 1.338. 
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gladdening communion with God. By them Adam and Eve “acknowledged God’s 
goodness, rejoiced in God, and felt safe in God’s goodness,”75 knowing, believing, and 
receiving the gift of God’s own “rejoicing and exulting” over them.76 Nor should 
Luther’s interest in Adam’s physical perfections be entirely ignored, for in them the 
fullness of Adam’s divine life as bearer of  God’s image “shines” forth through his body 
into the rest of the material cosmos. Though on the whole, with the tradition at large, 
Luther is most concerned with the spiritual character of the image. It is precisely and 
only because Adam and Eve are endowed by their Maker with these specific natural 
perfections that they are able to engage in those spiritual actions by which they relate 
to God in deifying union with God. Thus my proposed interpretation of Luther on the 
image harvests the strengths of the German and the Finnish positions while correcting 
their weaknesses. 
Luther’s discussions of Adam’s “original righteousness” parallel his 
explanations of the image closely. From what I can gather, he never quite equates the 
two concepts outright, but he defines them in the same way. Lecturing on Gen. 2:17, 
for example, Luther states that Adam’s originalem iusticiam meant that he “was 
righteous, truthful, and upright, not only in body but especially in soul, that he knew 
God, that he obeyed God with utmost joy (summa voluptate), and that he understood 
the works of God even without prompting.”77 He adds: “Adam loved God and his 
works with an excellent and pure affection,” lived amongst the other creatures in 
                                                        
75 WA 42.107.16-7, LW 1.142-3. 
76 WA 42.51.17, LW 1.68. 
77 WA 42.86.4-6, LW 1.113. 
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fearless peace, and had an obedient body untroubled by evil affections or lust.78 In his 
comments on Gen. 3:7 the same themes arise, though now with a polemically-charged 
emphasis on original righteousness as Adam’s “nature.”79 Luther states that it was 
“Adam’s nature to love God, to believe God, to know God, etc.”80 As it is the eye’s 
nature to see, “so it was the nature of reason and will in Adam to know God, to trust 
God, and to fear God.”81 These claims about the nature of original righteousness again 
reflect the Reformer’s predominant interest in the perfection of Adam’s psychological 
faculties, fully alive and naturally realized in those actions which united him to God. 
Reason and will unreservedly engaged in the actions of knowing, trusting, and loving 
God was “truly natural”82 for unfallen Adam, connaturalis,83 de essentia hominis,84 de 
natura hominis.85 And this knowing, trusting, and loving God was at once Adam’s 
original righteousness and the wellspring of his divine life of fearless, God-drunken 
joy.  
Thus if I have tried to reduce an emphasis on theosis to its proper proportions, 
I fully agree with Yeago’s claim that when Luther defines man’s originally righteous 
                                                        
78 WA 42.86.11-5, LW 1.113. 
79 Polemically charged, because directed against the late scholastic concept of grace as a 
superadded gift (donum superadditum) either (a) integrating natural faculties otherwise prone to 
inner conflict or (b) elevating natural faculties that are already integrally intact to the supernatural 
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80 WA 42.124.5-6, LW 1.165. 
81 WA 42.124.11-2, LW 1.165. 
82 WA 42.124.5, cf. LW 1.165. 
83 WA 42.123.38, cf. LW 1.164. 
84 WA 42.124.34, cf. LW 1.166. 
85 WA 42.125.31, cf. LW 1.167. 
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natura, he does so “in terms of the acts that are its telos, its fulfillment.”86 As I have 
repeatedly noted, Luther is not disinterested in the nature of the human person 
formally considered. To the contrary, he extensively discusses the natural perfections 
of Adam’s psychological and physiological faculties and includes them within his 
definition of the divine image. But the Reformer is not ultimately concerned with 
philosophical questions about the nature of the will or the intellect. Indeed, in his 
lecture on Gen. 1:2 he admits candidly that “we lack knowledge about our very selves” 
and despite endless investigations remain “incapable of giving a definition of the 
soul.”87 The real object of Luther’s concern is man’s nature considered in terms of its 
finality, viz., not the quid sint of his faculties but the purpose for which those faculties 
were created by God. Putting aside consideration of Adam’s physical perfections and 
their penultimate ends, it is clear that his mind and heart are by nature ordered to—
and engaged in—the unitive acts of knowing, trusting, and loving God. By these 
actions, Adam received and maintained the originally-given gift of deifying 
communion with God: the gift that constituted his being in the divine image.88 
Knowing, loving, and trusting God, he is “completely absorbed” by his goodness,89 
radiant with his divine life, perfect in righteousness, drunk with joy toward God, 
                                                        
86 Yeago, “Martin Luther on Grace, Law and Moral Life,” 170. 
87 WA 42.11.12-15, LW 1.13; cf. the 1545 lecture on Gen. 45:3, WA 44.589.33-590.14, LW 8.14-15: Quid 
autem anima sit speculative, vel ut Philosophi loquuntur, Metaphysice, non possumus scire, sed est 
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properly attend to the way in which God’s free gift of Adam’s being in righteous communion with 
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See Kolb’s Martin Luther: Confessor of the Faith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 104. 
89 WA 42.71.27, cf. LW 1.93. 
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and—vitally—“content with God’s grace” (contentus gratia Dei).90 This is Adam’s 
nature considered with respect to the end for which he was created, to wit: 
experiencing by trust and love the gladdening and deifying gift of communion, as a 
creature, with God. 
As a creature—and therefore, as a worshipper. For Adam to know, trust, and 
love his Maker is for Adam to offer him the “inner and spiritual worship” that is his 
Maker’s due.91 To this point, we have seen Luther describe man’s end in terms of 
psychological faculties fully alive and engaged in those actions that unite him in glad 
communion with God. Luther also teaches that the chief end of man is to glorify God 
and enjoy him forever. In his lecture on Gen. 2:3, he twice states this explicitly: the 
institution of the Sabbath day proves “that man was especially created for the 
knowledge and worship of God” and that his nature “was chiefly created for 
acknowledging and glorifying God (ad agnitionem et glorificationem Dei).”92 In 
Luther’s teleological anthropology these two definitions of man’s nature, the 
psychological and the doxological, coincide. Adam was made to worship his Maker 
will all his heart, soul, mind and strength, and in worshipping him to be glad. That is 
what people are ultimately for, to be worshippers who live and flourish in adoration of 
the true God whose gracious goodness absorbs and intoxicates them with thankful 
delight.  
The coincidence of the psychological and the doxological accounts of man’s 
nature surfaces tellingly in Luther’s comments on Gen. 2:21-22. He states that Plato, 
                                                        
90 WA 42.47.11, cf. LW 1.63. 
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Cicero, and other philosophers of “the better sort” are able to grasp something of the 
formal and material causes of human nature. That is, they have some genuine insight 
into human psychology, biology, etc. But they are in the dark as to the efficient and 
final causes of mankind, “about who did the creating and for what purpose he 
created.” And “without the knowledge of these two causes, our wisdom does not differ 
much from that of the beasts.”93 Plato might know something useful about the 
intellect as such, but he does not know what the intellect is ultimately for. Thus he 
will use it the way beasts use their eyes and ears, namely, to achieve a modicum of 
self-preservation in this world only to perish in the end, having failed to attain his true 
end or even to understand what it is. It is perhaps not an accident that Luther singles 
out Platonism as an example of an earth-bound philosophy; the irony merely sharpens 
the point he is making as a Worttheologe. For the Word alone reveals that the true 
God—the Holy Trinity—is both “the efficient and the final cause”94 of all things, 
including his “beautiful creature,” Man.95 The Word reveals that God made Adam as 
his creature ex nihilo, out of the sheer goodness and generosity of his heart. He then 
appointed Adam to the end of manifesting his Maker’s glory, and to do so in that 
intimate fellowship with himself which—from Adam’s side—took the form of adoring, 
thankful, praising knowledge, trust, and love. This was Adam’s “purpose” (finem), the 
chief end for which he was made. He “was created to worship God and to live eternally 
                                                        
93 WA 42.94.3-6, LW 1.124-5. Bayer, Luther’s Theology, 159, discusses a similar (and chronologically 
proximate) treatment of the four Aristotelian causes in Luther’s 1536 Disputatio de homine (WA 
39/1.175, LW 34.138). 
94 WA 42.95.25-6, LW 1.127. 
95 WA 42.98.11, LW 1.131. 
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with God.”96 And according to Luther, as we should by now expect, Adam’s principalis 
finis—to worship and live with God—is what it means that Adam was created 
according to God’s likeness.97 His natural existence as righteous bearer of the divine 
image (the psychological account of man’s end) consisted in his being a worshipper of 
the true God (the doxological), who lived to glorify God and to enjoy him forever, 
“drunk with joy toward God.”98 
Thanksgiving stands at the center of the glorificatio Dei that is Adam’s chief 
end: he existed to give God thanks. In his exposition of the first article of the Creed in 
the 1529 Small Catechism, Luther first celebrates the munificence of God’s gifts in 
creation, all lavished upon us “out of pure, fatherly, and divine goodness and mercy,” 
then culminates by insisting on our responsibility to respond to such a generous God 
with thanksgiving and praise.99 In his meditation on this text, Bayer declares 
categorically: “This describes everything about the human being that needs to be 
stated.”100 I believe my argument thus far has shown both the way in which Bayer 
exaggerates and the deeper sense in which he is absolutely correct. Luther’s lectures 
on Gen. 1-2 demonstrate that for the Reformer—much to the surprise, I suppose, of 
Dom Gregory Dix—Adam is, originally as well as ultimately and finally, homo 
eucharisticus. Having received everything from God as the sheer gift of his generosity, 
goodness, and love, including his life in communion with such a God, Adam was to 
rejoice and give God thanks from the bottom of his heart. Thus when Luther imagines 
                                                        
96 WA 42.98.12-3, LW 1.131. 
97 WA 42.98.20-2, LW 1.131. 
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99 Book of Concord, 354-5. 
100 Bayer, Luther’s Theology, 173. 
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Eden’s “church” in his comments on Gen. 2:16-17, this great and glad thanksgiving 
holds the central place in the liturgy. Adam would have “praised God and lauded him” 
for the gift of dominion over the creatures, using something like Ps. 148 or 149 as “a 
kind of liturgy for such thanksgiving (quandam formam talis gratiarum actionis).” And 
in his preaching, Adam would have extolled “the greatest gift,” viz., that he was 
created according to God’s likeness.101 The only thing God wanted from Adam, the 
telos to which he appointed him, was that he praise, thank, rejoice in, and obey his 
Maker.102 But this form of eucharistic existence is the very gift that God himself had 
lavished upon Adam freely by virtue of his creation in the divine image. To be fully 
human meant that Adam was an adoring, thankful worshipper and lover of the God 
who made him by grace, who knew this generous God in the intimate communion of 
faith and love, and gave him glory. This, in Luther’s reckoning, is what people are 
defined in terms of what people are for. 
2.1. Gen. 2:16-17—Adam and Eve’s Trial  
 
To grasp what happened in the temptation and fall of Adam and Eve in Gen. 3, I need 
first to explain the trial of their obedience established by God’s command at Gen. 2:16-
17 to refrain, on pain of death, from eating from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good 
and Evil.  
The trial is inextricably bound up with Luther’s contention that “Adam had a 
twofold life: animal and immortal (duplicem vitam: animalem et immortalem).”103 
What does this mean? At one level, it reflects what I exposited above regarding the 
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 43
perfections of Adam’s physiological and psychological faculties. Like the beasts in 
“physical life and bodily activity,” comments Luther at Gen. 2:17, Adam also possessed 
the “intellectual power (potentiam intellectivam)” which is in the angels, such that 
“man is an animal compounded from the nature of beasts and of angels (sit homo 
mixtum animal ex brutali et angelica natura).”104 This idea of the human as an 
“amphibious” creature, situated between beasts and angels in the order of being and 
partaking of each of their natures, has a long pedigree in the theological and 
philosophical tradition and is certainly not new to Luther.105 But it is not the primary 
meaning Luther normally intends when he speaks of Adam’s duplex vita. 
The second, and more predominant, meaning Luther attaches to the higher 
kind of “life” possessed by Adam refers not so much to his capacity for certain types of 
actions but to his eschatological destiny. His life is twofold, because unlike the beasts 
and like the angels he is destined for immortality. “We were created for a more 
excellent life (ad excellentiorem vitam) in the future than this physical life would have 
been, even if our nature had remained unimpaired,”106 not merely an animal but a 
“spiritual life (spiritualem vitam)”107 and “an immortal one.”108 That the two meanings 
converge is plain from what I have argued above regarding the nature of the divine 
image, to wit: that Adam’s psychological constitution, his ability to think, to know, to 
love, rendered him not only a rational but a “spiritual” animal, indeed an “angelical 
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animal” (animal ex… angelica natura) naturally capable of, and engaged in, living a life 
of radiant joy in communion with God. 
 Nevertheless, Luther envisions a very definite eschatological reserve in Eden. 
Adam did have a twofold life, animal and immortal, but the latter “was not yet clearly 
(plane) revealed, but only in hope (in spe).”109 In some sense, deified and God-drunken 
Adam already enjoyed the spiritual, immortal, angelic, and eternal life that 
complemented and surpassed his animal nature. But in another sense, he had yet to 
arrive at this fullness of the life his nature was created to enjoy, save only in hope.110 
God so constituted his nature that even in Paradise he had not yet arrived at his 
eschatological goal. Here, Luther stands on firm traditional ground—and tells his 
students so: 
Therefore the Doctores have put it well: Even if Adam had not fallen through 
his sin, still, after the appointed number of saints had been attained, God 
would have translated them from this animal life to the spiritual life. Adam was 
not to live without food, drink, and procreation. But at a predetermined time, 
after the number of saints had become full, these activities would have come to 
an end; and Adam, together with his descendants, would have been translated 
to the eternal and spiritual life.111 
 
“Doctores” indicates Luther’s awareness that in speaking of Adam’s hypothetical 
translatio he is passing on a common Augustinian inheritance.112 He alludes to it 
                                                        
109 WA 42.43.7-8, LW 1.57. 
110 On this point, see Peura, 132-8. 
111 WA 42.42.22-4, LW 1.56, slightly altered. 
112 See Peter Lombard, Sent. II d. 19.6, d. 20.2, and esp. d. 20.6, de hominis translatione in meliorem 
statum. For Augustine, see e.g. Enchiridion 8.25, WSA I/8, 289: “God had threatened [Adam] with 
the punishment of death if he sinned, bestowing free will on him while still ruling him by his 
authority and terrifying him with the thought of death, and placing him in the bliss of paradise as if 
in the shadow of life, from which he was to rise to better things if he preserved his state of justice.” 
Cf. civ. dei 12.22 and 13.1 (CCSL 48.385, Bett. 510): “The condition of human beings was such that if 
they continued in perfect obedience they would be granted the immortality of the angels and an 
eternity of bliss, without the interposition of death, whereas if disobedient they would be justly 
condemned to the punishment of death.” 
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repeatedly in his lectures on Genesis 1-3.113 Adam was not created for an exclusively 
earthly destiny. Rather, by nature the bearer of the divine image—who in some real 
sense partook of divinity and immortality—was ordained by God to share in a higher, 
more glorious, more “spiritual” kind of life than the one he already enjoyed. If we press 
further for clarification of what Luther has in mind here, the most helpful insight 
comes in a comment on Gen. 2:7, which St. Paul quotes at 1 Cor. 15:45. Reading Paul’s 
First and Last Adam theology back into Eden in a very traditional way, Luther 
speculates that the translatio would have transformed Adam as first created—the 
“living soul” (animam viventem), still partly animal in nature and needing to eat, drink, 
beget, etc.—into a “quickening spirit” (spiritum vivificantem) who would have lived 
without any animal qualities “from within,” in direct dependence on God alone. But, 
Luther is careful to add, this hypothetically translated Adam “would still have flesh 
and bones and would not be a mere spirit (non sit mere spiritus) like the angels” (cf. 
Luke 24:39). In other words, he would have experienced “resurrection,” as the Last 
Adam did, but without the preceding death.114 
 But the translation into resurrection-like spiritual life depended upon the 
condition of Adam and Eve’s obedience to God’s command at Gen. 2:16-17: “The LORD 
God commanded the man, saying, ‘You may surely eat of every tree of the garden, but 
of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil you shall not eat, for in the day that 
                                                        
113 LW 1.46, 56-7, 65, 80, 86, 92, 100, 104, 110, 115-6, 121, 130, 153. 
114 WA 42.65.25-36, LW 1.86. At Sent. II d. 20.6, Peter quotes 1 Cor. 15:46 (primum est quod est 
animale, deinde quod spirituale est) but does not seem to envision such a vividly resurrection-like 
translation. In civ. dei 13, on the creation and fall of Man, Augustine closely relates Adam’s 
hypothetical “gift of immortality” with the resurrection of Jesus and the future bodily resurrection 
of the saints. In a real sense, the entire book is a sustained interpretation of 1 Cor. 15:20-22 and 42-9, 
e.g., 13.23 (CCSL 48.405, Bett. 536-7): “The first man, however, was ‘of the earth, earthy,’ and he was 
made as a ‘living soul,’ not a ‘life-giving spirit’; that condition was reserved for him after he had 
merited it by obedience.” 
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you eat of it you shall surely die.” Why did God establish this command? In his 
comment on Gen. 2:13-14, Luther explains that this “Law was given to Adam that he 
might have an outward form of worship by which to show his obedience and gratitude 
toward God.”115 There are, I think, two points to tease out here for the purpose of my 
argument. 
 First, drawing insights from Cargill Thompson, Raunio, and Yeago and building 
upon my own exposition of Adam’s nature, it is vital to grasp that the verbum 
externum issued in Gen. 2:16-17 depends upon a deeper and more basic “law,” to which 
the command not to eat from the Tree gives expression. This is the law of Adam’s 
nature: the lex naturae originally identical with his creation in the perfection of the 
divine image.116 This point becomes clearer when Luther’s stance on the relation 
between revealed and natural law post lapsum is correlated with the protological 
anthropology examined thus far in this chapter. In the second Disputation against the 
Antinomians (12 Jan. 1538), for example, Luther explains that fallen, vitiated humans 
need the help of the revealed law “so that we might be reminded of what we were 
before Adam’s fall (quid ante lapsum Adae fuerimus).”117 In the Decalogue, the Lord of 
                                                        
115 WA 42.77.19-20, LW 1.101. 
116 On natural law in Luther, see Antti Raunio, “Natural Law and Faith: The Forgotten Foundations 
of Ethics in Luther’s Theology,” in Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, eds., Union with Christ: 
The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 96-124; idem, Summe des 
Christlichen Lebens: Die ‘Goldene Regel’ als Gesetz der Liebe in der Theologie Martin Luthers von 
1510-1527 (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 2001), 294-319. I am not here so interested in Raunio’s insights 
regarding the Golden Rule, as with his contention that in Luther’s thought natural law is grounded 
ontologically in human nature as God’s creature. Despite his differences with Cargill Thompson, 
this aligns Raunio with the former’s argument for the persistence of a broadly Thomistic natural 
law tradition within sixteenth-century Reformation theology, flowering in Richard Hooker but 
already there in Luther and other magisterial reformers. See W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, The 
Political Thought of Martin Luther (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1984), 79. 
117 WA 39/1.454.13-14, ATD, 105. Cf. WA 39/1.539.7-15, ATD, 172: God’s laws, summed in the 
Decalogue, “are written on the hearts of all men, unless they are utterly unnatural, ever since the 
birth or creation of man, together with Adam.” But because man is so deeply fallen, “God was 
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redemption does not issue arbitrary commands unrelated to his work in creation. 
Rather, he reminds sinful, wounded, forgetful, and thus less than entirely “natural” 
humans of what being fully alive as his creaturely image-bearers actually entails. But 
innocent Adam needed no such reminder, because he knew, trusted, loved, obeyed, 
and worshipped God by nature. This is what he was made for, and this is what he did 
from the first moment of his creation, because this is who he was as the protological 
Man. God did not “demand” this knowing, trusting, obeying, etc. from Adam as if from 
an unwilling subject. He gave it to Adam when he gave him his being as this sort of 
creature, for whom to exist is to exist as one who knows and trusts the divine 
goodness that absorbs and intoxicates him, freely obeys such a trustworthy God, and 
responds to God’s bounty with glad shouts of thanksgiving from the deepness of his 
heart.118  
Thus, as Luther states in the first Disputation against the Antinomians (18 Dec. 
1537), “When Adam was first created, the law was for him not only something possible, 
but even something enjoyable. He rendered the obedience the law required with all 
this will and with gladness of heart, and did so perfectly.”119 For Adam is and does—by 
the “grace” of his creation in God’s image—what the law of his nature requires him to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
forced again to give us a limit, lest we forgot totally his law, so that we would at least remember 
who we were before (qui iam antea fuerimus).” 
118 Here I lean heavily on Yeago’s comments on Gen. 2:16-7, e.g., “Martin Luther on Grace, Law and 
Moral Life,” 176: “The commandment is not given to Adam so that he might become a lover of God 
by keeping it; Adam already is a lover of God… The commandment was given, rather, in order to 
allow Adam’s love for God to take form in an historically concrete way of life.” Yeago’s analysis is 
profoundly insightful, but he does not connect the “positive” lex regarding the Tree to the lex 
naturae (which he nonetheless describes in concrete terms).  
119 WA 39/1.364.10-3, ATD, 36. Cf. Andreas H. Wöhle, Luthers Freude an Gottes Gesetz: Eine 
historische Quellenstudie zur Oszillation des Gesetzesbegriffes Martin Luthers im Licht seiner 
alttestamentlichen Predigten (Frankfurt am Main: Haag und Herchen, 1998), 29-30, 63, 183. Wöhle 
argues for an organic connection between the joyfulness of Adam’s law-keeping and its restoration 
in Christ by the Spirit—to which we will return in the next chapter. 
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be and do. Adam worships, obeys, and thanks God from the bottom of his glad heart, 
because God has given this to him as the gift of his being. This is the real keeping of 
the law, the law of his nature. That is why, for Luther, the subsequent command not 
to eat from the Tree revealed not (as we might think) the severity, but “the goodness 
of God,” who had created Adam’s nature with all its perfections.120 It is also why 
Adam’s own preaching on the “text” of the command would have “extolled the 
greatest gift” of his creation in the divine image.121 In short: “For Adam, this Word was 
Gospel and Law,”122 for the purpose of Gen. 2:16-17 was to give external expression to 
the inner spiritual reality of total obedience, complete faith and love, and thankful joy 
that Adam simply was—prior to Gen. 2:16-17—by virtue of the free gift of his creation 
in God’s image. The command gave occasion to reveal the glory of God’s beautiful gift, 
as the spiritual reality of the divine image took shape—as Yeago puts it—in the 
historical concreteness of Adam’s life.123 
 This brings me to my second point. When God tests Adam by establishing the 
command about the Tree, his real object runs much deeper than testing external 
obedience to a positive law. What is ultimately at stake is whether or not Adam will 
continue willingly in his uniquely human form of creatureliness, gladly conforming to 
                                                        
120 WA 42.80.1-10, LW 1.105. 
121 WA 42.80.27-8, LW 1.106. 
122 WA 42.110.18-9, LW 1.146. 
123 This account of lex naturae vis-à-vis Gen. 2:16-17 has some affinity with Paul Althaus’ distinction 
between a post-fall “law” and an original “command” that is essentially God’s loving summons to 
“participation in his life in the partnership of love.” See his short book, The Divine Command: A 
New Perspective on Law and Gospel. Trans. Franklin Sherman (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), 8-11, 
here 8. Cf. Ernst Sartorius, The Doctrine of Divine Love: Or, Outlines of the Moral Theology of the 
Evangelical Church. Trans. Sophia Taylor (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1884), 68: Gen. 2:16-7 “keeps 
man in an orderly fellowship of love with God and His fellow-men, it admonishes him to abide in 
love. The hearts of the first human beings were filled with their first love, and need therefore no 
impelling and prescribing law, though they did require a regulative and restrictive one.” 
 49
the law of his nature.124 Will he be “content” with the grace of his creation in the image 
of God?125 Will it be enough for him to be and remain a creature, however glorious? 
That is, will he continue to worship God—to humbly receive his entire being as a gift, 
and thus to give God glory by giving him thanks? To obey the command and to wait 
patiently for the translatio that such obedience would “merit”—this would mean for 
Adam to abide in the “grace” of the trust, love, and thankfulness that made him 
originally righteous and/or fully human and united him, as this kind of creature, in 
communion with the God who rejoiced over him. To break God’s command would, by 
contrast, mean for Adam to refuse and renounce the gift of his being as a creature in 
God’s image; to be dissatisfied with this grace and gift; to hold back thanksgiving; to 
turn his trust, love, and obedience in upon himself; to break off communion with God; 
to attempt to cease existing as a creature, and to become his own god. In sum: would 
Adam remain in the submission and thankfulness proper to his existence as a 
dependent creature, refraining from the Tree and thus manifesting his “obedience and 
gratitude to God”?126 Or would he destroy himself by entering upon a path of 
autonomy, rebellion, and ingratitude, that is, of idolatry?127 
                                                        
124 At civ. dei 12.22 (CCSL 48.380, Bett. 502), Augustine directly ties the “amphibious” nature of 
humanity to the test of obedience established at Gen. 2:16-17 and thus to Adam’s original 
eschatological vocation: “God created man’s nature as a kind of mean between angels and beasts, so 
that if he submitted to his Creator, as to his true sovereign Lord, and observed his instructions with 
dutiful obedience, he should pass over into the fellowship of the angels, attaining an immortality of 
endless felicity, without an intervening death; but if he used his free will in arrogance and 
disobedience, and thus offended God, his Lord, he should live like beasts, under sentence of death, 
should be the slave of his desires, and destined after death for eternal punishment.” 
125 WA 42.47.11, cf. LW 1.63. 
126 Cf. civ. dei 13.20 (CCSL 48.403, Bett. 534): God forbade them to eat from the Tree of Knowledge, 
“not because it was evil in itself, but in order to emphasize the good of pure and simple obedience 
which is the great virtue of a rational creature (magna uirtus est rationalis creaturae) set under the 
authority of the Lord his creator.” 
127 On this entire theme, cf. Augustine’s exegesis of Gen. 17:1-21 at civ. dei 16.26-7 (Bett., 686-9). He 
first explains in cp. 26 that the covenant God entered into with Abraham is the new covenant of 
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2.2. Temptation and Fall 
 
When the Devil tempts Adam and Eve in Gen. 3, he sets to work obfuscating and 
eventually snatching away the concrete commandment of Gen. 2:16-17.128 But his real 
                                                                                                                                                                     
grace, albeit hidden within the old: hic apertiora promissa sunt de uocatione gentium in Isaac, id est 
in filio promissionis, quo significatur gratia, non natura; thus omnia resonant nouitatem, et in 
testamento uetere odumbratur nouum (CCSL 48.530-1). Augustine then argues in cp. 27 that the 
reason an infant left uncircumcised past the eighth day will be “cut off from his people” for having 
broken the “covenant” (Gen. 17:14) is that the child broke the original covenant that God 
established with Adam at Gen. 2:17, when he was in Adam originally: … etiam paruuli, non secundum 
suae uitae proprietatem sed secundum communem generis humani originem, omnes in illo uno 
testamentum Dei dissipauerunt, in quo omnes peccauerunt (CCSL 48.531). Again: Testamentum 
autem primum, quod factum est ad hominem primum, profecto illud est: Qua die ederitis, morte 
moriemini (CCSL 48.532). Key texts for Augustine in cp. 27 are Rom. 5:12, Hos. 6:7, and Ecclus. 14:17. 
From what I can gather, Luther does not pick up on this Augustinian insight into the scriptural 
theology of the covenant in so many words; later on, Reformed theologians will develop it 
thoroughly in their contrast between the covenant of works and the covenant of grace (a 
representative and lucid example of which can be found in Thomas Watson’s A Body of Divinity § 
3.1 and 4.1). That said, Luther’s teachings regarding the command at Gen. 2:16-17 as an expression of 
the natural law of Adam’s being, the contingent nature of Adam’s translatio on the condition that 
he keep this law, and the material identity of the lex naturae with the lex Moysi, all have a deep 
dogmatic affinity with both Augustine’s insights and with the subsequent developments in the 
Reformed tradition. The same holds true in regard to the new covenant of grace in Christ; indeed, 
the very notion of God’s “promise” of grace in the gospel is perhaps indistinguishable from the 
biblical concept of the covenant. And the mature Luther everywhere aims to divide rightly between 
the conditional promises of the law and the free promise of grace in the gospel. See, e.g., the 1542 
lecture on Gen. 32:3-5, WA 44.71.26-31, 72.5-12, LW 6.96-7: vera est distinctio, duplices esse 
promissiones, conditionales et simplices sine conditione: ut legis promissio est conditionalis: Gratiae 
promissio est simplex. Quando merces promittitur laboranti, conditio est, quae requirit operam et 
officium pactum, quod si non sequitur, merces non solvitur. Sed tales promissiones missas faciamus, 
quando est cum Deo agendum in conscientia. Mox enim confundemur: Si quidem ne uno quidem 
momento in officio sumus… Promissio autem gratiae haec est, quando dicit Deus: Tu nihil fecisti, 
nihil es meritus. Sed hoc tibi faciam, et donabo ex sola misericordia. Tales promissiones sunt 
gratuitae, et his similes fuerunt Patriarcharum Abrahae, Isaac, Iacob promissiones. Sicut supra 
recitatae sunt. ‘Adorabunt te filii matris tuae’, item ‘vino et oleo stabilivi te’, ibi nulla conditio accedit: 
Si feceris hoc, eris benedictus. Sed habes hanc promissionem et benedictionem gratuito. Moses 
quidem plenus est promissionum legalium: sed Patriarchae simplices et gratuitas habent. I confess, it 
is hard for me to see how this differs in substance from the later Reformed distinction between the 
foedus operum and the foedus gratiae. Cf. Robert Letham, “The Foedus Operum: Some Factors 
Accounting for Its Development,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 14/4 (Winter 1983): 457-67. 
Letham’s learned article pinpoints the roots of later Reformed covenant theology in Zwingli and 
Bullinger; it is, I think, especially intriguing that he locates a crucial developmental step in 
Zacharias Ursinus’ union of Bullinger’s covenant theology with Melanchthon’s teaching on natural 
law (p. 463). As I have merely suggested here, I think these roots run much deeper in the 
Augustinian tradition, passing from Augustine himself through the late medieval Ockhamist 
pactum-theology to Luther and thence to various sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Swiss, 
German, Scottish, English, and Dutch theologians. 
128 The classic old study on the Devil in Luther’s thought is by Hans-Martin Barth, Der Teufel und 
Jesus in der Theologie Martin Luthers (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967). But Barth’s 
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aim is to attack and destroy Adam himself, whose inner life of trust, love, obedience, 
and adoration found expression in this external form of obedience and worship. The 
two are deeply interwoven, the former being the Devil’s tactical means of achieving 
the latter end. To unpack this farther, Luther’s remarks near the start of his lecture on 
Gen. 3:1 merit quoting at length:  
This was the greatest (summam) and severest of all temptations; for the 
serpent directs his attack at God’s good will and makes it its business to prove 
from the prohibition of the tree that God’s will toward man is not good (Dei 
voluntatem erga hominem non esse bonam). Therefore it launches its attack 
against the very image of God and the most excellent powers in the 
uncorrupted nature. The highest form of worship itself, which God has 
ordained, it tries to destroy. It is therefore vain for us to discuss this or that sin. 
Eve is simply urged on to all sins, since she is being urged on against the Word 
and the good will of God (voluntatem Dei bonam).129  
 
God’s sheer goodness established Adam and Eve in his image, and they rejoiced in 
God and led a “divine life” of fearless joy because they knew and trusted the goodness 
of his will toward them. If God is for us, who can be against? They walked about in 
Eden “resplendent with innocence and original righteousness, and abounding in peace 
                                                                                                                                                                     
intentional disavowal of interest in the continuity of Luther’s demonology with the tradition, 
combined with his thesis that Luther’s thought on the Devil must always be conceived 
christologically, hampers his researches. Heiko Oberman’s biography rightly emphasizes Luther’s 
own self-understanding as a man armed with the bare Word of God and engaged in apocalyptic 
struggle against all the powers of hell. Luther: Man between God and the Devil, trans. Eileen 
Walliser-Schwarzbart (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). At the 2012 Luther Congress in 
Helsinki, Scott Hendrix spoke of the Devil as Luther’s “symbol for evil.” That may sell at Princeton, 
but an Oberman student should know better than to modernize Luther in this way. For Luther, the 
Devil was very much a real personal being, the ancient foe who lied to, poisoned, and killed Adam 
and Eve—as his lectures on Gen. 3 put beyond any shadow of doubt. Cf. Volker Leppin’s fine little 
article, “Luther on the Devil,” Seminary Ridge Review 16/2 (Spring 2014): 13-27. Inter alia, Leppin 
tells of how Luther wrangled with Andreas Osiander over the reality of poltergeists in 1540. Luther 
had often heard the devil clattering with something; and he’d sometimes seen the devil coming at 
him in the form of a black sow or dog—once, the dog even crept into his bed, and Luther had to 
cast him out the window! “This seems not to be the Luther of our confirmation classes or our 
seminary lessons—but it is a real Luther, one who sees the devil as more than an enlightened idea 
of evil” (p. 16, citing WA Tr 5.87f, #5358b).  
129 WA 42.110.8-15, LW 1.146. 
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of mind because of their trust in God, who was so kind” to them.130 Now in this highest 
temptation, the Devil seeks to destroy the divine image—and the “highest form of 
worship” that it represented—by calling into question the legitimacy of Adam and 
Eve’s trust in God’s goodness. But this is the very divine goodness that absorbed and 
intoxicated them and, in so doing, made them the fully living, fearless, glad, God-
adoring creatures they originally were. Thus the deceptive attack on the concrete 
command of Gen. 2:16-17 is an all-out assault on Adam’s natura, because it is nothing 
less than an invidious slandering of the character of God.  
So the Devil asks: “How can such ill will (tanta invidia) come upon Him that 
He does not want you to be wise?”131 “How can He, who favored you with all these 
things, be so envious (invidere) as to withhold from you the fruits of this one single 
tree, which are so delightful and lovely?”132 God is not good after all. His purpose for 
his human creatures cannot be trusted. Rather than an occasion to worship God and 
give him thanks for his goodness, the Devil’s rhetoric makes the command to refrain 
from the Tree proof of the restrictedness of God’s kindness toward Adam and Eve. 
God must be holding back from them, hoarding some good that a more generous 
Maker would have lavished upon them. In this way, Satan “stirs up resentment 
(invidiam)” against God, and Eve first doubts and then begins to hate this God “as 
though He bore them too little good will.”133 In short: by the Devil’s false logic, the 
command proves that God’s will toward man is not good, but invidious, resentful, 
grasping, tight-fisted; Adam and Eve’s trust in God’s goodness is broken, as they take 
                                                        
130 WA 42.108.28-9, LW 1.144. 
131 WA 42.112.38-9, LW 1.149. 
132 WA 42.115.3-4, LW 1.152. 
133 WA 42.119.12-4, LW 1.158. 
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the Devil at his word but reject the Word of God; and thus their hearts, filled with the 
devil’s “poison,”134 begin to reflect the image of the “new god” that is “invented by 
Satan for men without their even being aware of it.”135 They become as truly invidious 
as the Devil’s aspersions have falsely made their Maker out to be. The divine image, 
constituted at its core by trust in the divine goodness, is thus shattered by unbelief. 
Eve and Adam obey the Devil instead of God and fall from the true worship they were 
made for into the lie of idolatry.136 
 It is worth exploring Luther’s claim, in his lecture on Gen. 1:26, that through 
the fall “the image of the devil (imago Diaboli)” was stamped upon us.137 Later in the 
lectures the Reformer twice refers back to Gen. 3:5 and the Devil’s promise of self-
deification contained within it.138 At Gen. 3:22, Luther states: when Adam “wanted to 
become like God (similis Deo), he became like the devil (similis Diabolo).”139 Likewise 
at Gen. 4:9: “In Paradise we wanted to become like God, and through our sin we 
became like the Devil.”140 What does it mean that Adam and Eve—who already bore 
the divine image—strove to become like God only to be stamped with the likeness of 
the Devil? Luther’s position becomes clearer when we focus on invidia in the context 
of the story of the Devil’s own fall. When discussing this scripturally-reticent point of 
                                                        
134 WA 42.117.5, LW 1.155. 
135 WA 42.112.3, LW 1.148. 
136 WA 42.113.30-2, LW 1.149. 
137 WA 42.47.22, LW 1.63. 
138 Cf. WA 5.128.34-129.1 (Operationes in Psalmos, 1519, on Ps. 5:3): because God’s true Son became 
man, nos sibi conformes facit et crucifigit, faciens ex infoelicibus et superbis diis homines veros, idest 
miseros et peccatores. Quia enim ascendimus in Adam ad similitudinem dei, ideo descendit ille in 
similitudinem nostram, ut reduceret nos ad nostri cognitionem. Atque hoc agitur sacramento 
incarnationis. Hoc est regnum fidei, in quo Crux Christi dominatur, divinitatem perverse petitam 
deiiciens et humanitatem carnisque contemptam infirmitatem perverse desertam revocans. 
139 WA 42.166.22-3, LW 1.222. 
140 WA 42.208.8-9, LW 1.281. 
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doctrine, Luther often refers coyly to Bernard of Clairvaux’s theory as a good 
possibility.141 His comment on Gen. 1:6 is a good example. Referring to Isa. 14:13—a key 
text for Bernard142—and to Bernard himself, Luther explains that Lucifer was given a 
glimpse of God’s plan to raise mankind higher than the angels through the 
Incarnation of the Son, and that “this proud spirit envied (invidisse) mankind this 
happiness and fell.”143 Thus the devil and his angels “despised the Word or Son of God 
and wanted to place themselves above him (se ei voluerunt anteferre),” and fell as a 
result of this pride (ex superbia).144 Lecturing on Gen. 2:17, Luther again refers to Isa. 14 
and restates the elements of Bernard’s theory: “Some proud angels, displeased by the 
humility (humilitate) of the Son of God, wanted to place themselves above Him 
(voluerunt se ei praeferre).”145 Notably in this connection, Luther introduces the idea 
that the Devil exalted himself over all “on account of certain gifts (ob certa dona).”146  
                                                        
141 Franz Posset points to Bernard’s Sermo in adventu domini 1, Homelium super ‘Missus est’ in 
laudibus virginis matris 3, and Sermo super Cantica canticorum 17 as possible sources for Luther. His 
study examines Luther-texts appealing to Bernard that range from 1526 to 1542, including two 
further places in the Genesis Lectures: WA 43.319, LW 4.256 (on Gen. 24:5-7); WA 43.580-1, LW 
5.220-1 (on Gen. 28:12-14). See Posset’s Pater Bernhardus: Martin Luther and Bernard of Clairvaux 
(Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1999), 285-89. On Bernard’s general influence upon 
Luther’s thought, see also Theo Bell, Divus Bernhardus: Bernhard von Clairvaux in Martin Luthers 
Schriften (Mainz: Philip von Zabern, 1993). 
142 He cites it, e.g., at SC 17.3.5: “… it could have happened that because of his lofty endowments of 
wisdom and grace, he could have foreseen that members of the human race would one day be 
raised to be his equals in glory… Then, stung by a wild impulse of envy, he plotted to maintain as 
subjects those whom he scorned as companions… Was this impious scheming of his the 
consequence of his presumptuous self-exaltation, of his pretensions to a seat of power? For he said: 
I will climb up to the heavens; I will sit in the recesses of the north (Isa. 14:13). He would assume the 
very likeness of the Most High God; for just as God, from his throne above the cherubim, governs 
the whole angelic host, so Lucifer, from his usurped position, would control the race of men.” The 
Works of Bernard of Clairvaux II: On the Song of Songs I, trans. Kilian Walsh OCSO (Spencer, MA: 
Cistercian Publications, 1971), 129. 
143 WA 42.18.16-21, LW 1.23. 
144 WA 42.18.33-5, LW 1.23. 
145 WA 42.85.30-1, cf. LW 1.112. 
146 WA 42.85.23, cf. LW 1.112. 
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The basically Augustinian picture that emerges is bleak and centers around the 
overlapping concepts of envy, pride, vainglory, and idolatry.147 The Devil prided 
himself on account of his superior dona, envied the future glory of the inferior human 
nature, and vaunted himself against the humility of God’s Son in a vain and futile 
attempt to take God’s place as the true and sole possessor of glory. When he enticed 
Eve and Adam into rebellion with the promise that they would become “like God” 
(Gen. 3:5), he was luring them to imitate the path he had already chosen. And they 
took the bait, preferring to be “like God” in the Devil’s proud, invidious, and idolatrous 
fashion rather than thankfully abide in the divine image they had received as creatures 
deified by grace. “They put themselves in the place of God the Creator and forget that 
they are creatures,” laments Luther in a later lecture on Gen. 17:10-11; “Oh the wretched 
divinity (miseram divinitatem) with which Satan surrounded us through sin.”148 Thus 
despite the low profile of superbia in Luther’s lectures on Gen. 3,149 his repeated 
references to invidia and his claim that Adam and Eve forfeited the divine image in 
order to gain the Devil’s likeness argue strongly that the Reformer’s faith/unbelief 
                                                        
147 On the Devil’s fall, see civ. dei 11.13-15, where Augustine makes appeal to Isa. 14 and Ezek. 28:13f; 
and 14.2-3, where in the course of arguing that embodiment does not cause vice and sin, Augustine 
exegetes Gal. 5:19-21 and argues that the Devil’s envy and pride make him an especially fleshly being 
on St. Paul’s account (CCSL 48.417, Bett. 551): Etsi enim diabolus fornicator uel ebriosus uel si quid 
huius modi mali est, quod ad carnis pertinet uoluptates, non potest dici, cum sit etiam talium 
peccatorum suasor et instigator occultus: est tamen maxime superbus atque inuidus. On Adam’s fall, 
see esp. 14.13 (CCSL 48.434-5, Bett. 571-2): Adam became proud, “and what is pride except a longing 
for a perverse kind of exaltation?” (Quid est autem superbia nisi peruersae celsitudinis appetitus?) 
Thus when he performed the first and decisive turn to the self in human history, this turning “to 
abandon God and to exist in himself (esse in semet ipso)” was nothing but “the lifting up of one’s 
heart in worship to one’s self, which is the essence of pride (sursum cor habere… ad se ipsum, quod 
est superbiae).” 
148 WA 42.647.20-25, LW 3.139. 
149 cf. WA 42.110.39-40, LW 1.147: after faith in the Word is lost, quid mirum est postea fieri 
superbum? 
 56
centered-account—favored by Bayer, e.g.150—incorporates an underlying 
Augustinian/Bernardine focus on pride and vainglory as the root causes of Adam and 
Eve’s devilish, self-deifying treachery. I shall return to this theme in the next section.  
First, I need to outline the aesthetics of temptation (tentatio/Anfechtung) that 
Luther first lays down in his lecture on Gen. 3 and then returns to throughout the 
duration of the Lectures.151 Though there is nothing beautiful about temptation, 
Luther does believe that a deep and instructive correspondence obtains between the 
paradigmatic temptation in Eden and all subsequent varieties of the experience. One 
way or another, all temptation leads man away from faith in the Word and true 
worship of God into unbelief, self-reliance, and idolatry. “The source of all sin truly is 
unbelief and doubt and abandonment of the Word,” on account of which the world 
remains in idolatry, denies God’s truth, and invents new gods instead.152 “The root and 
source of sin is unbelief and turning away from God (aversio a Deo).”153 “The pattern 
(formam) of all temptations of Satan is the same, namely, that he first puts faith to 
trial and draws away from the Word.”154 Thus Eve’s and Adam’s temptation is the 
                                                        
150 Bayer, Luther’s Theology, 177-80. 
151 Cf. Horst Beintker, Die Überwindung der Anfechtung bei Luther. Eine Studie zu seiner Theologie 
nach den Operationes in Psalmos 1519-21 (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1954). Beintker’s study 
is dated and betrays the marks of its era especially in its prejudice against the heritage of mysticism; 
but his focus on God’s sovereignty over and amidst temptation, and the victory of Jesus Christ over 
it by faith, remains helpful. See also H.-M. Barth, Der Teufel, 123-83. Volker Leppin, Martin Luther, 
41-2, links Luther’s experience and theology of Anfechtung to John Tauler and Jean Gerson, and 
rightly argues for its enduring role in the Reformer’s mature theology. Bayer (e.g., Luther’s 
Theology, 20, 29-43) has drawn attention to the critical role of Anfechtung in the formation of the 
theologian, drawing on Luther’s 1539 Preface to the collection of his German works (WA 50.657-61, 
LW 34.283-8).  
152 WA 42.112.20-3, LW 1.149. Cf. WA 42.111.23-4: In summa, omnia mala sequuntur incredulitatem seu 
dubitationem de verbo et Deo. 
153 WA 42.122.12, LW 1.162. 
154 WA 42.122.22-3, LW 1.163. 
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caput omnium tentationum.155 For the purposes of my argument, this must be further 
specified in two respects:  
(1) In temptation, one grows dissatisfied with the Word: non contenti verbo.156 
Whether in the form of law or Gospel, command or gift, in temptation the Word no 
longer seems to be enough. In the primal temptation, as the Deceiver gyrates 
rhetorically to gain every point he can against Adam and Eve, they actually experience 
both types of discontentment. The “Word” of God’s grace and good will toward them, 
which established them in his image, no longer felt trustworthy once demonic invidia 
suggested itself to their imaginations. On the other hand, the Devil convinced Eve that 
the threatened punishment of death was not really credible either.157  
(2) There is in Luther’s theology such a thing as a “high” temptation more 
arduous than those of lower degree.158 It is “stupid to think” that Eve was inflamed 
with sensual desire for the fruit. Such a temptation might suit a lesser person, but not 
this awe-inspiring, holy, unfallen Eve. No, she had to grapple with the tentatio 
summa,159 “the greatest (summa) and the most bitter of all temptations.”160 It was “far 
more serious and more dangerous” than mere enticement to fornication, adultery, and 
other sins of the flesh; indeed, it was a temptation “proper to the Church and to the 
Saints (propria Ecclesiae et Sanctorum).”161 As we saw earlier, this is the temptation to 
                                                        
155 WA 42.110.41-111.1, LW 1.147. 
156 WA 42.111.36, LW 1.148. 
157 WA 42.117.2-4, LW 1.155. 
158 Sometimes, Luther refers similarly to the “black devil,” who tempts to external sins like adultery 
or murder, and the “white devil” who incites to spiritual pride, heresy, etc.—the latter being the far 
more sinister. Cf. Mickey Mattox, “Martin Luther’s Reception of Paul,” in R. Ward Holder, ed., A 
Companion to Paul in the Reformation (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 93-128, here 126-7. 
159 WA 42.111.5-10, LW 1.147. 
160 WA 42.110.8, LW 1.146. 
161 WA 42.110.34-7, LW 1.147. 
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believe that God had turned against her, to believe that his will toward her was no 
longer good or had never truly been so at all.162 This is the summa tentatio that, in 
Luther’s theology, is uniquely propria to the “Saints” of God in his Church.  
In Luther’s mature and “mystical” theology of sanctification through the holy 
cross, these two factors converge: amidst the summa tentatio, when Satan (or in 
Jacob’s case at the Jabbok: God himself appearing in “hostile form”) beats and 
pummels the tempted saint with the terrifyingly compelling lie that God has turned 
against him, the saint responds by defiantly refusing to let go of the truth of the 
Promise, the Gospel. Even in the highest and most bitter temptation, he resolves to 
remain contentus verbo and triumphs by in fact clinging to this Word alone. In light of 
Luther’s lectures on Gen. 3, it is clear that to endure this temptation and to triumph by 
faith in the Word is to reverse the tragedy of Eden. There is a definite fittingness to 
this state of things: the very temptation by which Adam fell becomes the graced 
means of his wounded nature’s restoration in the saints. For the saint is precisely the 
one who has learned, through faith’s struggle in temptation, “to take hold of the Word 
and let sink and fall what falls (lassen sincken und fallen, was da felt).”163 He does what 
Adam out to have done: crush the serpent with his foot and say, “Shut up! The Lord’s 
command was different.”164 In such an heroic and holy person, vitiated nature is in 
process of being restored to the original righteousness that had characterized unfallen 
humanity deified by grace, that is to say, to wholehearted trust in the merciful 
goodness of God. 
                                                        
162 WA 42.110.10, LW 1.146. 
163 WA 44.110.41-2, LW 6.148. 
164 WA 42.114.8-9, LW 1.151. 
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3. Human nature vitiated by original sin 
 
Adam and Eve’s rebellion at the Devil’s bidding brings about their own ruination: the 
corruption of their nature and the just sentence of condemnation to death and hell. I 
will return to the problem of God’s wrath in the final section of this chapter. Now our 
concern is the corruptio naturae that comes about through original sin. In Luther’s 
teaching, original sin does not entail the complete obliteration of nature. Rather, it 
means an undoing of the perfections of mankind’s unfallen nature as described above: 
“For the name ‘original sin’ is correctly given to whatever was lost of those conditions 
which Adam enjoyed while his nature was still unimpaired.”165 It should therefore 
come as no surprise that Luther describes original sin in terms of the vitiation of our 
psychological faculties and their permanent teleological frustration.166 Because of this 
fatal wounding of their nature, humans are now cut off from the possibility of 
attaining their true end in knowing, trusting, loving, and adoring communion with 
God. The “darkened” intellect no longer knows God and his beneficent will. Lacking 
true knowledge of God, the human will is “extraordinarily depraved” such that we no 
longer trust God’s mercy or fear his severity, but simply disregard his will and Word 
entirely and give way to the desires and impulses of the flesh. Fearless joy has given 
way to a troubled, unquiet conscience prone either to despair before God’s judgment 
or else to concoct foolish defenses.167 Importantly, because of these “vices of the soul” 
(animi vicia)—which Luther sums as unbelief, ignorance of God, despair, hate, and 
blasphemy—sin-wounded humans “do not everywhere and always give thanks to 
                                                        
165 WA 42.87.2-3, LW 1.114. 
166 So Yeago, “Martin Luther on Grace, Law and Moral Life,” 171. 
167 WA 42.86.19-25, LW 1.114. 
 60
God.”168 The “madness of lust” (furor libidinis), that is concupiscence regarded in a 
primarily sexual sense, is indeed some part of original sin; but these “spiritual 
disasters” (calamitates spirituales) are of greater importance by far.169 Because of them, 
fallen Adam has lost his original righteousness, lost the divine image, and forfeited his 
divine life of fearless joy in communion with God.170 Having made himself his own 
end, his own god, he is now doomed to the futility of failing to achieve his true 
purpose in eucharistic adoration and glorification of God. His fists closed tightly, he 
no longer gives God thanks. 
For the purposes of my argument, I will pass over a more comprehensive study 
of original sin’s global effects and focus more narrowly on its manifestation as the 
abuse of “gifts” (dona).171 At times Luther simply identifies the misuse of gifts as 
                                                        
168 WA 42.86.34-5, LW 1.114. For animi uitia in Augustine, see e.g. civ. dei 14.2 (CCSL 48.416, Bett. 
549). 
169 WA 42.86.39-41, LW 1.114. 
170 In de genesi ad litteram 6.26.37-28.39 (c. 401/16), Augustine states three times that by sinning, 
Adam lost the divine image: 1. after quoting Eph. 4:21-4, Augustine writes: ecce quod perdidit Adam 
per peccatum. In hoc ergo renovamur, secundum id quod amisit Adam, i.e. secundum spiritum mentis 
nostrae. 2. Then, after quoting Col. 3:9-10: hanc imaginem in spiritu mentis impressam perdidit 
Adam per peccatum; quam recipimus per gratiam iustitiae. 3. Lastly: in interiore homine fuerit 
spiritalis, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum; quod amisit peccando, meruitque etiam corporis 
mortem. See WSA I/13.322-3. It is vital to take note of the fact that Eph. 4:21-4 and Col. 3:9-10 deeply 
inform Augustine’s interpretation at this point. At Retr. 2.24, Augustine clarifies: “What I said in the 
sixth book, that ‘Adam lost by sin the image of God according to which he was made,’ is not to be 
taken as meaning that no image at all remained in him, but that it was so misshapen (tam deformis) 
as to stand in need of reshaping (reformatione).’” See WSA I/13.167. On my reading, Luther makes 
both kinds of claims because he agrees with both: with respect to the Eph./Col.-oriented and thus 
righteousness/holiness-focused understanding of the image, it was simply lost through Adam’s sin; 
but with respect to human nature understood in terms of its faculties, it was gravely vitiated but 
not obliterated. And therefore, what Luther sometimes calls the aptitudo passiva remains in fallen 
humans as the material for their potential renovation by grace and the Spirit. See, e.g., the 1525 de 
servo arbitrio, WA 18.636.16-22: At si vim liberi arbitrii eam diceremus, qua homo aptus est rapi 
spiritu et imbui gratia Dei, ut qui sit creatus ad vitam vel mortem aeternam, recte diceretur; hanc 
enim vim, hoc est, aptitudinem, seu ut Sophistae loquuntur dispositivam qualitatem et passivam 
aptitudinem et nos confitemur, quam non arboribus neque bestiis inditam esse, quis est qui nesciat? 
neque enim pro anseribus (ut dicitur) coelum creavit. 
171 On original sin in Luther’s thought, see Hamel, II/13-37; Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin 
Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), 157-60; Lohse, Luther’s Theology, 
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original sin, as in his lecture on Gen. 6:1: “This is the original sin, that we have neither 
the knowledge nor the capability to use God’s great and excellent gifts properly.”172 At 
Gen. 6:4, he states similarly that “we in the corrupt state of our nature cannot make 
use of even the slightest gift without haughtiness.”173 This is the real core of the subtle 
spiritual idolatry that arises precisely in the saints, and is thus the focal point of their 
progressive sanctification by the cross. 
What did the proper use of gifts look like before the fall? In his lecture on Gen. 
3:1, Luther states that Adam’s good and righteous will pleased, obeyed, and trusted in 
God, “making use” (utens) of the creatures “with an expression of thanks.”174 This 
passing remark fits snuggly with Luther’s entire teleological/doxological anthropology. 
Adam too is a creature, and he must “use” himself rightly by offering the gift of his 
being back to God—rejoicing—in the sacrifice of thanksgiving and praise. He exists to 
glorify God and enjoy him forever. This right eucharistic use, and its corollary in the 
true enjoyment of God, has been lost with the fall. Or better, the fall happened when 
Adam stopped offering this sacrifice, and turned away from God toward himself as his 
own chief end: fieri igitur deum est peccatum originale.175 In imitation of the Devil, 
Adam and Eve did so in the act of the first sin itself; and the most gifted of the filii 
Adae are shaped to the core of their being by the same propensity to self-adoration 
and the refusal of thanksgiving to God that this vain-glorying entails. Thus fallen 
mankind, like the Devil, boasts in “gifts” (whether this-worldly or spiritual) as if they 
                                                                                                                                                                     
248-53; Bayer, Luther’s Theology, 177-95; Jairzinho Lopes Pereira, Augustine of Hippo and Martin 
Luther on Original Sin and Justification of the Sinner, 321-342; L’ubomír Batka, “Luther’s Teaching on 
Sin and Evil,” in OHMLT, 233-53. 
172 WA 42.264.38-40, LW 2.4. 
173 WA 42.287.21-2, LW 2.36. 
174 WA 42.106.32-4, LW 1.142. Cf. LW 1.73. 
175 WA 42.647.26-7, cf. LW 3.139. On Gen. 17:10-11. 
 62 
were self-generated possessions and forgets or mocks God, the Giver of every good 
and perfect gift (Jas. 1:17).  
Luther is quite explicit about this point. Lecturing, for example, on Gen. 4:2 
and the story of Cain and Abel, he first reiterates Bernard’s theory of Satan’s fall 
sketched above,176 then applies the same principle to the human race: “This is the 
universal bane of our nature, that we are not satisfied with God’s gifts (non contenti 
sumus donis Dei) but abuse them and thus mock their Donor and Creator.”177 This 
mocking of God takes its most subtle form in the vainglory inherent within the 
autonomous pursuit of virtue: when one arrogates to himself the glory of his 
goodness, it is “rank idolatry” and a “despoiling of the Godhead (spolium 
divinitatis).”178 But alas, this insidious vanity, idolatry, and robbery of God’s glory 
creeps into the hearts of the graced. For all false boasting is false worship, a “glorying” 
(gloriari) in the creature instead of the Creator—even and indeed especially the false 
boasting in spiritual dona that by definition can only take place in the heart of a saint.  
 There are deep Augustinian roots here,179 which surface in Luther’s plaintive 
ruminations on this theme in his 1515/16 scholion on Romans 5:4. The young professor 
                                                        
176 WA 42.181.36-8: Sic cum optimis et pulcherrimis donis prae aliis instructi Angeli in coelo inciperent 
superbire contemnentes humilitatem filii Dei, praecipitati sunt in infernum et facti foedissimi Diaboli. 
177 WA 42.182.1-3, LW 1.244. 
178 WA 42.350.32, LW 2.125. 
179 For the roots of the uti/frui distinction and the exile theme, see Augustine’s De doctrina 
christiana 1.4.4: “Enjoyment, after all, consists in clinging to something lovingly for its own sake, 
while use consists in referring what has come your way to what your love aims at obtaining… if we 
wish to return to our home country, where alone we can be truly happy, we have to use this world, 
not enjoy it.” WSA I/11, 107-8. Luther probably first encountered the distinction while studying 
Peter Lombard, Sent. I d. 1.2. Cf. Raymond Canning, “UTI/FRUI,” in Allan D. Fitzgerald, O.S.A., ed., 
Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 859-60. For the 
Augustinian theology of “boasting” vis-à-vis 1 Cor 4:7 and 1 Cor 1:31, see Pierre-Marie Hombert, 
Gloria Gratiae. Se glorifier en Dieu, principe et fin de la théologie augustinienne de la grâce (Paris: 
Insitut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1996). 
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refers directly to Peter Lombard’s Sententiae Book I dist. 1, which establishes 
Augustine’s uti/frui distinction as the organizing principle of his entire theology.180 
Luther takes it up into his theology of sin and his mysticism of sanctification through 
tribulatio. Sin runs deep, and the uti/frui distinction serves Luther as a heuristic tool 
to penetrate its depths. In this context appears the famous claim that the wound of 
original sin has left our nature “so deeply curved in upon itself” (tam profunda est in 
seipsam incurva).181 What does this mean? Fallen humans do not stop at turning God’s 
finest gifts back upon themselves for their own enjoyment; we even use God himself 
(ipso Deo vtatur) to achieve this end.182 If we do seek God, we do so for our own sakes, 
using him to enjoy ourselves. Everything is upside down: God exists to serve my own 
ego, and I “serve” him only insofar as he serves me, and gratifies my own desires. I am 
a mercenary, serving God for pay; I am the kind of child who “loves” his parents only 
in order to get out of them what he wants. God is in the creature’s place, and the sinful 
creature has exalted himself to God’s throne. As Lohse aptly puts it, “sin is the desire 
to set oneself in place of God, not allowing God to be one’s God.”183  
The original sin, as an historical act of transgression, took just this form: Adam 
usurped God’s place, thinking it better to reign in his own hell than to serve in God’s 
heaven. Now even the saint, still bearing the remnants of original sin in his flesh, 
usurps God’s place precisely as he grows and increases in his service. For God’s gifts 
are so lovely and so “vigorously excite enjoyment” that his fallen nature rushes in upon 
                                                        
180 WA 56.305.6-7, LW 25.292. Cf. the 1544 lecture on Gen. 41:40, WA 44.433.22-3, LW 7.181: “‘But,’ 
you say, I am born from a famous and illustrious heritage, I am a doctor of the law, I am a 
philosopher.’ Correct indeed! Sed his omnibus utendum est, non fruendum, iuxta distinctionem 
Augustini.” 
181 WA 56.304.25-6, LW 25.291. 
182 WA 56.304.27-8, LW 25.291. 
183 Lohse, Luther’s Theology, 250. 
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the “enjoyable” sin of resting in the gifts themselves, instead of thankfully resting in 
God the Giver alone. He does not “love and worship God purely for himself,” but for 
the sake of his grace and gifts. He “luxuriates” in the enjoyment of received grace. This 
fruitio acceptae gratiae is tantalizing and irresistible. He cannot help but enjoy his own 
holiness. But this means he enjoys the creature instead of the Creator.184 He worships 
himself instead of God. He does not yet attain his true end, he is not yet restored to 
the original purity of his nature, for he does not yet glorify God and enjoy him. That 
is—unless God gives him the even higher, yet deeply hidden, gift of sharing in Christ’s 
cross, which “comes and takes away everything he has” to lead him through hope’s 
dark path to the praise and the enjoyment of the Giver in the pure affection of 
friendship and love.185  
 
4. The Promise of the Serpent-Crusher and his grace and gift 
 
“I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your seed and her Seed: 
he shall crush your head, and you shall crush his heel” (Gen. 3:15). Ulrich Asendorf 
asserts that Luther’s christological interpretation of the Protevangelium became the 
“organizing principle” of his mature theology, which “finds its monumental expression 
in the Genesis Lectures.” If it is something of an exaggeration to claim that this verse 
comprises “the summa of Luther’s theology,” Asendorf’s championing of its 
importance does accurately reflect its utter centrality in the Lectures and in the lives 
of the Genesis saints.186 Lecturing on Gen. 3:14 but already anticipating its sequel, 
Luther himself laments his inability to do the text the full justice it deserves, “for it 
                                                        
184 WA 56.305.12-24, LW 25.292; cf. Hamel, Der junge Luther und Augustin, II/30-3, 124-5. 
185 WA 56.305-6, LW 25.292-3. 
186 Ulrich Asendorf, Lectura in Biblia, 19-20. 
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contains whatever is excellent in all Scripture.”187 If this too sounds like a (for Luther 
admittedly characteristic) overstatement, consider a complementary claim from his 
1525 de servo arbitrio: “Take Christ from the Scriptures—and what more will you find 
in them?”188 Jesus Christ is the res of the Bible, and Gen. 3:15 is his first appearance on 
the stage of the history of salvation. Because he is present here in the first promise of 
all, the “source of all mercy and fountainhead of all promises”189 that would follow, 
Luther’s (and Asendorf’s) valuation of the excellency of this verse is in fact quite 
straightforward. Asendorf, who depends heavily on Oswald Bayer’s seminal 
monograph on Promissio in Luther’s Reformation theology,190 may be consulted for an 
exhaustive treatment of this theme; here I attend only to matters of direct relevance to 
my argument. 
 In the first place, Luther’s lectures on Gen. 3:9-15 are highly forensic. Earlier I 
claimed that the two basic problems facing fallen mankind are the corruption of his 
nature and the wrath and judgment of God against his sin. My study of Luther’s 
                                                        
187 WA 42.137.14-5, LW 1.183. 
188 WA 18.606.29, Packer 71. On Christ as the Bible’s res, see Mickey L. Mattox, “Martin Luther,” in 
Justin S. Holcomb, ed., Christian Theologies of Scripture: A Comparative Introduction (New York: 
New York University Press, 2006), 94-113, here 96-98. 
189 WA 42.142.33-4, LW 1.191. 
190 Oswald Bayer, Promissio: Geschichte der reformatorischen Wende in Luthers Theologie. Bayer 
argues forcefully that from the 1520 Babylonian Captivity onward, the promissio-fides relation 
becomes “the crystallization point of Luther’s reformational theology” constituting the real 
Grunddifferenz between evangelical theology and Catholic tradition; in particular, he pits 
evangelical faith in the promise over against the (German) mysticism of Luther’s early theologia 
crucis (12; cf. 166, 173, 181, 191, 195, 235-6, 285, 299-301). Faith in the justifying Promise of the Seed is 
certainly a major theme in the Lectures. Indeed, the high profile of God’s promises in Moses’s First 
Book, beginning with Gen. 3:15 and crescendoing in the history of the patriarchs through Abraham, 
Isaac, and Jacob to the last great promise to Judah at Gen. 49:9-12, may have been among the 
reasons Luther resolved to invest the last decade of his life laboring exegetically over this particular 
book; interestingly, Bayer suggests that Luther’s insights regarding the promise solidified in 1519 
precisely as he preached his way through Genesis (243). But I will argue below in chapter 5.3 that 
Bayer is wrong to dichotomize promissio and crux theology; Luther’s mature theology and 
spirituality of holiness is a theologia mystica promissionis, fidei, et crucis. 
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theology of sanctification will focus on the healing or restoration of human nature. 
But I hope this suggests neither an aversion on my part toward the Reformer’s 
teaching about sin, guilt, judgment, and wrath (doctrina legis), nor that modish 
distaste for his—or anyone else’s—theology of atonement, forgiveness, justification, 
and reconciliation through Christ’s death on the cross (doctrina evangelii) which 
seems to be afflicting much of historical, exegetical, and dogmatic theology today. To 
the contrary, the proper correlation of forgiveness and renewal constitutes a deep and 
abiding concern for Luther and a key aspect of my research. For primarily exegetical 
reasons, the balances tip here in the forensic direction: God enters into judgment with 
Adam and Eve, and this is the story of their trial, conviction, and sentencing. Thus 
Adam, who “sinned and is guilty of death,”191 “stands before God’s judgment seat and is 
now called in for his punishment.”192 To be sure, the vitiation of Adam’s nature is on 
full display: his flight from God, his excuses and prevarications, his aversion from the 
One who had not long since been his greatest delight, his sense of wrath and 
Anfechtung, all demonstrate that “Adam is no longer the same that he was, but that he 
has undergone a change and has become a different person (mutatum et alium esse 
factum).”193 Luther is especially keen to underscore the way Adam’s turn to self 
functions in the state of despair brought upon a man by the sense that his sin has 
made God his implacable foe: though his only hope of help consists in turning away 
from himself to God, apart from God’s own merciful intervention his bentness toward 
self only disposes him to run further away, whether by hiding from God altogether, or 
                                                        
191 WA 42.130.34, LW 1.175. 
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by justifying himself, or by laying the blame for his sin at God’s own feet. “Thus we see 
Adam and Eve so fallen and sunk in sin that they cannot sink deeper.”194 Only the 
promise of God’s mercy is powerful enough to evoke such a sunken heart’s faith, to 
pull it back out of its despairing obsession with itself to vivifying fellowship with God: 
“Unless hearts are raised up through trust in mercy (fiducia misericordiae), this nature 
cannot be urged on beyond this point.”195 The word that promises divine mercy, the 
pardon of transgression and the abolition of God’s wrath through Christ, is itself the 
root of man’s renovation; there is here a possible echo of Staupitz’s inversion of gratia 
gratum faciens as the grace that makes God pleasing to the sinner, an object no longer 
of fear but of hope and trust because of the Gospel.196  
Regardless, Luther sets out to exegete this text as the story of how God, in his 
mercy, makes himself pleasing to pitiable and cowering Adam and Eve. He finds 
evidence of this gracious turning already to hand in the fatherly way the Lord deals 
with his rebellious subjects, who had been the object of Satan’s cruelty and deception, 
as opposed to the stern and unqualified judgment with which he handles the Deceiver. 
This in two respects: first, the fact that God calls Adam and Eve back from their sin. 
Fascinatingly, Luther avers that this fatherly turning “shows that even then Christ, our 
Deliverer, had placed himself between God and man as a Mediator”197 (cf. 1 Tim. 2:5). 
He explains further: “although the promise concerning Christ”—viz., Gen. 3:15—“is not 
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yet there, it is already noticeable in the thought and counsel of God.”198 This is either a 
rather daring piece of speculative theology bordering on the later Reformed concept of 
the intra-trinitarian pactum salutis (a real possibility given its medieval precedents199) 
or at the least a more scripturally-grounded insistence that God’s mercies are always 
grounded in and with a view toward the mediation of Jesus Christ and the 
reconciliation between God and man achieved by his self-interposing in taking man’s 
flesh and suffering on the cross. The second pre-promise evidence of God’s fatherly 
affection for Adam and Eve consists in the cursing of the serpent in Gen. 3:14. The 
Devil’s unmitigated punishment itself comforts them by assuring them that God has 
entered into the lists as the enemy of their own foe: “Here in the midst of most serious 
threats the Father reveals his heart,” and promises victory over the deceiver and 
conqueror of human nature.200 These proofs of the Father’s mercy and affection for his 
human creatures are of decisive importance for their destiny, for as guilty traitors 
worthy of death their most pressing need is for a merciful pardon that would restore 
them to the good graces of their Sovereign.    
Now to the Protevangelium itself. For Luther, the promise of a “Seed” born 
from the woman who will crush the Serpent’s head is a fully-orbed presentation of the 
Gospel of the incarnation of God’s Son from Mary and his victory over sin, death, and 
the powers of hell through his death and resurrection. Combined with the threats of 
Gen. 3:14, this first promise draws up Adam and Eve into battle against the Devil and 
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199 So Christine Helmer, “God from Eternity to Eternity: Luther’s Trinitarian Understanding,” HTR 
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alongside God himself, “with the hope of help from the Son of God, the Seed of the 
woman.” Thus forgiveness of sins and reception back into God’s grace are extended to 
Adam and Eve through this promise: “Their guilt has been forgiven; they have been 
won back from death and have already been set free from hell.”201 In accord with the 
forensic emphases of the trial at God’s judgment seat, the promise of the Woman’s 
Seed has as its real focal point the liberation, through Christ’s atoning sacrifice, of 
Adam and Eve from the guilt of their sin and its just punishment in death and hell. To 
expound the meaning of the promise, Luther turns rather naturally to Rom. 4:25 
(“Christ died for our sins and rose again for our justification”) and John 1:29 (“Behold 
the Lamb of God, which bears the sin of the world”).202 The joining of these verses 
embodies the inseparable nexus in Luther’s kerygmatic theology of objective 
substitutionary atonement through Christ’s shed blood and its subjective implicate, 
free justification by grace through faith in Christ (cf. Rom. 3:21-28). Held together as 
Luther holds them here, they show how atonement by the cross and justification by 
faith are two sides of the same coin. It is no accident that the very same verses, in the 
same order, front Luther’s presentation of “the first and chief article” regarding “the 
office and work of Jesus Christ, or to our redemption” in the 1537 Smalcald Articles203 
(on which more below in chapter 2). There as here, the primary issue for Luther is “the 
glory of our redemption and deliverance” from sin, death, and hell; and this glory 
belongs by right and quite exclusively to the Son of God, the Promised Seed.204 In 
short: “the Son of God had to become a sacrifice to achieve these things for us, to take 
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away sin, to swallow up death, and to restore the lost obedience.”205 Thus the mercy 
and affection of the Father, who turned to his lost and ruined creatures already with a 
view to their redemption through the Mediator, first promises and then finally secures 
the pardon, justification, and reconciliation of sinners to himself through the death of 
his Son, Eve’s Seed. It is noteworthy that in a text so given to the Christus Victor 
theme, which is by no means absent in the lecture, it is the Seed come as the sacrificial 
Lamb who triumphs and crushes Satan’s head. The Son’s sacrifice on the cross is itself 
the great victory over the Devil: through it, sin’s power to condemn is destroyed; 
death, the just wages of sin, is therefore abolished; and in this way, the head of the 
murdering, lying, and accusing adversary is crushed.206 
In the next chapter, I will argue that in the 1530s and 40s Luther’s typical 
shorthand for this gift of forgiveness and justification received at the hands of God’s 
fatherly mercy and secured through Christ’s blood is gratia, “grace.” It is the heart and 
soul of the first promise as Luther exposits it in the Lectures, and as such it constitutes 
the central reality of the patriarchal saints who, like Adam and Eve, put their trust and 
hope in the promise of God’s grace in Christ. However, as my introductory reading of 
Luther on Ps. 51 has already shown, this does not exhaust the fullness of his theology 
of the ransomed and restored human creature. The first promise, and the Gospel as 
such, necessarily emphasizes the grace of reconciliation with God through Christ 
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because the basic disaster of ruined humanity is alienation from God through sin. But 
in Luther’s theology, the promise of a grace and mercy strong in Christ to restore the 
sinner to fellowship with God always and necessarily entails the promise of the 
restoration of the sinner himself, the healing and restoration of his nature into the 
fullness of life and joy in union with God. This, in Luther’s shorthand, is the Spirit-
worked donum or “gift,” a term sufficiently elastic to encompass all the element’s of 
man’s renewal from regeneration, through progress in sanctification, to the full glory 
of the resurrection.  
In the lecture on Gen. 3:15, this theme is present but muted, not because of 
Luther’s lack of interest in it but because of the mainly forensic themes called for by 
the scriptural text itself. Still, it is there: those who believe the promise are enlisted in 
battle, by faith in the Seed, against the Devil; and they are able to do so effectively 
because in addition to abolishing sin as guilt, the promise of the Seed also brings with 
it the renewal of Adam and Eve’s lost obedience. Thus Jesus Christ defeats the devil, 
death, sin, and the Law’s power to condemn (“grace”), “and not only this, but at the 
same time the obedience which was lost is restored (restituitur simul obedientia, quae 
amissa est)” (“gift”).207 This restoration is real but imperfect in this life: “we make some 
progress (aliquousque procedimus),” but the abiding presence of sin warring in our 
members—Luther alludes here to Rom. 7:23—prevents the perfection of righteousness 
in this life.208 Thus Adam and Eve, restored through faith in the promise of the Seed, 
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are not yet fully restored to the life they had lost; they live in hope of the resurrection 
of their flesh and the eternal life that is promised to them through the Son of God.209  
Now, as Peura has pointed out,210 what is intriguing about this claim is Luther’s 
contention that unfallen Adam and Eve had already lived in hope of a resurrection-like 
translatio. What Luther seems to be saying is this: on the one hand, partially restored 
but still sinful humans are not yet possessed of the full vigor of righteousness, life, and 
joy enjoyed by Adam and Eve prior to the fall. Yet at the same time, their partial 
restoration to that originally given holiness of life entails within it a full restoration to 
the original state of eschatological hope. Adam has forfeited his chance at obtaining 
the translatio through his own obedience, but in the end he will arrive at his originally 
appointed destination nonetheless through the obedience unto death and the 
victorious resurrection of the Second Adam, the Son of God. In the meantime, post as 
ante lapsum, he lives in hope. 
What of the restoration of the image itself? In the immediate vicinity of the 
lectures on Gen. 1:26 that I explored above, Luther found the occasion to discuss the 
loss of the image through original sin and its restoration through the grace and gift of 
the Gospel: imago illa reparetur.211 The Gospel brings it about that ruined humanity is 
re-formed (reformemur) “according to that familiar and indeed better image.” For 
through it, we are “born again into eternal life, or rather into the hope of eternal life 
by faith, that we may live in God and with God and be one with him, as Christ says” 
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(John 17:21).212 Luther rushes ahead, as it were, to the final glory of the complete 
restoration of human nature, even to the extent of its deifying union with God, then 
pulls back to reassert the same eschatological reserve we saw above: we are reborn 
into the hope of eternal life. There follows a compact summary of Luther’s theology of 
grace and gift, with the restoration of the image both in this life and in the next falling 
under the latter category. Faith takes hold of God’s mercy through Christ, acquires 
Christ’s merits, and knows that by Christ’s death we have been set free. This is man’s 
rebirth ad iustitiam, the righteousness of faith through which he is set free from guilt 
and condemnation and reconciled to God. But from it (inde) “that other righteousness 
of ours arises, namely that newness of life (novitas vitae) by which we are zealous to 
obey God.” To be sure, this second kind of righteousness is never perfect in this life 
and, therefore, can never stand as the basis for one’s standing before God’s righteous 
judgment. But by the Holy Spirit given to us through the Gospel, a real beginning is 
made in newness of life (cf. Rom. 6:4), fierce resistance is offered against the flesh that 
remains (cf. Rom 7:14-25), and the “grace” of God’s mercy in Christ covers whatever is 
lacking in the “gift” of the Christian’s renewal.213 “In this manner”—that is, by the gift 
of inchoate renewal empowered by the Spirit—“this image of the new creature (imago 
ista novae creaturae) begins to be restored by the Gospel in this life, but it will not be 
finished in this life.”214 Then, when the image is perfected in the Father’s kingdom, 
man’s natural psychological faculties will be restored: the will made truly free and 
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good, the mind enlightened, the memory steadfast and sure.215 That is, the natural 
perfections that rendered Adam originally capax of deifying union with God, ruined by 
his rebellion, will be restored; which is why, as we saw just above, Luther explicitly 
describes the eschatological completion of the redeemed in the Johannine terms of 
eternal life in, with, and united to God. In short: “the godly have within themselves 
that unfinished image (imaginem rudem) which God will on the Last Day bring to 
perfection in those who have believed his Word.”216    
Those who have believed his “Word”—that is, the Promise of the Gospel, first 
freely spoken by God in his mercy to unworthy Adam and Eve at Gen. 3:15. It is crucial 
to grasp that both the grace of forgiveness and reconciliation with God through Christ 
and the gift of the restoration of human nature, the novitas vitae begun in this life and 
perfected in the glory of the resurrection, are included in and given with the Promise 
of the serpent-crushing Seed. There is a real priority to “grace,” for at least two 
reasons: first, the origin of the redemption and restoration of ruined mankind lies 
entirely in the merciful purpose of the Father, who turns to us in Christ the Mediator; 
second, the incompletion (in this life) of the saint’s renewal after the image of God in 
true holiness ever stands in need of being covered over by the mercy of God in 
Christ.217 But grace is ordered to glory, and the final aim of God’s mercy in pardoning 
and accepting sinners through Christ is the restoration of these ruined creatures to 
their true end of glorifying and enjoying him. That, after all, is what the invidious 
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Devil sought to destroy: the image of God which is the summum cultum.218 When the 
generous God purposes in mercy to destroy the work of the Devil, and promises Adam 
and Eve that he will do so by crushing the Serpent’s head through Eve’s Seed, it is the 
whole evil work that he purposes to undo and overcome. Thus “grace” leads to glory 
through the ongoing restorative work of the “gift.” Grace, we might say, restores the 
union of God and man from God’s side of the relation, through his own free mercy and 
through the Mediator and his sacrifice. But it is the gift of the Spirit’s renewal that 
restores this union from man’s side, healing and renewing his inmost being and thus 
empowering him to trust and love, hope and delight in the God who has accepted him 
freely in Christ. Each of these two blessings, the grace of forgiveness and the gift of the 
image’s renewal into the highest righteousness of eucharistic life, is given in the 
promise of the Gospel and received by faith/hope: “These treasures we possess in 
Christ, but in hope.”219 
The following chapter pursues Luther’s mature theology of grace and gift in 
greater depth. 
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2. LUTHER’S MATURE DOGMATICS OF HOLINESS (1536-44):  
GRACE, GIFT, AND THE “AUGUSTINIAN SIMUL” 
 
 
We come now to the heart of my argument in this book: in the present chapter 
expositing the mature Luther’s dogmatics of holiness, then in Part II exploring its 
roots in the young Luther’s appropriation of the old Augustine’s theology of sin, grace, 
and holiness. Since in chapter 1.4 I have already introduced the dogmatic subject 
matter to be taken up at length here, I can afford to be relatively brief in this 
introduction. My principal object is to set forth Luther’s creedal and evangelical 
theology of forgiveness and justification in Jesus Christ (gratia/Gnade) and 
regeneration and progressive renewal in holiness of life by the Holy Spirit 
(donum/Gabe); and to do so attending carefully to the kind of “sin” which 
characterizes the saints of God as they live, suffer, and fight in via under the covering 
of Christ’s great grace and in the strength of the Spirit’s effectual gift. In process, I 
have three subordinate goals in mind as well: first, to drawn attention to the scriptural 
exegesis that informs and shapes Luther’s dogmatics; second, to highlight the robust 
economic trinitarianism that is virtually co-extensive with this scriptural dogmatics; 
third, to bring to light the reality and nature of the renewed spiritual agency which the 
Holy Spirit brings about in the saints of God by his gift. A few comments on these 
three ancillary aims will, I think, help to elucidate my approach in this chapter. 
In the first two points, I stand close to Ulrich Asendorf both in his critique of 
much modern historical and dogmatic theology and in his proposed alternative. 
Discussing Gerhard Ebeling’s influential work on Luther’s hermeneutics, Asendorf 
states that as a rule, “the more abstract one’s understanding of the Word, the greater 
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the possibility that the interpreter is removed from Luther and his biblical fullness.”220 
That strikes me as exactly right; and one concrete way to counteract this scholarly flaw 
is to attend with great care to the proof-texts that Luther appeals to as he argues 
theologically, rather than skipping on (as is the scholarly fashion) past his scriptural 
premises to the conclusions he reaches thereby. The better we become at listening to 
Luther as he listens to the Word of God, the deeper our grasp of his response to that 
Word—i.e., his theology—will become; and beyond the real gains to be had in 
historical comprehension, this increased proximity to the Word will better position us 
to critically assess both the strengths and the weaknesses of Luther’s dogmatics in 
lumine scripturae.221 
As to the second point: Asendorf speaks of the older Luther’s growing concern 
to integrate Scripture and Dogma, the result being a lively, dramatic, and “integral 
theology” that echoes the Bible’s polyphony and revolves around the cantus firmus of 
Gen. 3:15; and for Luther, a kind of patristic exegete born out of season, the 
Protevangelium is empty and lifeless apart from the rich trinitarian christology that he 
finds hidden in the enigmatic promise of an eternal redemption through the mortal 
human Seed of Eve which only the true and living God himself could ever possibly 
accomplish.222 In the course of his own meditations on Luther’s exegesis of Gen. 3:15, 
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Asendorf draws on Albrecht Peters’ great Kommentar zu Luthers Katechismen to 
establish this point; and even if one must decline Asendorf and Peters’ suggestion that 
Luther’s resolute focus on the saving economy of God in Christ signals a return past 
die augustinisch-scholastischen Trinitätsspekulationen back to die altkirchlichen 
Trinitätstheologie exemplified by the Cappadocian fathers—since, on the one hand, 
Augustine’s and Thomas’ speculations were deeply grounded in the biblical economy 
of salvation, and on the other Basil, the two Gregories, and Luther were all keenly 
interested in speculative trinitarian theology—still, I think they are quite right to say 
that Luther’s relentless attention to the biblical Zentrum of the gospel led to an 
enriched trinitarianism as a matter of course.223 In Luther’s mature theology of God’s 
free bestowal of grace in Christ and renewal by his Spirit’s gift, we shall see this 
reinvigoration of a scriptural, evangelical, and catholic trinitarianism on full display.224 
                                                                                                                                                                     
theologian. Abraham “understood the promise beautifully” for “he reasoned (ratiocinatus est)” (WA 
42.448.17-18, LW 2.261) in the following way: First, the promise clearly states that through Abraham 
all the nations of the earth will experience “blessing”: specifically, blessing to overcome the curse 
that entered upon the human race because of original sin. Thus Abraham correlates the new 
promise of Gen. 12:3 with the original promise of Gen. 3:15, interpreted with the help of the 
curse/blessing contrast elaborated by St. Paul in Gal. 3:10-14 (WA 44.448.3-5, LW 2.261). The curse 
of sin, death, and damnation that afflicts the entire human race is to be removed, somehow, “in” 
Abraham, and replaced with the blessing of forgiveness, life, and salvation. Abraham knows this 
cannot possibly come to pass through his own person, for two reasons: first, he is mortal, and 
second, he is himself a sinner saved by sheer mercy. Therefore, the promise must refer to one of his 
heirs, the “Seed” (cf. Gen. 22:18) who will be such a Man as to be blessed in his own person (per se 
benedictus) and thus without need of the blessing of another. But in order to bring blessing to the 
entire world, this human offspring of Abraham must necessarily be true God at the same time. He 
therefore concludes his vaguely Anselmian logic: “He must necessarily be God and not a human 
being, although He will be a human being and will take on our flesh so that He is truly my seed” 
(WA 42.447.20-29, LW 2.260). Thus Abraham reasoned, on the basis of Gen. 12:3’s promise of 
“blessing” (and back of it, the first promise of Gen. 3:15), to the fully-orbed doctrine of the two 
natures in Christ’s person that encompasses the mysterium incarnationis filii Dei (WA 42.448.17, 
LW 2.261). 
223 See Asendorf, 73, and Albrecht Peters, Kommentar zu Luthers Katechismen. Bd. 2: Der Glaube—
Das Apostolikum, 39-50. 
224 On the depth of Luther’s creedal catholicity, see G. Kretschmar, “Die altkirchliche Tradition in 
der evangelischen Kirche,” in Tradition und Glaubensgerechtigkeit: Das Arnoldshainer Gespräch 
zwischen Vertretern der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland und der Russischen Orthodoxen Kirche 
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The creedal and richly trinitarian dogmatics of holiness that I read in Luther’s 
texts puts me at odds with some major currents in the scholarship. In the first place, 
for Luther the gospel of grace in Jesus Christ is unintelligible apart from the revelation 
of God’s just judgment and fierce wrath against sin through the law. Since 
condemnation to death and hell at the hands of God’s justice is the great and 
fundamental disaster facing fallen mankind, the satisfaction of God’s justice through 
the merciful donation of his own Son pro nobis in the cradle and on the cross—and 
above all, the shedding of his blood as our substitute—stands at the heart of the 
gospel of grace (Rom. 1:18-3:26, 8:1-4). The verbum crucis is not in vogue today,225 but 
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(2011): 1-15. This inattention to the real Jesus Christ, true God and Man in one Person, nailed to the 
cross for our sins and raised for our justification, is, I think, a structural flaw in Bayer’s 2003 book 
on Martin Luther’s Theology. In e.g. cp. 10.3.2 (“Christ’s Nature is His Work—Christ’s Work is His 
Nature”), Bayer interweaves passages from the Large and Small Catechisms: “That now is the 
summa of this article, that the little word ‘Lord’ simply means the same as ‘Redeemer,’ that is, he 
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these dogmatic themes cannot be avoided without running the risk of a serious 
historical misapprehension of Luther’s mature doctrine of “grace.” No presentation of 
Luther’s theology of holiness that minimizes the cross of Christ and the free gift of 
righteousness won by it (and given freely to faith) can do real justice to the Reformer’s 
actual position. Rather than arguing for the reality of renewal in holiness at free 
justification’s expense, I follow Luther’s texts in emphasizing both; and perhaps I will 
find a few salty amici crucis (or even a Bluttheologe like Joachim Mörlin) amongst my 
readers.226  
The deep trinitarianism of Luther’s dogmatics of holiness cuts against another 
and perhaps more surprising grain in the scholarship. There is a tendency in some 
                                                                                                                                                                     
who brought us back from the devil to God, from death to life, from sin to righteousness, and keeps 
us there” (p. 232, LC, BSLK, 1056.18-20, BC, 434), then “who has redeemed me, a lost and 
condemned person, acquired, won from all sins, from death and from the power of the devil… with 
his holy, precious blood and with his innocent suffering and death” (p. 233, SC, BSLK, 872.4-7, BC, 
355). Well and good; but Bayer dances around the quite explicit and concrete teaching of the LC on 
(1) God’s wrath against sin, and the sentence of eternal damnation which fallen human beings have 
merited and deserved (BSLK, 1056.6-9, BC, 434), and (2) the satisfaction Christ rendered through 
his death: “He became man, conceived and born of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin, free from all sin, 
so that he would be the Lord of sin; to that end he suffered, died, and was buried, so that he might 
make satisfaction (gnug thete) for me and pay what I had owed, not with silver or gold but with his 
own precious blood [1 Pet. 1:18-9]” (BSLK, 1056.24-9, BC, 434). Bayer’s omissions are telling in 
themselves: but in his comments on the material that he does quote from the Catechisms, he 
engages in rather speculative meditations on the intersection of eternity and time in the identity of 
God and fails to attend to the simplest and most important matters at hand, to wit, Jesus Christ and 
him crucified. It would seem that, in principle, Bayer’s attempt to distance the law from the God of 
the Gospel (“one cannot attribute the law that kills to the triune God, pure and simple,” 224) has 
eliminated a priori both the possibility of and the need for the satisfaction of God’s justice through 
the penal sufferings of the incarnate Son. Similar criticisms might be leveled against, e.g., Gerhard 
Ebeling, Gerhard Forde, and George Lindbeck, whose contribution to the Forde-festschrift is 
especially illuminating: “Justification and Atonement: An Ecumenical Trajectory,” in Joseph A. 
Burgess, ed., By Faith Alone: Essays on Justification in Honor of Gerhard O. Forde (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2004), 183-219. For a critical analysis of this major problem in modern Lutheran 
dogmatics, see Jack D. Kilcrease, “The Self-Donation of God: Gerhard Forde and the Question of 
Atonement in Lutheran Tradition” (PhD diss., Marquette University, 2009). 
226 Olli-Pekka Vainio, Justification and Participation in Christ: The Development of the Lutheran 
Doctrine of Justification from Luther to the Formula of Concord (1580) (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2008), 
25-6, is such a friend, as are Asendorf and Peters. Vainio (124) relates that in his polemics against 
Mörlin, Osiander derided him as a “blood theologian.”  
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Finnish theologians to read both gratia and donum in christological terms at the 
expense of the proper work of the Spirit, often in concert with a somewhat forced 
differentiation between Luther and Melanchthon in this regard.227 One of my major 
aims in this chapter is to accentuate the pneumatological character of the “gift” in 
Luther’s mature theology, and in so doing to establish the inseparability of forgiveness 
in Christ (gratia) and real renewal by the Spirit (donum) on the sure trinitarian footing 
that it in fact enjoys in the works of his maturity. 
I have a hunch that this is not unrelated to the third of my ancillary aims in 
this chapter. At the center of Mannermaa’s groundbreaking work is the thesis that 
Jesus Christ himself is present in faith: in ipsa fide Christus adest. On my reading, this 
is in fact a vital theme for Luther in not a few of his writings, including some of his 
most important and well-known, e.g., the 1520 Freedom of a Christian, the 1521 
Antilatomus, and in particular the great 1531/5 Lectures on Galatians upon which 
Mannermaa rested most of his case.228 In some of his comments on Gal. 2:20 (“Now it 
                                                        
227 Tuomo Mannermaa, Der im Glauben gegenwärtige Christus: Rechtfertigung und Vergottung zum 
ökumenischen Dialog (Hannover: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1989), esp. 15, 30, 56-62, 82-3; Simo 
Peura, “Christus als Gunst und Gabe”; Vainio, Justification and Participation in Christ, 10-11 (on 
Mannermaa), 26-7, 38, but much better at 49-51 on texts from the 1530s and 40s; also cp. 3, on 
Melanchthon. Pace Vainio, Master Philipp’s teaching on the Spirit’s effective renewal of the 
believer’s psychological faculties, affections, and operations (as Vainio himself sets it forth) bears 
striking resemblance to Doctor Luther’s, at least in the 1535-46 period. Cf. Reinhard Flogaus, 
“Luther versus Melanchthon? Zur Frage der Einheit der Wittenberger Reformation in der 
Rechtfertigungslehre,” ARG 91 (2000), 6-46.  
228 On Gal. 2:16, WA 40/1.228.31-229.30 [Dr] (cf. LW 26.129-30): fides Christiana non est otiosa 
qualitas vel vacua siliqua in corde quae possit exsistere in peccato mortali, donec charitas accedat et 
eam vivificet, Sed si est vera fides, est quaedam certa fiducia cordis et firmus assensus quo Christus 
apprehenditur, Sic ut Christus sit obiectum fidei, imo non obiectum, sed, ut ita dicam, in ipsa fide 
Christus adest. Fides ergo est cognitio quaedam vel tenebra quae nihil videt, Et tamen in istis tenebris 
Christus fide apprehensus sedet, Quemadmodum Deus in Sinai et in Templo sedebat in medio 
tenebrarum. Est ergo formalis nostra iustitia non charitas informans fidem, sed ipsa fides et nebula 
cordis, hoc est, fiducia in rem quam non videmus, hoc est, in Christum qui, ut maxime non videatur, 
tamen praesens est. Iustificat ergo fides, quia apprehendit et possidet istum thesaurum, scilicet 
Christum praesentem. Sed quo modo praesens sit, non est cogitabile, quia sunt tenebrae, ut dixi. Ubi 
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is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me”),229 Luther’s emphasis on the real 
presence of Christ in faith does seem to overwhelm any sense of a distinct personal 
agency on the believer’s part; and because of their zeal to promote the ontological 
reality of union with Christ, this is a point the Finns are inclined to underscore.230 If 
this Finnish emphasis on Christ’s agency is then combined with vague assumptions 
about Luther’s “monergism” (Alleinwirksamkeit) based upon impressions formed by 
the 1525 de servo arbitrio—assumptions which, I suspect, grow in force in inverse 
proportion to how closely that intricate text is actually read—the notion of Luther as a 
theologian of renewed human agency would seem a most unlikely hypothesis.  
Yet I will argue that this is just what we find in the texts at hand: a repeated 
grappling with the mysterious interplay of divine and human action, carried out 
within a broadly Augustinian framework but now with Augustine’s gratia cooperans 
reworked into Luther’s donum Spiritus Sancti. To be sure, the fallen human being can 
only suffer the advent of grace. But once a dead son or daughter of Adam is reborn in 
Christ and made alive by the Spirit, the latter’s vivifying gift renews the nature vitiated 
                                                                                                                                                                     
ergo vera fiducia cordis est, ibi adest Christus in ipsa nebula et fide. Eaque est formalis iustitia propter 
quam homo iustificatur, non propter charitatem, ut Sophistae loquuntur. Summa: Sicut Sophistae 
dicunt charitatem formare et imbuere fidem, Sic nos dicimus Christum formare et imbuere fidem vel 
formam esse fidei. Ergo fide apprehensus et in corde habitans Christus est iustitia Christiana propter 
quam Deus nos reputat iustos et donat vitam aeternam. 
229 WA 40/1.287.24-34 [Dr] (cf. LW 26.169-70): Supra dixerat: ‘Ego mortuus sum’ etc. Hoc malevolus 
facile sic calumniaretur: Quid ais Paule? Mortuus es? Unde ergo loqueris et scribis? Infirmus etiam 
facile offenderetur: Quis tu? An non video te vivere? res gerentem? Respondet: ‘Vivo quidem, verum 
iam non ego, sed Christus vivit in me.’ Est igitur duplex vita: Mea naturalis vel animalis, et aliena, 
scilicet Christi in me. Secundum animalem meam vitam mortuus sum, iamque vivo alienam vitam. 
Non vivo iam Paulus, sed Paulus mortuus est. Quis tum vivit? Christianus. Paulus ergo ut in se vivens 
plane per legem mortuus est, Sed ut in Christo vel potius ut Christus in eo vivens vivit aliena vita, quia 
Christus in eo loquitur, operatur et exercet omnes actiones. Hoc iam non est Paulinae sed Christianae 
vitae. 
230 Mannermaa, Der im Glauben gegenwärtige Christus, 52-62; Reijo Työrinoja, “Opus theologicum: 
Luther and medieval theories of action,” Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und 
Religionsphilosophie 44/2 (2002), 119-53; Vainio, Justification and Participation in Christ, 33-4, 40-1. 
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in Adam and thus restores believers to the spiritual agency in which real human 
holiness chiefly consists: believing God’s promise, hoping in his faithfulness, loving 
him with all the tattered fragments of one’s broken heart, rejoicing in his goodness, 
and giving him thanks. This very much includes that high pitch of spiritual agency 
which only comes about amidst the extreme sufferings of the Anfechtungen. By the 
Spirit’s hidden co-operations, an actio spiritualis comes into being precisely and only 
in summa passione, in process refining the spiritual agent’s character in the virtues of 
faith, hope, patience, detachment, and love. Attending to the Holy Spirit’s role in the 
economy of salvation will help bring Luther’s reflections on human agency out from 
under the dark shadow of determinism into the light of the true freedom which God 
gives again to the redeemed of Jesus Christ in the depths of their being through the 
operations of his Spirit. In the words of ancient prophecy and promise: “I will put my 
Spirit within you, and you shall live” (Ezek. 37:14). 
 The scholarship on “grace,” “gift,” and the “simul” is immense; though there is 
no need to rehearse here what I have written in the introduction to this book, I think 
it is helpful to focus our attention on a few salient figures. Most misreadings of 
Luther’s theology of holiness can be traced back to Rudolf Hermann’s 1930 monograph 
on the “simul” via Wilfried Joest’s 1951 Gesetz und Freiheit. I will engage Hermann at 
length in Part II below. In this chapter, Joest’s introduction of a distinction between 
the Total- and Partialaspekt of the “simul” will occupy my attention. Joest’s 
Totalaspekt is so deeply ensconced in the literature that it is pretty much assumed in 
many quarters as a kind of primum principium for interpreting Luther’s theology of 
renewal in holiness—that is to say, for taking as granted that he doesn’t really have 
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much of one. David Yeago first taught me to question the validity of this principle,231 
and my confidence in rejecting it has grown steadily as I have studied the works of 
Julius Köstlin,232 Reinhold Seeberg,233 Axel Gyllenkrok,234 Regin Prenter,235 Philip 
Watson,236 Manfred Schloenbach,237 Erwin Iserloh,238 Juhani Forsberg,239 Jarod 
Wicks,240 Gilbert Meilaender,241 Simo Peura,242 Sammeli Juntunen,243 Andreas 
Wöhle,244 Otto Hermann Pesch,245 Theodor Dieter,246 Reinhard Hütter,247 Risto 
                                                        
231 David Yeago, “Martin Luther on Renewal and Sanctification: Simul Iustus et Peccator Revisited.” 
232 The Theology of Luther in its Historical Development and Inner Harmony, esp. II/4.435-45, 455-58, 
465-6. 
233 Reinhold Seeberg, The Text-Book of the History of Doctrines, trans. Charles E. Hay (Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 1977), II/3.260-5. 
234 Axel Gyllenkrok, Rechtfertigung und Heiligung in der frühen evangelischen Theologie Luthers 
(Uppsala: A.-B. Lundequistska Bokhandeln, 1952). 
235 Regin Prenter, “Luthers Lehre von der Heiligung,” in Vilmos Vajta, ed. Lutherforschung heute: 
Referate und Berichte des 1. Internationalen Lutherforschungskongresses, Aarhus, 18.-23. August 1956 
(Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1958), 64-74. 
236 Philip Watson, “Luther und die Heiligung,” in Vilmos Vajta, ed. Lutherforschung heute, 75-84. 
237 Manfred Schloenbach, Heiligung als Fortschreiten und Wachstum des Glaubens in Luthers 
Theologie (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola, 1963). 
238 Erwin Iserloh, “Gratia und Donum, Rechtfertigung und Heiligung nach Luthers Schrift ‘Wider 
den Löwener Theologen Latomus’ (1521),” in Luise Abramowski und J. F. Gerhard Goeters, eds., 
Studien zur Geschichte und Theologie der Reformation. Festschrift für Ernst Bizer (Neukirchener 
Verlag, 1969), 141-156. 
239 Forsberg, Das Abrahambild. 
240 Jarod Wicks, S.J. Luther’s Reform: Studies on Conversion and the Church (Mainz: von Zabern, 
1992), esp. cp. 4, “Living and Praying as simul iustus et peccator: A Chapter in Luther’s Spiritual 
Teaching,” and cp. 9, “HOLY SPIRIT—CHURCH—SANCTIFICATION: Insights from Luther’s 
Instructions on the Faith.” 
241 Gilbert Meilaender, The Theory and Practice of Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1984), cp. 5: “The Examined Life is Not Worth Living: Learning from Luther”; Faith and 
Faithfulness. Basic Themes in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 
cp. 4: “Human Nature: The Justified Sinner”; “Grace, Justification through Faith, and Sin,” in 
Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics: Protestants Engage Pope John Paul II’s Moral Encyclicals, eds. 
Reinhard Hütter and Theodor Dieter (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 60-83; “Divine Grace and 
Ethics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics, eds. Gilbert Meilaender and William 
Werpehowski (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 74-90; The Freedom of a Christian: Grace, 
Vocation, and the Meaning of Our Humanity (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2006), 37-55. 
242 Peura, “Die Teilhabe an Christus bei Luther” (1990); Mehr als ein Mensch? Die Vergöttlichung als 
Thema der Theologie Martin Luthers von 1513 bis 1519 (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1994); “Christus 
als Gunst und Gabe” (1997). 
243 Sammeli Juntunen, Der Begriff des Nichts bei Luther in den Jahren von 1510 bis 1523 (Helsinki: 
Luther-Agricola, 1996). 
244 Andreas H. Wöhle, Luthers Freude an Gottes Gesetz: Eine historische Quellenstudie zur 
Oszillation des Gesetzesbegriffes Martin Luthers im Licht seiner alttestamentlichen Predigten. 
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Saarinen,248 Olli-Pekka Vainio,249 Mickey Mattox,250 and Jairzinho Lopes Pereira.251 In 
their diverse ways and to varying degrees, each of these theologians has argued against 
Hermann and/or Joest (or other readers of Luther who take their lead from them) in 
the course of arguing that real renewal in holiness constituted a core dogmatic 
commitment for the historical Luther. My argument in this chapter stands on their 
shoulders. This includes those occasions when I have found it necessary to correct an 
emphasis here or there, usually in relation to how a given reader of Luther calibrates 
the often complex interrelation of the dogmatic and spiritual realities summed up in 
the three helpful verba that orient this chapter: gratia, donum, simul. If there are 
particularly novel aspects to my work, I suspect they lie in two areas: one, my 
contention that the “simul” as Luther held it was deeply Augustinian, and perhaps 
above all in his consistent and adamant insistence that the saint’s refusal of consent to 
his residual sin is the gift-empowered conditio sine qua non for his remaining in the 
grace of Christ; two, my exclusive focus on writings from the last decade of Luther’s 
life. This, as opposed (say) to the richly rewarding—and programmatic—Antilatomus 
                                                                                                                                                                     
245 Otto Hermann Pesch, “Simul iustus et peccator. Sinn und Stellenwert einer Formel Martin 
Luthers. Thesen und Kurzkommentare,” in Theodor Schneider and Gunther Wenz, eds., Gerecht 
und Sünder zugleich? Ökumenische Klärungen (Freiburg: Herder and Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2001), 146-67. Pesch seems to have modified his reading of Luther since his huge 1967 
book, Theologie der Rechtfertigung bei Martin Luther und Thomas von Aquin. Versuch eines 
systematisch-theologischen Dialogs (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald, 1967), 109-21, when Hermann’s 
thesis and Joest’s distinction decisively shaped his Lutherdeutung; though even then, Pesch saw (p. 
121) that in the later Luther the Partialaspekt and its Kampf-spirituality predominate. 
246 Theodor Dieter, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles. 
247 Reinhard Hütter, Bound to Be Free, 111-67. 
248 Risto Saarinen, “Klostertheologie auf dem Weg der Ökumene”; Weakness of Will in Renaissance 
and Reformation Thought, 23-6, 119-27 
249 Vainio, Justification and Participation in Christ. 
250 Mickey L. Mattox, “From Lutheran to Catholic—Justification and Holiness,” in idem and A. G. 
Roeber, Changing Churches: An Orthodox, Catholic, and Lutheran Theological Conversation (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), cp. 1. 
251 Jairzinho Lopes Pereira, Augustine of Hippo and Martin Luther on Original Sin and Justification of 
the Sinner. 
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(1521), the penetrating de servo arbitrio (1525), or the joyful Galaterbrief (1531/5), all of 
which set forth substantially the same dogmatics of sin, grace, and holiness that I 
exposit in this chapter on the basis of texts ranging from late 1536 to 1544. 
 We begin with the Smalcald Articles.  
 
1. The Smalcald Articles (Dec. 1536/Jan.-Feb. 1537—1538) 
 
In June 1536, Pope Paul III called for a general council to meet in Mantua the following 
year. The Elector of Saxony, John Frederick, did not intend to participate in this 
council—which did not, of course, materialize until 1545 as the Council of Trent—but 
he did wish to present it with a clear statement of the confessional position of the 
Saxon churches. To this end, he commissioned Luther (assisted by Melanchthon, John 
Bugenhagen, Nicholas von Amsdorf, John Agricola, George Spalatin, Justus Jonas, and 
Caspar Cruciger Sr.) to draft a confession. The Smalcald Articles were ready by 
February 1537 to be presented to the meeting of the defensive league whence the 
confession took its name; though the text did not take hold as a binding confession till 
the intra-Lutheran disputes of the 1550s culminating in its inclusion in the Book of 
Concord.252  
I anchor this chapter with the SA for two reasons. First, as a confessional text it 
offers dogmatic conciseness and clarity that helps bring focus to Luther’s mature 
theology of grace, gift, and the “simul.” A real strength in this regard is its firm 
theology of atonement through Christ’s cross and forensic justification by faith alone. 
As Brecht says of the SA: “Like no other Reformation confession, they were based on 
                                                        
252 For more historical detail, see Brecht, Preservation, 178-85; for an overview of the SA, see William 
R. Russell, Luther’s Theological Testament: The Smalcald Articles (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995). 
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the central doctrine of justification.”253 Second, the trenchant, feisty, and pugnacious 
tone of the SA vis-à-vis Rome make them an ideal source for Luther’s robust theology 
of holiness. For if we find such a theology in this “warlike manifesto”254 where Luther 
explains “all that we teach and live against the pope, the devil, and the world”255 and 
condemns “many noxious maggots and the excrement of various idolatries” in no 
uncertain terms,256 we can rest assured that this theology of holiness is indeed the 
Reformation theology of the evangelical Luther; or else, if here too the Reformer is 
found to have retained “pre-reformational” relics from his theological past,257 I 
suppose confessional Lutherans will need to embrace the catholicity of their tradition. 
 
1.1. Gnade 
 
Like the 1530 Augsburg Confession penned by Melanchthon, Luther’s Articles begin by 
confessing the common Catholic faith in the Trinity, the two natures in Christ’s 
                                                        
253 Brecht, Preservation, 181. 
254 So Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, with a History and Critical Notes, ed. David S. 
Schaff, 6th ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1931), 1/222. 
255 SA II.1, BSLK, 728.11-12, cf. BC, 301. 
256 SA II.2, BSLK, 732.13-14, BC, 303. 
257 This is the rather implausible argument of Lowell Green regarding most of Luther’s writings up 
to 1530, in his book How Melanchthon Helped Luther Discover the Gospel: The Doctrine of 
Justification in the Reformation (Fallbrook, CA: Verdict Publications, 1980). But “vorreformatorisch” 
is a common adjective used by scholars in pursuit of the Durchbruch to described either (1) Luther’s 
theology prior to what they pinpoint as the decisive breakthrough to Reformation, or (2) bits and 
pieces of Luther’s pre-breakthrough theology that linger on inconsistently after the breakthrough. 
So, e.g., Oswald Bayer (Promissio, 12) argues against “the popular canonizing of the Heidelberg 
Disputation” (held 26 April 1518), since one can be quite Catholic and embrace its theologia crucis; 
whereas the same cannot be said of the theologia promissionis et fidei clearly articulated for the first 
time in the disputation pro veritate inquirenda et timoratis conscientiis consolandis held in the early 
summer months of the same year. Cf. ibid., 166-7, 173, 181, 191, 195, 235-6, 285, 299-301, 340. In my 
judgment, Volker Leppin’s stepwise approach to Luther’s development has much to commend it. 
There was no sudden breakthrough, but instead a series of gradually mounting shifts from the 
monastic piety-theologian to the Reformer: Staupitz leading Luther to the solus Christus in 1513, 
Augustine to sola gratia by 1516, St. Paul to sola fide by the Heidelberg Disputation, and 
Melanchthon (and John Eck at the Leipzig Disputation) spurring full-blown sola scriptura 
commitments in 1519, all culminating in the unmistakably “reformational theology” of the great 
Reformation treatises written in the summer and early fall of 1520 (Martin Luther, 107-64, 
summarized at 116-7). 
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person, and the history of his birth from Mary the Virgin, his death, descent, 
resurrection, ascension, rule, and promised return in judgment. This amounts to a 
summary of the ancient Creeds of the Church, and the Reformer refers to and upholds 
the Apostles’ and Athanasian Creeds by name (SA I.1-4). The brevity of this portion of 
the confession must not belie its decisiveness. Everything else that Luther states builds 
upon this foundation, which does not need to be further explicated because it is 
shared in common with his Roman Catholic opponents. In the foremost place, this 
holds true of der erste und Heubtartickel which immediately follows, viz., regarding 
the office and work of “Jesus Christ, our God and Lord” in the redemption of sinners 
through his death on the cross (SA II.1).258  
Though the word Gnade appears only once in passing, it is here that Luther 
lays down the theology of “grace” that definitively shapes the rest of the confession. As 
the catena of scriptural texts marshaled by Luther demonstrates, “grace” refers to the 
forgiveness and justification that God in his mercy grants a Gospel-believing sinner on 
the exclusive basis of the substitutionary death of Jesus Christ. Indeed, as I argued in 
chapter 1, the objective, self-substituting, sin-bearing death of the God-Man on the 
one hand, and the acquittal or justification of the sinner on the other, form two sides 
of the same coin in Luther’s theology.259 This is why Rom. 3:23-8 proves to be so 
                                                        
258 BSLK, 726.25-6, BC, 300. 
259 Referring to SA II.1, Althaus (Theology of Martin Luther, 225) observes that it “refers to Christ’s 
work and justification as one and the same thing.” This is quite clear in Luther’s 1531/5 Lectures on 
Galatians, 3:13. On the one hand: “Here you see how necessary it is to believe and confess the 
doctrine of the divinity of Christ. When Arius denied this, it was necessary also for him to deny the 
doctrine of redemption. For to conquer the sin of the world, death, the curse, and the wrath of God 
in Himself—this is the work, not of any creature but of the divine power. Therefore it was necessary 
that He who was to conquer these in Himself should be true God by nature” (WA 40/1.441.14-19, 
LW 26.282). On the other: “The doctrine of justification must be learned diligently. For in it are 
included all the other doctrines of our faith; and if it is sound, all the others are sound as well. 
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structurally significant in SA II.2.260 The Reformer merely reproduces St. Paul’s 
insistence on the inseparability of redemption and propitiation through Christ’s shed 
blood (vv. 24-5) on the one hand,261 and justification by grace (v. 24) and faith (vv. 26 
& 28) on the other. Into this basically Pauline fabric, Luther weaves texts from St. John 
and Isaiah: Jesus Christ is the Lamb of God who took away the sin of the world (John 
1:29) when the Lord laid upon him the iniquity of us all (Isa 53:6). Because of this slain 
Lamb, though all have sinned and fall short of God’s glory (Rom. 3:23), 
… werden on verdienst gerecht aus seiner Gnade, durch die Erlösung Jhesu 
Christi inn seinem blut etc., Ro. 3. 
 
… they become righteous without merit by his grace, through the redemption 
that is in Jesus Christ in his blood etc., Rom. 3[:24-5].262  
 
According to the Apostle and to the Reformer, since this undeserved justification 
before God is “by his grace” (Gnade)—accomplished apart from our works and solely 
through the work of Jesus Christ on the cross—it may be grasped only by faith. 
“Because this must be believed and may not be obtained or grasped otherwise with 
any work, law, or merit, it is clear and certain that this faith alone makes us righteous, 
as St. Paul says,” citing Rom. 3:28: “Wir halten, das der Mensch gerecht werde on 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Therefore when we teach that men are justified through Christ and that Christ is the Victor over 
sin, death, and the eternal curse, we are testifying at the same time that He is God by nature” (WA 
40/1.441.29-33, LW 26.283). 
260 For Rom. 3:23-8 in Luther’s translation, see WA DB 7.38.23-28: Denn es ist hie keyn vnterscheyd, 
sie sind alle zumal sunder, vnnd mangeln des preyses den got an yhn haben solt, vnd werden on 
verdienst gerechtfertiget, aus seyner gnad, durch die erlosung, so durch Christo geschehen ist, wilchen 
gott hat furgestellet zu eynem gnade stuel, durch den glawben ynn seynem blut, da mit er die 
gerechtickeit, die fur yhm gilt, beweyse, ynn dem, das er vergibt die sund, die zuuor sind geschehen 
vnter gotlicher gedult, die er trug, das er zu disen zeyten beweysete die gerechtickeyt, die fur yhm gilt, 
Auff das er alleyne gerecht sey, vnd rechtfertige den, der da ist des glawbens an Jhesu. Wo ist denn nu 
deyn rhum? er ist außgeschlossen, durch wilch gesetz? durch der werck gesetz? Nicht also, sondern 
durch des glawbens gesetz. So halten wyrs nu, das der mensch gerechtfertiget werde, on zu thun der 
werck des gesetzs, alleyn durch den glawben. 
261 Note well that in the 1522/46 Deutsche Bibel, Luther renders Paul’s hilasterion with gnade steul. 
Christ crucified, the Propitiator, is the throne of “grace.” WA DB 7.38.25. 
262 BSLK, 726.27-31, cf. BC, 301. 
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werck des Gesetzes durch den glauben.”263 Such faith does not justify by its own 
intrinsic virtue, but by virtue of the object it apprehends: Jesus Christ and his cross. 
When an ungodly sinner hears this Gospel of “grace”—that is to say, of redemption, 
forgiveness, and justification through Christ’s shed blood—and believes it, God 
mercifully justifies him on the just basis of Christ’s substitution: “That he alone may be 
righteous (Gerecht sey) and may make righteous (gerecht mache) the one who has 
faith in Jesus” (Rom. 3:26).264  
 “Grace” (Gnade), then, refers at once to Jesus Christ and his atoning work and 
to the forgiveness and justification that faith receives through him. Thus in SA III.3 
(“On Repentance”), with John 1 especially in mind, Luther contrasts the convicting 
“hammer” of God’s law (cf. Jer. 23:29) with “the consoling promise of grace 
(verheissung der gnaden) through the Gospel.”265 The Reformer vividly portrays his 
classic law/Gospel contrast through the figure of John the Baptist, who preached 
repentance to convict open sinner and false saint alike and thus prepare them “for the 
Lord to receive grace (die gnade zu empfahen), to await and accept from him the 
forgiveness of sins.”266 St. John told everyone without exception: “You all need the 
forgiveness of sins,” then pointed his finger to the Lamb of God and proclaimed: “God 
is present there, in the One from whose fullness we all must receive grace upon grace 
(gnade umb gnade) and without whom no human being can be righteous before 
God.”267 Note how Luther combines John 1:16’s gnade umb gnade with the Pauline 
                                                        
263 BSLK, 728.1-4, BC, 301. 
264 BSLK, 728.5-6, cf. BC, 301. 
265 BSLK, 752.6-7, BC, 313. 
266 BSLK, 752.9-14, BC, 313. 
267 BSLK, 760.25-762.2, cf. BC, 317. 
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language of righteousness before God, all in the overarching context of the movement 
in John 1 from the incarnation of the Word at v. 14 to the sin-bearing Lamb at v. 29. 
Thus in the following paragraphs, when Luther defines evangelical contrition (reu), 
confession (Beicht), and satisfaction (gnugthuung), the last consists “in the suffering 
and blood of the innocent Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world.”268 
Incarnation, atonement through satisfaction, forgiveness and becoming righteous 
before God: Gnade. In these later passages from SA III.3, as in the foundational 
confession of the chief article in SA II.1, by “grace” Luther means the forgiveness of 
sins and justification before God that are to be had only through God’s incarnate Son 
and blood-shedding Lamb, Jesus Christ.  
 What of the “gift”? 
1.2. The deep, evil corruption of nature 
 
To grasp Luther’s theology of the “gift,” I need first to sketch his teaching on the depth 
of sin’s corrupting power and thus the totality of the repentance required by the Law’s 
judgment upon the sinner. In SA III.1 (“On Sin”), Luther reiterates the Augustinianism 
he embraced as a lecturer on Romans in 1515, including its application contra 
pelagianos modernos in much the same manner Leif Grane has accounted for in the 
earlier period (matters that will occupy our full attention in Part II below).269 In 1537 
the aging Reformer still stakes his position on Rom. 5:12-19, and the entire article 
prioritizes the “original sin” (Erbsunde) of Adam. Through his disobedience, “all 
people have become sinners (sind Sünder worden) subject to death and the devil.”270 
                                                        
268 BSLK, 762.13-26, BC, 318. 
269 Leif Grane, Modus Loquendi Theologicus.  
270 BSLK, 746.17-20, cf. BC, 310. 
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This “chief sin” (Heubtsunde),271 inherited by all, has caused “a deep, evil corruption of 
nature (verderbung der natur).”272 From it grow subsequent evil works, as the rotten 
fruits of a wounded tree (cf. Matt. 7:17-20).273 In short, Adam’s filii sin because they are 
born sinners; they do not become sinners by committing discrete sinful acts. Agere 
sequitur esse. This is why a theology of repentance (SA III.3’s topic) that focuses 
exclusively on actual sins—in Luther’s judgment, “the false penance of the Papists” 
consisting in contrition, confession, and satisfaction—fails to grapple with the real 
issue at hand, “always doing penance but never arriving at repentance.”274 True 
repentance begins when people who are sinners hear and take to heart the Law’s 
sobering—indeed, strictly speaking, mortifying—judgment: 
You are all of no account, whether you are open sinners or saints; you must all 
become different and act differently (Ir müst alle anders werden und anders 
thun), no matter who you are and what you do now, be you as great, wise, 
mighty and holy as you want, here no one is godly (cf. Rom. 3:10).275  
 
Such a law-crushed, contrite heart makes the total confession: “We are all lost, neither 
hide nor hair of us is good, and we must become altogether new and different people 
(müssen schlechts neue und andere Menschen werden).”276 
 Once God’s “hammer” (the law) has effected this true contrition and elicited 
this absolute confession, the sinner is prepared to receive the Gnade of satisfaction 
through God’s Lamb. But the “grace” of forgiveness through Christ, inestimably 
precious as it is in itself, does not exhaust the fullness of God’s redeeming work in the 
                                                        
271 BSLK, 746.20, BC, 310. 
272 BSLK, 746.27, BC, 310. 
273 BSLK, 746.21-26, BC, 310. 
274 BSLK, 758.5 (BC, 315): Das hies imerdar gebüsst und nimer mehr zur busse komen. 
275 BSLK, 752.1-5, cf. BC, 312-3. 
276 BSLK, 762.10-12, cf. BC, 318. 
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Gospel. For the law exposes the awful reality of sin not only as guilt but also as 
corruption, and thus lays bare humanity’s need not only for forgiveness by “grace” but 
also for renewal by the “gift” (Gabe) of the Spirit, to the end that justified sinners may 
become neue und andere Menschen.  
 
1.3. Gabe 
 
In the SA, there are two principal loci to examine regarding this gift of renewal: the 
conclusion of SA III.3 on repentance, and III.13 on justification and good works. For 
reasons that will become clear presently, I first turn briefly to the latter. Appealing to 
Acts 15:9, Luther states that “through faith (as St. Peter says) we receive a different, 
new, pure heart (ein ander neu, rein hertz).”277 Though he does not use the word, this is 
an account of the spiritual regeneration that either takes place through faith (as 
Luther puts it here) or is identical with the Spirit-worked gift of faith itself, the donum 
fidei in the heart (Eph. 2:8).278 The “different, new, pure heart” of faith marks the real 
beginning of the “new and different man” called for by the Law and sought ought in 
repentance. As the broken-hearted penitent takes hold of the grace of forgiveness in 
Christ by faith, he does so by virtue of the very gift that initiates the inchoate renewal 
of his vitiated nature. The two realities—forgiveness and newness of life—are distinct, 
but inseparable. Thus Luther lines up “faith, renewal (verneuerung), and forgiveness of 
                                                        
277 BSLK, 776.15-16, cf. BC, 325. 
278 Cf. WA 44.824.23-5, LW 8.332 (on Gen. 50:19-23): Ideo non paratur ea [fides] nostris viribus, non 
est acquisita fides, sed ut Paulus ait, ‘donum Dei est, non ex nobis.’ On this ambiguity, see Manfred 
Schloenbach, Heiligung, 13-18. As for regeneration, see e.g. Theses Concerning Faith and the Law (11 
Sept. 1535), #65-6, WA 39/1.48.14-18, LW 34.113.: “65. Justification is in reality a kind of rebirth in 
newness (revera regeneratio in novitatem), as John says: who believe in his name and were born of 
God (John 1:12-13, 1 John 5:1). 66. Therefore, Paul calls baptism ‘the washing of regeneration and 
renewal’ (lavacrum regenerationis et renovationis) (Tit. 3:5) and Christ himself says, ‘Unless one is 
born anew, he cannot see the kingdom of God’ (John 3:3).” 
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sin” in grammatical parataxis, innocent of the later Lutheran scruple to reverse their 
order; convinced of the inseparable unity of grace and gift in the divine work of 
redeeming and renewing lost sinners, it is enough to insist upon their ontological and 
temporal priority vis-à-vis the doing of good works.279 As in the fallen creature, so in 
the creature restored by the grace of Jesus Christ and the gift of his Spirit: action 
follows being, as the good fruits springing forth from an old and rotten tree made new 
and fruitful.  
 Having considered the beginning of renewal in regeneration, we can now turn 
to the concise but rich explanation of die Gabe des heiligen Geists in SA III.3 (which 
follows on the heels of the Christ- and Gnade-focused material I considered above).280 
                                                        
279 BSLK, 776.20-21, BC, 325: “Good works follow such faith, renewal, and forgiveness of sin…” Hence 
the next two theses that follow Luther’s discussion of regeneration in the 1535 disputation I cited in 
the preceding footnote (WA 39/1.48.19-23, LW 34.113): “67. For that reason, it is impossible to be 
justified by good works, since it is impossible for us to be born of our works, but rather, the works 
are born of us, so to speak. 68. By the same Spirit we are called righteous, a new creature of God 
(nova creatura Dei) and the firstfruits of God’s creatures, who according to his will brought us forth 
by his Word (2 Cor. 5:17, Jas. 1:18).” 
280 The phrase die Gabe des heiligen Geists is ambiguous: is the Spirit himself the gift, or does the 
Spirit give a gift distinct from himself? On this question, Risto Saarinen’s interpretation of Luther’s 
shifting stances vis-à-vis the scholastic distinction between gratia increata et creata is quite 
illuminating: “Ipsa Dilectio Deus Est: Zur Wirkungsgeschichte von 1. Sent. dist. 17 des Petrus 
Lombardus bei Martin Luther,” in Tuomo Mannermaa, Anja Ghiselli, and Simo Peura, eds., 
Thesaurus Lutheri: Auf der Such nach neuen Paradigmen der Luther-Forschung (Helsinki: Luther-
Agricola, 1987), 185-204. Saarinen shows (pp. 192-3) that in the 1509/10 Sentenzkommentar, Luther 
recognizes that Peter’s Augustinian emphasis on uncreated grace stands in some tension with later 
developments in scholastic theology; for assuming the ascendancy and primacy of an Aristotelian 
theory of virtue as habitus somewhat stacks the deck against a robust account of the role of gratia 
increata in the Christian life. Luther tentatively suggests an alternative (WA 9.42.39-43.8): quando 
Augustinus dicit quod dilectio est deus, non intelligatur cum praecisione seu exclusive i.e. quasi 
dilectio sit tantum deus, Sed concedendo quod dilectio sit deus, Sed non tantum. Sed est etiam dilectio 
creata. Sicut ‘Christus est fides, justitia, gratia nostra et sanctificatio nostra.’ Et videtur Magister non 
penitus absurdissime loqui: in eo quod habitum dicit esse spiritum sanctum. Quia commentum illud 
de habitibus opinionem habet ex verbis Aristotelis rancidi philosophi. Alias bene possit dici, quod 
spiritus sanctus est charitas concurrens seipso cum voluntate ad productionem actus amandi, nisi sit 
forte determinatio ecclesiae in oppositum (i.e., at the Council of Vienna 1311/12; see DEC I.361.9-25, 
esp. ll. 17-18: et culpa eisdem [parvulis] in baptismo remittitur et virtutes ac informans gratia 
infunduntur quoad habitum). Saarinen next argues convincingly that the Augustinian Rom. 5:5/1 
John 4:8-centered theology of caritas as gratia increata stands near the center of Luther’s polemics 
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Recall that the overall context of the article is the contrast between false and true 
repentance, the former focused on actual sin and the latter—without disregarding 
actual sin—pressing deeper to the sinful or corrupt nature of the sinner. Now, as I will 
argue in Part II of this book, Luther has been convinced since his reading of St. Paul 
and the anti-Pelagian treatises of Augustine in 1515 that the dregs and remnants of this 
vitiated nature remain a force to be reckoned with (and fought against) in the lives of 
the renati, who are really but only partially renewed in this life. For this reason, 
repentance can only be restricted to actual sins dealt with in the context of 
sacramental penance at the risk of mortal spiritual danger to the penitent. Rather, as 
Luther put it in the first of his Ablaßthesen (31 Oct. 1517), “When our Lord and Master 
Jesus Christ said, ‘Repent’ (Matt. 4:17), he willed the entire life of believers to be one of 
repentance (omnem vitam fidelium penitentiam esse).”281 Two decades later, the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
against Ockham, Biel, et al. in the 1515-17 period (pp. 193-8). Later on, however, Luther assumes a 
mediating position (pp. 199-201). On the one hand, in the 1537 Zirkulardisputation De veste nuptiali 
he explicitly rejects Peter’s teaching in Sent. I d. 17 (WA 39/1.319.25-320.18): Charitatem fecerunt 
[scholastici] creatam et increatam. Charitas increata, quae est ipse Deus, iustificat, sed creata non 
iustificat, nisi in futura vita; ibi erit perfecta. Iam magister sententiarum est reprehensus, qui dixerit, 
Spiritum sanctum esse ipsam charitatem in nobis, et non distinxit inter charitatem infusam seu 
creatam et increatam. On the other hand, in the Promotionsdisputation von Palladius und Tilemann 
of the same year, Luther argues that the real presence of the indwelling Spirit and the gifts of faith, 
hope, love, etc. which he infuses are inextricable (WA 39/1.245.12-246.11 [A]): Neque tantum venit ad 
nos sicut artifex aliquis, qui aedificat domum et postea abit et tradit eam alteri possidendam. Sed 
semper adest nobis, fulcit et conservat nos. Denn er hat immerdar an uns zu halten, und wie an einem 
alten bösen peltz zu flicken. Itaque cum infundit nobis fidem, spem, charitatem, modestiam, 
libertatem, beneficientiam, longanimitatem, non discedit, sed manet in nobis. Es were denn, das wir in 
selber mutwilliglich mit unsern sünden von uns jagten. Hoc tantum bonum summa cum veneratione 
et gratiarum actione agnoscendum est et cavendum, ne amittamus. Et ut Spiritus sanctus nobis 
adest, ita adest pater, filius, in suis involucris conclusi et tecti veluti puer in fasciis. Saarinen thus 
observes that for Luther in 1537, the Holy Spirit, personally present in the saints as the divine Giver, 
is really distinct from his gifts, yet inseparable therefrom (p. 201). This, I suggest, is the nuanced 
dogmatic position that lies behind the ambiguity in Luther’s oft-repeated phrases die Gabe des 
heiligen Geists and donum Spiritus sancti. I will explore this farther in the argument below, 
especially with respect to texts like Rom. 8:13.  
281 WA 1.233.10-11, LW 31.25. Cf. Volker Leppin, “‘Omnem vitam fidelium penitentiam esse voluit’—
Zur Aufnahme mystischer Traditionen in Luthers erster Ablaßthese,” ARG 93 (2002), 7-25. Leppin 
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mature theologian holds the same doctrine of repentance: “This repentance endures 
among Christians till death, since it struggles with the leftover sin in the flesh (der 
ubrigen sunde im fleisch) through the whole life.”282  
In the Augustinian tradition, the classic scriptural locus for this “leftover” or 
“residual sin in the flesh”—in Nikolaus Selnecker’s 1584 translation, peccato residuo in 
carne283—is St. Paul’s forthright confession at Rom. 7:14-25 of his grievous battle with 
the lex peccati indwelling his members. Luther appeals directly to it here: “As St. Paul 
bears witness in Rom. 7[:23], er kempff mit dem Gesetz seiner glieder etc.”284 This battle 
against the stubborn remnants of original sin, this true and enduring repentance, 
forms the spiritual Sitz im Leben for the ongoing work of the Holy Spirit by his “gift” in 
the regenerated saint’s heart. St. Paul fights against his own flesh, not as a strong 
Pelagian but as a weak Christian, that is,  
… er kempff mit dem Gesetz seiner glieder etc., Und das nicht durch eigen 
kreffte, sondern durch die Gabe des heiligen Geists. 
 
… he battles with the law of his members etc., and that not though his own 
powers, but through the gift of the Holy Spirit.285 
 
(This “gift,” he adds, “follows upon the forgiveness of sins,” i.e., “grace,” thus reversing 
the order found later at SA III.13.286) The Spirit’s gift empowers the believer for the 
great battle against “sin”/flesh through lifelong daily repentance. And as the gift of 
God the Holy Spirit, it is not weak and ineffectual but potent and transformative: “This 
                                                                                                                                                                     
argues convincingly for the decisive influence of the mysticism of John Tauler, the Theologia 
Deutsch, and John Staupitz for the formation of Luther’s Bußtheologie. 
282 BSLK, 764.3-4, cf. BC, 318. 
283 BSLK, 765.3-4: Haec poenitentia in Christianis durat usque ad mortem, quia luctatur cum peccato 
residuo in carne per totam vitam. 
284 BSLK, 764.4-5, cf. BC, 318. 
285 BSLK, 764.5-6, cf. BC, 318. 
286 BSLK, 764.5-7, cf. BC, 318. 
 97
same gift (Gabe) daily purifies and sweeps out the remaining sins (die ubrige sunden; 
in Selnecker’s Latin, reliquias peccati) and works to make people truly pure and holy 
(recht rein und heilig zu machen).”287  
Here, then, is a concise formulation of Luther’s trinitarian theology of grace 
and gift circa the winter of 1536/37: Jesus Christ brings forgiveness and righteousness 
to condemned sinners by his death on the cross, and the Holy Spirit works progressive 
renewal in forgiven but still partly sinful or fleshly believers, making them truly pure 
and holy. 
 
1.4. Agricola’s Antinomian and Luther’s “Augustinian Simul” 
 
Luther’s strongly-worded articles were presented to the princes of the Smalcaldic 
League in February 1537, but for use in their negotiations with Rome they chose 
Melanchthon’s more irenic Augsburg Confession and its Apology. When Luther 
eventually prepared his articles for publication in 1538, he appended two highly 
significant paragraphs to SA III.3. This addendum is directed primarily against the 
theological antinomianism of John Agricola, the erstwhile friend and colleague with 
whom Luther engaged in protracted controversy from 1537 to 1540.288 But it also 
addresses the popular abuse and degeneration of Luther’s teaching on free grace and 
justification into a convenient excuse for licentiousness. Esto peccator et pecca fortiter, 
after all: reducing progress in sanctification to “the art of getting used to justification” 
                                                        
287 BSLK, 764.7-9, cf. BC, 318. 
288 The controversy that flared up in 1537 had roots in the dispute between Agricola and 
Melanchthon in the 1520s. See Timothy J. Wengert, Law and Gospel: Philip Melanchthon’s Debate 
with John Agricola of Eisleben over “Poenitentia” (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997). 
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is a perennially popular theological option.289 As such, these paragraphs—which fit 
seamlessly into the confession, and do not introduce any substantial change in its 
doctrine—shed invaluable light on the Reformer’s theology of grace and gift, 
especially as it pertains to the surprisingly specific sense in which he regards the 
graced and gifted Christian as a “sinner.” Luther’s opponents 
… maintain that all who once have received the Spirit or the forgiveness of sin 
or have become believers, should they sin after that, would remain 
nevertheless in the faith, and such sin would not harm them. They shout, “Do 
what you will! If you believe, then nothing else matters. Faith blots out all sin,” 
etc.290 
 
In short, believers may indeed go on sinning that grace may abound: do what you like, 
since faith in Christ blots out all sin. Thus Luther’s doctrine of free justification 
elicited from some the same response as St. Paul’s (Rom. 6:1, cf. 3:5-8), and the 
Reformer’s response to the antinomian abuse of his teaching was identical to the 
Apostle’s: unmitigated opposition. “I have encountered many such foolish people, and 
I am concerned that such a devil is still present in some.”291 This is an ominous 
allusion to Agricola, no doubt. In it Luther stoutly rejects—as demonic—any version 
of the “simul” that eliminates the Christian’s real renewal in holiness and winks at sin 
in the name of an exclusively forensic doctrine of justification. Against antinomianism 
refined or vulgar, Luther the theologian and pastor urges that sin does indeed do great 
                                                        
289 Gerhard O. Forde, “The Lutheran View of Sanctification,” in The Preached God: Proclamation in 
Word and Sacrament, eds. Mark C. Mattes and Steven D. Paulson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 
226-44. Cf. David P. Scaer, “Sanctification in Lutheran Theology,” Concordia Theological Quarterly 
49/2-3 (April-July 1985): 181-97; Matthew Harrison, “Sanctification and Charitable Works in 
Lutheran Theology,” in Sanctification: New Life in Christ, ed. John A. Maxfield (St. Louis: Concordia 
Historical Institute, 2002), cp. 5. 
290 BSLK, 764.15-19, cf. BC, 318. 
291 BSLK, 764.21-2, BC, 319. 
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harm to the Christian, who may not do whatever he wills if he wills to remain in 
Christ.  
 In what sense, then, is the real Christian—forgiven by Christ’s grace and 
renewed by the Spirit’s gift—still a sinner? If it is not exactly decisive, it is nonetheless 
important that in his explanation of his position Luther does not appeal to “the simul” 
(though he describes it) nor does he call Christians “sinners” (though he does explain 
the sense in which that is not an improper appellation). Better to call believers “the 
holy people (die heiligen Leute),” with this qualification: “they still have and feel the 
original sin (die Erbsunde noch haben und fülen) against which also they daily repent 
and struggle.”292 As a partly but not yet perfectly renewed “holy people,” believers 
must still fight the Pauline battle against the lex peccati lodged within them, which 
they have and feel but to which they do not yield their consent. Rather, by virtue of 
the Spirit’s Gabe, they overrule the sinful inclinations, desires, and impulses which 
their imperfectly renewed nature still obliges them to suffer. As Vinzenz Pfnür has 
recently observed vis-à-vis SA III.3,293 Luther insists that in God’s saints, 
… the Holy Spirit does not allow die sunde to rule [Rom. 6:12a] and gain the 
upper hand so that it is brought to completion (volnbracht werde) [cf. Rom. 
7:18b], but controls and forbids, so that it [sc. die sunde] is not able to do what 
it wants [Gal. 5:17c].294  
                                                        
292 BSLK, 764.23-5, cf. BC, 319. 
293 Vinzenz Pfnür, “Simul iustus et peccator—Gerecht und Sünder zugleich. Hintergrund bei Luther 
und in der katholischen Kontroverstheologie. Abklärung der Kontroverse im amicum colloquium 
zwischen Eck und Melanchthon. Augsburg 1530 und Worms 1541,” in Theodor Schneider and 
Gunther Wenz, eds., Gerecht und Sünder zugleich? Ökumenische Klärungen (Freiburg: Herder and 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 227-51, esp. 232 and 249. 
294 BSLK, 764.27-9: Denn der heilige Geist lesst die sunde nicht walten und uberhand gewinnen, das 
sie volnbracht werde, Sondern steuret und wehret, das sie nicht mus [alt.: darf] thun, was sie wil. 
Selnecker translates a little freely (BSLK 765.25-7): Spiritus enim sanctus non sinit peccatum 
dominari, invalescere et victoriam obtinere ac consummari, sed reprimit et coërcet, ne facere possit, 
quod vult. Kolb and Wengert accept the suggested alternate, reading “darf” for “mus” (BC, 319); this 
makes better sense of the grammar, and fits with Selnecker’s translation.  
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The Reformer thus acknowledges the presence of “sin” in God’s holy people only in the 
limited sense of the persisting remnants of original sin that are throttled, reigned in, 
checked, and overruled by the Spirit’s sanctifying Gabe.295  
This is Luther’s real “simul” in its most basic form. The twin facts that he (1) 
states it in terms drawn from Rom. 6-7 and Gal. 5:17, interpreted unselfconsciously 
through the lens of the traditional facere/perficere (volnbracht) distinction, and then 
(2) proceeds to summarize his position by pairing together 1 John 3:9 and 1:8 in just 
the manner that Augustine had modeled at pecc. mer. 2.7.9-8.10 in the winter of 
411/12,296 strongly suggests the depth of its roots in Augustine’s own theology. 
As St. John says: “Whoever has been born of God does not sin and cannot sin 
(sundigt nicht, und kan nicht sundigen)” [1 John 3:9]. Nevertheless, this is also 
the truth (as the same St. John writes): “If we say that we have no sin (wir nicht 
sunde haben), we lie, and God’s truth is not in us” [1 John 1:8].297  
 
                                                        
295 Cf. Risto Saarinen, “The Pauline Luther and the Law: Lutheran Theology Reengages the Study of 
Paul,” Pro Ecclesia 15/1 (2006): 64-86, here 81: despite the fact that the sinful subject of Rom. 7 is the 
spiritual man, “for Luther this does not mean that the speaker in question would actually perform a 
morally bad action”; Mickey Mattox, “Martin Luther’s Reception of Paul,” 120: “Paul as Luther 
imagines him was not at all a man who struggled with besetting sins.”  
296 CSEL 60.79-82, WSA I/23.84-5. From Augustine’s summary at §8.10, the matrix for which is 
provided by Rom. 8:23-5 (CSEL 60.81-2): Adoptio ergo plena filiorum in redemptione fiet etiam 
corporis nostri. primitias itaque spiritus nunc habemus, unde iam filii dei re ipsa facti sumus; in 
ceteris uero spe sicut salui, sicut innouati ita et filii dei, re autem ipsa quia nondum salui, ideo 
nondum plene innouati, nondum etiam filii dei, sed filii saeculi. proficimus ergo in renouationem 
iustamque vitam per quod filii dei sumus et per hoc peccare omnino non possumus [cf. 1 John 3:9b], 
donec totum in hoc transmutetur, etiam illud, quo adhuc filii saeculi sumus; per hoc enim et peccare 
adhuc possumus. ita fit ut et qui natus est ex deo non peccet [1 John 3:9a] et, si dixerimus, quia 
peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos decipiamus et ueritas non sit in nobis [1 John 1:8]… nunc ergo et 
similes ei esse iam coepimus primitias habentes spiritus et adhuc dissimiles sumus per reliquias 
uetustatis. proinde inquantum similes, in tantum regeneratione spiritu filii dei, in quantum autem 
dissimiles, in tantum filii carnis et saeculi. illinc ergo peccare non possumus [1 John 3:9b]; hinc uero, 
si dixerimus, quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos decipimus [1 John 1:8] donec totum transeat in 
adoptionem et non sit peccator et quaeras locum eius et non inuenias [cf. Ps. 37:10]. 
297 BSLK, 764.30-33, cf. BC, 319. In citing 1 John 1:8 here, Luther adds the word “Gottes” prior to 
“warheit.”  
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In Parts II and III of this book, I will attend in depth to the question of how Luther’s 
theology of sin, grace, and holiness relates to Augustine’s. For the time being, I pause 
to mark the baseline content of Luther’s “Augustinian simul” in its striking Johannine 
formulation by supplying (in gut augustinisch fashion) interpretive glosses taken from 
Rom. 7/Gal. 5:16-17. Luther’s position in the 1538 addendum to SA III.3 comes to this:  
(1) The born of God confess that they have “sin,” that is, the remnants of 
original sin, the sinful flesh, the law of sin, the law of one’s members, etc.  
 
(2) Despite this, the regenerate do not sin and indeed cannot sin: that is, 
because they are born of God, regenerated by water and the Spirit and 
endowed with the Spirit’s gift, they refuse to gratify the sinful desires they still 
have and feel within them, and instead restrain and fight against them by the 
Spirit’s strong Gabe.  
 
This is, I think it safe to say, a far cry from standard assumptions about Luther’s 
“simul.” The reborn kan nicht sundigen! Still, it is important to specify what he takes 
St. John to mean. Luther rejects outright the ancient perfectionist claim—revived by 
some Anabaptists in the sixteenth century—“that if someone sins after receiving faith 
and the Spirit, then that person never really had the Spirit and faith.”298 On Luther’s 
reading, 1 John 3:9 does not mean that the regenerate have already obtained the high 
gift of not being able to sin at all: in Augustine’s and Peter Lombard’s terms, the 
complete eschatological freedom of non posse peccare.299 Rather, 1 John 3:9 means that 
                                                        
298 BSLK, 764.19-20, BC, 318. 
299 Sent. II d. 25 cp. 6 de quatuor statibus liberi arbitrii (Grott. I/464-5). Drawing heavily on 
Augustine, Peter distinguishes the power of free decision (1) ante peccatum, when nothing impeded 
Adam from obtaining the good, and nothing compelled him toward evil; (2) post peccatum but ante 
reparationem gratiae, when the fallen human being potest peccare et non potest non peccare, etiam 
damnabiliter; (3) post reparationem but ante confirmationem. This is the Christian life of grace in 
via, when the regenerate premitur a concupiscentia, sed non vincitur; et habet quidem infirmitatem 
in malo, sed gratiam in bono: ut possit peccare propter libertatem et infirmitatem, et possit non 
peccare ad mortem propter libertatem et gratiam adiuvantem; nondum tamen habet posse omnino 
non peccare vel non posse peccare, propter infirmitatem nondum perfecte absorptam, et propter 
gratiam nondum perfecte consummatam; (4) post confirmationem, i.e., in glory, when weakness will 
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insofar as the regenerate are and remain so, they do not and cannot sin. But for 
Luther, with the Catholic tradition he inherits and the Lutheran tradition he 
inspires—but unlike later developments amongst the Reformed—regeneration is 
amissible (and, by God’s grace, recoverable).300 When the regenerate do in fact 
commit sin by succumbing to the “sin” that they “have” (1 John 1:8), they thereby 
forfeit their regeneration.301 So it turns out that the regenerate kan sin after all: but if 
and when they do so, they ipso facto cease to be the regenerate.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
be completely consumed, the work of grace will be consummated, and the elect will no longer be 
able to sin (non posse peccare). For the roots of the Augustinian theology of true freedom in 
Augustine himself, see e.g. civ. dei 14.11 (CCSL 48.432, cf. Bett. 569): Arbitrium igitur uoluntatis tunc 
est uere liberum, cum uitiis peccatisque non seruit. Tale datum est a Deo; quod amissum proprio 
uitio, nisi a quo dari potuit, reddi non potest. Vnde Veritas dicit: ‘Si uos Filius liberauerit, tunc vere 
liberi eritis.’ Id ipsum est autem, ac si diceret: Si uos Filius salvos fecerit, tunc uere salui eritis. Inde 
quippe liberator, unde saluator. Note well the centrality here of John 8:36, which has a high profile 
for the mature Augustine. 
300 I claim no authority of my own regarding Lutheran Orthodoxy; but according to Heinrich 
Schmid’s useful anthology, the later Lutheran scholastics followed Luther on the amissible nature 
of regeneration. See The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, trans. Charles A. 
Hay and Henry E. Jacobs (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1899), 458-9, citing David Hollaz (1646-1713): “It 
depends, too, upon the fidelity of man, whether he will persevere in the new condition of 
regeneration or not, and thus regeneration is amissible; but, at the same time, it is recoverable by 
the grace of God, for the way of return to the state of regeneration, so long as life lasts, is open to 
him who has fallen from grace.” For Luther, as an Augustinian of the rock-ribbed variety, the 
recovery of lost grace is not in one’s own power to obtain. See, e.g., WA 43.537.7-11, LW 5.157-8 (on 
Gen. 27:38): Fruamur itaque praesenti benedictione, et oblata gratia post renatam lucem Euangelii, 
nec simus negligentes aut ingrati. Si enim semel ablata est benedictio: non est id in nostro arbitrio, ut 
eam recuperemus, sed in donatione Dei gratuita, atque ita, ut nullius lachrymis, clamoribus, 
laboribus moveatur; WA 44.822.9-14, LW 8.329-30 (on Gen. 50:19-23): Sed regia via incedendum, et 
fugiendum est peccatum. Quanquam enim promisit Deus veniam, sicut ait Augustinus, tamen non 
promisit hoc, quod certo sis rediturus post lapsum, sicut Saul et Iudas non redeunt. Non est in nostra 
potestate apprehendere gratiam, neque scis, an possis remissionem oblatam accipere. Ideo timendus 
est Deus, qui et praesumptionem et desperationem odit. 
301 Pace e.g. Berndt Hamm, “What was the Reformation Doctrine of Justification?” cp. 6 in idem, 
The Reformation of Faith in the Context of Late Medieval Theology and Piety: Essays by Berndt 
Hamm, ed. Robert J. Bast (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2004), 197-201. Hamm asserts that for Luther, as for 
Reformation theology as a whole, “Salvation means the unconditional and thus final acceptance of 
the godless, an acceptance that cannot be reversed” (p. 200). That is incorrect: in this section of his 
paper, Hamm conflates Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin on the unconditional eschatological finality of 
justification and, therefore, the assurance of persevering to the end in salvation. I shall return to 
this point in the conclusion of this book. 
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In the addendum to SA III.3, Luther makes this point clear by using the story of 
David’s great fall from grace and gift alike as an example (2 Sam. 11). When David 
commits adultery, murders to cover it up, and thus blasphemes God, he falls into 
“open” or “public sin” (offentliche sunde). “At that point,” declares Luther without the 
slightest equivocation, “faith and the Spirit have departed.”302 For “when sin does what 
it wants”—that is, when the believer stops repenting and struggling by the Gabe 
against the residual sin still present in his members, and instead gives free reign for it 
to break out into open, actual, consentient sin—“then the Holy Spirit and faith are not 
there.”303 David might have resisted the urges of his flesh by the Spirit’s gift, but he did 
not; and when he yielded his consent, die sunde lurking in his flesh began to rule, 
gained the upper hand, and brought to completion its evil desires. Having laid down 
his spiritual arms, quit the holy battle of repentance, and given way to the residual sin 
in his flesh, David forfeited his good standing in “the holy people” who enjoy the 
exalted status gratiae et doni. 
In terms of Luther’s polemic against antinomian counterfeits of his theology of 
justification, this means that when David progresses (that is, regresses) from “having 
and feeling sin” in his flesh to the point of actually committing sin through consent, 
the “simul” simply breaks down. Suppose a hypothetical fighting David, who saw 
Bathsheba, manfully resisted the lusts of his flesh by the Spirit’s Gabe, and turned the 
other way. He could not but confess that he is a sinner, for he laments and longs to be 
freed from the sinful desires that afflict him; yet he would remain very much a 
                                                        
302 BSLK, 764.25-7: … das als denn der glaube und Geist weg ist gewest. Cf. BC, 319. 
303 BSLK, 764.29-30: Thut sie [sc. die sunde] aber, was sie will, So ist der heilige Geist und glaube nicht 
dabey. Cf. BC, 319. 
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righteous and holy man at the same time, the grievousness of his lust to his own soul 
being the chief proof of the reality of his holiness. And to this we can add that, having 
engaged in such a painful conflict and emerged the victor by the Spirit’s power, a sin-
killing, repenting, and believing David would have made real progress in holiness. For 
in that case, the Spirit’s Gabe would have purified and swept away der ubrigen sunde a 
little bit more, and worked to make him recht rein und heilig. But alas, David chose not 
to fight this battle; faith and the Spirit departed from him; and this meant, in Luther’s 
judgment, that fallen David—prior to the subsequent renewal of his repentance and 
faith in the Gospel (2 Sam. 12:13, Ps. 51)—became an unqualified peccator, no longer 
iustus in any sense at all.304  
 
1.5. Grace, gift, and the “simul” 
 
To this point I have referred to Luther’s “simul” exclusively in terms of the real but 
partial renewal in holiness effected by the Spirit’s gift. This is, as I argued above, its 
baseline content, and David’s example leaves no room for doubt on this score. Only 
spiritually regenerate, Gabe-empowered, sin-fighting, daily-repenting believers attain 
the lofty status of the “simul.” But this does not yet fully describe the complexity and 
richness of Luther’s teaching; and to do this, we must take into account the ongoing 
role of “grace” in the life of the Spirit-gifted believer. In stressing (as I have, following 
Luther) the distinction between “having and feeling sin” on the one hand, and 
committing sin through consent on the other; and in insisting on the spiritually-
                                                        
304 Selnecker’s translation captures this powerfully. For Luther’s Thut sie aber, was sie will, So ist der 
heilige Geist und glaube nicht dabey, Selnecker provides: Si vero facit, quod vult, certe Spiritus 
sanctus et fides amittuntur nec simul adsunt (BSLK, 765.27-9). In other words: the Spirit and faith 
cannot be present together with consentient “sin” in the same person simul. 
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decisive role of refusing consent to residual sin through gift-empowered repentance; it 
is possible to lose sight of the fact that the “sin” which a regenerate believer has, feels, 
and fights against is in fact—sin. This, as Luther sees it, is the basic error of his 
opponents. Having denuded the lex peccati of its sinful quality in the baptized, “they 
only do penance for actual sins, such as evil thoughts to which they consent (böse 
bewilligete gedancken),” because in itself—apart from consent—the “evil impulse, lust, 
and inclination was not sin (böse bewegung, lust, reitzung, war nicht sunde).”305  
Now, in saying this Luther is not dismissing the spiritually vital significance of 
refusing consent to indwelling sin’s böse bewegung, lust, or reitzung. David’s example 
proves that in this respect, the Reformer agrees with his opponents: whether the 
believer retains faith and the Spirit through repentance or forfeits both through 
consent to the evil impulse in his flesh determines whether or not he remains in statu 
gratiae et doni. Rather, Luther is insisting—against the majority position in the 
tradition—that already prior to consent, the evil impulse, lust, and inclination that 
constitutes the remnant of original sin in the regenerate is itself intrinsically sinful. In 
Part II below, I will come to the question of how this relates to Augustine’s shifting 
evaluations of concupiscentia in the 410s and 20s and Luther’s engagement with 
Augustine’s texts in 1515. For now, I content myself with an analysis of how the real 
sinfulness of original sin’s remnants in the saints factors into Luther’s theology of 
grace, gift, and the “simul.”  
                                                        
305 SA III.3, BSLK, 754.1-3, cf. BC, 313. Kolb and Wengert transfer Luther’s singulars to plurals in their 
translation. Selnecker (BSLK 755.2-4): concupiscentia enim, vitiosi affectus, inclinatio, libido et 
affectio prava secundum illos non sunt peccata. 
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 To this end, we return once more to SA III.13: “How a person becomes 
righteous before God (fur Gott gerecht wird), and concerning good works.”306 I drew 
attention above to Luther’s teaching on regeneration/renewal in this article; now we 
must see how the gift of new life, fruitful in good works, relates to the grace of 
forgiveness in Christ. Luther sums up his entire theology of grace and gift in their 
interrelation vis-à-vis the saints’ residual sin in a tw0-sentence proposition: 
… wir durch den glauben (wie S. Petrus sagt) ein ander neu, rein hertz kriegen 
und Gott umb Christi willen, unsers Mittlers, uns fur gantz gerecht und heilig 
halten wil und hellt; ob wol die sunde im fleisch noch nicht gar weg oder tod 
ist, so wil er sie doch nicht rechen noch wissen. 
… through faith (as St. Peter says) we receive a different, new, pure heart, and 
for the sake of Christ our Mediator, God wants to and does regard us as 
completely righteous and holy; although the sin in the flesh is still not 
completely gone or dead, God will nevertheless not count it or consider it.307 
The first sentence comprises Luther’s teaching on how a sinner becomes righteous 
(gerecht wird) in the gracious divine act of justification: his heart is renewed through 
faith, and God regards him as completely righteous and holy for the sake of Jesus 
Christ the Mediator. In short, Gabe and gnade, real renewal and forensic/imputational 
justification propter Christum, together form the complex reality of justification 
conceived as a whole; they are, as we saw in Luther’s 1532 comment on Ps. 51:2, the 
“two parts of justification.” But why, if the sinner has really received a new and pure 
heart through faith, does he still need God to regard him as righteous and holy for 
Christ’s sake?  
The renewed believer, pure of heart by faith, still needs Christ’s mediation and 
God’s justification because of “the sin in the flesh,” which despite the reality of renewal 
                                                        
306 BSLK, 776.12-13, cf. BC, 325. 
307 BSLK, 776.15-19, cf. BC, 325. 
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“is still not completely gone or dead.” It is, I think, unfortunate that Kolb and Wengert 
omit the word die before sunde im fleisch in their translation. Their anarthrous “sin in 
the flesh” leaves the door open to the very sort of antinomian interpretation of his 
theology that Luther is keen to stamp out, for it obscures the specificity of die sunde 
that keeps the pure-hearted Christian in constant need of die Gnade of forgiveness in 
Christ. In fact, Luther operates here with the same high degree of precision regarding 
the nature of “the sin” that remains in believers which we saw above. “The sin in the 
flesh” that is not yet completely gone or dead despite the different, new, pure heart 
that comes through faith is the original sin of Adam in the depleted, fragmentary, 
residual, and overruled form it assumes in the regenerate person. By the power of the 
Gabe, the renewed repent of and fight against this sin in their flesh; that is, they refuse 
to yield to its böse bewegung, lust, or reitzung. But because the sin in the flesh really is 
and remains sin even in its overruled condition, it still needs to be forgiven if the 
“sinful” believer is to enjoy reconciled fellowship with the true God, who is perfect in 
holiness. This lack, the Gnade of forgiveness and (forensic) justification through Christ 
the Mediator supplies. For his sake, God “wants to and does regard us as completely 
righteous and holy,” even though we are in fact only partly so, inchoately renewed 
through faith but still bearing the remnants of Adam’s sin in our flesh. The latter God 
in his mercy does not “count” or “impute” (rechen) to our account. In short, through 
Jesus Christ the Mediator the remaining “sin” in believers is not imputed to their 
account, and instead God regards them as perfectly righteous and holy.  
This is the “grace” that, so far from conflicting with the role of the “gift” in the 
lives of the renewed, complements and completes it. The Spirit renews the redeemed 
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of Jesus in true righteousness and holiness; and whatever remains of the old Adam in 
their flesh as they are progressively renewed, God mercifully covers, overlooks, and 
disregards for the sake of Christ, seeing in believers only the perfect righteousness and 
holiness of the Mediator whom they grasp hold of by faith. Translated into the terms 
of the “simul,” this means Luther teaches that believers are “sinners” for one reason, 
but righteous and holy for two. They remain sinners because of die sunde im fleisch, 
the remnants of Adam’s sin that persist in them despite the reality of their renewal. 
Yet they are righteous and holy—partly but really—through the Spirit’s Gabe, the gift 
of faith that renews and purifies their hearts and empowers them to rule over the sin 
that remains. And this sin cannot harm them, because they are also righteous by the 
Gnade of Jesus Christ, who presents them holy and blameless before the Father by the 
power of the blood he shed in their place as the Mediator. That is to say, this sin 
cannot harm them so long as they continue to battle against it in repentance and to 
grasp hold of Christ by faith. If, as in the case of David, the sinful flesh is permitted to 
break out into open sin, it is spiritually lethal: faith and the Spirit depart; Christ’s 
righteousness, graspable only by faith, is grasped no longer; and the one who had once 
been righteous in two senses and “sinful” only in the very specific way I have just 
described is righteous no longer, a sinner pure and simple.  
This is Luther’s mature theology of residual sin, grace, and holiness as he 
confesses it in the Smalcald Articles.  
 
2. The First (18 Dec. 1537), Second (12 Jan. 1538), and Third (6 Sept. 1538) Disputations 
against the Antinomians 
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We have already seen Luther expositing his theology of grace, gift, and the “simul” 
with respect to John Agricola’s aberrant antinomianism. I turn now to the set of three 
disputations which Luther held in 1537 and 1538 to publicly clarify his position on the 
proper use of the law in articulo iustificationis. For the purposes of my argument, 
however, both the tangled skein of the number of uses Luther envisions for the law308 
and the time-honored Lutheran pastime of distinguishing law and Gospel309 are 
mainly tangential. My object is again to set out his theology of grace and gift, and in so 
doing to elucidate the sense in which the Christian remains sinful while advancing in 
real holiness of life. For the most part, I follow Martin Brecht’s recent analysis of these 
texts: though his spare remarks on the sanctifying work of the Spirit are 
underdeveloped, his compelling case for the continuity of Luther’s Bußtheologie from 
1517 on, with its focus on the peccatum remanens, points in the right direction.310 I 
have chosen to treat the three disputations as a single text. Though this is somewhat 
artificial, their thematic unity, their temporal proximity to one another, and the 
consistency of Luther’s theology within this short span of time (as within his last 
                                                        
308 For a thorough overview of the large body of scholarship stemming from Karl Barth’s 
provocative 1935 essay Gospel and Law, as well as a helpful interpretation of Luther’s “third use of 
the law,” see Norman J. Lund, “Luther’s ‘Third Use of the Law’ and Melanchthon’s tertius usus legis 
in the Antinomian Controversy with Agricola (1537-1540),” Ph.D. diss., University of St. Michael’s 
College, Toronto, 1985. 
309 See Jeffrey G. Silcock, “Law and Gospel in Luther’s Antinomian Disputations, with Special 
Reference to Faith’s Use of the Law,” Th.D. diss., Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, 1995.  
310 Martin Brecht, “Luthers Antinomerdisputationen. Lebenswirklichkeit des Gesetzes,” in Dietrich 
Korsch & Volker Leppin, eds., Martin Luther – Biographie und Theologie (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2010), 195-210. For a detailed analysis of the historical context of the disputations, see Brecht, 
Preservation, 156-71; Mark U. Edwards, Jr., Luther and the False Brethren (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1975), 156-79. Brecht has crossed swords with Leppin over the latter’s argument for 
the role of German mysticism in the formation of Luther’s theology of repentance c. 1516-18. If one 
sides with Leppin against Brecht about the early texts, but agrees with Brecht regarding the 
continuity of these texts with Luther’s theology in the 1530s and 40s, it then stands to reason that 
the influence of Tauler and the Theologia Deutsch extends into the latter period; and in fact this is 
just what we find in the works of Luther’s maturity. On this point, see section 3 of this chapter 
below, as well as Part III, cp. 5.  
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decade taken as a whole) argue in favor of this approach. For ease of reference, I will 
abbreviate as follows: “D 1.4” refers to the first disputation in its fourth argument. 
 
2.1. Luther’s theology of grace and gift in the Disputations 
 
Because the presenting issue in the disputations is the role of the law, the lion’s share 
of passages wherein Luther’s theology of grace and gift surfaces speak directly and 
concretely of Jesus Christ’s work in fulfilling the law once for all on the cross (“grace”) 
and the Holy Spirit’s work in the saints empowering them to keep the law in their own 
right (“gift”). The quasi-technical use of the terms gratia and donum to designate this 
trinitarian soteriology is present in the disputations, but relatively rare.  
 
2.1.1. Gratia and donum: verba et res 
 
To begin with “grace”: at D 1.3, for example, Luther states that “grace properly (gratia 
proprie) is the fulfillment of the law, the forgiveness of sins, righteousness, and life in 
Christ.”311 Note that to the familiar “grace” of forgiveness, righteousness, and life in 
Christ is now added the fulfillment of the law. This does not mark a substantial 
innovation so much as an epexegetical fleshing-out of the fullness of Christ’s grace. 
The believer has Christ’s perfect obedience, even to death on the cross, as his own; and 
to say this is to say that he possesses forgiveness, righteousness, and life propter 
Christum. This is gratia proprie. Thus at D 1.14, Luther explains that the law-broken 
penitent ought to hear the “word of grace” (verbum gratiae) from his choice Pauline 
                                                        
311 WA 39/1.368.11-12 [A], ATD, 39. 
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proof-text, Rom. 3:22-24: “the free forgiveness of sin by God’s grace (per gratiam Dei) is 
to be taught, through the redemption (per redemptionem) which is in Christ Jesus.”312 
The same nexus of grace and redemption through Christ’s cross emerges at D 1.21. 
Referring to John 1:29, Isa. 53:4-6, and Gal. 2:21, Luther explains that the Gospel 
teaches that satisfaction for sins comes about only through God’s slain Lamb, and 
declares that all who believe this cannot doubt the grace of God (gratia Dei) unless 
they want to imply that Christ died for nothing.313 Similarly at D 2.13, those whom the 
law has taught to “learn to aspire for grace (gratiam)” seek and thirst for Christ, the 
Lamb of God.314 By faith in the Gospel of grace through the Lamb, the embattled 
Christian can tell the law that accuses him of his sins:  
Behold, Christ is already present here, without me (hic iam adest sine me). For I 
certainly have this Christ (eum habeo Christum), who makes me alive, saves, 
justifies, and gives eternal life, and this freely (gratis) and though I am 
unworthy, therefore without me (sine me). And now, be quiet! For Christ is 
already here, that is, peace and the forgiveness of sin because of his blood.315 
 
The odd-sounding adest sine me in the first sentence becomes clearer by the end of 
the second: “without me,” that is, without regard to the sinner’s own unworthiness, 
Jesus Christ is freely present with and for him, bringing the grace of forgiveness and 
peace with God won for the believer by his shed blood. Finally, two passages from D 3 
which illuminate the connection between “grace,” imputation, and the blood of the 
                                                        
312 WA 39/1.382.18-25 [A], ATD, 50. 
313 WA 39/1.396.23-397.3 [A], ATD, 61. 
314 WA 39/1.456.5-6 [A], cf. ATD, 106. 
315 WA 39/1.456.11-15 [A], cf. ATD, 106. 
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Mediator. In his preface, Luther explains that sin is taken away completely by 
imputation (reputative seu imputative), which means that “the mercy and grace 
(gratia) of God has removed sin.”316 This gracious imputation takes place through and 
for the sake of Jesus Christ, “the Propitiator and Mediator,” whom the condemned 
sinner grasps by faith.317 Likewise at D 3.2.2[29], believers are already “utterly saints 
and righteous by way of imputation,” because it is certain that “we have been baptized 
in Christ’s blood and received by the Father into grace for Christ’s sake (in gratiam 
propter Christum), in whom we believe.”318  
In sum: in these disputations, gratia properly defined is virtually identical to 
Gnade in the SA, and Luther develops his theology of grace on the basis of the same 
catena of scriptural texts taken from Isaiah, John, and Paul. “Grace” means free 
forgiveness, righteousness, and peace with God for the unworthy, through faith in the 
Lamb who made satisfaction for sins and brought redemption to his own by his blood. 
If there is a new nuance here, it lies in the tendency to define grace in terms of God’s 
merciful imputation for the sake of Christ’s perfect fulfillment of the law. And in fact, 
as I suggested above and as we shall see in further depth below, for the most part it is 
this forensic nuance that takes center-stage in the disputations regardless of whether 
or not the Reformer speaks explicitly about gratia. But as the texts I have cited 
demonstrate, each mention of God’s gracious or merciful imputation and/or Jesus 
Christ’s propitiatory and redeeming fulfillment of the law marks an instance of 
Luther’s theology of grace. 
                                                        
316 WA 39/1.491.24-492.1 [A], ATD, 141. 
317 WA 39/1.492.21-493.5 [A], ATD, 142. 
318 WA 39/1.562.15-563.1 [A], ATD, 185. 
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 On my reckoning, there are only three explicit references to the donum of the 
Holy Spirit in the disputations. In each case, the context is an interesting 
pneumatological parallel to Luther’s familiar christological distinction between God 
hidden in his majesty and revealed in the incarnation and cross of the Son.319 When, in 
accordance with John 16:8, the Spirit acts to convict the sinner, he speaks in his divine 
majesty and terrifies hearts. “Yet when he is enveloped in tongues and spiritual gifts 
(donis spiritualibus), then he is called the gift (donum), sanctifies, and vivifies.”320 In D 
1.17, Luther explains further: “For usually we call the Holy Spirit the One whom Christ 
sent us from the Father as gift (donum) in order that he might be our Vivifier, 
Sanctifier (noster vivificator, sanctificator), etc.”321 Thus when the Spirit is “God in his 
nature,” he is the Law’s author and he convicts of sin; but when he is “the gift through 
Christ (donum per Christum), he is our Vivifier and Sanctifier.”322 Arguing along the 
same lines at D 2.29, Luther concludes that “the Holy Spirit as God terrifies by the law, 
but as gift (donum), in the form of a dove, in the fiery tongue, he consoles, sanctifies, 
and vivifies.”323 Thus in the disputations, the “gift” of the Holy Spirit refers principally 
to the Spirit himself in his evangelical (as opposed to legal) operations, that is, the 
Spirit clothed in his dona spiritualia and at work in the saints of God thereby, 
sanctifying them and giving them life. As we shall see presently, in the context of the 
disputations Luther primarily correlates the Spirit’s sanctifying work with the renewal 
                                                        
319 On this point, see Pekka Kärkkäinen, Luthers trinitarische Theologie des Heiligen Geistes, 134-141. 
320 D 1.4, WA 39/1.370.18-21 [A], ATD, 40. 
321 WA 39/1.389.5-7 [A], cf. ATD, 56. 
322 WA 39/1.391.17-20 [A], ATD, 57. 
323 WA 39/1.484.20-22 [A], cf. ATD, 122-3. 
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of law-keeping in the justified. In each case, this is an instance of his theology of the 
gift. 
 
2.1.2. Grace and gift: res, non verba 
 
I turn now to some select examples of how Luther develops his theology of grace and 
gift in the disputations without mentioning either gratia or donum, and instead 
describing the work of Jesus Christ and the Spirit in terms taken directly from the 
Bible. Sometimes, he does so without immediate reference to the law. For example, at 
D 1.14 Luther sums his theology of grace and gift by coupling John 1:29 and 3:8: “Christ 
is the Lamb of God on whose shoulders the sins of the entire world are placed, and the 
Holy Spirit is efficacious (efficax) and blows and works where he wills.”324 Likewise at 
D 1.20, Luther sets out the same teaching by joining Rom. 8:1 and 8:13: “There is no 
condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus; and if they still have remnants of sin, 
nevertheless by the Spirit those remaining deeds of the flesh are put to death.”325 Or, 
in a compact statement of this theology found in the preface to the third disputation, 
Luther alludes to Rom. 4:6-8/Ps. 32:1-2 and 8:23 to this effect: Christians are “pure and 
holy, but first through imputation, because sin is not imputed to us; secondly, we also 
are formally righteous, as soon as I, through these firstfruits (primitias) and the Holy 
Spirit given to me from heaven, through faith begin to wrestle and fight with sin and 
blasphemy.”326 Finally, in a fascinating witness to the enduring role of Brautmystik in 
his theology—drawn from the Song of Songs, Eph. 5:23-32, etc., and mediated above 
all by Bernard of Clairvaux—at D 3.1 Luther teaches that when it is a matter of 
                                                        
324 WA 39/1.383.24-26 [A], cf. ATD, 51. 
325 WA 39/1.398.23-399.1 [A], cf. ATD, 63. 
326 WA 39/1.493.25-494.3 [A], cf. ATD, 143. 
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justification and the peace of consciences, “here we are in the Lord, who is our 
Bridegroom (noster sponsus) and does not suffer anyone else to sleep with us in this 
narrow bed.” For in the bridal chamber of the believer’s conscience, only Jesus Christ 
may reign as king. But this regal Lover is impatient with his consort’s flesh, and leads 
the fight against it, remaining in his chamber to console his bride and giving the Holy 
Spirit to arm her for the battle.327 In each of these passages and in scripturally-varied 
ways, Luther exposits his theology of grace, forgiveness, and justification in Jesus 
Christ and of ongoing growth in real holiness through the gift of the Holy Spirit. 
 
2.1.3. Grace, gift, and impletio legis: res, non verba 
 
More often than not, Luther sets his theology of Christ’s grace and the Spirit’s gift in 
direct relation to the fulfillment of the law (impletio legis). In such cases, Matt. 5:17 (“I 
have not come to destroy the law, but to fulfill it”), Matt. 22:37-40, Gal. 3:13, Rom. 3:31, 
8:1-4, 8:23, and 10:4 are especially prominent. Luther’s own remarks at D 1.1 provide a 
useful summary statement of his position: “By freely submitting himself to his own 
law, and enduring all its curses, Christ merited the Spirit for those who believe in him; 
and with the Spirit impelling them, they begin to fulfill the law even in this life; and in 
the future life, a most joyful and perfect obedience to the law will be in them, so that 
in body and soul they will do then what the angels do now.”328 The Reformer revisits 
this twofold trinitarian impletio legis so frequently in the disputations that it would be 
                                                        
327 WA 39/1.498.15-21 [A], cf. ATD, 146-7. Cf. Luther’s 1545 lecture on Gen. 49:11-12, WA 44.772.4-23, 
LW 8.263.  
328 WA 39/1.365.2-6 [A]: Christus tamen per hoc, quod legi sua sponte se subiecit et omnes eius 
maledictiones pertulit, emeruit credentibus in se Spiritum, quo impellente incipiunt etiam in hac vita 
legem implere, et in futura vita iucundissima et perfectissima obedientia legis erit in eis, ut corpore et 
animo eam faciant, ut nunc angeli. My translation; cf. ATD, 36. 
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tedious to review each occurrence.329 But I will supply representative examples that 
draw out particular nuances within his overall design.  
(1) In the preface to the first disputation, Luther cites Matt. 5:17 and then 
exegetes it, from the perspective of Jesus, in terms of Christ’s and the Spirit’s work in 
bringing about the law’s fulfillment in the redeemed: 
I did not come to abolish the law, but to fulfill it, which demonstrates that my 
office is not to take away the law, but to fulfill it: and to fulfill it in such a way, 
that those who believe that they are redeemed from the curse of the law (Gal. 
3:13) through this, my fulfillment of the law (hanc meam legis impletionem), 
may know that the law is to be fulfilled by them here (legem a se hic 
implendam), especially since they have already received the firstfruits of the 
Holy Spirit (Rom. 8:23).330 
 
Luther goes on to explain this further in terms of Rom. 3:31 and 8:3-4. Justification by 
faith apart from works of the law (Rom. 3:28) does not destroy the law, but establishes 
it: first by setting sinners free from its curse through Christ’s impletio legis; then by 
empowering the redeemed to do in the Spirit’s strength what had previously been 
impossible for them to do on their own, ut iustificatio legis impleretur in nobis.331 Both 
in Christ extra nos and by the Spirit in nobis, the law is upheld and confirmed 
precisely because it is kept. On the basis of Christ’s fulfillment of the law in the 
sinner’s place, God justifies the ungodly with full respect to the perfection of his own 
justice as it is expressed in the law; and this forensic, atonement-focused justification 
in Christ is intrinsically ordered to the Gerechtmachung, the iustificatio legis in nobis, 
                                                        
329 See, e.g., D 1.2, WA 39/1.367.7-11 [A]; D 1.6, WA 39/1.372.19-4 [A]; D 1.16, WA 39/1.387.16-388.6 [A]; 
D 1.21, WA 39/1.395.20-24 [A]; D 2.7, WA 39/1.444.4-11 [A]; D 2.16, WA 39/1.468.10-469.3 [A]; D 2.27, 
WA 39/1.482.13-483.1 [A]; D 3.13, WA 39/1.526.2-8 [A]. 
330 WA 39/1.363.3-7 [A], my translation; cf. ATD, 35. 
331 WA 39/1.363.8-10 [A], cf. ATD, 35. 
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that begins to take shape in the redeemed by the power of the Spirit’s primitiae (Rom. 
8:23).  
 (2) In D 1.12, the polemicist gegen die Antinomer explains the precise sense in 
which he too affirms that Jesus Christ has abolished or abrogated the law. As the 
above-quoted excerpt from Luther’s preface already demonstrates, Gal. 3:13’s 
maledictum legis provides the crucial distinction.332 It is with respect to the law’s 
“curse,” that is, to the law in its exacting, accusing, condemning, terrifying, and 
punishing function, that Christ has abrogated the law. As for St. Paul in Gal. 3-4, so for 
Luther here, the emphasis therefore lies on Christ’s self-substituting submission to the 
law in penal suffering (cf. Gal. 4:4-5). Because the law condemned him though he was 
innocent (cf. Rom. 8:3), Christ took from it its whole power to condemn anyone who 
trusts in him (cf. Rom. 8:1).333 When Christ is present, the exacting law that punishes 
sinners comes to an end (Rom. 10:4), since he has already fulfilled all its demands.334 
This takes place “through the forgiveness of sins and divine imputation,” that is to say, 
“God wills to consider the law fulfilled (Deus vult habere legem pro impleta lege) when 
we believe in the Fulfiller of the law (impletorem legis).”335 Though the law’s sentence 
is not fulfilled in the believing sinner, who deserves nothing short of death and hell, 
God forgives him and regards him as a righteous law-keeper on account of Christ the 
impletor. So far the theology of “grace” in D 1.12, to which Luther promptly annexes the 
complementary “gift”: “On top of this, God gives the Holy Spirit, in order that we may 
                                                        
332 Cf. D 1.2, WA 39/1.365.14-17 [A]: Lex est abrogata id est maledictum legis. Nam cum venerit 
Christus, non habet vim accusandi nos. Cf. ATD, 37. 
333 WA 39/1.380.1-3 [A]: quia lex eum innocentem condemnavit, abstulit legi universam vim, quae est 
exigere, accusare et perterrefacere. Ista exaction cessavit in Christo. Cf. ATD, 48. 
334 WA 39/1.379.16-17 [A], cf. ATD, 48. 
335 WA 39/1.379.16-380.5 [A], cf. ATD, 48. 
 118
begin to fulfill the law here,” with a view to the future life when we will be similes 
impletori Christo (cf. 1 John 3:2) and thus keep the law perfectly.336  
 (3) In D 1.13, weaving together Acts 15:9-11 and Matt. 11:28-30 with allusions to 
Rom. 5:1, 5:12-21, and Phil. 2:8, Luther states that the condemning “yoke” of the law is 
replaced by Christ’s light and easy yoke, “so that they may live in peace under him 
who rendered the obedience owed and required by the law, and gives it to those who 
believe in him.”337 As in the preceding argument, the overarching terms are set by Gal. 
3:13 and liberation through Christ’s impletio legis from the law’s curse. But whereas at 
D 1.12 the emphasis rested on Christ’s substitutionary penal sufferings, here his own 
“active” (to speak anachronistically, but clearly) obedientia rises to the fore: to those 
who lack the obedience owed to the law, Christ gives his obedience as their very 
own.338 Thus the believer is not only set free from the law’s curse by Christ’s becoming 
a curse in his place. He is also given Christ’s entire obedience as his own, possessed of 
which he stands before God as innocent and blameless as Christ himself. By faith, he 
has fulfilled the law, because by faith he has Christ’s obedientia—or, as Luther 
explicitly says at D 2.4, Christ’s aliena iustitia339—as his own. Et tamen, the law is still 
to be fulfilled by the godly (piis) as well: and to this end, they mortify the deeds of the 
flesh by the Spirit (Rom. 8:13) and purge out the old leaven (1 Cor. 5:7).340 Thus the 
“gift” of law-keeping by the Spirit, so far from being rendered superfluous by Christ’s 
                                                        
336 WA 39/1.379.16-380.5-6 [A], cf. ATD, 48. 
337 WA 39/1.381.4-7 [A], cf. ATD, 49. 
338 Vainio (Justification and Participation in Christ, 25) notes the usefulness of the later scholastic 
distinction between Christ’s active and passive obedience for describing Luther’s atonement 
theology (in its res), while making the same caveat I do here, viz., that Luther himself did not 
employ the distinction in so many words. 
339 WA 39/1.436.6 [A], cf. ATD, 93. 
340 WA 39/1.381.7-9 [A], cf. ATD, 49. 
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“grace,” is in fact rendered possible by the transformation (through that grace) of a 
grievous and intolerable burden into the light and easy iugum Christi. Once again, 
grace in Christ is ordered to the gift of the Spirit. 
 (4) In D 1.14, Luther develops the same theology with special reference to Rom. 
8:3-4, which he interprets in light of his distinction between an imputational and a 
real or formal fulfillment of the law. Weakened by the flesh, the law cannot justify and 
save. But God in his mercy has done what the law, thus weakened, could not do: “he 
sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and damned sin in the flesh through sin, in 
order that the justification of the law (iustificatio legis) might be fulfilled in us.”341 
Luther takes full advantage of this rich scripture to elaborate his bedrock theology of 
incarnation and atonement. Bearing our flesh, Christ “killed” our sin by his sacrifice on 
the cross, “so that in this way, the righteousness of the law (iustitia legis) might be 
fulfilled in us.”342 This righteousness, obtained by the cross of God’s Son, is fulfilled in 
nobis in two ways: “first, by way of imputation (imputative), then also formally 
(formaliter).”343 This second kind of righteousness refers to the formal renovation of 
human nature, such that the ungodly is not only declared to be righteous from 
without for Christ’s sake but is in fact also made righteous deep within by the 
operation of the Spirit. The God who sent his Son in our flesh to shed his blood ex 
gratia 
… gives the Spirit to those who believe this (haec [viz., gratia]), in order that 
they may begin to hate sin ex animo, to acknowledge this immense, 
                                                        
341 WA 39/1.383.3-5 [A]: misit filium suum in similitudine carnis peccati et damnavit peccatum in 
carne per peccatum, ut iustificatio legis in nobis impleretur. 
342 WA 39/1.383.5-9, cf. ATD, 50. 
343 WA 39/1.383.9 [A], cf. ATD, 42. 
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incomprehensible, and ineffable gift (donum) and to thank God for it, to love, 
worship, and call upon God, to expect everything from him.344 
 
Since Luther quotes Rom. 8:32 in the next sentence, it is clear that the “gift” in 
question here is the gift of God’s Son in the incarnation and on the cross—a good 
reminder that gratia and donum do not always function as technical terms. 
Nevertheless, in D 1.14 we again find Luther developing his creedal theology of grace 
and gift, of righteousness won through the cross of God’s incarnate Son, imputed to 
believers, and effectually worked within them by the Spirit through the formal 
renovation of their nature. For by the Spirit’s renewing work, the vitiated filii Adae 
begin again to engage in those spiritual actions which unite them with God, viz., to 
know, acknowledge, thank, worship, and love God.  
None of this, Luther insists, comes ex nobis. Rather, all is ex gratia Dei mittentis 
filium in carnem.345 This reflexive anti-Pelagian qualification of formal righteousness 
probably has two points of reference in this context. On the one hand, Luther upholds 
the commonplace Augustinian conviction that all righteousness has its origin in the 
free generosity of God: non ex nobis, sed ex gratia Dei (cf. Eph. 2:8). In this regard, 
Luther stands in an august line of high and late medieval Augustinians contra 
pelagianos modernos. But on the other hand, he seems to be making a point more 
immediately related to the dynamics of his own theology of grace and gift, namely, 
that the formal renewal of the justified into real righteousness of life is itself the fruit 
and outworking of God’s “grace” in the incarnation and atonement of his Son. In other 
words, he is again linking the Spirit’s “gift” to Christ’s “grace” in the closest possible 
                                                        
344 WA 39/1.383.10-13 [A], cf. ATD, 42. 
345 WA 39/1.383.9-10 [A], cf. ATD, 42. 
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way, by causally rooting the gift of formal renewal by the Spirit in the grace of 
atonement and (forensic) justification through the Son.  
 (5) I turn last to the Reformer’s rich exposition of these themes at D 2.3, where 
three times he unfolds his theology of grace and gift vis-à-vis the law’s fulfillment both 
imputatively and formally or purgatively. He builds the first on a christological 
interpretation of Isa. 9:4. Jesus Christ breaks “the yoke of burden and the rod of the 
exactor,” that is, the exactio legis which accuses the sinner, because he “devours 
(devorantem) our sin in his own body” (cf. 1 Pet. 2:24).346 Thus Luther explains that by 
way of imputation (imputative), sin is dead and ceases to affect the Christian “when I 
receive forgiveness of sins because of faith in Christ, and I am utterly set free from sin, 
as if it were nothing, as if we were already in heaven.”347 But at the same time, because 
“certain remnants (reliquiae) of every kind of sin” adhere in us, sin is also removed and 
ceases in Christians formaliter et expurgative.348 Notably, in this first case Luther does 
not actually speak of the Spirit’s sanctifying work at all—though it is assumed—and 
locates the agency of progressive growth in holiness firmly in the renewed Christian 
himself: “Day by day, more and more, I purge and mortify (expurgo et mortifico) the 
sin still adhering in my flesh, till finally everything that belongs to the old man is 
taken away and consumed, and a pure and glorified man, without any spot or blemish, 
comes forth.”349  
 Luther’s donum-rendition of the traditional gratia cooperans becomes clearer 
in the second instance of his theology of grace and gift in D 2.3. The believer is free 
                                                        
346 WA 39/1.431.13-16 [A], cf. ATD, 91. 
347 WA 39/1.431.10-12 [A], cf. ATD, 91. 
348 WA 39/1.432.7-8 [A], cf. ATD, 91. 
349 WA 39/1.432.8-11 [A], cf. ATD, 91. 
 122
from sin and the accusing law first imputative, “since sins against the law are not 
imputed to me and are pardoned on account of the most precious blood of the 
immaculate Lamb, Jesus Christ my Lord.”350 Then, Luther immediately adds, he is also 
set free from sin expurgative, “when the Holy Spirit is given to me.”351 But this 
purgation by the gift of the Spirit is not a monergistic affair, for the Spirit’s operation 
quickens and sustains a spiritual agency on the part of the redeemed person himself: 
“having received the Spirit, I begin to hate ex animo everything that offends his name, 
and I become a pursuer of good works. And if there is something of the remnant of sin 
in me, I purge it until I become totally pure—and this in the same Spirit (in eodem 
spiritu) who is given for Christ’s sake.”352  
 The third place builds on the first two, implicitly explaining the relation 
between the Spirit’s work and the redeemed person’s renewed spiritual agency in 
terms of the latter’s new-found love for the righteousness required by the law. In a 
                                                        
350 WA 39/1.434.6-8 [A], cf. ATD, 92. 
351 WA 39/1.434.8-9 [A], cf. ATD, 92. 
352 WA 39/1.434.9-12 [A], cf. ATD, 92. I intend to develop this theme throughout this book, in 
correction of the one-sided emphasis on divine action at the expense of renewed human agency 
which one frequently finds in the scholarship. This probably goes back at least to Karl Holl’s stark 
monergism and its influence on the Luther Renaissance he inspired. More recently, see e.g. Tuomo 
Mannermaa, Der im Glauben gegenwärtige Christus, esp. 56-62, 80-3; Reijo Työrinoja, “Opus 
theologicum,” 119-53; Reinhard Hütter, “St. Thomas on Grace and Free Will in the Initium Fidei: The 
Surpassing Augustinian Synthesis,” Nova et Vetera, English Edition 5/3 (2007): 521-554, esp. 524-34; 
and Jennifer A. Herdt, Putting on Virtue: The Legacy of the Splendid Vices (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), cp. 6: “Luther: Saved Hypocrites.” Though her argument is deeply flawed, 
Herdt’s chapter is useful for assessing the status questionis since she writes on Luther secondhand 
and acknowledges her dependence on the work, e.g., of Wilfried Joest, Alister McGrath, Bernhard 
Lohse, Tuomo Mannermaa, Gilbert Meilaender, and Paul Althaus. Joest and Mannermaa make 
strange bedfellows, to be sure. But in some of the Finns’ work—Mannermaa and Työrinoja being 
two cases in point—their welcomed emphasis on Christ’s real presence in faith and his divine 
action in the believer (Gal. 2:20) can overwhelm the reality of the believer’s own creaturely agency 
as it is restored by the Spirit’s renovating gift (Rom. 8:13). It is ironic that the Finnish recovery of 
“the Catholic Luther’s” doctrine of salvation through union with Christ has at times induced a 
diminished appreciation of his Augustinian theology of vitiated human agency restored by the 
inner-workings of the Spirit. 
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striking use of Col. 2:14, Luther first states that “Christ took our place and supplied 
what we lack, and erased by his blood the handwriting of the decree which was against 
us, until the law was finally satisfied by one in the place of us all.”353 Thus sin’s guilt 
and the accusing law are clear taken away by Christ’s death in our place. But sin is also 
taken away formaliter when it is “purged and eliminated,” and the law itself—that is, 
the accusing law—also ceases formaliter  
… when what the law demands is done in us (fit in nobis), and we render it 
freely and willingly (ultro et volentes), not just because the law demands it, but 
out of love of righteousness (ex amor iustitiae) and the right and of God 
himself.354 
 
Prior to the renovating operation of the Spirit, fleshly humans only ever keep the law 
out of fear of punishment or hope of reward.355 But in those redeemed from the law’s 
debt-sheet by Christ’s blood, the Spirit so transforms the heart that the Christian is no 
longer motivated to keep the law by compulsion or self-complacence, but by real love 
for the righteousness expressed in and required by it. I shall attend to this point 
further in section 2.2 below. 
 In sum, Luther’s position in the disputations comes to this: although it is no 
longer possible, after the fall of Adam, for vitiated humans to keep the law, God sent 
his Son in our flesh to keep it for us, in our place. He fulfilled it positively through his 
active obedience (as later Protestant theology would put it), keeping all its 
commandments; and he fulfilled it negatively through passive obedience, suffering all 
                                                        
353 WA 39/1.434.14-16 [A], cf. ATD, 92 
354 WA 39/1.434.17-435.2 [A], cf. ATD, 93. 
355 D 2.14, WA 39/1.460.17-21 [A]: quasi dicat lex: Ego spiritualis sum, hoc est, cor purum et spirituale 
requiro, non satisfit mihi nisi hilari corde et spiritu per Spiritum sanctum renovato; tu quidem 
speciosa opera, magna et utilia facis, sed quia impuro corde et spiritu vel amore tui et timore 
poenarum facis, non es ille, qui mihi satisfecerit. Cf. ATD, 109. 
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its sanctions by taking its curse upon himself on the cross in our place. In the 
preaching of the Gospel, Jesus Christ gives his superabundant twofold impletio legis to 
the believer as his own, and thus sets him free from the law’s curse. At the same time, 
Christ gives his Spirit, so that the just requirements of the law—summed up in the 
twofold love commandment—might begin to be fulfilled ex corde in those who have 
been set free from its curse; and what is begun really but imperfectly in this mortal life 
will be brought to completion in the resurrection to come. In the terms of this study, 
Christ’s “grace” sets believers free from the law’s curse so that by the Spirit’s “gift” they 
may begin to keep the law. This is Luther’s creedal theology of grace and gift, 
transposed into the framework of the law in order to reply to the antinomian 
challenge but identical in substance to his confession in the Smalcald Articles. 
 
2.1.4. The renovation of Adam and impletio legis 
 
In chapter 1, I argued that Adam’s being and life in the divine image needed to be 
understood in part in terms of natural law. In his lectures on Gen. 1-3, Luther depicts 
the unfallen Adam as one who keeps the law of his nature—which can be properly 
reduced to wholehearted love of God and neighbor—spontaneously and with great 
joy. Now I shall argue just the reverse, that is, that the theology of renewed law-
keeping by the Spirit’s gift set forth in Luther’s disputations is at once a theology of 
the restoration of fallen and vitiated human nature to its original wholeness and 
holiness. Theses 29-32 from D 1 show that Luther, no less than Irenaeus or Augustine, 
is able to compress his entire soteriology into St. Paul’s Adam-Christ typology: dead in 
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sin through the first Adam, we are justified and made alive in the Last,356 who is the 
Promised Seed of Gen. 3:15.357 And in D 1.15, to which I drew attention above, Luther 
states that Christ is given in order that the “disease” (morbus) infecting Adam’s nature 
may be “healed” (medeatur); for he came in the likeness of Adam’s sinful flesh that “he 
might seek the lost and restore (restituat) the corrupt nature to its integrity” (note 
Luther’s composite allusion to Luke 19:10 and Acts 3:21).358 In the fourth set of theses—
which were never disputed—Luther says virtually the same thing, but now in terms 
not of nature but of law: in thesis 40 repeating his allusions to Luke 19:10 and Acts 3:21, 
then concluding in thesis 41 that “the law is not taken way through Christ, but 
restored (restituitur), so that Adam might become such as he was and even better.”359 
Thus for Luther, the law is restored in Christ because “Adam”—viz., humana natura—
is restored and perfected in him. But we shall have to look into this a bit further, in 
relation to the Spirit and the law. 
 Remember that for Luther vitiated humans need the help of the revealed law, 
summed in the Decalogue, the Golden Rule, and the twofold love commandment, “so 
that we might be reminded of what we were before Adam’s fall (quid ante lapsum Adae 
fuerimus).”360 The law’s perfection and beauty gives some sense of what unfallen 
Adam’s original being was like in its natural perfections. Because he was given the gift 
of being and acting as a law-keeper by virtue of his creation in the divine image, 
                                                        
356 Thesis #29, WA 39/1.347.3-4, cf. ATD, 31. 
357 Thesis #32, WA 39/1.347.9-10, cf. ATD, 31. 
358 WA 39/1.386.8-11 [A], ATD, 53. 
359 WA 39/1.354.11-14, ATD, 131. 
360 D 2.13, WA 39/1.454.13-14 [A], ATD, 105. Or, stated negatively at D 3.7, WA 39/1.516.5-8 [A], cf. 
ATD, 158: “the law came and wished to show us that we are not what we were in Paradise, where 
Adam was a most beautiful man, great and whole in his powers (integer viribus).” By stark contrast, 
now “we are dwarfs (homunciones), and extremely corrupt by that original wound (illo vitio 
originis).” Cf. WA 39/1.539.7-15, ATD, 172. 
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obeying the law was not only a possible but an enjoyable or pleasant (iucunda) 
exercise for Adam; he obeyed it perfectly, “with the highest will and gladness of soul 
(summa voluntate et laetitia animi),” because it was identical to the law of his being as 
the protological Man.361 That, I argued in chapter 1, is the fuller picture that emerges 
from comparing Luther’s wistful portraits of Adam in the lectures on Gen. 1-3 with the 
theology of the law developed in the disputations.  
In D 1.1, after asserting the glad and voluntary nature of unfallen Adam’s 
obedience to the law, Luther continues to explain that what was possible and pleasant 
for Adam has become impossible and terrifying to us, not because the law has 
changed but because we have by Adam’s fall.362 It is no accident that at this point 
Luther pairs our impossibility and terror before the law, for they correspond to the 
twofold predicament of Adam’s fallen children: natural corruption and subjection to 
the law’s curse of death and damnation. This sets the stage for the concise statement 
of the Reformer’s theology of grace and gift already noted above: “By freely submitting 
himself to his own law, and enduring all its curses, Christ merited the Spirit for those 
who believe in him; and with the Spirit impelling them, they begin to fulfill the law 
even in this life; and in the future life, a most joyful and perfect obedience to the law 
(iucundissima et perfectissima obedientia legis) will be in them, so that in body and 
soul they will do then what the angels do now.”363 It is at first glance a little odd that 
Luther begins with Adam only to end with the angels, but keep in mind that in 
Luther’s protology even unfallen Adam looked in hope for the future translatio to the 
                                                        
361 D 1.1, WA 39/1.364.10-13 [A], cf. ATD, 36. 
362 WA 39/1.364.13-365.2 [A], cf. ATD, 36. 
363 WA 39/1.365.2-6 [A]. My translation. Cf. ATD, 36. 
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fullness of spiritual life with and in God. What Luther is saying therefore comes to 
this: Jesus Christ takes away the curse of the law, and with it its terror, making it 
“pleasant” once again to those redeemed by his blood. Then by the gift of his Spirit, he 
renders the law possible even in this life by beginning to restore vitiated human 
nature to its original perfection. This beginning will attain its end in the angelic, 
iucundissima et perfectissima obedientia legis that will be in us—body and soul—in the 
coming resurrection. Thus in D 1.1, and in terms of the impletio legis, Luther develops 
a full-fledged theology of Adam’s redemption and restoration in Christ by the Spirit.364 
 
2.2. Luther’s partim/partim or “Augustinian simul” 
 
In these 1537-38 disputations, as in the 1538 addendum to SA III.3 examined above, 
Luther’s “simul” is predominantly and basically an account of the renewed Christian 
undergoing the Holy Spirit’s progressive sanctifying work while battling—in the power 
of the Spirit’s gift—against the “sin” or “flesh” that still remains in a depleted, 
fragmentary, and overruled form.365 The heart of this spiritual battle—fought only by 
the saints—is the struggle to refuse consent to the sinful desires that constitute one’s 
                                                        
364 Cf. D 1.7, WA 39/1.375.4-9 [A]: Sic Christi officium est etiam in hac vita restituere genus humanum 
in amissam illam innocentiam et obedientiam legis iucundam, quae erat in paradiso in positivo, quod 
fecit, cum pro nobis mortuus est et legis maledictiones et poenas pertulit ac suam innocentiam 
iustitiam nobis donavit. Hoc modo fit nobis lex, obedientia aliquo modo iucunda, quam illic in 
superlativo praestabimus.  
365 Cf. Theodor Dieter, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles, 325: “For Luther, progress does not exclude 
the simul iustus et peccator, but rather explains and energizes it.” Likewise p. 344: “Luther’s 
understanding of progress does not exclude the simul: it incorporates it.” For Luther’s “simul” is 
only adequately grasped as an “incessant movement” from sin to righteousness (semper in motu). 
Dieter convincingly demonstrates (1) that the conjunction of semper- and simul statements in 
Luther’s early works is rooted in Ockham’s interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of motion, and (2) 
that this Ockhamist theory provides Luther with the set of conceptual tools he needs to account for 
the continuity of the Christian’s existence in grace without appealing to the usual scholastic 
categories of accidens, habitus, qualitas, etc. Thus “das Gerechtsein des Glaubenden wird als 
Gerechtwerden verstanden,” not because Luther anticipated Heidegger but because he 
appropriated Ockham.  
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“flesh.” These desires at once entice and grieve the renewed person, who, as “spirit” 
(spiritus), suffers their presence unwillingly (invitus) and longs for the eschatological 
freedom of perfection in righteousness. Thus we find ourselves once again in the 
familiar territory of an anthropology and penitential spirituality driven by a deeply 
Augustinian interpretation of Rom. 6-8, Gal. 5:16-17, and the Psalter. In this section I 
continue to build my case for this, Luther’s real “simul” by first studying the Spirit’s 
work in creating the renewed spiritus by producing holy desires in the donum-
renovated heart. I then sample a few choice battle scenes that especially highlight the 
logic of non-consent to “sin” that comprises the spiritual linchpin of Luther’s “simul.” 
In the following section 2.3, I will interpret the rather sparse texts that Wilfried Joest 
employed in 1951 to make his case for the so-called Totalaspekt of the “simul.”  
 
2.2.1. The Spirit’s re-creation of the soul through holy desires  
 
In studying D 2.3 above, I took note of the Spirit’s work in producing amor iustitiae in 
the renewed heart, so that the believer begins to keep the law willingly and gladly. 
This, states Luther at D 2.14, is what the law—grasped in its true spiritual depths—
really requires of us: not just external conformity to precepts, but a pure, spiritual, 
joyful heart (or “spirit”) brought into being through the renovating work of the Holy 
Spirit.366 Such a heart is the effect and production of the Spirit’s gift in the redeemed: 
raised up by the promise of forgiveness through Christ (“grace”), “we receive through 
faith the Holy Spirit, who brings forth new emotions (novos motus parit) and 
                                                        
366 D 2.14, WA 39/1.460.17-19 [A]: quasi dicat lex: Ego spiritualis sum, hoc est, cor purum et spirituale 
requiro, non satisfit mihi nisi hilari corde et spiritu per Spiritum sanctum renovato. Cf. ATD, 109. 
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permeates the will (voluntatem imbuit), so that it truly begins to love God and to 
detest the sin left in the flesh.”367  
By the sixteenth century, “motus” had already enjoyed a long and distinguished 
career in the tradition of moral psychology, with deep roots in ancient Stoicism.368 For 
the Stoics, motus animi are emotions, commotions, passions, affections, perturbations, 
agitations, disturbances, or impulses that take place in the soul through what Pierre 
Hadot calls “the double aspect of the cognitive process—passive and active, 
                                                        
367 D 1.21, WA 39/1.395.20-24 [A], cf. ATD, 60-1. 
368 The best introductions to the Stoic doctrine remain, I think, those of Cicero in his Tusculan 
Disputations 3 and 4 and Augustine in s. 150 and civ. dei 9.3-6 and 14.2-19. See, e.g., Tusc. Disp. 
3.10.23: “The Greeks name every perturbation of the soul by the same word, for they call every 
turbulent motion in the soul (motus in animo turbidus) a πάθος, i.e., a disease (morbus)”; 3.11.24: 
“Every perturbation is an animi motus which is either apart from reason or heedless of reason or 
disobedient to reason.” At civ. dei 14.5-6 (CCSL 48.420-1, cf. Bett. 555), we find the traditional motus 
language taken up in Augustine’s novel way: “It is not only from the flesh (ex carne) that the soul is 
affected (afficitur anima), so that it desires, fears, rejoices, and grieves; but it is even able to be 
agitated by these emotions (motibus) from its self (ex se ipsa). The difference maker is the quality of 
one’s will (qualis sit uoluntas hominis): since if it is perverse, it will have these emotions (motus) as 
perverse emotions; but if it is upright, they will be not only blameless, but even praiseworthy.” In 
more recent scholarship: Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1985); Marcia L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle 
Ages, vols. 1-2 (Leiden: Brill, 1990); A. A. Long, “Representation and the Self in Stoicism,” in Stephen 
Everson, ed., Companions to Ancient Thought 2: Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 102-20; idem, Stoic Studies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Julia Annas, 
Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Berkley: University of California Press, 1992); Johannes 
Brachtendorf, “Cicero and Augustine on the Passions,” Revue des Études augustiniennes 43 (1997): 
289-308; Pierre Hadot, The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, trans. Michael Chase 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Margaret Graver, Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan 
Disputations 3 and 4 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Tad Brennan, “Stoic Moral 
Psychology,” in Brad Inwood, ed., The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 257-94; Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Karl-Heinz zur Mühlen, “Die Affektenlehre im 
Spätmittelalter und in der Reformationszeit,” in idem, Reformatorisches Profil: Studien zum Weg 
Martin Luthers und der Reformation (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995), 101-22. For my 
knowledge of Stoic philosophy and its influence on Augustine, I am indebted to my teacher, Prof. 
Michel René Barnes, and in particular his spring 2011 Marquette University seminar on Augustine’s 
moral psychology, in which I was honored to participate. 
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constrained and free.”369 In essence, it consists in the complex psychological interplay 
of  
(1) An external stimulus that pressures, allures, or otherwise “moves” the soul 
from without, thus giving rise to a pre-emotional impression 
(φαντασία/imago/visum). This happens willy-nilly to sage and fool alike. 
  
(2) A rational process of judgment, in which the soul assesses the propriety of 
its pre-emotional impression in light of what it holds to be true about reality. 
This issues either in the decision to decline the initial impression’s suggested 
motus or to consent to it; and it is within the soul’s power to withhold or grant 
its consent (adsensus mentis/consensus voluntatis). 
 
Since the initial impression affects the soul but falls short of causing a complete 
motus, it is sometimes theorized as either a pro-passio or a primus motus. When the 
fool, by an act of false judgment, grants consent to the appropriateness of the initial 
pre-emotional response, he inwardly experiences or “suffers” (patitur) a full-blown 
motus animi. The language of “movements,” “affections,” or “passions” connotes the 
passivity and responsiveness that is basic to emotional phenomena: because a person 
experiences some object as auspicious or threatening, it moves or affects him; and if in 
response he gives way and consents to suffering the full force of the suggested 
impulse, he is moved or affected in the depths of his soul. Thus passion is, by 
definition, mental suffering; it is intrinsically injurious to the soul’s well-being, a kind 
of psychological wound. For it is what happens to the fool when he permits an 
external reality to act upon and affect his soul. πάθος, motus, and affectus are 
therefore preferred and basically convertible terms in Stoic accounts of psychological 
affections: though Augustine, followed by Brachtendorf, notes that Cicero uses 
                                                        
369 Hadot, The Inner Citadel, 102, discussing a text from Epictetus preserved in Aulus Gellius; cf. civ. 
dei 9.4.  
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perturbatio to translate the Greek πάθος (Tusc. Disp. 3.10.23), while most other authors 
employ passio.370   
This will, I think, become clearer if I present the Stoic theory concretely vis-à-
vis the classic “tetrachord” of the passions, of which the four genera are desire, 
pleasure, fear, and grief.371 At its heart, the project of ancient philosophy involved 
programs of therapy that aimed to heal the soul of its deep sadness and lead it instead 
to happiness, eudaemonia.372 In the train of the Socrates presented in Plato’s early 
dialogues, the Stoics held that happiness consisted exclusively in the possession of 
virtue. The moral excellence of the wise soul is itself the summum bonum. The notion 
that an external good might contribute to one’s happiness, or that an external evil 
might take away from it, is an error of philosophical judgment. Indeed, a quite literally 
pathological error: for the passions arise from believing this bad philosophy. Objects 
represented to the soul as pleasant and propitious (e.g., sexual pleasure or wealth), 
which the fool mistakenly thinks will bring him happiness if attained, move him first 
to desire, then to pleasure if he attains the desideratum. By a like error in judgment, 
objects perceived to be prejudicial to one’s self (e.g., torture or poverty) cause fear in 
anticipation, then pain or grief in the event. But this is all to reason irrationally, that is 
to say, to experience realities circumstantial to one’s soul in the manner proper to 
soulless beats; for humans are by nature rational beings whose happiness consists 
solely in the enjoyment of the inner good of wisdom. And as no external good can 
                                                        
370 Augustine, civ. dei 14.8 (CCSL 48.423, Bett. 558-9); Brachtendorf, “Cicero and Augustine on the 
Passions,” 290 n. 3. Brachtendorf suggests that the use of “passio” in such contexts was a neologism 
coined by Apuleius (p. 296), which is perhaps implied by Augustine’s comments at civ. dei 9.4.  
371 See, e.g., Tusc. Disp. 3.11.24-5, civ. dei 14.3. 
372 Cf. Augustine’s s. 150.4 (WSA III/5.31): “In common, all philosophers strove by dedication, 
investigation, discussion, by their way of life, to lay hold of the blessed life. This was their one 
reason for philosophizing.” 
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contribute to the happiness of wisdom, so no external evil can take it away. Since the 
Stoic sage possesses this wisdom, if an initial pro-passio buffets him from outside the 
inner citadel of reason and virtue, he defeats its assault on his tranquility and 
blessedness by rendering a true judgment about both the irrationality of the proposed 
passion and the sufficiency of the virtue which he already enjoys for his happiness. 
The outcome is the goal of Stoic moral therapy. Though a fierce storm at sea makes 
even the philosopher’s face turn pale, he refuses to consent to the impulse of fear 
suggested by his pre-rational (and thus pre-emotional) response to the external 
provocation presented by the wind and the waves and the threat of impending death, 
and remains unmoved in the freedom and felicity of apatheia.373 So far the Stoics on 
matters moral-psychological.  
In 1969, Wilhelm Maurer argued that the precocious Melanchthon acquired his 
early Affektenlehre by reading Cicero, Marsilio Ficino, and Lorenzo Valla at Tübingen 
under the watchful eye of uncle Reuchlin: the Stoic theory of the affections shaping his 
doctrine of sin, and Renaissance Platonism’s theory of love his doctrine of grace.374 
Luther, by contrast, was just not interested in a theory of psychological affections; and 
when he did come to speak of the affections, he did so on the basis of his own spiritual 
experience in prayer, interpreted in the language of the Bible and especially the 
Psalter.375 Maurer’s (and derivatively, Karl-Heinz zur Mühlen’s376) arguments 
                                                        
373 Some time before Hadot (The Inner Citadel, 102), Augustine used this example, drawn from 
Aulus Gellius’ Attic Nights 19.1, to explain the Stoic theory at civ. dei 9.4. 
374 Wilhelm Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus und Reformation. Bd. 2: Der 
Theologe (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969), 257-9. 
375 Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon, 249-51. 
376 Karl Heinz zur-Mühlen, “Melanchthons Auffasung vom Affekt in den ‘Loci communes’ von 1521,” 
in idem, Reformatorische Prägungen: Studien zur Theologie Martin Luthers und zur Reformationzeit, 
Athina Lexutt and Volkmar Ortmann, eds. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 84-95. 
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regarding the sources of Melanchthon’s moral-psychology are, I think, compelling. But 
unless one is predisposed to drive a wedge between the biblical Luther and the 
philosophical Melanchthon,377 Maurer’s assertions about Luther’s disinterest in a 
theory of the affections appear to be groundless. For Luther too had read his 
classics;378 and, as Risto Saarinen has recently argued, Cicero and Seneca in particular 
were important philosophical influences on the formation of his thought.379  
Now, as Lodi Nauta has argued, for an Augustinian humanist like Lorenzo 
Valla, Cicero had more to offer than elegant prose: he provided an alternative 
philosophical discourse to the scholastic Aristotelianism that Valla had grown tired 
of.380 One part of this bigger humanist program of Antischolastik via Ressourcement—
                                                        
377 From his Duke dissertation, Timothy J. Wengert has labored indefatigably to disabuse the guild 
of Reformation studies from this predisposition. See e.g. Philip Melanchthon’s Annotationes in 
Johannem in Relation to its Predecessors and Contemporaries (Geneva: Librairie Droz S.A., 1987), 
57-8, where Wengert locates Maurer’s Humanismus—Reformation dichotomy in the tradition of 
Wilhelm Neuser, Adolf Sperl, and Ekkehard Mühlenberg. By the mid 1530s, Luther was already 
aware of the emerging differences between his theology and that of his junior comrade-in-arms; 
but into the 1540s, Luther continued to hold Master Philipp in the highest regard. See, e.g., WA Tr 
5.204.16-28, cf. LW 54.441-2 (#5511, winter 1542/43): “If one wishes to become a theologian, he has in 
the first place a great advantage: he has the Bible. This is now so clear that he can read it without 
any trouble. Afterward he should read Philipp’s Loci Communes. This he should read diligently and 
well, so that he has it all in his head. If he has these two, he is a theologian whom neither the Devil 
nor any heretic can shake. The whole of theology stands open to him, and afterward he can read 
whatever he wants for edification. If he wishes, he can read Philipp’s Romans, my Galatians, 
Deuteronomy; that’ll give him eloquence and an abundance of words. You will find no book under 
the sun in which the whole of theology is so excellently gathered together as in the Loci Communes. 
Read all the fathers, the sententiaries, etc., it’s nothing. There is not a better book after holy 
scripture. Philipp is more efficiently machined than I am: he fights, and he teaches. I’m garrulous, 
and more rhetorical.” 
378 Helmar Junghans, Der junge Luther und die Humanisten (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1985); Brecht, Martin Luther: His Road to Reformation 1483—1521, trans. James L. Schaaf 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1985), 38-44. 
379 Risto Saarinen, “Luther und humanistische Philosophie,” Lutherjahrbuch 80 (2013), 77-109. 
380 Lodi Nauta, In Defense of Common Sense: Lorenzo Valla’s Humanist Critique of Scholastic 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), esp. 155-74 on Valla’s insistence that 
virtue is an affect, not a habit, and his debt to Cicero’s eclectic Stoicism—despite, ironically, Valla’s 
bitter polemics against Stoicism: in which points he parallels both Augustine and, I am arguing, 
Luther. Cf. Charles Trinkhaus, In Our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian 
Humanist Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); William Bouwsma, “The Two Faces 
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in which figures as diverse as Petrarch, Valla, Luther, Melanchthon, and Calvin all 
participated in their different ways—involved the displacement of virtue theory from 
the habitus tradition inspired by Aristotle (and ascendant in the schools) into the 
sphere of “Emotionstheorie als Affekte,” the special province of the Stoics.381 So the 
supposition that Luther acquired the elements of his affective theory directly from 
Cicero or Seneca is not outside the realm of possibility. Indeed, Volker Leppin has 
argued that Luther participated quite self-consciously in “die humanistische Front 
gegen Aristoteles.”382 
That being said, I think it is highly probable that Luther’s (and Melanchthon’s, 
for that matter) appropriation of the Stoic motus-theory—like Valla’s a century 
before—is mediated through Augustine’s own reworking of the psychology of human 
motivation in the context of his theology of grace.383 Ockham’s useful razor suggests as 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought,” in Heiko Augustinus 
Oberman and Thomas A. Brady Jr., eds., Itinerarium italicum: The Profile of the Italian Renaissance 
in the Mirror of its European Transformations (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 3-60. 
381 Risto Saarinen, “Luther und humanistische Philosophie,” 78-9. Cf. Jill Kraye, “Moral philosophy,” 
in C. B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, and Jill Kraye, eds., The Cambridge History of 
Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 303-86, esp. 364-7 on the 
Stoic theory of emotions as it was alternately appropriated, modified, or rejected by various 
Renaissance philosophers and theologians; also Katharine Park and Eckhard Kessler, “The concept 
of psychology,” ibid., 455-63, esp. 460. 
382 Leppin, Martin Luther, 93-4. 
383 With respect to Melanchthon, in the same breadth Maurer (p. 258f) asserts both (1) that “Diese 
einzigartige Synthese von Cicero und Plato ist Melanchthons eigenstes Werk,” and (2) that “Von 
Augustin an bis zu Erasmus hin kannte die abendländische Rhetorik und Psychologie eine Synthese 
von Cicero und Plato.” Which one is it? I think certainly the latter. In civ. dei 9.4, Augustine is 
already discussing (with approbation) Cicero’s argument for the real identity of Platonic, 
Aristotelian, and Stoic virtue theory in his de finibus bonorum et malorum. Colish (The Stoic 
Tradition, I/141-2, 153-55) confirms that Cicero attempted a synthesis of Platonism and Stoicism: in 
e.g. his Tusculan Disputations, he upholds the ancient Stoic theories about passion, virtue, and 
apatheia even as he revises its psychological monism by incorporating faculty psychology in the 
tradition of Plato and Aristotle. This, as civ. dei 9.4 attests and as Colish (II/165-79, 207-25), James 
Wetzel, and Sarah Byers have cogently argued, approximates at least one side of Augustine’s 
complex position (i.e., the moral-psychological; the other being the theology of grace): see Wetzel, 
Augustine and the Limits of Virtue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Byers, “Augustine 
on the ‘Divided Self’: Platonist or Stoic?” AugS 38/1 (2007), 105-18. It will be remember that from the 
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much: if Luther read Cicero and Seneca, he “devoured” Augustine; and Augustine’s 
critical revision of the Stoic theory is there in the texts, ripe for the harvest by one who 
has the ears to hear to it.384 (On the nature of this revision in a moment.) Indeed, we 
know that by 1509 Luther had read and annotated—briefly, but in a way that evinces 
understanding—civ. dei 14, arguably the most important essay in moral psychology in 
Augustine’s works;385 and in any case, by 1515 at the latest he was voraciously engaging 
the anti-Pelagian writings bound up in vol. 8 of the new Amerbach edition of 
Augustine’s works,386 writings replete with Augustine’s philosophical psychology for 
the very reason that their main object is the defense of a scriptural theology of human 
renewal by grace. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
initium of his search for true wisdom in 373, Cicero exercised a profound influence on Augustine, 
not just as a rhetorician but as a philosopher. Cf. Maurice Testard, Saint Augustin et Cicéron: 
Cicéron dans la formation et dans l’oeuvre de Saint Augustin, 2 vols. (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 
1958); Johannes Brachtendorf, “Cicero and Augustine on the Passions”; John C. Cavadini, “Feeling 
Right: Augustine on the Passions and Sexual Desire,” AugS 36/1 (2005), 195-217; idem, “The Darkest 
Enigma: Reconsidering the Self in Augustine’s Thought,” AugS 38/1 (2007), 119-32; Timo Nisula, 
Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012), esp. pp. 194-200 on 
Augustine as a Ciceronian Platonist with key influences from Stoic moral philosophy, and p. 234 on 
the nexus of moral psychology and the theology of grace in Augustine’s thought. 
384 WA Tr 1.140.5, #347 (1532): Principio Augustinum vorabam, non legebam. Cf. LW 54.49. 
385 WA 9.25.19-23. At 14.6 (CCSL 48.421, Bett. 555-6), Augustine argues that diverse affections/motus 
are nothing but diverse forms of one’s voluntas transformed by one’s response to diverse objects: 
Voluntas est quippe in omnibus [motibus]; immo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt... Et 
omnino pro varietate rerum, quae appetuntur atque fugiuntur, sicut allicitur vel offenditur voluntas 
hominis, ita in hos vel illos affectus mutatur et vertitur. Luther accurately notes: Perturbationes sunt 
voluntates. On 14.8, Luther’s terse Stoicorum philosophia seu potius stultitia { Apathie/pathe is an 
accurate if unsympathetic summary of the specific Stoic doctrine against which Augustine writes in 
bk. 14, even as he draws other key elements from the Stoics for use in fashioning his own moral 
psychology.  
386 So Hamel, I/9-10, II/1-2; Bernhard Lohse, “Die Bedeutung Augustins für den jungen Luther,” in 
Leif Grane, Bernd Moeller, and Otto Hermann Pesch, eds., Evangelium in der Geschichte. I. Studien 
zu Luther und der Reformation (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 11-30, here 13-14 (this 
essay began as Lohse’s 1964 Hamburg Antrittsvorlesung); Grane, Modus loquendi, 26-7; Markus 
Wriedt, “Produktives Mißverständnis? Zur Rezeption der Theologie des lateinischen Kirchenvaters 
Augustinus im Werk Martin Luthers (1483-1546),” in Norbert Fischer, ed., Augustinus: Spuren und 
Spiegelungen seines Denkens. Band 1. Von den Anfängen bis zur Reformation (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner, 2009), 211-223, here 215; Leppin, Martin Luther, 89-95.  
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This, I think, suggests a more (though not less) than quellenkritisch reason for 
the hypothesis that Luther acquired his moral psychology from Augustine. For it is no 
accident that the old Augustine (in Julian of Eclanum) and the young Luther (in 
Gabriel Biel, and in Bartholomäus Arnoldi von Usingen and Jodocus Trutfetter, his 
Erfurt teachers) faced diverse species of a cognate philosophical, spiritual, and 
theological position, to wit: Aristotelian virtue theory recast within the Sitz im Leben 
of Christian asceticism and a theology of merited grace. Faced with similar 
“Aristotelian” opponents,387 Augustine in the 420s and Luther in 1515—the latter, 
certainly, intending dependence upon the former; and both alike, from the vantage of 
catholic dogmatics but also defensibly from an historical perspective, engaged in the 
same struggle that St. Paul had (Phil. 1:30)388—responded with robust pneumatologies 
                                                        
387 Henri Strohl, Luther jusq’en 1520 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), 181: “The 
adversary is the same.” Cited in Pereira, 29 n. 11, who argues in his own right (p. 26) that Luther 
turned to Augustine because they shared a common interest, to wit, “the struggle against 
Pelagianism in the Church.” Indeed, this is the thesis of Pereira’s book (p. 17): “The radical 
anthropological and soteriological insights with which Augustine opposes the theologians 
associated with fifth century Pelagianism are the key for understanding the early stages of Luther’s 
call for Reformation of the doctrine of the Catholic Church regarding Original Sin and 
justification.”  
388 Cf. John Owen, writing in 1674, on the course of the Church’s grasp of the nature of the Spirit’s 
regenerative and sanctifying operations: “This, I acknowledge, was variously contended about of 
old; and the truth concerning it hath scarce escaped an open opposition in any age of the church. 
And at present this is the great ball of contention between the Jesuits and Jansenists; the latter 
keeping close to the doctrine of the principal ancient writers of the church; the former, under new 
notions, expressions, and distinctions, endeavoring the re-enforcement of Pelagianism, whereunto 
some of the elder schoolmen led the way, of whom our Bradwardine so long ago complained. But 
never was it with so much impudence and ignorance traduced and reviled as it is by some among 
ourselves [i.e., by English Socinians and Arminians]… The ancient writers of the church, who 
looked into these things with most diligence, and labored in them with most success, as Austin, 
Hilary, Prosper, and Fulgentius, do represent the whole work of the Spirit of God towards the souls 
of men under certain heads or distinctions of grace; and herein were they followed by many of the 
more sober schoolmen, and others of late without number… And although there may be some 
alteration in method and ways of expression—which may be varied as they are found to be of 
advantage unto them that are to be instructed—yet, for the substance of the doctrine, they taught 
the same which hath been preached amongst us since the Reformation, which some have 
ignorantly traduced as novel. And the whole of it is nobly and elegantly exemplified by Austin in 
his Confessions; wherein he gives us the experience of the truth he had taught in his own soul.” 
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of grace. The main object of these pneumatologies of effectual or operative grace was 
the affective renovation of vitiated human beings enslaved to their “selves” by the 
perversity of their vicious loves; and that is to say, from the perspective of ancient 
philosophy, that the main object of Augustine’s (and by derivation, Luther’s) theology 
of renovating grace was the resolution of an aporia in the moral-psychological 
tradition. 
Aristotle didn’t really know how a vicious person could become virtuous (nor 
the Stoics, for that matter389): the self-transformation of one’s character from the 
quality of injustice to justice via the repeated performance of just acts is a moral 
theory hard to square with a metaphysics that insists that a being in a state of potency 
cannot reduce itself to a state of action. Something existing at a greater level of being 
must act upon it: for the vicious soul to become virtuous, it must undergo or suffer the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΑΛΟΥΙΑ, or, A Discourse Concerning the Holy Spirit, in WJO, 3.300-1. Owen is a 
luminous example of an Augustinian Aristotelian in the Reformed tradition, and it is no accident 
that he held Thomas Aquinas in high esteem amongst the number of “the more sober schoolmen.” 
Cf. the conclusion to Pereira’s book (p. 476): “The fact remains that every now and then, a 
theologian sympathetic to Augustine’s radicalism of grace shakes things up by revisiting and 
insisting on the soteriological insight of the old bishop of Hippo … The truth is that whenever 
someone insists on the need of accepting the real theological and doctrinal implications of the 
Pauline-Augustinian soteriology, it means trouble.” Pereira, a Roman Catholic theologian, offers 
Gregory of Rimini, Luther, Calvin, and Jansen as examples of such “trouble.”  
389 Primarily due to the co-inherence of two defining moral-psychological theories, viz., (1) 
psychological monism, and (2) the doctrine that anything less than complete virtue is vice. See e.g. 
Colish, The Stoic Tradition, I/44: “The sage possesses all virtues; the fool possesses all vices. To 
possess one vice or one virtue is to possess all, for vice and virtue are not a congeries of individual 
acts but expressions of unified, consciously determined states of being. Thus both vice and virtue 
are all-or-nothing propositions. For the ancient Stoa there is scarcely any possibility of a gradual 
change from folly to wisdom or vice versa.” Colish (I/45-50) argues that Middle Stoics like 
Panaetius and Posidonius modified these doctrines in Platonic directions, while the later Romans 
drew upon both currents in the tradition: Epictetus tending more to ancients like Zeno and 
Chrysippus, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius to the moderating doctrines of the middle Stoa. Cicero 
has much in common with the Middle Stoic effort to combine the strengths of Stoic virtue theory 
with the faculty psychology of Plato and Aristotle; as a conduit of Stoic doctrine to the Middle 
Ages, he stands second only to Seneca (I/127). 
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agency of another more virtuous than itself.390 (A bald-faced theory of self-realization 
would have to wait for the likes of Fichte and Nietzsche;391 but seeing as it is the 
philosophia perennis ingrained in the hearts Adam’s children, it ought not surprise the 
Christian theologian that the 17th-century turn to the self has culminated in the 
commonsense nonsense of the autonomous creation of one’s “self” ex nihilo that holds 
the field today in our acutely Adamic culture.)  
Plato could speak indefinitely of a kind of mystical “grace,” a door closed to the 
other philosophical schools.392 
Augustine—as a kind of Platonist to be sure, but also as a kind of Stoic and, 
above all, as a student of the Bible and a preacher of the Gospel—surmounted this 
                                                        
390 Dieter, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles, 153-75. Dieter (pp. 156-8) notes that Aristotle recognizes 
the aporia in his own thought at Nichomachean Ethics 2.3, for acting virtuously presupposes the 
presence of virtue. He also discusses (pp. 168ff) a sermon from 1 Jan. 1517, where Luther interacts 
with the problem directly (WA 1.119.23-39): At dicitur ‘si ergo Abraham iustus ante Circumcisionem 
et Abel ante oblationem, similiter et omnes S. Patres, Quid ergo necesse fuit illos operari? Et nos cur 
operamur? Simus otiosi et dormitantes, quia in gratia sumus’. Sic sapiunt qui ex circumcisione et 
operibus iustificari quaerunt, quia sine illis ideo non putant esse iustitiam, quia eis non sit opus si iam 
iustitia habetur. Quare enim audita iustitia statim dicunt ‘non ergo operemur bonum’, nisi quia ea 
velut causam iustitiae posuerunt, tanquam habito effectu, iustitia scilicet, iam non sit necessaria 
causa. Haec ergo est perversitas tota, cum etiam secundum Aristotelem, licet ipse iustitiam ex 
operibus fieri dicat, actibus scilicet frequentatis, tamen docetur, quod, cum iusti fuerimus, tum 
maxime possumus iusta operari. Quis enim discit cantare, ut cum scierit nunquam cantet, ac non 
potius ut saepe cantet? Ita iustitia fidei sine quidem operibus datur, sed tamen ad opera et propter 
opera datur, Cum sit res quaedam viva nec possit esse otiosa. Sic Circumcisio Abrahae fuit opus fidei 
seu iustitiae et non causa iustitiae: accepit enim eam pro signaculo iustitiae fidei, Rom. 4. Ac sic 
omnes Sancti antiqui aliquod signum foris necessario in opere habuerunt, quo fidei iustitiam intus 
testarentur foris. Sic Abel suae fidei signaculum habuit sacrificium, et consequenter postea omnes S. 
Patres. 
391 Reinhard Hütter, “(Re-)Forming Freedom,” in Bound to be Free, 111-44, esp. 116-24, citing and 
translating e.g. J. G. Fichte’s System der Sittenlehre nach den Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre (GA 
I/5.208, F 4.229): “Independence—which is our ultimate goal—consists in the fact that everything 
depends on me and I depend on nothing; that what I will occurs in the complete world of senses, 
that it occurs absolutely and merely through the fact that I will it—in the same way that it occurs in 
my body, the starting point of my absolute causality. The world has to become for me what my 
body is to me. Although this goal cannot be reached, I have to continually approximate it, i.e., to 
treat everything in the world of sense such that it becomes a means for reaching this final goal. This 
approximation is my final goal.”  
392 William Christian, “Waiting for Grace: Philosophy and Politics in Plato’s Republic,” Canadian 
Journal of Political Science 21/1 (March 1988), 57-82; J. Patout Burns, “Grace,” ATTA, 391-98, esp. 391-
92. 
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philosophical impasse with his theology of effectual grace. The Spirit’s operations in 
the depths of the self-enclosed heart are alone able to reorient it to God by changing 
from within what such a heart in fact desires, fears, enjoys, and grieves, i.e., what 
moves the heart and thus produces motus animi. The unregenerate person neither 
fears nor desires God. This includes the virtuous pagan and above all the Stoic sage: 
for possessed as he is of his own self-cultivated virtue, he is quite happy all on his own 
and is in principle committed to the proud and vain notion that he does not need to 
live in dependent communion with God.393 Thus the filii Adae do not find God 
“moving,” as we say today. And even if they do, it is not because the real God moves 
them in truth, i.e., in accord with the ordo rerum and, therefore, the ordo amoris.394 
                                                        
393 civ. dei 14.5 (CCSL 48.420, cf. Bett. 554): “Anyone who exalts the nature of the soul as the 
summum bonum and censures the nature of the flesh as evil in fact both desires the soul in a fleshly 
way (animam carnaliter adpetit) and flees the flesh in a fleshly way, since his opinion stems from 
human vanity, not divine truth.” See too s. 150.8-9 (WSA III/5.35-6): “The Epicurean, who places 
man’s supreme good in the body, is placing his hopes in himself. But after all, the Stoic who places 
man’s supreme good in the mind has indeed placed it in man’s better part; but even he has placed it 
in himself. Now the Stoic is a man just as much as the Epicurean. ‘Cursed therefore is everyone who 
places his hope in man’ (Jer. 17:5) … A virtuous mind is something very praiseworthy; sagacity, 
telling the difference between bad things and good, justice, distributing to all what is theirs by 
right, moderation, curbing lusts, courage, imperturbably enduring trials. A great thing, an 
admirable thing; admire it, Stoic, as much as you ever can. But tell me: where do you get it from? It 
is not precisely your virtuous mind that makes you happy, but the One who has given you virtue, 
who has inspired you to desire it, and granted you the capacity for it… You are among those who 
trust in their own virtue; among those who place their hopes in man. Virtue delights you; it’s a 
good thing that delights you. I know, you are thirsty for it; but you can’t pour yourself a drink of 
virtue. You’re dry; if I show you ‘the fountain of life’ (Ps. 36:9), you will probably mock. You’re 
saying to yourself, you see, ‘Am I going to drink from this crag?’ The rod was brought, and water 
poured out (cf. Num. 20:11, 1 Cor. 10:4). ‘For Jews seek a sign’; but you’re not a Jew, Stoic, I know; 
you’re a Greek: ‘and Greeks seek wisdom. But we preach Christ crucified’—the Jew is shocked, the 
Greek sneers—‘to the Jews indeed a stumbling block, and to the nations folly; but to those who are 
called, Jews and Greeks’—that is, to Paul himself, once Saul, and to Di0nysius the Areopagite, and 
such as these and such as those—‘Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God’ (1 Cor. 1:22-4). 
Now you are not mocking the crag; recognize the cross in the rod, Christ as the gushing torrent; 
and if you are thirsty, drink your fill of virtue. Take your fill from the Fount, and perhaps you belch 
out your gratitude. What you get from him you won’t now be giving yourself, and you will exclaim 
with your belching, ‘I will love you, Lord, my virtus’ (Ps. 18:1).” 
394 civ. dei 15.22, on Gen. 6:2 and the disordered love of the filii dei for the bodily pulchritudo of the 
filiae hominis (CCSL 48.487-8, Bett. 592-3): Sic enim corporis pulchritudo, a Deo quidem factum, sed 
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Rather, the idea of God either moves the fallen soul to a selfish desire for the reward 
he wishes to obtain from God’s hands, a reward he would just as happily enjoy on his 
own apart from filial love and intimacy with his Father (cf. Luke 15:12-3); or else it 
moves him to sheer terror when faced with the prospect of God’s judgment. For the 
vetus homo is ruled by, indeed in the depths of his Adamic psychology he is 
constituted by, perverse desire for his own self. Adam’s children find their selves 
deeply “moving,” and regard their own selves and their needs and desires as objects of 
sacred worth and worship. 
Now it is good to lift up your heart: but not to your own self, which belongs to 
pride, but to the Lord, which belongs to obedience; and obedience can only 
belong to the humble.395  
 
But the transition from the self-deifying worship of pride (amor sui, which is “vice”) to 
the humble creaturely praise of God (amor dei, “virtue”) is not in one’s power to attain, 
as neither Aristotle nor Zeno could see but as Aristotle’s metaphysics might have 
taught him; it is a miracle of free grace, as St. Paul, John, Peter etc. heard and believed. 
The God of all grace (1 Pet. 5:10), whose infinite fullness of being, goodness, and life is 
pure lively activity without the slightest hint of potency, mercifully acts upon the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
temporale carnale infimum bonum, male amatur postposito Deo, aeterno interno sempiterno bono, 
quem ad modum iustitia deserta et aurum amatur ab auaris, nullo peccato auri, sed hominis. Ita se 
habet omnis creatura. Cum enim bona sit, et bene amari potest et male: bene scilicet ordine custodito, 
male ordine pertubato… Creator autem si ueraciter ametur, hoc est si ipse, non aliud pro illo quod non 
est ipse, ametur, male amari non potest. Nam et amor ipse ordinate amandus est, quo bene amatur 
quod amandum est, ut sit in nobis uirtus qua uiuitur bene. Vnde mihi uidetur, quod definitio breuis et 
uera uirtutis ordo est amoris; propter quod in sancto cantico canticorum cantat sponsa Christi, 
ciuitas Dei: ‘Ordinate in me caritatem.’ Cf. Song 2:4 LXX.  
395 civ. dei 14.13 (CCSL 48.434-5, cf. Bett. 572): ut natura sit, ex eo habet quod a Deo facta est; ut 
autem ab eo quod est deficiat, ex hoc quod de nihilo facta est. Nec sic defecit homo, ut omnino nihil 
esset, sed ut inclinatus ad se ipsum minus esset, quam erat, cum ei qui summe est inhaerebat. Relicto 
itaque Deo esse in semet ipso, hoc est sibi placere, non iam nihil esse est, sed nihilo propinquare. Vnde 
superbi secundum scripturas sanctas alio nomine appellantur sibi placentes. Bonum est enim sursum 
habere cor; non tamen ad se ipsum, quod est superbiae, sed ad Dominum, quod est oboedientiae, quae 
nisi humilium non potest esse. 
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hapless self-obsessed soul. He transforms it from within by his Spirit, quickening its 
aptitudo passiva from the death and sorrow of its inherited self-enclosure into the 
spiritual life of joyful communion with God.396 For the Holy Spirit renovates the vain 
heart by permeating it with new motions, impulses, desires, and affections, which lead 
it out of its passion for its self into holy and delighted love for God.397 Thus affectus 
affectu vincitur, as a prodigious Augustinian philosopher and theologian put it in 
1521.398  
 Perhaps Luther’s most striking elaboration of these Augustinian themes in the 
disputations comes at D 1.6. The argument’s terms are set by the high praise of God’s 
                                                        
396 Dieter rightly concludes (Der junge Luther und Aristoteles, 173) that the young Luther affirms 
Aristotle’s metaphysical Grundsatz but then uses Aristotle’s metaphysics to develop an anti-
Aristotelian/Scholastik moral theory, citing WA 56.364.17-20 (Rom. 8:7 scholion, early 1516): Non ex 
operibus et actibus virtus, Vt Aristoteles, Sed ex virtutibus fiunt actus, vt Christus docet. Quia actus 
secundus presupponit primum et operatio prerequirit substantiam et virtutem et effectus causam. 
Dieter’s great work is impressive, but I think he leaves Luther’s Augustinianism underdeveloped 
and this is telling a case in point: in pitting Aristotle against Aristotle, Luther is also siding with 
Augustine. On the “passive aptitude” of the fallen human being, a kind of potency, see above cp. 1.3 
and WA 18.636.16-22: At si vim liberi arbitrii eam diceremus, qua homo aptus est rapi spiritu et imbui 
gratia Dei, ut qui sit creatus ad vitam vel mortem aeternam, recte diceretur; hanc enim vim, hoc est, 
aptitudinem, seu ut Sophistae loquuntur dispositivam qualitatem et passivam aptitudinem et nos 
confitemur, quam non arboribus neque bestiis inditam esse, quis est qui nesciat? neque enim pro 
anseribus (ut dicitur) coelum creavit. 
397 Pekka Kärkkäinen, Luthers trinitarische Theologie des Heiligen Geistes, 107-12 on “Die Sendung 
des Geistes als Eingießung der göttlichen Liebe,” e.g. p. 107 (aptly citing WA 56.338.6-12): “… der 
anwesende Heilige Geist mit der eingegossenen Liebe den Menschen einen neuen Willen gibt, der 
bereit zur Erfüllung dessen macht, was das Gesetz fordert. 
398 From Melanchthon’s original Loci communes theologici, on free choice §2 (MW 2.1.27, cf. 
Wilhelm Pauck, ed., Melanchthon and Bucer [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969], 27): interni affectus 
non sunt in potestate nostra. Experimentia enim usuque comperimus non posse voluntatem sua 
sponte ponere amorem, odium aut similes affectus, sed affectus affectu vincitur, ut, quia laesus es ab 
eo, quam amabas, amare desinis. Nam te ardentius quam quemvis alium amas. In this first edition, 
Melanchthon set forth both an Augustinian-“Stoic” affective moral psychology and what is, for 
Augustine himself, its theological corollary, i.e., St. John’s and Paul’s doctrine of predestination and 
grace. For this reason, it is no accident that Luther lavished high praise on the 1521 Loci in the 
introduction to his 1525 de servo arbitrio. WA 18.601.1-6 (cf. Packer, 62-3): besides the fact that 
Luther has already refuted Erasmus’ (and the Sophists’) arguments for libero arbitrio in many 
works, “Philipp Melanchthon, in his unconquered little book de locis Theologicis, has trampled 
them in the dust.” So much so, that “in my judgment, that little book of his is worthy not just of 
immortality, but even of the ecclesiastical canon.”  
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law in Ps. 19 and 119; but just beneath the surface lie texts like the following from one 
of Augustine’s initial forays against Pelagius, the de spiritu et littera of 412: 
If the commandment is observed out of fear of punishment, not out of love of 
righteousness (amore iustitiae), it is observed slavishly, not freely, and for that 
reason it is not observed. For there is lacking the good fruit that springs up 
from the root of love. But if faith that works through love (Gal. 5:6) is present, 
one begins to delight (incipit condelectari) in the law of God in the interior 
human being (Rom. 7:22). This delight is a gift, not of the letter but of the 
Spirit (delectatio non litterae, sed spiritus donum est), even if another law in 
one’s members resists the law of the mind (Rom. 7:23), until the whole oldness 
(tota uetustas) is changed and passes over into the newness (nouitatem) which 
grows from day to day in the interior human being (2 Cor. 4:16), as we are set 
free from the body of this death by the grace (gratia) of God through Jesus 
Christ our Lord (Rom. 7:24).399 
 
For our purposes, notice three things from this excerpt, the whole tenor of which is set 
by citations from St. Paul and especially Rom. 7:22-24: first, Augustine’s insistence on 
the need for amor iustitiae in order to keep the law; second, his teaching that this love 
comes into being when the Holy Spirit bestows delight (delectatio) in the law as a gift 
(donum) within one’s inmost being; third, the fact that this incipient delight in the 
law, confessed by St. Paul at Rom. 7:22, is limited by the counterbalancing weight of 
the alia lex in membris which still repugnat legi mentis, as Paul also confesses in the 
next verse. This, in basic outline, is Augustine’s teaching on how the Spirit renovates 
the heart through the grace of holy delight, which in this instance he actually calls the 
Spirit’s donum.  
In its real content, if not necessarily in its use of the word “donum,” this is the 
traditional soil in which Luther’s theology of the gift took root and grew. His 
                                                        
399 sp. litt. 15.26, CSEL 60.180.22-181.4, cf. WSA I/23.161. On sp. litt., see Hombert, Gloria Gratiae, 181-
97, and on the same theme in works against Julian, 277-8; cf. Isabelle Bochet, Saint Augustin et le 
Désire de Dieu (Paris: Insitut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1982), esp. cp. 10: “‘Delectatio Victrix’: Grace 
et liberte.” 
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presentation of the Spirit’s work at D 1.6 is especially germane to this point, because it 
centers expressly on the Spirit’s recreation of the fallen soul through delight. Luther 
first sets out a characteristic and pithy statement of Christ’s work in redeeming 
sinners from the law’s curse (“grace”), then goes on to explain that the Redeemer 
… brings (affert) the Holy Spirit to those who believe in him, in order that they 
may have pleasure (voluptatem) in the law of the Lord, according to the first 
Psalm [1:2; cf. Rom. 7:22]. And thus through it (per eam [viz., voluptatem]) their 
souls are recreated (recreantur), and he gives the will (voluntatem) in order 
that they may do it (eam [viz., legem]), this spirit (hic spiritus). But in the 
future life, they will have the will to do the law (voluntatem faciendi legem) not 
only in the spirit (in spiritu), but also in the flesh—which, so long as it lives 
here, strives against this delight (adversatur huic delectationi).400 
 
The two ambiguous pronouns, and the awkward hic spiritus, make this a difficult text 
to translate. I have suggested my interpretation in the brackets and will defend it here. 
Luther is giving an account of how the Holy Spirit transforms a vitiated or fleshly soul 
into a voluntary law-keeper, that is, one moved from within by holy desire for the 
beauty, pleasantness, and goodness of the law’s commandments. To this end, the 
Spirit produces a pleasure in the law within the soul, of the sort that David (Ps. 1:2) 
and Paul (Rom. 7:22) attested; Luther calls this first voluptas and later delectatio. 
Through the gift of this pleasure, the soul itself is recreated: both grammatically and 
in accord with the sense of the passage, Luther’s ambiguous per eam must refer back 
to the believer’s voluptas in the law. So, Christ gives the Spirit in order that believers 
may take pleasure in the law; and through this pleasure, their souls are recreated 
(recreantur) such that they become the kind of people who want (voluntas) to perform 
the law, and do in fact perform it, because they delight in it. As Augustine once said, 
                                                        
400 WA 39/1.373.1-6 [A], my translation; cf. ATD, 42. 
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everything is easy for love.401 Right action springs forth from the goodness of the 
renewed will, and the will’s renovation follows from its permeation by the Spirit with 
new, holy, and spiritual affections, pleasures, delights.  
This is Luther’s account of the inner-workings of the Spirit’s gift within the 
soul, and its Augustinian character is further confirmed by two details relating to his 
appropriation of the Pauline and Augustinian spiritus/caro distinction. Consider first 
the awkwardly placed hic spiritus. It is possible to read this as a reference to the Holy 
Spirit, in which case Luther is clarifying that the One who gives the will (datque 
voluntatem) to keep the law is the Spirit of God. But I suggest that it is better to 
interpret it as a reference to the spiritus created by the Holy Spirit within the soul. By 
his gift, the Spirit makes the fleshly soul spiritual, a new creation constituted by 
voluptas, delectatio, and voluntas ordered to God’s holy law; and this law-delighted, 
Spiritually-renovated human being, who must still struggle with the remnants of his 
flesh, is spiritus, “spirit.” On this reading, Luther is specifying both the object of the 
Spirit’s recreating work and the subject of the holy pleasure and action thus brought 
into being. The recreated soul, which has a will to keep the law and does in fact keep 
it: this is the “spirit” produced by the Holy Spirit’s bestowal of holy delight. Luther’s 
next sentence, with its allusion to Gal. 5:17, argues in favor of this interpretation in two 
respects. First, Luther states that believers already possess the will to do the law in 
spiritu, but that in the resurrection to come this joy in the law will consume the entire 
                                                        
401 Nat. grat. 69.83, CSEL 297.22-3: omnia quippe fiunt facilia caritati. Cf. WSA I/23.258. See too En. 
Ps. 31/2.5 (CCSL 38.228, WSA III/15.366-7): “Now, if faith is without love, it will be without a work. 
But lest you think too much about the work of faith, add to it hope and love, and you won’t want to 
think about what you will work. This love is not able to be idle.” Ibid., 31/2.6 (CCSL 38.229, WSA 
III/15.368): “The work of faith is love, and this love cannot remain idle: it must refrain from doing 
evil and do all the good it can.” 
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being of the redeemed person body and soul, such that not only the “spirit” but the 
flesh itself will be made new. (In passing, I note that in this text Luther identifies 
“flesh” with the human body itself. Often enough, it has been asserted that 
Augustine’s “Platonic” reading of caro as the natural human corpus fairs poorly 
alongside Luther’s genuinely Pauline interpretation of flesh as egoism.402 In point of 
fact, Augustine well knows that sin originated in the vanity and pride of an 
incorporeal angel,403 and believes firmly in the eschatological resurrection of the 
                                                        
402 Here are three important examples: (1) Rudolf Hermann, Luthers These “Gerecht und Sünder 
zugleich,” 149-50: Augustine’s tantummodo concupiscere means sensuality. Though he sometimes 
aims for a better definition of sin in terms of Adam’s disobedience to his Maker, it is always mixed 
up with the more fundamental “mönchisch-asketische” opposition between sensuality and spirit. 
(2) Anders Nygren, “Simul iustus et peccator bei Augustin und Luther,” Zeitschrift für 
Systematische Theologie 16 (1 Jan. 1939): 364-79, e.g. p. 369: for Augustine, sin is being bound to 
earthly reality (Erdegebundenheit), whereas for Luther it is being bound to one’s ego 
(Ichgebundenheit); (3) Leif Grane, Modus Loquendi, 56: for Augustine, “das Fleischliche consists in 
the resistance of the bodily against reason and the grace-strengthened will. Thus ‘flesh’ quite 
unambiguously means bodily drives (körperliche Triebe); and along these lines, a fleshliness that 
could be seduced by the devil sub specie spiritualis boni to please itself even in pious works appears 
to lie outside the horizon.” For correctives, see Hamel, Der junge Luther und Augustin, I/105-9, II/14 
(but cf. II/34-5, where the Hermann-style contrast surfaces again); Christoph Markschies, “Taufe 
und Concupiscentia bei Augustinus,” in Theodor Schneider and Gunther Wenz, eds., Gerecht und 
Sünder zugleich? Ökumenische Klärungen (Freiburg: Herder and Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2001), 92-108, who takes Nygren to task at pp. 105-8; Pereira, 61-71. 
403 civ. dei 14 alone establishes this point. When Augustine discusses Gal. 5:16-21 at 14.2 (CCSL 
48.415-6, Bett. 548-50), he takes great interest in the fact that St. Paul’s catalogue of the opera carnis 
includes in its number animi uitia like idolatry, enmity, envy, etc. On this scriptural basis, he 
explicitly affirms what Grane claims he could not say, viz., that a man may refrain from the 
pleasures of the body (a voluptatibus corporis) for the sake of subtle and refined evils like idolatry 
and heresy—“and nevertheless even this man, though he appears to restrain and suppress the 
carnis libidines, lives secundum carnem and is convicted by this apostolic authority; and by the very 
fact that he abstains a voluptatibus carnis, it is proven that he does damnabilia opera carnis.” In 14.3 
(CCSL 48.417, Bett. 551-2), Augustine states that “those who think that all the evils of the soul derive 
from the body are in error,” arguing against Virgil and the Platonica sententia he upholds at Aeneid 
6.730ff. “Our faith holds a very different position. For the corruption of the body, which weighs 
down the soul [Wis. 9:15], is not the cause of the first sin, but its penalty; neither did corruptible 
flesh make the soul sinful, but a sinful soul made the flesh corruptible.” The Devil is therefore an 
eminently fleshly being. For though he is no fornicator or drunkard, he is maxime superbus atque 
invidus; and Paul attributes demonic vitia like pride and envy to the flesh. “For it was not by having 
flesh—which the devil does not have—that man became like the devil; it was by living secundum se 
ipsum, that is secundum hominem. For the devil wanted to live according to his own self, when he 
did not stand in the truth.” This, I think, is just the kind of sin-qua-Ichgebundenheit that Augustine 
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dead;404 and, as the present text shows, on occasion Luther himself employs the usage 
wrongly attributed solely to Augustine.) Second, as the Reformer concludes his 
allusion to Gal. 5:17, where Paul has the flesh striving against the “spirit,” Luther has 
simply replaced—and thus equated—Paul’s spiritus with Augustine’s delectatio. The 
dregs of fleshly desire fight against the holy delight in God’s law produced by the gift 
of God’s Spirit; and the new spiritual being recreated by and consisting in this holy 
delight is the spiritus that fights back—in the power of the Spirit’s gift—against the 
stubborn remnants of its caro.  
 
2.2.2. Battle scenes: Spirit-gifted non-consent in real time 
 
This restless Gal. 5:17-styled spiritual battle between “spirit” and “flesh,” the new 
creature and the old, the believer as renewed by Christ’s Spirit and the believer as yet 
bearing the remnants of Adam’s sin, forms the core content of Luther’s real “simul.” Or 
to turn that around: the “simul” as Luther holds it is a snapshot of the Christian saint 
as he battles against sin for the sole reason that he is undergoing the sanctifying 
operations of the Holy Spirit. Thus in D 3.13, Luther has the law-fulfilling Christ 
(“grace”) say to the Christian: “Be forgiven; but lest you complain that you are utterly 
forsaken, I will give you my Holy Spirit, who will make you a soldier (militem).”405 The 
third disputation is especially replete with battle scenes depicting the Christian 
                                                                                                                                                                     
is said not to teach and that Luther is said to teach novelly. Cf. the striking discussion at En. Ps. 
31/2.4, as well as my treatment of civ. dei 11.13-14 in chapter 1.2.2 above. 
404 See esp. civ. dei books 13 and 22, e.g., 13.19 (CCSL 48.402, Bett. 532): “… at the resurrection, the 
saints will inhabit the actual bodies in which they suffered the hardships of this life on earth”; 22.21 
(CCSL 48.841, Bett. 1064): “The spiritual flesh will thus be subject to the spirit, but it will be flesh, 
not spirit, just as the fleshly spirit was subject to the flesh, and yet was spirit, not flesh.”  
405 WA 39/1.526.4-5 [A], cf. ATD, 164. 
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believer as a brave and (by the Spirit’s power) victorious soldier fighting against and 
triumphing over his own flesh.  
I will present a sampling of them in this section, but first I again take pains to 
specify the exact nature and limited scope of this spiritual combat. For here we have to 
do with “the constant struggle of believing saints (perpetua pugna sanctorum 
credentium) which is treated often in the Psalms, who complain and cry out about 
their evils (suis malis), even when they do not add any actual sin (actuale aliquod 
peccatum).”406 In Luther’s theology of holiness, the renewed saint does not fight 
against actual or consentient sin, because he sundigt nicht und kan nicht sundigen (1 
John 3:9). Rather, he fights against the sinful desires (suis malis) stubbornly persisting 
in, and comprising, his “flesh” (cf. 1 John 1:8, Rom. 7:14-25, Gal. 5:16-17, and great 
stretches of the Psalter—not least as interpreted in the monastic tradition of theology 
and prayer). Actual sin is the visible tree that grows from the hidden root of evil 
desire, and the Christian’s aim in the daily struggle of repentance is to tear up sin at its 
roots in the depths of his soul. He does so, in the power of the Spirit’s renovating and 
delight-producing gift, by refusing to consent to the sinful desires that still indwell 
him. So, for instance, at D 2.4 Luther states that “after receiving the Holy Spirit we 
begin to detest sin, and hate it, and we purge it with the Holy Spirit himself helping 
us, not consenting to sin (non consentientes peccato) but fighting back.”407 This is the 
                                                        
406 D 2.5, WA 39/1.438.13-15 [A], cf. ATD, 95. Cf. the undisputed third set of theses, #13-16 (WA 
39/1.350.32-39): 13. Ita non multo minus est, per poenitentiam perpetuam reliquum peccati persequi, 
quam a principio incoepisse detestari. 14. Unde fit, ut sancti et iusti (sic exercente eos per legem Deo) 
saepius tristentur et lugeant pro peccatis. 15. Cum tamen remissis peccatis in gratia sint et in Domino 
debeant gaudere. 16. Imo nullum actuale peccatum allegant, et tamen miserabiliter clamant et petunt 
gratiam Dei, ut est in Psalmis videre. 
407 WA 39/1.436.9-11 [A], cf. ATD, 94. 
 148
logic of non-consent that holds Luther’s real “simul” together, as we shall see vividly 
portrayed in the following battle scenes. 
 (1) In D 3.2, Luther first argues that the law belongs in the Church in order to 
stir up the saints, who still have “residual sin in the flesh” (peccatum reliquum in 
carne), to enter into “battle and military service (pugnam et militiam) against the 
remnants of sins (reliquias peccatorum) and temptations.”408 Even “holy and righteous 
Paul” needed the law in this way, “not insofar as he is righteous and holy, but insofar 
as he is flesh (inquantum est caro).”409 This is Luther’s basic spirit/flesh “simul,” 
exemplified by Paul and drawn directly from his letters. The very practical pastor and 
professor goes on to give a concrete example of the battle entailed by it that probably 
hit close to home for not a few of the university students listening to the public 
disputation: 
For example: if I, a Christian, still a robust adolescent, were to fall for some 
beautiful girl or woman, in this case, unless I’m a total tree trunk, I’m not able 
to not be affected toward her (non possum non affici erga illam)—even if I were 
baptized and justified—so that I would desire to touch her (cuperem eam 
attingere) if it were permitted, and if it weren’t for the disgrace and penalty 
which I fear. Yet nevertheless, if I am a Christian, immediately the heart and 
the Holy Spirit cry out against this within, in the heart (statim reclamat cor et 
Spiritus sanctus intus in corde): “Get behind me, Satan [Matt. 16:23]! Say 
nothing! No, no Lady Flesh (domina caro), hush, be quiet! You shouldn’t impel 
or solicit me in this way to seduction, adultery, libido, or to do any other 
shameful acts against my God. But I will wait until God gives me someone 
whom I will love, and with her I will make an end; as for this one, I will leave 
her to her own spouse and her family.” These and other such voices of this kind 
are not of man, but of Christ and the Holy Spirit, who says in the heart: “Leave 
the girl in peace; I will give you another in due time, whom you will love 
without troubles.” This Christian, even if he is affected by sex (afficiatur sexu), 
nevertheless obeys the Spirit, averting the evil he feels (sentit) by praying that 
he will not enter into temptation [Matt. 6:13].410 
                                                        
408 WA 39/1.500.10-14 [A], cf. ATD, 148. 
409 WA 39/1.500.14-16 [A], cf. ATD, 148. 
410 WA 39/1.500.16-501.5 [A], cf. ATD, 148. 
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This, adds Luther, is what it really means “to take sin captive” (peccatum captivare), 
“even if it doesn’t happen without annoyance and many difficulties.”411 The “sin” in 
question is “the residual sin in the flesh,” which makes its presence known through its 
disordered, powerful, alluring and (at the same time) vexatious affections. In Luther’s 
Augustinian moral psychology, the sanctified Christian is not able to prevent his being 
affected by the stirrings, movements, and impulses of “Lady Flesh.”412 For he is no 
truncus, a cipher in Luther’s writings for either the apathetic Stoic sages of antiquity 
or the hermitic monastics he regarded as Stoics redivivi.413 The adolescent Christian is 
fired by sexual desire. He feels the evil impulse of his flesh. He wants to touch the girl 
whose beauty arouses him. But he fights back. His own heart, and the Holy Spirit 
shouting within it, resist, hush, stifle, repress, reign in, and overrule the illicit desires 
of his flesh. Prayerfully calling upon God for help (with the Lord’s Prayer, Matt 6:13), 
                                                        
411 WA 39/1.501.5-6 [A], cf. ATD, 148. 
412 In the terms of ancient philosophical psychology sketched above, these are pro-passiones which 
only ignite into full-blown passions with the granting of consent. More on this in chapter 3 below, 
but cf. Sarah C. Byers, “Augustine and the Cognitive Cause of Stoic ‘Preliminary Passions’ 
(Propatheiai)” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 41/4 (Oct. 2003), 433-48. 
413 See, e.g., Luther’s comments in praise of Joseph’s weeping at Gen. 42:24, against the Devil’s 
saints, who are “Stoics seven times over” (WA 44.493.3-26): Hoc autem in primis notandum est, 
quod Ioseph describitur plenus charitate et affectibus naturalibus ac fraterna benevolentia. 
Quanquam enim duriter compellat et tractat fratres, tamen ardet cor eius στοργῇ φυσιχῇ et amore 
spirituali. Quia fides et Spiritus sanctus non corrumpit, aut destruit naturam, sed corruptam et 
destructam sanat et reparat. Manent itaque naturalissimi adfectibus in parentibus, fratribus, 
uxoribus, qui non tolluntur per gratiam, sed excitantur. Monachi olim ex hominibus truncos et saxa 
insensibilia fecerunt, ac singulare praeconium de sanctis suis voluit celebrari Sathan, quod non 
commoverentur ullo genere adfectuum, homines stolidi, ac septies Stoici. Gratia vero et spiritus 
sanctus non sic exuit humanam naturam suis motibus, ut pater Iacob non defleat filii interitum, hoc 
enim pugnaret cum natura sic condita a Deo cum adfectibus. Vidimus autem ante aliquot annos 
fanaticos spiritus conari eiusmodi ἀπάθειαν invehere in Ecclesiam. Sicut Monetarius [viz., Thomas 
Münzer] eam vita et moribus studebat exprimere, tanquam singularem sanctimoniam. Cum enim 
nunciata ei esset nativitas filii, stetit ante altaram quasi mutus et surdus, non laetatus est nec gratias 
egit, neque quicquam respondit, ut ostenderet et truncum et stipitem esse et postea iactaverat 
naturam suam prorsus esse mutatam et mortificatam. Id revera fanaticum fuit longe deterius 
Stoicorum delirio. Deus enim vult servatam naturam, non extinctam, sed iubet eam corrigi, ut fiat 
purior et affectus magis sint compositi in piis, quam in gentilibus, qui non regunt eos timore et fiducia 
Dei, sed temere et sine certa lege verbi Dei iis rapiuntur. Cf. LW 7.261. 
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and heeding the Word spoken by Christ and the Spirit within his heart, the Christian 
averts and overcomes the evil he feels in his flesh, obeys the Spirit, and looks the other 
way, leaving the girl in peace and waiting on God to provide a suitable wife. Without 
using the word consentire, Luther has thus provided a dramatic sketch of the co-
operative workings of the Holy Spirit and the renewed Christian (who together 
employ scriptural teachings about chastity and God’s fatherly providence, which 
function analogously to the Stoic lekta) amidst the ultimately successful battle to 
refuse consent to the Christian’s residual flesh.  
Later in the same argument, Luther explains that the same affective 
psychological phenomena occur in each instance of temptation, whether it be 
disobedience in the child, lust in the adolescent, ambition in the grown man, 
vainglory in the theologian, or—in “the true saints”—the “highest temptations” 
(summis tentationibus) of unbelief, despair, and blasphemy.414 Here is the same 
hierarchy of temptations we took note of in chapter 1, culminating in the summa 
tentatio. Regardless of how the particular Christian is tempted by the sinful desires of 
his flesh, which vary by age and by degrees of growth in holiness,415 “it belongs to all of 
us to take up the spear and sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God [Eph. 6:17], 
and to fight, not snore, amidst such great evils.”416  
 (2) Luther carries the same themes into D 3.3. The Christian is a “true Thomas 
Thomist” (!) or “twin” (cf. John 11:16), who at the same time exists in triumphant and 
militant states: righteous, free, and glad by faith in Christ, but embattled and battling 
                                                        
414 WA 39/1.501.15-502.10 [A], cf. ATD, 148-9. 
415 On degrees of growth in holiness, see D 1.8. 
416 WA 39/1.502.10-12 [A], cf. ATD, 148. 
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because “he still has sin inhering in himself.”417 Luther equates this peccatum haerens 
with Rom. 7:23’s aliam legem in membris meis.418 After lamenting its wretchedness, he 
again vividly portrays the Christian’s battle against his own flesh: 
But there (ibi), right away when these things happen [viz., evil desires], and 
this law (lex) or that carnal nature (carnalis illa natura), infected by Satan’s 
poison in Paradise, shows itself and incites the wretched Christian [miserum 
christianum, Rom. 7:24] to sexual desire or avarice or desperation or hatred of 
God, there (ibi) I say the Christian rouses himself and says, as if in wonder: 
“Behold, and are you still here? Welcome, Lord Sin (domine peccatum)! Where 
were you? Where were you off amusing yourself all this time? Are you still 
alive? From where do you come to us? Away with you to the cross (Apage te in 
crucem)! Not this way, it will not be this way! I will protect my virgin [cf. 1 Cor. 
7:37] and I will do what is just, even against your will (te invito). And the more 
you torture me, or invite and incite me to seduction, sexual desire, or 
desperation, the more I will laugh at you, and with a great and strong soul—
supported by the help of my Christ—I will despise you and crush your head 
[Gen. 3:15]. What business do I have with you? I have another Lord (alium 
habeo dominum), in whose camp I am now a soldier; here I will stand, here I 
will die.”419 
 
Such a great-souled Christian, who valiantly fights his own flesh to the death, “makes 
a great massacre in the devil’s army, and triumphs gloriously,” the Reformer 
denominates a true St. George—ille gloriosus miles et fortis Georgius—to match the 
dragon-slaying legend of old. He says with St. Paul: “In all these things we more than 
conquer through Jesus Christ” (cf. Rom. 8:37).420 As this battle scene graphically 
attests, such holy knights cannot but help “feeling (sentire) many sins and desires,” 
says Luther; “but with the Lord helping we do not permit them to rule (dominari).”421 
Thus Luther confesses that he sees in his flesh a taste for the same things as the Turk, 
                                                        
417 WA 39/1.504.6-19 [A], cf. ATD, 150-1. christianum esse verum Thomam Thomistam? Hard at work 
in his theological task, Luther is clearly enjoying himself; he repeats his little joke at D 3.21. 
418 WA 39/1.505.2-3 [A], cf. ATD, 151. 
419 WA 39/1.505.3-14 [A], cf. ATD, 151. 
420 WA 39/1.505.14-16 [A], cf. ATD, 151. 
421 WA 39/1.505.17-19 [A]: Non enim possumus non quisque in sua aetate seu sorte plurima peccata et 
concupiscentias sentire, sed dominari tamen Domino adiuvante non permittimus. Cf. ATD, 152. 
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the Pope, and the rest of the world: sed non acquiesce!422 In the same way, the 
paradigmatic spiritual warrior, St. Paul, “has sin [cf. 1 John 1:8], but conquered and 
faint (victum ac languidum),” whereas the impious have peccatum vivum, dominans, 
triumphans.423 In short, and in terms of a rich Augustinian constellation of texts from 
St. John and Paul (especially Rom. 6:12-14), the Christian knight successfully 
overcomes the residual desires of his flesh by not consenting to them, however fierce 
the struggle. 
Now, apart from the fundamental similarities that unite this passage with the 
preceding argument, four things stand out. First, the sense of surprise that Luther’s 
knight experiences when the flesh’s impulses make themselves known indicates their 
spontaneous and pre-volitional quality. Haec fiunt, these motions “happen” because of 
the indwelling sin’s operations in the renewed Christian; and they happen apart from 
and prior to any consent to their movements on his part. Indeed, the Christian 
experiences the onslaught of Lord Sin’s enticements as a kind of spiritual torture. 
Second, the Christian’s heroic refusal of consent to the evil desires of his flesh is as 
instantaneous as their arousal in his embattled soul (ibi … ibi.). This strong George 
does not toy with his flesh; he slays it, promptly. Third, the Christian knight fights and 
takes his stand with confidence and bold defiance, mocking and despising Lord Sin, 
whom we might otherwise consider a rather formidable opponent. This, I suggest, is 
due to the fourth striking aspect of this passage, namely, that the Christian fights 
against Lord Sin with and in the Lord Jesus Christ. He sends evil desires away to the 
cross and triumphs over them with Christ’s help; and when he does so, he becomes a 
                                                        
422 WA 39/1.505.19-506.1 [A], cf. ATD, 152. 
423 WA 39/1.506.1-3 [A], cf. ATD, 152. 
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Gen. 3:15-style serpent-crusher in his own right, beating down Lord Sin’s head beneath 
his feet. For he is a solider in the camp of the true Serpent-Crusher, Jesus Christ.424 
Thus the battling Christian participates in Christ by faith and enters into conformitas 
Christi: in particular, the flesh-conquering knight assumes the form of a Christus 
victor in miniature.425 
 (3) The last battle scene I will present here, from D 3.5, is unique in that it is 
mainly an expansive exegesis of Rom. 7:14-25. For this reason it is especially 
illuminating as to the nature of the “simul” that characterizes Luther’s flesh-fighting 
saints, who long for a perfection in holiness which they cannot yet attain. 
Thus also the divine Paul, when he was turning the matter up and down and in 
various parts, finally cried out: “Ach, who will set me free from the body of this 
death?” [Rom. 7:24] He therefore says that this life [viz., the Christian life of 
struggle depicted in Rom. 7:14-23] is to be defended, so that we can at last be 
set free from sins. For before we are buried, we are not able not to sin (non 
possumus non peccare), even the saints. To be sure, we all desire (Cuperemus) 
to live according to God’s law and to obey it in the most holy way possible 
(quam sanctissime), but alas, how often does our flesh interrupt us here? How 
often is our soul drawn in different directions and seized by that which it does 
not want (rapitur eo, quo nolit)? In this way Paul complains about himself, 
Rom. 7[:19]: “I do not do what I want, but what I do not want (Non, quod volo, 
facio, sed quod nolo),” and many other things in the same sentence—which is a 
place where one can see that huge battle or wrestling match of God’s Spirit and 
the flesh in the saints (ingentem illam pugnam seu luctam spiritus Dei et carnis 
in sanctis). Without a doubt, there are many adolescents and youths who with 
perpetual and assiduous prayers petition and beg for the same thing from God, 
in order that they might be able to live as holy and piously as they want to (ut 
ita sancte et pie possent, quam vellent, vivere). For what pious person would not 
wish (optaret) to be free from those vexations and difficulties, which he is 
forced (cogitur) to take in here, and never to be seized and solicited by things 
                                                        
424 Cf. Asendorf, Lectura in Biblia, 31: Luther’s “simul” is “no einfache Existenzdialektik, inasmuch as 
faith isn’t left alone, but stands under the lordship of One who is stronger, who not only is present, 
but who as such puts the adversary in his place.” 
425 A fifth observation is incidental to my argument, but intriguing nonetheless: notice the 
similarity between Luther’s concluding hic stabo and his Hier stehe ich at the Diet of Worms in 1521, 
plus the fact that he passed as “Knight George” during his 1521/2 stay at the Wartburg. 
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which offend God the Father? But this cannot happen in this life; we are 
flesh.426 
 
We have to be very precise in handling Luther’s non possumus non peccare. In the 
context of exegeting Rom. 7, it refers to the illicit and unwanted movements of the 
saint’s residual flesh, not to the unavoidable necessity of falling into actual sins. 427 The 
saints eagerly desire to obey God’s law perfectly, without the least resistance of the 
residual sin in their flesh. They beg God in prayer to be given the ability (posse) to 
really live in a way that equals their earnest will (velle) for holiness. But Paul himself, 
read through Luther’s Augustinian spectacles, confesses: “I do not do what I want, that 
is, I do not yet live in the freedom of holiness for which I long; rather, I do what I do 
not want, that is, I am still forced to suffer being rapt, seized, solicited, drawn, and 
vexed by the evil desires of my flesh, which are offensive to my Father and repugnant 
to my own holy soul.” In Luther’s theology of holiness, the partly renewed but still 
partly fleshly believer longs for the perfection of the Spirit’s inchoate work with all his 
heart. For, as we saw above, he delights in the law and loves righteousness and is 
therefore repulsed by his own residual fleshly impulses, against which he fights 
incessantly and from which he longs to be set free. This is the huge battle and 
                                                        
426 WA 39/1.512.6-513.1 [A], cf. ATD, 155-6. 
427 Luther’s choice of language here is not helpful. As he well knew, in the tradition non posse non 
peccare refers to the second of Augustine’s and Peter’s four status liberi arbitrii, that is to say, post 
peccatum et ante gratiam. For the vitiated human being prior to the advent of healing grace, not 
being able to refrain from sin is in fact the order of the day. In Peter’s third status gratiae, the 
regenerate person is hard-pressed by concupiscence. But empowered by helping grace (gratia 
adiuvans), he is able to resist sin if he wishes (posse non peccare); though not yet perfectly, as he 
will in glory when he receives the gift of no longer being able to sin at all (Sent. II d. 25 cp. 6 de 
quatuor statibus liberi arbitrii [Grott. I/464-5]). Despite his rhetoric, in reality Luther is describing 
Peter’s third state. But whereas Peter allows that the regenerate nondum tamen habet posse omnino 
non peccare vel non posse peccare, propter infirmitatem nondum perfecte absorptam, et propter 
gratiam nondum perfecte consummatam, Luther seems rather to relish in this Pauline/Augustinian 
datum as a consoling truth delivered by the Spirit as a special gift for hard-pressed and battle-weary 
souls. On the consoling power of the “Augustinian simul,” farther in Part II below. 
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wrestling match between the Spirit’s gift, operative in and through the renewed 
agency of the believer, and the flesh that remains in sanctis. In contrast to valiant 
knight George in D 3.3, here the plaintive longing of battle-weary Pauline Christians 
comes to the fore. The saint’s fight with his flesh is hard, trying, and lifelong, and the 
longer he perseveres in its course the more Rom. 7:24’s quis me liberabit becomes the 
cry of his own painfully divided heart. Farther on in the same disputation, Luther 
again quotes Rom. 7:24 (and 7:19), then exhorts his hearers: “Learn to pray in this way 
for sanctification, and do not be secure.”428  
 
2.2.3. Summary 
 
In the disputations, Luther’s theology of regeneration and renewal by the Spirit’s gift 
co-inheres with a Rom. 7-centered theology of residual indwelling sin, such that 
Christians are “partly righteous, partly unrighteous,”429 “partly saint, partly sinner.”430 
In Paul’s terms, they are both spirit and flesh, with the new creature in the ascendancy 
and the remnants of the old held in subjection to the new; and Luther intends his own 
terms as explications of the apostle’s. The really but partially renewed Christian 
delights in the law of God in his inner being or spirit, and therefore battles against the 
unholy desires that remain lodged within (or simply constitute) his flesh. The heart of 
this spiritual battle consists in his refusal—in the power of the Spirit’s sanctifying 
gift—to yield voluntary consent to the sinful desires which afflict and grieve the saint 
precisely because (a) they are his desires, not some separate subject’s, and (b) they cut 
                                                        
428 D 3.13, WA 39/1.527.7 [A]: … ut sic discas orare pro sanctificatione et non securus esse. Cf. ATD, 
165. 
429 D 3.2.2[29], WA 39/1.561.11 [A]: … partim sumus iusti, partim iniusti. Cf. ATD, 185. 
430 D 3.21, WA 39/1.542.18-19 [A]: … partim sanctus, partim peccator. Cf. ATD, 174. 
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painfully against the grain of his own renewed will.431 The Lutheran saint no longer 
wants to experience the sinful passions he is nonetheless forced to endure: passions to 
which, through the delight-producing renovation of his heart by the Spirit, he is no 
longer bound to consent. This account of the Christian soul as a complex of 
disordered affections inherited from ruined Adam (“flesh”) and holy affections 
produced by the new-creating Spirit (“spirit”), locked in perpetual combat that only 
persists so long as the flesh remains subordinate to the spirit through the victory of 
Christ’s spiritual knight in non-consent: this is Luther’s real “simul.” Far from being 
inimical to real growth in holiness, it is in Luther’s theology an account of evangelical 
sanctification underway and advancing amidst the vicissitudes and dangers of spiritual 
life lived out and fought for in a deadly combat zone, with due attention paid not only 
to the ongoing reality of the sinful flesh (and the devil, and the world) but also to the 
greater and stronger reality of the Holy Spirit’s—and the holy spiritus’!—progressive 
victory over all his foes. Rightly grasped in the context of his theology of the gift, the 
Reformer’s “simul” is nothing less than a profile of the Christian advancing in holiness. 
Thus at D 3.25, Luther explains that by “dying to sin” (cf. Rom. 6:2, 11) Paul means 
“fighting against them and not allowing it to rule in us” (cf. Rom. 6:12-14), and adds 
that “this happens, not only in one member, but in all, so that now the heart, eyes, 
hands, tongue, and feet operate differently than before, and serve Christ the Lord—
not sins—and thus become from day to day constantly holier and better (sic fieri 
subinde de die in diem sanctior et melior).”432  
                                                        
431 Back of my reference to lumber is Isaiah’s beautiful prophecy comparing the redeemed to “oaks 
of righteousness, the planting of the LORD,” 61:3. 
432 WA 39/1.551.1-7 [A], cf. ATD, 179. 
 157
 
2.3. Totaliter peccatores? Grace, gift, and the “simul” 
 
In his term-setting 1951 study, Joest referred to this (to him, more pedestrian) element 
in Luther’s theology as the Partialaspekt of the “simul,” or alternately as the 
partim/partim variation of the same, which he contrasted unfavorably with its 
Totalaspekt. Although Joest’s study moves freely from various texts spanning the 
length of Luther’s theological career, two passages from the third disputation figure 
especially prominently in his argument for a “total simul” interpreted as an overtly 
anti-logical, existential, “paradoxical collision of two total realities,” in which total 
righteousness and total sinfulness are predicated of the same subject at the same 
time.433 I will examine them both, and argue (following David Yeago’s suggestive 2004 
essay)434 against Joest that Luther’s occasional totus/totus remarks fit quite snuggly 
with his rather more frequent emphases on partial residual sinfulness juxtaposed to 
real though partial renewal in holiness.  
 (1) The first comes in the last paragraph of the unusually lengthy D 3.3, an 
earlier portion of which I studied above—viz., the great battle scene where Luther 
names the flesh-slaying saint, who refuses to consent to the evil desires that torture 
his righteous soul, a true St. George. More on this in a moment. Joest’s attention falls 
on an arresting phrase near the end of the argument: duo contraria in uno subiecto et 
in eodem puncto temporis.435 He then conflates this text with a similar passage at D 
3.2.3[30], which I will consider separately below, and asserts that this proves that for 
                                                        
433 Wilfried Joest, Gesetz und Freiheit. Das Problem des tertius usus legis bei Luther und die 
neutestamentliche Parainese, 57-60. 
434 Yeago, “Martin Luther on Renewal and Sanctification.” 
435 WA 39/1.508.1-2 [A], cf. ATD, 153. 
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Luther Christians are Reputative totaliter iusti—revera totaliter peccatores. For this 
seemingly impressive Latin summation of Luther’s “total” theology of justification, 
Joest cites WA 39/1.564.3ff; but as Yeago has pointed out, it isn’t actually there.436 I will 
interpret what Luther does say at this critical text shortly, but for now it suffices to 
note that Joest reads the duo contraria remark at D 3.3 to mean that Christian 
believers are totally righteous by way of imputation, but in reality totally sinners. Is 
this what Luther is fact teaching at this point in the disputation? He does claim, a few 
lines later, that the Christian is a saint “insofar as he is a Christian, viz., to the extent 
that I am righteous, godly, and Christ’s, but insofar as I look at me and my sin, I am 
wretched and the greatest sinner” (cf. Rom. 7:24, 1 Tim. 1:15).437 I grant that, taken out 
of the context of D 3.3, Joest’s reading of Luther’s duo contraria in light of this 
sentence is at least possible; but there are two factors that militate strongly against it.  
First, consider the phrase itself. Luther speaks of two contraria in a single 
subject at the same time, to wit, righteousness and sin. Joest finds in this cause to 
celebrate an instance of the Reformer’s “flagrant” disregard for the principle of non-
contradiction and, with it, “the foundations of all logic.”438 He then explains the 
simultaneous coexistence of these mutually-excluding predicates in existential terms: 
they belong to “two wholly distinct planes of being (völlig verschiedenen Seinsebenen),” 
on the one hand one’s extrinsic relation to Christ with his perfect righteousness, on 
                                                        
436 Yeago, “Martin Luther on Renewal and Sanctification,” 662-3. 
437 WA 39/1.508.4-7 [A]: Attamen es sanctus? Ita, in quantum christianus, eatenus enim sum iustus, 
pius et Christi, sed quatenus respicio ad me et ad meum peccatum, sum miser et peccator maximus. 
Cf. ATD, 153. 
438 Joest, 58, and 207 n. 162. 
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the other one’s own qualitative being as a sinner.439 As I allowed earlier, Luther’s 
subsequent eatenus/quatenus lends a certain plausibility to this reading; but Joest is, I 
think, being a little too clever for his own good. For he overlooks the most obvious fact 
about Luther’s remark, namely, that the two contraria exist in a single subject. On 
Joest’s interpretation, one of the predicates is relational and extrinsic to the Christian’s 
being (i.e., righteousness) while the other is intrinsic, qualitative, and real (i.e., sin). 
To be sure, Luther can say that the Christian is to be considered in praedicamento 
relationis et qualitatis, as he does in the 1540 Promotionsdisputation for Joachim 
Mörlin, which Joest supplies as a parallel text to D 3.3 and leverages for his 
interpretation.440 But Luther does not do so here: the two contraria are both “in” a 
single subject. This does not refer to two kinds of predications, relational versus 
qualitative, applied to a single subject. Rather, it refers to two contrary qualities 
predicated of a single subject, precisely because they inhere together within the same 
subject in their contrariety. In other words, taken in its simplest sense, this is another 
instance of Luther’s partim/partim “simul,” wherein the partially renewed Christian 
continues to bear within himself the remnants of Adam’s sin. This is why, in the very 
next line, Luther explains that the saint cries out to God quia sentio peccatum 
adhaerens mihi,441 and in the last two lines of the paragraph speaks of the vetus Adam 
                                                        
439 Joest, 58. 
440 WA 39/2.141.1-6: Christianus est dupliciter considerandus, in praedicamento relationis et 
qualitatis. Si consideratur in relatione, tam sanctus est, quam angelus, id est, imputatione per 
Christum, quia Deus dicit, se non videre peccatum propter filium suum unigenitum, qui est velamen 
Mosi, id est, legis [2 Cor. 3:18]. Sed Christianus consideratus in qualitate est plenus peccato. Note that 
to be qualitatively “full of sin” does not mean that the Christian is totally sinful, i.e., that he is 
nothing but sinful. Cf. Luther’s lecture on Gen. 26:9, WA 43.454.37-455.12, LW 5.38. 
441 WA 39/1.508.2-3 [A], cf. ATD, 153. 
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and natura corrupta which manet in the saints till death.442 As Yeago and Theodor 
Dieter have argued against Joest, the predication of contrary qualities to a single 
subject only rises to the level of a logical contradiction if they are predicated not only 
at the same time, but also in the same respect.443 This point of logic is just what Luther 
himself upholds at D 1.8: contraria non sunt in eodem subiecto in eodem gradu.444 He 
explains this, vis-à-vis his theology of progressive growth in holiness, in sanative terms 
taken from the venerable christological interpretation of Luke 10:25-37: 
When health is perfect, disease is excluded. But in faith we are not yet perfectly 
healthy, but we are being healed. The Samaritan began to heal the man who 
had fallen into the hands of robbers. And therefore the disease is not yet 
entirely healed, but repeatedly bothers us. In this way, both are in us, sin and 
righteousness, certainly not in the same degree, but in different ones (Sic 
utrumque est in nobis, peccatum et iustitia, non tamen in eodem gradu, sed 
diverso).445 
  
Faith (the root of all inherent righteousness) battles against the disease of sin, and 
rules over it. Sin fights back against faith, but though it proves bothersome it does not 
triumph, for it only exists in the Christian subject in inferiore gradu.446 The Samaritan’s 
healing ministrations have effected much, and though his patient in the inn is not yet 
perfectly sound, he is more healthy than sick. “In this way,” reasons Luther, “in diverse 
degrees contraries are well able to exist in the same subject.”447 I submit that D 1.8’s 
explanation of how contraria bene possunt esse in eodem [subiecto]—viz., diversity in 
respect of degree—is the far more suitable text to pair with D 3.3’s duo contraria in 
                                                        
442 WA 39/1.508.8-9 [A], cf. ATD, 153. 
443 Yeago, “Martin Luther on Renewal and Sanctification,” 664, n. 30; Theodor Dieter, Der junge 
Luther und Aristoteles, 306-7. According to Dieter, Luther is “downright persnickety” about 
showing that his “simul” does not contradict the law of non-contradiction. 
444 WA 39/1.376.2 [A], cf. ATD, 43. 
445 WA 39/1.376.5-9 [A], cf. ATD, 44. 
446 WA 39/1.376.9-13 [A], cf. ATD, 44. 
447 WA 39/1.376.13-14 [A], cf. ATD, 44. 
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uno subiecto. To round off this first argument, I need only add that Joest does indeed 
engage D 1.8 at some length, and that he does so in his treatment of the Partialaspekt 
of Luther’s “simul.”448 
Second, consider the context of Luther’s remark in the course of the overall 
argument of D 3.3. As I noted above, its first half consists in the Knight George versus 
Lord Sin “battle scene” examined earlier. From here, Luther presses the point of real 
holiness maintained and furthered through the saint’s fierce struggle to refuse consent 
to the desires of his flesh by presenting a second vivid hagiographical story, which 
Luther (speaking off the cuff in the disputation) mistakenly attributes to Cyprian. A 
certain martyr was bound and shut up alone by his captors, who then brought 
beautiful prostitutes into his chamber to entice him to engage in illicit sex, with the 
promise that if he did so he would be set free. He steadfastly refused their advances, 
throttled the sexual lusts aroused in his own flesh, and, as a true “soldier of Christ” 
(militem Christi), preferred to die in faith in Christ rather than to live by offending his 
Lord.449  
Luther proceeds to explain the theology (and moral psychology) exemplified in 
the story of the martyr’s heroic and victorious battle to refuse consent to his fleshly 
desires for sex and for freedom from torture and death. “The Christian feels that he is 
moved and inflamed (sentit, se moveri et accendi) by wrath, hatred, that he is burned 
(uri) by sexual lust, that he is inflamed (ardere se) by love of glory, money, power, 
etc.”450 Does the mere fact that he feels and is moved violently by these passions mean 
                                                        
448 Joest, 66. 
449 WA 39/1.506.11-507.4 [A], cf. ATD, 152. 
450 WA 39/1.507.5-7 [A], cf. ATD, 153. 
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he is not a Christian? Luther’s answer to his own question contains an exact statement 
of his theology of grace, gift, and the “simul.” “In that part” (in hac parte) of him which 
is comprised by these unruly motions and sinful passions, that is in his residual flesh, 
the Christian—as flesh—is not a Christian.451 The law exposes this, not least the 
encompassing non concupisces452 of the 10th Commandment and Rom. 7:7-8. But the 
gospel speaks a stronger reality and supplies two reasons for a better judgment of such 
a person: “He who fights, and neither suffers himself to be conquered by sin nor 
permits sin to rule [Rom. 6:12], is and is called a Christian on account of faith in Christ, 
because of which whatever evil is still present in him is not imputed to him.”453 Once 
again, Luther adjudges the Christian a “sinner” (or in this case, a non-Christian) in the 
very precise sense that in that “part” of him which is his flesh—quod adhuc adest 
mali—he continues to feel, suffer, or experience illicit and disordered impulses, 
desires, or affections. This is the one reason why the Christian is sinful; but for his 
righteousness there are two. First, he fights against his sinful flesh, refuses its powerful 
suggestions, and does not permit it to rule over him. Second, because of his faith in 
Christ, these evil desires—overcome through the refusal of consent, yet intrinsically 
sinful nonetheless—are not reckoned to his account. Thus gift and grace together, 
victory over one’s flesh by the Spirit and forgiveness or non-imputation propter fidem 
Christi of the “sin” that remains in its conquered and depleted form, constitute the 
Christian’s righteousness. And to be clear, the Christian’s refusal of consent to the 
desires of his flesh in the power of the Spirit’s gift is the sine qua non of his abiding in 
                                                        
451 WA 39/1.507.9 [A], cf. ATD, 153. 
452 WA 39/1.507.8-9 [A], cf. ATD, 153. 
453 WA 39/1.507.10-12 [A], cf. ATD, 153. 
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the grace and forgiveness of Christ. Qui pugnet—the sin-fighter, and the sin-fighter 
alone, is the one to whom the residual sin against which he fights is not imputed for 
Christ’s sake. Now, this proves that Joest’s “total simul” is, for Luther, theologically 
(and spiritually) impossibile. The person who consents to his sinful flesh forfeits gift 
and grace alike, and does indeed become a “total sinner.” But now he is not righteous 
at all, either in himself or in Christ. For he has lost that faith which alone unites (or 
relates) him to Christ and grasps hold of his righteousness. Only the Spirit-gifted, sin-
fighting, non-consenting knight has that faith in Christ which receives all the riches of 
his grace. That is to say, only the Christian who is really (though partially) renewed in 
righteousness by the Spirit obtains the grace in Christ that pardons the vexatious 
dregs of Adam’s sin which remain for the fight. 
The next paragraph’s Augustinian interpretation of Ps. 32 and 1 John 3:9 and 
1:8, which immediately precedes the duo contraria remark highlighted by Joest, 
confirms that this is in fact Luther’s real dogmatics of sin, grace, and holiness. He 
begins with Ps. 32:1: “Blessed are they whose iniquities (iniquitates) are forgiven, and 
whose sins are covered.”454 Interestingly, he does not continue to v. 2, which provides 
the vital non imputavit that he has already alluded to in the preceding paragraph’s 
summary of his theology of grace and gift. St. Paul cites these verses in Rom. 4:6-8 to 
establish his doctrine of justification by faith, and they are of great moment for Luther 
even if his sense of their meaning has sometimes been mistaken. In D 3.3, his 
interpretation stands out clearly because he passes on strait to v. 6: “for this, viz., 
iniquity (iniquitate), every saint (omnis sanctus) will pray to You,” then cites 1 John 3:9 
                                                        
454 WA 39/1.507.16-17 [A], cf. ATD, 153. 
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and 1:8 as parallel and explanatory texts.455 The latter two verses, as we have seen, 
factored decisively in the 1538 addendum to SA III.3, and they are taken in the same 
sense in this text from the same year. St. John’s qui natus est ex Deo, non peccat (1 John 
3:9) matches the sanctus in Ps. 32:6, while his si dixerimus, quod peccatum non 
habemus, nos ipsos fallimus (1:8) explains why David’s saint prays to God on account of 
his iniquity and is blessed in the first place because God mercifully forgives and covers 
his sins. The renewed saint “has sin”—the sinful flesh and its illicit passions—but he 
does not commit actual sin through voluntarily consenting to the desires he has. He 
does not boast of his inherent righteousness as though he were already perfect, but 
humbly prays to God in the fashion of Ps. 32:6. All the while, despite the reality of his 
“sin” and the imperfection of his renewal in real holiness, he is nonetheless perfectly 
beatus and sanctus through God’s merciful non-imputation. Thus when Luther asks,  
What is this? How do these things fit together? How does it agree, to be holy 
and to pray for sin (sanctum esse et orare pro peccato)? It is truly a marvelous 
thing. It is truly a fine thing. Reim da, wer reimen kan.456 
 
—his question is basically rhetorical, for he has already “rhymed” a solution to the 
apparent contradiction of duo contraria in uno subiecto in the body of the argument. I 
do not mean to imply that Luther, any less than St. Paul or Augustine, is indifferent to 
the mysteriousness of indwelling sin or, what is far greater, to the marvelousness of 
the gospel that defeats it. Far from it. But Luther is not in the least at a loss to render a 
theological explanation of the nature of residual “sin” in the saints, on the one hand, 
and on the other of the manner in which it is overcome through the grace of Jesus 
Christ and the gift of the Spirit. That is what he has labored at, over against the 
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456 WA 39/1.507.19-508.1 [A], cf. ATD, 153. 
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antinomian misconstrual of his theology, in D 3.3 and throughout these disputations, 
as I hope my own exposition of the same is bearing out. In light of the regnant 
confusion in much of twentieth-century Lutheran theology on this point, the 
exhortation which the Reformer interposes amidst his explanations in D 3.3 of the 
interrelation of grace, gift, and indwelling sin takes on a certain prophetic quality: “I 
implore you to learn this well. Believe me this: when we are dead, not many will teach 
this and make this distinction.”457  
(2) The second text from the disputations that Joest claims in defense of his 
“total simul” comes at D 3.2.3[30]. Although Joest misquotes it, the passage as it 
actually stands in WA 39/1 does include the statement that revera sumus et totaliter 
peccatores,458 and concludes dicimur iusti et peccatores simul et semel.459 As Yeago has 
already handled this text ably, I can afford to be more brief in my treatment of it 
here.460 But as a complement to Yeago’s interpretation, which leans heavily on the 1521 
Antilatomus, I will base my reading exclusively on texts from the third disputation.  
In the first place, it is vital to grasp that the thesis to which Luther responds in 
the body of his argument is itself an explicit argument against the partim/partim 
“simul.” To wit: since the beneficium Christi, namely justification, vivification, and 
liberation from the law, pertains to the whole person, believers cannot be described as 
partim iusti, partim iniusti; instead, they are either totaliter iusti vel totaliter 
peccatores.461 This thesis did not drop out of thin air: in the preceding D 3.2.2[29], 
                                                        
457 WA 39/1.507.12-14 [A], cf. ATD, 153. 
458 WA 39/1.564.4 [A], cf. ATD, 186. 
459 WA 39/1.564.6-7 [A], cf. ATD, 186. 
460 David Yeago, “Martin Luther on Renewal and Sanctification,” 662-66. 
461 WA 39/1.563.8-12 [A], cf. ATD, 186. 
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Luther had argued that “it is absolutely certain that we are partly righteous, partly 
sinners (partim iustos, partim peccatores), since we carry around with us the flesh of 
our father Adam infected by original sin.”462 So, the initial thesis in D 3.2.3[30], in the 
mode proper to scholastic disputation, is pressing the logical validity of what Luther 
had just established by directly countering it. In his reply, we should expect Luther to 
defend his partim/partim by way of further clarification of its meaning. And that—
pace Joest’s interpretation but consistent with the theology of grace, gift, and residual 
sin that Luther upholds throughout the disputations—is precisely what we find.  
Luther begins by granting that the “total” thesis is a good one Reputative 
scilicet, by way of imputation.463 He goes on: “For this is true, that by divine 
imputation we are really and totally righteous (reputatione divina sumus revera et 
totaliter iusti), even if sin is still present.”464 Now, the question that must be asked 
here is, What is the nature of the “sin” that is still present (adhuc adsit peccatum) in 
the saints and requires God’s mercy in order to establish the believer as totally 
righteous in his sight? In light of the preceding argument’s claim that we are partim 
peccatores on account of the remnants of Adam’s sin, as well as the whole tenor of 
Luther’s theology as I have exposited it to this point, the answer is ready to hand; and 
a few lines farther on, Luther specifies that Christians are sinners “insofar as we regard 
ourselves and the first birth (prima generatione).”465 Indeed, says Luther, in this 
respect revera sumus et totaliter peccatores.466 This is more or less the line that drew 
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464 WA 39/1.563.13-14 [A], cf. ATD, 185. 
465 WA 39/1.564.4-5 [A], cf. ATD, 185. 
466 WA 39/1.564.4 [A], cf. ATD, 185. 
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Joest’s attention, but Luther’s meaning is far more restricted than Joest recognized. In 
D 3.3, Luther stated that in hac parte of the Christian that is his residual “flesh,” the 
Christian is not a Christian. Here, he states that when the Christian attends to what he 
is in himself, that is to say, to what he is by virtue of his first generation as a son of 
ruined Adam, apart from his regeneration in Christ by the Spirit, he is truly and totally 
a sinner. In both cases, different terms express the same theological judgment: in his 
residual Adamic “flesh,” apart from Christ’s grace and the Spirit’s gift, the Christian 
non est christianus and the saint is totaliter peccator. This kind of language sounds 
paradoxical, and Joest and his heirs would have it be so, but it actually is not. Rather, 
Luther is urging what a later English Puritan called “the sinfulness of sin,”467 precisely 
in the flesh of the regenerate Christian. By the Spirit’s gift such a one really is reborn 
and made new. But the remnants of Adam’s sin, manifest in the disordered passions 
which afflict the saint’s heart against his will, are so utterly repugnant and abhorrent 
to the holiness of God that their mere presence in the saint—apart from any voluntary 
consent to their illicit promptings—requires the merciful non-imputation of God, and 
the covering of Christ’s precious blood, for the flesh-bearing saint to stand righteous 
and pure in God’s sight.468 When regarded apart from this gift and grace—which, in 
addition to being a logical possibility and as such a useful penitential discipline, is also 
                                                        
467 This is the title of a book by Ralph Venning (1621-74). 
468 For an instructive parallel, see D 3, preface, WA 39/1.492.19-493.5 [A]: Verum vos scitis nos esse 
quidem iustos, puros, sanctos, esse etiam peccatores, iniustos et damnatos. Sed diverso respectu. 
sumus enim iusti, quod ad reputationem seu misericordiam Dei in Christo promissam, hoc est propter 
Christum, in quem credimus, et qui in hunc credit, non peccat, imo non potest peccare, ut ait Ioannes 
[1 John 3:9], sed secundum formam aut substantiam, seu secundum nos, sumus peccatores inusti et 
damnati, quia certe nihil est in tota natura hominis, quod opponi possit iudicio Dei. Sed ubi haec 
misera et damnata natura arripit Christum propitiatorem et mediatorem per fidem, ibi illud ipsum 
peccatum, quod est adhuc in carne, modo non damnatur, non habetur pro peccato, sed condonatur 
propter Christum et est quasi nullum. Cf. ATD, 142. 
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an immensely fruitful (if intensely painful) spiritual experience, viz., the suspensio 
gratiae469—the greatest saint in via is indeed maximus peccator, revera et totaliter, and 
confesses himself to be so (1 Tim. 1:15).470 But in theological truth and spiritual reality, 
amidst all the afflictive passions of his sinful flesh—including the despairing 
paroxysms of the soul’s dark night—the Christian never actually exists apart from the 
regenerating and renovating gift of the Spirit and the abundant riches of God’s grace 
in Jesus Christ.  
There are two further points to be made in conclusion, the first in confirmation 
of the fact that the “sin” that requires God’s forgiving grace in Christ and renders 
Christians “total sinners” apart from that grace is to be understood only as the residual 
sinful flesh, the second regarding the nature of that grace itself. The first concerns 
Luther’s appeal, in D 3.2.3[30], to his favorite rhetorical trope: “synecdoche,” that is, 
taking a part for the whole or vice versa. He sandwiches two examples between his 
first reference to residual sin (adhuc adsit peccatum) and his last (prima generatione). 
When a wounded person is healed, we say that “the whole man” (totus homo) was 
healed, even though only a part of him had been wounded and only that part restored. 
                                                        
469 See, e.g., Luther’s lectures on Gen. 8:1, when at long last “God remembered Noah” (WA 42.335ff, 
cf. LW 2.103-6). In the midst of spiritual suffering such as Noah endured amidst the terrifying 
judgment and destruction of the Flood, we feel as if “the rays of divine grace (radii divinae gratiae) 
have been taken away, and we find ourselves in the darkness or the forgetfulness of God.” But 
though in the darkness he saw not one ray of grace (radium gratiae), still Noah “clung only to the 
promise” (335.25-28, 33-4). Only “the most perfect saints” (Perfectissimi Sancti) understand this 
“forgetful God” (Deum obliviosum) and are able to endure by faith. Some of the monks experienced 
this tentatio, and called it “the suspension of grace” (suspensionem gratiae) (336.11-12, 15-16). The 
expression is found in Thomas à Kempis (Imitatio Christi, bk. 2 cp. 9), the reality in Tauler. See 
Luther’s marginalia on Tauler’s sermons, WA 9.99.29 (suspensio gratiae et spiritus) and 101.3-4 
(derelictione a deo per suspensionem gratiae). I touched on this point above in cp. 1.3, and will 
explore it further in section 3.3 of this chapter below and in Part III of this book. 
470 If my reader is not inclined to grant Luther’s point, I might suggest reflection (with Anselm) on 
whether nondum considerasti quanti ponderis sit peccatum. Cf. Mickey Mattox’s discussion of 
Thérèse of Lisieux’s cognate spiritual theology in “From Lutheran to Catholic—Justification and 
Holiness,” in Changing Churches, 63-65. 
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Likewise we say that a man is wounded, when in fact “scarcely one of his members” is 
actually harmed. Sic etiam, explains Luther, when we have regard to ourselves and our 
first birth, we are really and totally sinners: viz., by way of synecdoche, in this case the 
second example being the more directly pertinent of the two.471 Its force requires that 
the rhetorically impressive totaliter peccatores is on par with saying that a whole man 
is wounded even though only one part of him really is. That is, the whole Christian is 
said to be a sinner, because part of him still is: his flesh. In other words, Joest’s 
apparently strongest candidate for a “total simul” is in fact an intentional rhetorical 
variation of the partim. 
On the whole, Yeago’s interpretation of this point is quite good. But he goes on 
to assert (a little vaguely) that as the totus peccator is really based on the Christian’s 
partial residual sinfulness, so the totus iustus is based on the reality of his partial 
renewal.472 This, I grant, is a legitimate inference from the first example of a 
synecdoche that Luther provides: the whole person is said to be healed (or 
“righteous”), whereas really only part of him is. The trouble with this is that in the 
text, Luther leaves the first example behind and explains the Christian’s “total” 
righteousness another way. Careful attention here will yield deeper insight into the 
                                                        
471 WA 39/1.564.1-5 [A], cf. ATD, 186. 
472 See Yeago, “Martin Luther on Renewal and Sanctification,” 664: “Because sin is ‘partially’ present 
within them, therefore the faithful, so to speak as concrete human wholes, are rightly called 
‘sinners altogether.’ Yet because they have been partly healed, the same human beings are at the 
same time equally truly said to be ‘totally righteous persons’ by divine imputation.” Here, Yeago 
seems to claim that God reckons total righteousness to the Christian propter his partial renewal—
more or less the position held classically by Karl Holl. Later in the article, however, Yeago more 
clearly states that “we are received into God’s favor ‘on account of the gift’ rather because faith is 
the human term of a relation of union with Christ” (666). This latter statement is unobjectionable. 
For Holl, see “Die Rechtfertigungslehre in Luthers Vorlesung über den Römerbrief mit besonderer 
Rücksicht auf die Frage der Heilsgewißheit,” in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte, vol. 1: 
Luther (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1948 [reprint of 1921 original; the essay dates from 1910]). 
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ongoing role of “grace” (properly defined) in Luther’s theology of holiness. If, in the 
present argument, Luther had maintained the kind of symmetry that Yeago suggests is 
there, he would have followed up his rhetorical reduction of the totaliter peccator to 
the partim with a statement of his theology of the Spirit’s gift of real but partial 
renewal in holiness. But this he does not do. Instead, Luther turns to his theology of 
grace in Jesus Christ: “Because Christ was given for us, we are totally holy and 
righteous (sancti et iusti totaliter).”473 In other words, a decisive asymmetry obtains 
between the theological rationale for calling a Christian a “total sinner” on the one 
hand and “completely holy and righteous” on the other. He is called totus peccator 
rhetorically by way of synecdoche, though he is actually only partly sinful and is in fact 
partly renewed in real holiness by the Spirit. But he is called—and really is—totus 
iustus by way of gracious imputation, God in mercy overlooking his fleshly 
imperfections and reckoning Christ’s self-donation into death on the cross to his 
account. This, after all, is how Luther had begun his reply: reputatione divina sumus 
revera et totaliter iusti, etiamsi adhuc adsit peccatum. So we have come full circle, with 
the important clarification that the divine imputation by which believers are found to 
be entirely righteousness in God’s sight (despite the residual sin in their flesh) is 
granted on account of the gospel of grace, quod Christus pro nobis datus est.474  
This, then, is Luther’s theology of grace, gift, and the “simul” as he exposits it in 
the three disputations gegen die Antinomer held from December 1537 to the fall of 
1538.  
 
                                                        
473 WA 39/1.564.5-6 [A], cf. ATD, 186. 
474 WA 39/1.564.5-6 [A], cf. ATD, 186. 
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3. On the Councils and the Church (early 1539) 
 
On the Councils and the Church falls in between the third (Sept. 1538) and the fourth 
(Sept. 1540) of Luther’s disputations gegen die Antinomer. So it is not at all surprising 
that in this his major work on church history, patristic authority, conciliar theory, and 
ecclesiology, Luther twice engages his ongoing polemics with Agricola.475 In each case, 
the result is a rich exposition of his trinitarian theology of grace and gift that 
emphasizes the real renewal of the Christian in the most robust terms. I shall first 
examine both loci on grace and gift, and then turn finally to Luther’s teaching on the 
sanctifying holy cross. 
 
3.1. A Pfingst prediger: the dialectics of grace and gift 
 
The first locus on grace and gift comes mid-way through the second part of the work, 
as Luther interacts in a strikingly sympathetic manner with the christologies of 
Nestorius and Eutyches vis-à-vis his own deeply held Chalcedonian orthodoxy.476 In 
each case, says Luther, well-meaning theologians erred by denying conclusions that 
logically followed from their own correct premises (e.g., Nestorius denied that God 
was born of Mary, but he affirmed that Christ was God and Man). This, says Luther, “is 
what my Antinomians, too, are doing today,” who are 
… preaching beautifully and (as I cannot but think) with real sincerity about 
Christ’s grace (der gnade Christi), about the forgiveness of sin and whatever 
else can be said about the article of redemption. But they flee as if it were the 
very devil the consequence that they should tell people about the third article, 
                                                        
475 For a lucid introduction to its primary themes, see David C. Steinmetz, “Luther and Calvin on 
Church and Tradition,” in his Luther in Context (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 85-
97. For greater depth, see Christopher Spehr, Luther und das Konzil: zur Entwicklung eines 
zentralen Themas in der Reformationszeit (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010).  
476 On the orthodoxy of Luther’s christology, see David Luy’s tightly argued book, Dominus Mortis: 
Martin Luther on the Incorruptibility of God in Christ. 
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of sanctification (Heiligung), that is, of the new life in Christ (neuen leben in 
Christo).477 
 
The paragraphs that follow are framed entirely by Luther’s theology of grace and gift, 
and from them three observations especially stand out for the sake of my argument. 
First, in contrast to Agricola et al. and their exclusive emphasis on “grace,” Luther 
offers an explicit and full presentation of his own creedal theology of grace and gift. 
Indeed, the Reformer’s insertion of the Latin gratia/donum at this juncture in this 
German writing lends them the aura of quasi-technical terminology. Since he basically 
affirms Agricola’s preaching of grace or redemption through Jesus Christ,478 the weight 
of his discussion falls on the gift of sanctification and renewal by the Holy Spirit. Jesus 
Christ “did not earn for us only gratiam, die gnade, but also donum, die gabe of the 
Holy Spirit,’ so that we might have not only forgiveness of sins, but also ceasing from 
sins (auffhoeren von den sunden).”479 Together with this negative definition of the 
Spirit’s donum/gabe at work in the sin-ceasing saints, Luther repeatedly couples a 
positive. With an allusion to 1 Pet. 2:24 in the foreground and Rom. 5—8 in the 
background, Luther states that Spirit-gifted believers are not only “dead to sin (der 
sunden tod),” they “live to righteousness (der gerechtigkeit leben), beginning and 
increasing (anfahen und zunehmen) here on earth and perfecting it beyond.”480 For the 
                                                        
477 WA 50.599.5-10, cf. LW 41.113.  
478 Hence when engaging in anti-Papal polemic vis-à-vis a potential council, Luther too—in this 
very work—can discuss the “grace” of justification without mention of the sanctifying gift: “The 
pope should not only abolish his tyranny of human ordinances in the council, but also hold with us 
that even good works performed in accordance with God’s commandments cannot help to achieve 
righteousness, to blot out sin, to attain God’s grace—only faith in Christ, who is a King of 
Righteousness in us, through his precious blood, death, and resurrection, so that he blotted out our 
sin for us, made satisfaction, reconciled God, and redeemed us from death, wrath, and hell.” WA 
50.621.18-24, cf. LW 41.139-40.  
479 WA 50.599.32-35, cf. LW 41.114. 
480 WA 50.599.30-32, cf. LW 41.114. 
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Spirit gives life and righteousness to those who are dead in sin, making “new men 
(neuen menschen) out of the old Adam”481 who “lead a new life (neu leben fueren)” 
precisely because they “have the Holy Spirit.”482 Thus true Pfingst-preaching about the 
Spirit means speaking de sanctificatione et vivificatione Spiritus Sancti,483 that is, of the 
Heiligung and vivification produced by the Spirit and consisting in “the new life in 
Christ (neuen leben in Christo).”484 In short, the Holy Spirit makes new men and 
women out of the old Adam, who desist from sin and progressively increase in 
righteousness as they advance by the Spirit’s gift in the new life in Christ. This ongoing 
work of sanctification and vivification by the Spirit, set in the context of St. Paul’s 
contrast between sin and death in the first Adam and righteousness and life in Jesus 
Christ, Luther here (as elsewhere in the works of his maturity) encapsulates in the 
single term, donum. 
Second, I note not merely Luther’s spirited defense of the real holiness of life 
imparted by the Spirit’s donum, but the integral and inseparable nexus of this 
sanctifying gift with the grace of redemption through Jesus Christ. With polemical 
verve, Luther insists that it is impossible to have Christ’s grace without the Spirit’s gift, 
since the mutual relation of the two is not only intimate and organic, but causal and 
purposeful. For Christ “has purchased redemption from sin and death”—i.e., grace—
“so that the Holy Spirit might make us into new men (das uns der Heilige Geist sol zu 
neuen menschen machen)”485—i.e., gift (cf. Gal. 3:14, 4:4-6, Acts 2:22-33). In the slight 
                                                        
481 WA 50.599.29-30, cf. LW 41.114. 
482 WA 50.600.11-12, cf. LW 41.115. 
483 WA 50.599.26-28, cf. LW 41.114. 
484 WA 50.599.5-10, cf. LW 41.113.  
485 WA 50.599.28-31, cf. LW 41.114. 
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variation quoted above, Luther can also simply say that Christ merited both grace and 
gift, and not the one without the other.486 Either way, his point is clear: Christ’s work 
in meriting the grace of forgiveness cannot be separated from the Spirit’s gift of 
renewal without imperiling the work of Christ itself. Or, to say the same thing 
positively, the redemption of sinners by forgiveness in Christ is not an end in itself, 
but is intrinsically ordered to their renewal in righteousness and life through the 
Spirit.487  
This is the insight that originally prompted Luther to digress from his 
discussion of fifth-century christologies to enter the fray against (as he put it) meine 
Antinomer. Like Nestorius and Eutyches—mutatis mutandis—Agricola et al. preach 
grace and forgiveness through Christ “beautifully” and even sincerely. But they refuse 
to preach holiness through the Spirit’s gift, because they fail to grasp that the Spirit’s 
gift of new life in Christ is the theo-logically necessary consequence (consequens) of 
Christ’s redeeming work. “They may be fine Easter preachers, but they are very poor 
Pentecost preachers,” quips Luther.488 But his real contention is that in the end the 
Antinomians prove to be bad rhetoricians because they were bad logicians first: 
granting the premise of redemption through Christ but denying the conclusion of 
sanctification by the Spirit.489 “They therefore preach Christ beautifully with 
Nestorisch und Eutychische Dialectica, that he is and yet is not Christ.”490 By contrast, 
                                                        
486 WA 50.599.32-35, cf. LW 41.114. 
487 Leonhard Fendt, Luthers Schule der Heiligung (Leipzig: H. G. Wallmann, 1929), 7, begins his 
little book on Luther’s “school of sanctification” arguing on the basis of On the Councils and the 
Church that the goal of redemption is holiness. 
488 WA 50.599.25, LW 41.114. 
489 WA 50.599.18-19, LW 41.114: “Tell me, my dear man, is that not granting the premise and denying 
the conclusion?” (Lieber, sage mir, heist das nicht antecedens concedirt und consequens negirt?). 
490 WA 50.599.23-26, cf. LW 41.114. 
 175
in the orthodox “Chalcedonian” dialectics driving Luther’s theology of grace and gift, 
“there is no such Christ that died for the kind of sinners who do not, after the 
forgiveness of sins, leave their sin and lead a new life (von den sunden lassen und ein 
neues leben fueren).”491 Mark well the vehemence of Luther’s polemic at this point, for 
it demonstrates just how seriously he regarded the matter of Christian holiness and 
the threat posed to it by the errant theology and preaching of Agricola. In Luther’s 
judgment, Agricola’s sincere but flawed theology of grace-sans-gift ends in a heresy no 
less devastating than the sincere but flawed christologies of the ancient heresiarchs; 
and heresy, in the Reformer’s still very catholic mind, cuts off its adherents from the 
salvation that is only to be had through faith in the true Gospel.492 Because the true 
Jesus Christ brings the pentecostal gift of holiness through the Spirit as the necessary 
consequence of his paschal forgiveness and grace, the Christian “should either have 
the Holy Spirit and lead a new life, or know that he has no Christ.”493 A sinful, Spirit-
less life falsely justified in the name of Christ’s grace is rooted at bottom in 
christological heresy: “He who does not abstain from sin, but persists in his former evil 
nature, must have a different Christ, that of the Antinomians; the real Christ is not 
there, even if all the angels would cry, ‘Christ! Christ!’ He must be damned with this, 
his new Christ.”494  
                                                        
491 WA 50.599.21-23, cf. LW 41.114. 
492 Eeva Martikainen, Doctrina. Studien zu Luthers Begriff der Lehre (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola 
Gesellschaft, 1992). 
493 WA 50.600.11-12, LW 41.115. 
494 WA 50.599.35-600.2, cf. LW 41.114. On linking apparently unrelated heresies to the orthodox 
doctrine of Christ, see 1 John 4:1-6 and Robert Dodaro, OSA, “‘Omnes haeretici negant Christum in 
carne uenisse’ (Aug., serm. 183.9.13): Augustine on the Incarnation as Criterion for Orthodoxy,” 
AugS 38/1 (2007): 163-74. 
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Third and last, a few comments on the “simul” as it pertains to this theology of 
grace and gift. In Luther’s positive exposition of his position, the res described by the 
term is nearly as absent as the term itself, which does not appear. The nearest he 
comes to it is a single, brief qualification of the saints’ renewal in the life of 
righteousness: it begins and increases in this life, but only reaches perfection in the 
next.495 This is an unexceptionable statement of traditional Augustinian eschatological 
reserve, in no way prejudicial to the theology of donum-worked holiness that Luther 
sets forth and defends in this passage with marked zeal. On the whole, it is the reality 
and vividness of the new life in Christ that impresses the reader as the real object of 
Luther’s concern here; even the very specific sense in which his Smalcald Articles and 
Disputations recognize the ongoing reality of sin in the Christian life is absent from 
this text. That said, the Antinomian “simul” that animated Luther’s stern 
disapprobation and summoned his discussion of David’s fall in the 1538 appendix to 
SA III.3 finds a nearly identical counterpart in this text from the following year. Luther 
charges that Agricola and his circle  
… think one should not frighten or trouble the people, but rather always preach 
comfortingly about grace and the forgiveness of sins in Christ, and under no 
circumstances use these or similar words: “Listen! You want to be a Christian 
and nonetheless (gleichwol) remain an adulterer, a whoremonger, a drunken 
swine, arrogant, covetous, a usurer, envious, vindictive, malicious, etc.!” 
Instead they say, “Listen! Though you are an adulterer, a whoremonger, a 
miser, or other kind of sinner, if you but believe, you are saved, and you need 
not fear the law. Christ has fulfilled it all!”496 
 
Regardless of whether Luther is fair to Agricola’s actual preaching and theology, his 
polemics powerfully illuminate his own position; for he charges his erstwhile friend 
                                                        
495 WA 50.599.31-2, LW 41.114. 
496 WA 50.599.10-17, LW 41.113-14. 
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with the very “simul”-theology he is often thought to have embraced himself. For 
Luther, it is impossible to be a Christian and remain an adulterer, a whoremonger, a 
drunken swine, arrogant, covetous, a usurer, envious, vindictive, malicious, “or other 
kind of sinner” at the same time. To teach and preach otherwise is to reject the Spirit’s 
gift and deny the gospel of Jesus Christ. 
 
3.2. The Holiness of the Church 
 
The second major locus on grace and gift appears in the compact treatise on 
evangelical ecclesiology that forms the third part of On the Councils and the Church. If 
in the previous material Luther digressed somewhat from his treatment of conciliar 
history and theory, here the theology of grace and gift is absolutely central to his 
exposition, for it is itself constitutive of the Reformer’s ecclesiology. More concretely 
put, for Luther redemption through Jesus Christ and sanctification by the Spirit are 
the evangelical realities that together make a gathered people the Church of God.  
 Luther takes his point of departure from “the Children’s Creed,” that is, the 
Apostles’ in the form it took in late medieval Germany already prior to the 
Reformation: “I believe in one holy Christian Church, the Communion of saints (eine 
heilige Christliche Kirche, Gemeinschafft der heiligen).”497 This he glosses with both 
ecclesia sancta catholica Christiana and, more decisively, ein Christlich heilig Volck.498 
The Church is a Christian, holy people: Christian, because it believes in Christ; holy, 
because it  
                                                        
497 WA 50.624.15, LW 41.143. On Christliche instead of catholica in pre-Reformation German Creeds, 
see BC, 22, note 13. 
498 WA 50.624.28-9, LW 41.143. 
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… has the Holy Spirit, who sanctifies it daily (teglich heiligt), not only through 
the forgiveness of sins that Christ has merited for them (as the Antinomians 
foolishly believe), but also through the abolition, sweeping out, and 
mortification of sins, on the basis of which they are called a holy people.499  
 
The Church’s holiness cannot be reduced to its reception of forgiveness in Christ by 
faith, as Agricola contends and as Luther himself had at least suggested in the recent 
past.500 Rather, the Church ransomed by God’s blood (Acts 20:28) is ein heilig Volck 
because it has den Heiligen Geist, who works real holiness in God’s forgiven people by 
ridding them of sin, which he abolishes, sweeps out, and kills. Amidst the ongoing 
controversy of the late 1530s, Luther maintains his firm insistence on the “grace” of 
forgiveness through faith in Christ but now adds a vigorous complementary emphasis 
on the Spirit’s sanctifying “gift” (described concretely by the Spirit’s works, though not 
here by the word Gabe).  
The Reformer’s culminating summary statement nicely captures his theology of 
grace and gift in its ecclesiological key: 
There is always a holy Christian people on earth, in whom Christ lives, works, 
and rules per redemptionem, through grace (gnade) and the forgiveness of sin, 
and the Holy Spirit, per vivificationem et sanctificationem, through daily 
purging of sin and renewal of life (erneuerung des lebens), so that we do not 
remain in sin but can and should lead a new life in all kinds of good works, and 
not in old evil works, as the Ten Commandments or the Two Tables of Moses 
demand.501 
                                                        
499 WA 50.624.29-33, cf. LW 41.143. 
500 See, e.g., the 1531/5 Lectures on Galatians (WA 40/1.197.23-7-198.14 [Dr], LW 26.109): “The Church 
is indeed holy, but it is a sinner at the same time (simul)… Therefore we are not said to be holy 
formally, as a wall is said to be white because of its inherent whiteness. Inherent holiness is not 
enough. Therefore Christ is our entire holiness (Christus igitur est tota sanctitas nostra); where that 
inherent holiness is not enough, Christ is enough.” Note that even in this text, Luther does not 
deny the reality of formal holiness. Rather, he denies that it is sufficient in itself to make a person 
truly holy. Only Jesus Christ can do that—and he does. Thus in the handwritten notes (WA 
40/1.198.1-2 [Hs]) we find: Inherens sanctitas ist zu infirma. ubi ista non satis inherens, satis est 
Christus. Cf. David S. Yeago, “ECCLESIA SANCTA, ECCLESIA PECCATRIX: The Holiness of the 
Church in Martin Luther’s Theology,” Pro Ecclesia 9/3 (2000), 331-54.  
501 WA 50.625.23-29, LW 41.144, alt. 
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In short, for Luther redemption through Christ and renewal by the Spirit, forgiveness 
and holiness, grace and gift—never one apart from the other—together transform 
guilty and vitiated sinners into Gottes volck,502 the holy Christian people who are the 
Church of God. To put this pointedly, Luther is here claiming that the “grace” of 
forgiveness and justification in Christ cannot bear the whole weight of the Church’s 
being and life on its own. Only foolish Antinomians believe that forensic justification 
isolated from the Spirit’s renewal is the article by which the Church stands or falls. In 
Luther’s considered judgment, it is the trinitarian theology of grace and gift, taken as a 
creedal whole, that attests the fullness of the Gospel’s saving power and thus 
comprises the articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae.503 “He who does not believe 
rightly in Christ is not Christian or a Christian; he who does not have the Holy Spirit 
against sin is not holy; therefore, they cannot be ‘a Christian holy people,’ that is, 
sancta et catholica ecclesia.”504  
Luther proceeds to an extensive and rich exposition of the nature of the 
Christliche heiligkeit505 worked by the Spirit in the Church. Drawing on Acts 15:9 as he 
had at SA III.13, Luther first establishes a basic proposition: Christian holiness is found 
                                                        
502 WA 50.625.2, LW 41.144. 
503 This famous phrase is not quite Luther’s own, though in high polemical pitch vis-à-vis Roman 
Catholic legalism (as opposed to Agricola’s antinomianism) he said it in substance again and again. 
Take, e.g., his preface to the third Antinomian Disputation (WA 39/1.489.4-6, ATD, 139): “As you 
have already frequently heard, and still hear today in lectures, as well as in sermons, so we now also 
say, that the article of justification (locum iustificationis) is without doubt the head and summary 
of Christian doctrine”; or the preface he wrote in 1538 to his great 1531 Lectures on Galatians (WA 
40/1.33.7-9, LW 27.145): “In my heart there rules this one article (iste unus regnat articulus), namely, 
faith in Christ. From it, through it, and to it all my theological thought flows and returns, day and 
night.” For the history of the formula, see Theodor Mahlmann, “Zur Geschichte der Formel 
‘Articulus Stantis et Cadentis Ecclesiae,” Lutherische Theologie und Kirche 17/4 (1993): 187-94. 
504 WA 50.625.12-15, cf. LW 41.144. 
505 WA 50.626.15, LW 41.145. 
 180
“when the Holy Spirit gives (gibt) people faith in Christ and through it sanctifies them, 
Acts 15[:9], that is, he makes a new heart, soul, body, work, and nature (er macht neu 
hertz, seel, leib, werck und wesen), and writes the commandment of God not on stone 
tables but in hearts of flesh, II Cor. 3[:3].”506 Although Luther refers expressly to 2 Cor. 
3:3, he draws the imagery of the new heart inscribed by the Spirit with God’s law from 
Ezek. 36:26-7 and Jer. 31:33. This collation of texts affords Luther the occasion to 
unfold the Spirit’s regenerating and sanctifying operations in the concrete terms of the 
Decalogue’s Two Tables: the First pertaining to the life of the soul in relation to God, 
the Second to the renewed person’s bodily existence in human society. 
To write the First Table’s commands in the human heart, the Spirit-vivificator 
“gives (gibt), effects, and works” faith, hope, and love in the inmost parts of a 
spiritually dead son of Adam.507 Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Luther calls these 
gifts the “tres virtutes theologicas, the three heubt tugent of Christians,” and explains 
that the “new holy life in the soul (neue heilig leben in der seele)” created by the Spirit 
consists in them.508 Is this the traditional language of infused supernatural virtue? As 
Eero Huovinen has rightly argued—against Joest’s personalist interpretation—Luther’s 
staunch anti-Pelagian contention that the Spirit’s gift comes to the undeserving gratis 
sine nobis ab extra does not at all require that it does not really enter in nobis to renew 
and transform vitiated human nature.509 The Finnish scholar rested his case mainly on 
                                                        
506 WA 50.626.15-19, LW 41.145, alt. 
507 Alluding to John 6:63, Luther states that the Spirit as Sanctificator oder vivificator must do this, 
since “the old Adam is dead and cannot do it, and in addition has to learn from the law that he is 
unable to do it and that he is dead; he would not know this of himself.” WA 50.626.33-36, LW 
41.146. 
508 WA 50.626.30-34, LW 41.146, alt. 
509 Eero Huovinen, “Der infusio-Gedanke als Problem der Lutherforschung,” in Oswald Bayer, 
Robert W. Jenson and Simo Knuuttila, eds., Caritas Dei. Beiträge zum Verständnis Luthers und der 
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the basis of Luther’s relatively early 1520 disputation de fide infusa et acquisita, in 
which Luther defines and approves the former while energetically rejecting the 
latter.510 In our text from 1539, the mature Luther is still plainly describing the real 
inner renewal of man’s vitiated nature by the Holy Spirit, who makes a new heart by 
fashioning a “new holy life in the soul” through the gifts of faith, hope, and love. 
Though he does not use the term gratia infusa, the ease with which he speaks the 
traditional language of the theological virtues and his clear assertion that the neue 
heilig leben consisting therein really exists in der seele argues for the enduring and 
profound affinity of Luthers’ theology of the Gabe/donum with the transformational 
concerns of the broad Augustinian tradition.  
That said, the Spirit-worked “gift” of new holy life in the soul is intrinsically 
ordered to the believer’s restored relationship with God. This is clear from the way 
Luther describes the Spirit’s renewing operations by aligning each of the virtues with a 
faculty and/or activity of the soul. Thus the Spirit gives (gibt) true knowledge of God 
by illumining (erleucht) the soul with true faith.511 He gives (gibt) strength and comfort 
to the conscience through hope.512 He gives (gibt) true fear and love toward God, so 
that we “love, praise, thank, and honor him for all that occurs, good or evil.”513 In 
short, the soul’s new and holy life of faith, hope, and love is life together with the God 
whom the renewed soul trusts, hopes in, and loves. All of which, as we know from 
                                                                                                                                                                     
gegenwärtigen Ökumene. Festschrift für Tuomo Mannermaa zum 60. Geburtstag (Helsinki: Luther-
Agricola-Gesellschaft, 1997), 192-204. Cf. Risto Saarinen, “Ipsa Dilectio Deus Est: Zur 
Wirkungsgeschichte von 1. Sent. dist. 17 des Petrus Lombardus bei Martin Luther.” 
510 WA 6.85-98; e.g., 85.7, 20-1: 2. Fides acquisita sine infusa nihil est, infusa sine acquisita est 
omnia… 11. Fides… infusa est spiritus vitae. 12. Etiam sola fides infusa satis est ad iustificationem 
impii. 
511 WA 50.626.19-20, LW 41.146. 
512 WA 50.626.22-27, LW 41.146. 
513 WA 50.627.27-30, LW 41.146. 
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chapter 1, is redolent of Luther’s protological anthropology: Adam had the divine 
image “in his substance,” that is, in the natural perfections of his psychological 
faculties; but the true glory of the image shined forth in the fact that by means of 
these faculties he was naturally capable of receiving (and in fact did originally enjoy) 
the gift of communion with God. To be sure, in On the Councils and the Church the 
verba have shifted somewhat from Luther’s lectures on Gen. 1-3; but I submit that the 
res is in essence the same. 
As for the Second Table, Luther adds that the Holy Spirit “also sanctifies the 
Christians in the body.”514 This too pertains to the material content of the sanctifying 
gift. The Spirit who restores communion with God through the soul’s new holy life 
effects renewal in Christian character as it takes shape in one’s relationships with 
other people “in the body.” Thus the Spirit gives (gibt) to God’s holy Christian people 
… that they are willingly obedient to parents and rulers; that they behave in a 
friendly, humble way, and are not wrathful, vindictive, or malicious but 
patient, friendly, obliging, brotherly, loving; not unchaste, adulterous, lewd but 
chaste and modest, with wife, child, and servants or without wife and child. 
And on and on: they do not steal, are not usurious, avaricious, do not cheat, 
etc., but work honorably, support themselves honestly, lend willingly, and give 
and help whenever they can. Thus they do not lie, deceive, and backbite, but 
are kind, truthful, faithful, and trustworthy, and do whatever else God’s 
commandments demand.515 
 
Such is the concrete shape of the “new life” which the Holy Spirit works in the body, in 
accord with the commands of the Second Table. Together with the new holy life in the 
soul, this is die Christliche heiligkeit, “the Christian holiness,” to be found in the 
Church of God.516 Rarely understated, Luther adds bluntly: “People who are not like 
                                                        
514 WA 50.627.1, LW 41.146. 
515 WA 50.627.2-9, cf. LW 41.146. 
516 WA 50.627.10-12, LW 41.146. 
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this should not count themselves Christians, nor should one comfort them (as if they 
were Christians) with much babbling about the forgiveness of sins and Christ’s 
grace—as die Antinomer do.”517 In dogmatic terms, Christ’s Gnade only avails amongst 
the people made holy by the Spirit’s Gabe.  
 That might sound a little jarring, or at least perplexing. But Luther’s adamant 
stance against lawlessness and his robust account of Christian holiness is not just the 
product of his polemical context in the late 1530s. Rather, it is the result of his 
carefully measured and deeply held theology of grace and gift brought to bear upon 
the pressing pastoral/theological demands of that context. Farther on in the third part 
of On the Councils and the Church, Luther returns to his theology of grace and gift, 
reinforcing the reality of holiness in the Christian life and at the same time putting it 
in proper relation to the Christian’s ongoing need for the grace of forgiveness. The 
Holy Spirit 
… effects in us a daily sanctification and vivification in Christ, and that 
according to the First Table of Moses, which we thereby fulfill (Die erfuellen wir 
hie durch), although not as abundantly (reichlich) as Christ has done. But we 
always follow after him (Wir Folgen aber jmer nach), under his redemption or 
the forgiveness of sins, until we too shall one day become completely holy 
(gantz heilig) and no longer need forgiveness. Everything is directed toward 
that goal.518 
 
The Spirit’s sanctifying and vivifying gift empowers believers to fulfill the Law, not as 
richly as Christ himself kept it but in earnest imitation of him in discipleship (Folgen 
nach) and with hearts set on the eschatological goal of perfection in holiness. On that 
great day, forgiveness will no longer be needed. But in the meantime, those who 
follow Christ by the Spirit’s “gift” stand under his forgiveness—“grace”—so that what 
                                                        
517 WA 50.627.14-17, cf. LW 41.147. 
518 WA 50.642.33-643.2, cf. LW 41.166. 
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is lacking in their real but imperfect fulfillment of the Law is covered by his redeeming 
blood. There is, however, no “grace” for the impenitent rebel against the Law, the false 
disciple who despises the Spirit’s gift and sins boldly in the name Christ’s grace. 
Forgiveness covers the true disciple of Jesus Christ, who remains a sinner not because 
he breaks the law willfully but because he does not yet keep it perfectly. The hidden 
premise, and the key to Luther’s real “simul”—as in the Smalcald Articles and the 
Disputations—is the lex peccati that the Christian has and feels, but which he fights 
against by the Spirit’s might and which God pardons for the sake of Christ. The 
unwanted companion of his “flesh” keeps the disciple back from the abundant law-
keeping which the law requires and which Christ alone performed. But despite this, it 
does not keep the disciple from peace with God. Christ’s abundant grace in 
redemption sees to that, so long as by the Spirit’s gift he continues and makes progress 
in the Nachfolge Christi that is Christian sanctification. “Thus we constantly grow in 
sanctification (jmer fort wachsen in der Heiligung) and always become the more a new 
creature (stets je mehr ein neue Creatur werden) in Christ (2 Cor. 5:17). This means 
‘grow’ and ‘do so more and more’ (2 Pet. 3:18).”519 
 
3.3. The Relic of the Holy Cross 
 
The heart of On the Councils and the Church’s third part consists in a highly creative 
(and in ways bitterly ironic) explanation of how the Gospel of forgiveness in Christ 
and holiness by the Spirit becomes visible in history as God creates, sustains in being, 
                                                        
519 WA 50.643.24-6, cf. LW 41.166. In a brief but revealing appeal to what Melanchthon called the 
law’s “third use,” Luther here states: “We need the Decalogue not only to apprise us of our lawful 
obligations, but we also need it to discern how far the Holy Spirit has advanced us in his work of 
sanctification and by how much we still fall short of the goal, lest we become secure and imagine 
that we have now done all that is required.” 
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and sanctifies his Church through the seven “relics” or “sacraments”520 bestowed upon 
it: the Word of God, Baptism, Eucharist, the Keys, the Pastoral Office, Prayer/Praise, 
and the Holy Cross.521 These “marks” of the true or evangelical Church are—tellingly—
at once the “principal parts of Christian sanctification” (heubtstueck Christlicher 
heiligung).522 For, as Reinhard Hütter has argued, Luther holds that it is by means of 
these seven sanctifying parts, relics, or sacraments in the Church that “the Holy Spirit 
effects in us a daily sanctification and vivification in Christ.”523 In section 3.2, I 
attended directly to the Spirit’s sanctifying operations and bypassed Luther’s 
treatment of the means employed by the Spirit in this work. Because of its special 
relation to his mystical theology of holiness, not least as it is displayed in the lives of 
the saints in the Lectures on Genesis, I now turn briefly to Luther’s remarks on the 
seventh and last of the relics, dem Heilthum des heiligen Creutzes.524 
 The holy cross stands out somewhat from the other relics: unlike the Word, 
Baptism, Eucharist, etc., where the emphasis lies on the externality and objectivity of 
the Spirit’s sanctifying means, the holy cross refers primarily to subjective experiences 
of suffering in the way of Christ (Matt. 16:24-27, John 12:24-26), indeed, to sharing in 
Christ’s sufferings (cf. Rom. 8:17-18, 2 Cor. 1:5, Phil. 3:10, Col. 1:24, 1 Pet. 4:13). For this 
                                                        
520 WA 50.643.2-3, LW 41.166: “I would even call these seven parts the seven sacraments,” but Luther 
prefers “the seven principal parts of Christian sanctification or the seven relics” because the word 
“sacrament” has been misused. Unlike the word Heilthumb? Luther’s irony is thick throughout the 
third part of this work. 
521 WA 50.628-43, LW 41.148-67.  
522 WA 50.643.5, LW 41.166. 
523 WA 50.642.32-34, LW 41.165-66. On the sanctifying work of the Spirit through these seven 
churchly means, see Reinhard Hütter, Suffering Divine Things: Theology as Church Practice (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 128-35; cf. David S. Yeago, “‘A Christian, Holy People’: Martin Luther on 
Salvation and the Church,” Modern Theology 13/1 (Jan. 1997): 101-20, esp. 107-110; Oswald Bayer, 
Living by Faith: Justification and Sanctification, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2003), 58-9. 
524 WA 50.642.1, LW 41.164. 
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very reason, it is in discussing the last relic that Luther engages what I refer to in this 
study as his “mystical theology” (or spirituality) of holiness. In such contexts, Luther 
steps beyond bare dogmatic description of the Spirit’s operations to speak from within 
these operations themselves, attesting the spiritual or experiential reality of 
conformity to Jesus Christ in his death and resurrection. In so doing, however, 
Luther’s spiritual teaching fills out his dogmatics of the “gift” by specifying its course 
in the lives of the saints with greater precision and depth. It is one thing to affirm 
broadly that the Holy Spirit sanctifies a soul by mortifying and vivifying it, and quite 
another to narrate the hard and narrow ways and means of the donum’s progress 
through “every misfortune and persecution, all kinds of trials (allerley anfechtung) and 
evil (as the our Father prays) from the devil, world, and flesh, inward sadness, 
timidity, fear, outward poverty, contempt, illness, weakness, suffering.”525 Such is a 
sample of the pieces of the holy cross which Christians must endure, “in order to 
become like their head, Christ.”526  
Hence the dogmatic and creedal skeletal structure of the Reformer’s theology 
of sanctification through the Spirit is filled with the mystical marrow of the holy cross. 
“When you are condemned, cursed, reviled, slandered, and plagued because of Christ, 
that makes you holy (das macht dich heilig), because it kills the old Adam and teaches 
him patience, humility, meekness, praise and thanks, and joy in suffering.”527 Sharing 
experientially in the holy cross is the means used by the Spirit to mortify the remnants 
of Adam’s sinful flesh in the saints; in the midst of this suffering with and for Christ, 
                                                        
525 WA 50.642.1-4, LW 41.164. 
526 WA 50.642.4, LW 41.164. 
527 WA 50.642.27-30, cf. LW 41.165. 
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the new creature—who is patient, humble, meek, glad, etc.—comes to life. As I noted 
in chapter 1, Rom. 5:3-5 figures prominently in this connection, and Luther cites it 
compactly here: wie Ro. 5, ‘Tribulatio spem &.c.,’ it is in and through suffering that the 
Christian “learns to believe, trust, hope in, and love God.”528 That is to say, it is by 
means of the holy cross that the “new holy life in the soul”—born anew of the Spirit 
and consisting in faith, hope, and love—comes more and more into its own. The dregs 
of the old life inherited from Adam progressively die by partaking in Christ’s death on 
the cross, and the new life in the risen Christ revives, increases, and grows precisely 
through the mystical experience of this death.529 “That,” says Luther, “is what it means 
to be sanctified (geheiliget) through the Holy Spirit and renewed to the new life in 
Christ (erneuet zum neuen leben in Christo).”530 Thus the mystical theology of the holy 
cross comprises the inner spiritual content of Luther’s dogmatics of the gift. 
 
4. Grace, Gift, and the “simul” in select lectures on Genesis (1540—44) 
 
In chapter 1, I introduced Luther’s theology of grace and gift by examining texts from 
his 1535 lectures on Gen. 1 and 3. This theology of forgiveness in Christ and restoration 
to holiness by the Spirit, which we have now seen displayed in three prominent texts 
from the late 1530s, pervades Luther’s sprawling lectures on Genesis. Rather than 
attempting an exhaustive study of Luther’s theology of grace and holiness as it stands 
in the lectures, which might end up exhausting me instead,531 I will examine here two 
                                                        
528 WA 50.643.31-2, LW 41.165, alt. 
529 As Mannermaa has it (Der im Glauben gegenwärtige Christus, 134), “the cross of Christ and the 
Christian’s cross belong together organically.” 
530 WA 50.643.30-1, cf. LW 41.165. 
531 In addition to the texts studied in chapter 1 and presently, see, e.g., WA 42.194.17-18, LW 1.262; 
WA 42.199.12-39, LW 1.269-70; WA 42.201.37-202.8, LW 1.273; WA 42.248.14-27, LW 1.338; WA 42.9-
24, LW 1.349-50; WA 42.289.32-291.21, LW 2.39-41; WA 42.347.1-9, LW 2.120; WA 42.352.1-11, LW 
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select loci dating from the 1540s where the interrelation of grace, gift, and the “simul” 
is especially vivid and clear. 
 
4.1. On Gen. 24:1-4 (May 1540)  
 
In Gen. 24:1-4, Abraham commissions his senior servant to secure a wife for his son, 
Isaac, from among his kindred in Mesopotamia. For Luther, this occasions a long 
discussion of a burning issue in Wittenberg at the time: parental authority over the 
marriages of their children, and the legitimacy of secret betrothals entered into 
without parental consent. This, in turn, leads to a more general consideration of the 
nature of marriage, procreation, and sexual desire or concupiscentia that unfolds along 
traditional Augustinian lines.532 The fact that Abraham, being like a Luther a good 
Augustinian on the matter at hand, “did not deny that concupiscence is a sin” which 
requires “the medicine of marriage” (medicinam coniugii) thus forms the immediate 
                                                                                                                                                                     
2.127; WA 42.406.32-4, LW 2.204-5; WA 42.440.9-11, LW 2.250; WA 42.448.3-10, LW 2.261; WA 
42.452.14-25, LW 2.266-67; WA 42.454.9-10, LW 2.269; WA 42.477.13-14, LW 2.301; WA 42.483.7-29, 
LW 2.309; WA 42.491.3-14, LW 2.320; WA 42.533.32-6, LW 2.378-9; WA 42.539.8-10, LW 2.386; WA 
42.550.28-554.11, LW 3.4-8; WA 42.666.35, LW 3.165; WA 43.34.5-36.31, LW 3.222-25; WA 43.65.7-17, 
LW 3.265-66; WA 43.67.34-68.4, LW 3.269; WA 43.97.39-98.22, LW 3.311-12; WA 43.114.4-116.26, LW 
3.333-36; WA 43.118.36-40, LW 3.339; WA 43.130.18-131.1, LW 3.355; WA 43.167.7-9, LW 4.44; WA 
43.258.7-8, 35-40, LW 4.169-70; WA 43.316.12-17, LW 4.252; WA 43.358.9, LW 4.310; WA 43.443.19-
445.18, LW 5.22-24; WA 43.454.37-455.12, LW 5.38; WA 43.471.38-472.19, LW 5.62-3; WA 43.572.12-
19, LW 5.208; WA 43.575.18-576.35, LW 5.212-14; WA 43.588.26-589.37, LW 5.232-33; WA 43.606.25-
608.9, LW 5.257-60; WA 43.612.12-28, LW 5.266; WA 43.617.16-35, LW 5.273-4; WA 43.649.33-650.8, 
LW 5.320; WA 44.13.6-8, LW 6.18; WA 44.53.1-5, LW 6.72; WA 44.71.39-72.12, LW 6.97; WA 44.128.11-
25, LW 6.171-2; WA 44.142.37-41, LW 6.193; WA 44.187.10-12, LW 6.252; WA 44.191.32-39, LW 6.258; 
WA 44.300.39-301.13, LW 6.402; WA 44.310.29-41, LW 7.12; WA 44.356.5, LW 7.75; WA 44.374.5-12, 
LW 7.100-1; WA 44.392.8-26, LW 7.126; WA 44.400.13-25, LW 7.137; WA 44.402.1-6, LW 7.139; WA 
44.430.23-33, LW 7.177; WA 44.490.33-491.15, LW 7.258; WA 44.493.3-494.34, LW 7.261-3; WA 
44.505.37-508.30, LW 7.278-82; WA 44.525.11-526.6, LW 7.304-5; WA 44.531.31-40, LW 7.313; WA 
44.552.27-33, LW 7.340; WA 44.567.25-568.3, LW 7.360; WA 44.585.6-11, LW 8.8; WA 44.591.4-10, 
LW 8.16; WA 44.593.42-594.9, LW 8.20; WA 44.602.12-24, LW 8.31-2; WA 44.608.38-40, LW 8.40; 
WA 44.612.11-18, LW 8.45; WA 44.701.1-21, LW 8.167; WA 44.737.10-11, LW 8.216; WA 44.739.9-10, 
LW 8.219; WA 44.740.6-11, LW 8.220; WA 44.748.39-749.6, LW 8.232; WA 44.766.15-22, LW 8.255; 
WA 44.769.7-14, LW 8.259; WA 44.774.35-775.11, LW 8.266-7; WA 44.775.35-776.20, LW 8.268-9; 
WA 44.822.9-19, LW 8.329-30. 
532 WA 43.292-314, LW 4.218-50. Cf. Sammeli Juntunen, “Sex,” in Olli-Pekka Vainio, ed., Engaging 
Luther: A (New) Theological Assessment (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2010), 186-209, esp. 200-2.  
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context for two concise and typical expositions of the Reformer’s theology of grace, 
gift, and residual sin in the Christian.533       
 (1) In the first, Luther begins by deploring the indecency of the male and 
female sexual organs and the vileness of their act, which together evince the harsh 
reality that “human nature has been terribly corrupted” by the fall.534 The ignominia 
and summa impuritas of fallen sexuality is an evil “implanted” (insitum) in human 
nature “by the vice of the origin” (vicio originis), and cannot be entirely emended or 
avoided in this life even in the married state.535 This is cause for grief and lamentation 
in the saints.536 Like St. Paul at Rom. 7:18, they therefore confess that they find no 
good in their flesh; but like the same apostle at 1 Cor. 9:27, they resolve to pummel 
their body and reduce it to servitude.537 The inexorability of fallen sexuality’s malum 
insitum does not, for Luther, justify passive acquiescence on the Christian’s part in the 
lasciviousness of his residual flesh. To the contrary, it summons the saint to battle for 
sexual purity: “with all zeal” he is to “throttle libidines, repress and detest 
concupiscentia, and strive for purity and chastity (pudicitia et castitas).”538  
 Although Luther does not mention the Holy Spirit in this passage, his 
exhortation to sexual holiness embodies the familiar Pauline struggle of the saint’s 
spiritus with his flesh that stands at the center of the Reformer’s theology of the “gift.” 
On the heels of his citation of Rom. 7:18, Luther proceeds immediately to the 
complementary theology of “grace” in Jesus Christ, the promised “Seed” of Gen. 3:15. 
                                                        
533 WA 43.306.16-8, LW 4.238. 
534 WA 43.306.28-9, 34-5, LW 4.238. 
535 WA 43.306.21, 34, LW 4.238. 
536 WA 43.306.21, 36-8, LW 4.238. 
537 WA 43.306.38-40, LW 4.238-9. 
538 WA 43.306.35-6, LW 4.238. 
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“But afterwards”—that is, after one has zealously throttled, repressed, detested, and 
lamented his sexual desire, and striven no less zealously for purity and chastity— 
… one must apprehend and invoke the Seed on whose account God has blessed 
us, in order that the remnants of sin are not imputed (ut reliquiae peccati non 
imputentur). For there is no condemnation (nihil damnationis) for those who 
are in Christ Jesus [Rom. 8:1].539 
 
The libido- and concupiscence-battling believer has the reliquiae peccati, for they are 
the antagonists against which he fights in his spiritual struggle for chastity. But 
because the sin-fighting saint grasps hold of the evangelical Seed promised to Eve and 
Abraham (Gen. 22:18), God’s blessing undoes Adam’s curse; and the dregs of Adam’s 
original sin left over in the saint—in this case, repressed, hated, and subdued sexual 
desires—are not reckoned to his account propter Christum. After quoting Rom. 8:1, 
Luther further explains that Paul “does not say nihil peccati, but nihil damnationis.”540 
The “sin” is there, in its residual form as the saint’s flesh; and the fragmentary and 
overruled remnants of Adam’s sin which constitute the saint’s flesh are intrinsically 
evil, sinful, and damnable. But so long as (a) the saint fights against the Rom. 6-7 
styled peccatum that afflicts and grieves him, and (b) apprehends Jesus Christ the sin-
bearer by faith—and indeed is found by faith to be in Christ Jesus—the sin that 
remains in his flesh is pardoned, and the condemnation it deserves by right is clear 
taken away by God’s grace in Christ. Here, then, is another case of Luther’s real “simul” 
as an account of the faithful Christian in a state of grace and gift. “Sin” is there as an 
unruly (and intrinsically guilty) affective force to be reckoned with. But through the 
Spirit’s battle-empowering “gift,” the sin that thus remains in the saint is overruled as 
                                                        
539 WA 43.306.40-307.1, LW 4.239. 
540 WA 43.307.2, LW 4.239. 
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he or she advances in purity and holiness; and, so long as he stays in the fight against 
it, the sinful libidines and concupiscentia that remain in this repressed state are 
forgiven by God’s “grace” in and for the sake of Jesus Christ. That the saint’s “gift”-
empowered battle against his flesh is the real spiritual condition sine qua non for his 
remaining in a state of “grace” becomes quite clear in the immediately succeeding 
lines of the lecture: 
Otherwise we will pursue (sectabimur) the work of the flesh, fornication, and 
adultery, and relax the reins (laxabimus frenum) for libido, and thus apprehend 
(apprehendemus) the matter while excluding the blessing (exclusa 
benedictione).541 
 
In this grim presentation of the alternative to holiness, Luther employs the same 
terms as before but carefully reverses them to set forth the logic of the forfeited 
“blessing” of grace in Christ through consent to sinful desire. Instead of reining in 
(frenandae) his libidines, striving for (sectanda) purity and chastity, and apprehending 
(apprehendendum) Christ the blessed Seed,542 the “gift”-forfeiting, sin-consenting 
erstwhile Christian relaxes the reins, strives after the realization of his evil desire, and 
apprehends his object. In so doing, and because he so does, he loses the blessing or 
“grace” of condemnation’s removal in Christ. In the apt example of 2 Sam. 11 taken up 
in the 1538 addendum to SA III.3, when David lies with Bathsheba, faith and the Spirit 
depart, and the “simul” breaks down.  
 (2) On the very next page, Luther leaves behind these considerations specific to 
sexual sin and broadens his scope to engage the conflict with the Antinomi, still 
dragging on at this point in mid 1540. He explains Agricola’s position as a 
                                                        
541 WA 43.307.2-4, cf. LW 4.239. 
542 WA 43.306.35-40. 
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misinterpretation of Rom. 8:1, the very verse that factored so critically just above in 
the course of Luther’s exposition of his own theology of “grace”: non dicit [Paulus] nihil 
peccati, sed nihil damnationis.543 By contrast, the Antinomians wrongly assert “that sin 
has been forgiven, that nihil est damnationis, and that therefore peccatum est nihil, or 
has been completely done away with (sublatum), Rom. 8[:1].”544 Luther continues: 
“They do not understand that righteousness and the forgiveness of sins is in the midst 
of sins (in mediis peccatis), but think that sins are completely done away with 
(sublata).”545 Now, extracted from its context, this is just the sort of Lutherrede that 
proponents of a “radical” or “paradoxical” theology of justification might make much 
of: in the midst of his sins, the total sinner is nonetheless righteous. But this, 
ironically, amounts to asserting a brand of antinomian theology the likes of which 
Luther everywhere opposes in the 1530s and 40s—including this very text—by failing 
to account for the highly specific nature of the peccata that encompass the Christian 
graciously possessed of the iustitia fidei. Once more, for Luther these “sins” are the 
remnants of sin adhering in (or simply comprising) the saint’s flesh, that is, the 
disordered desires to which he does not yield consent so long as he remains—by the 
Spirit’s gift—in Christ. 
 Luther’s ensuing counter-exposition of St. Paul’s meaning at Rom. 8:1, in which 
he cites Rom. 7:19, 24, and 25, leaves no room for doubt on this score. When the 
Apostle admits that he serves “the law of sin” (v. 25) and that he cannot do the good 
he wants to do (v. 19), this does not mean that he commits actual sin, or that he is 
                                                        
543 WA 43.307.2, LW 4.239. 
544 WA 43.308.10-12, LW 4.240. 
545 WA 43.308.15-6, LW 4.241. 
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powerless to do the good in any sense at all, but is nonetheless forgiven and righteous 
simul. Rather, on Luther’s reading, Paul’s real meaning comes to this: 
“I serve the law of sin.” Likewise: “I do not do the good I want,” that is, many 
vicious affections and motions adhere to me (haerent in me multi viciosi 
adfectus et motus), [for example,] security, doubt, impatience in adversities.546  
 
The “good” that Paul “wants” is to be set perfectly free from the vicious affections, 
emotions, impulses, etc., which comprise the lex peccati, which he “serves” by the very 
fact that he still experiences and suffers these sinful passions against his own 
spiritually regenerate and holy will (7:22). In aggregate, these vicious and vexatious 
affections are the “sin” that St. Paul has in his flesh, yet which cannot bring him into 
condemnation so long as he remains in Christ by not consenting to them. Luther 
concludes the substance of his reply with another striking “simul”-type claim which, 
on further examination of his own explanation of the same, bears out the Augustinian 
interpretation of Rom. 7 that the Reformer has been upholding all along: 
Therefore those who have been justified and have the forgiveness of sins are 
sinners (sunt peccatores), because they complain that they cannot do what 
they want [Rom. 7:19]. They fight, they resist concupiscence and the inhering 
disease (inhaerenti morbo), they crucify the flesh [Gal. 5:24], and nevertheless 
they are not able to be completely set free (non possunt penitus liberari), as 
Paul exclaims: “Wretched man, who will set me free from the body of this 
death?” (Rom. 7:24)547 
 
The justified are proved to be sinners, not because they commit sin, but because 
amidst their struggle to crucify the flesh they complain (conqueruntur) about the fact 
that they are not yet fully liberated from the sinful desires against which they fight. In 
other words, the justified are shown to be sinners precisely because they are really 
(though inchoately) holy, fighting against “sin,” lamenting its ongoing presence, and 
                                                        
546 WA 43.308.28-31, LW 4.241. 
547 WA 43.308.35-39, LW 4.241. 
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greatly desiring the day when they will at last obtain what they already want (Rom. 
7:19), to wit, to be completely set free from sin, and to enjoy the eschatological peace 
of uncontested and incontestable holiness.  
 Tying his polemics against Agricola back to the question of marriage and 
sexual desire raised by the text of Gen. 24:1-4, Luther summarizes the matter thus: 
“marriage is holy, and Paul says 1 Tim. 2[:15]: ‘child-bearing women are holy, but if 
they remain in faith,’ that is, if they believe in Christ and fight with the Serpent, that 
is, if they are chaste and fight against the vicious motions of the flesh (viciosis motibus 
carnis).”548 In short, married Christians are “holy” if (a) they believe in Christ for the 
“grace” of forgiveness and justification that is found in him, and (b) battle against the 
vicious (and vexatious) operations of their residual flesh, and for chastity and purity, 
in the strength of the Spirit’s “gift.” 
 
4.2. On Gen. 42:7 (mid 1544) 
 
“Just as there is nothing more beautiful in Holy Scripture than Genesis as a whole,” 
effused Luther in 1543 as he began to exposit the hagiography of St. Joseph, “so also 
this example is outstanding and memorable among the rest of the stories of the 
patriarchs.”549 Luther’s high esteem for the Joseph saga in Gen. 37—50 is due in large 
part to his profound admiration for the real holiness of life evinced in the patriarch 
amidst the great vicissitudes he first endured and then enjoyed. When the reader finds 
him in Gen. 42, Joseph has just been raised up from the Sheol-Schul (“hell-school”) of 
                                                        
548 WA 43.309.10-13, cf. LW 4.242. 
549 On Gen. 37:1. WA 44.234.2-4, LW 6.313. 
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his sanctifying sufferings550 and exalted to the vice-regency of Egypt.551 His 
impoverished brothers bow unwittingly (and in fulfillment of young Joseph’s dreams) 
before the man they murdered in intention and banished to exile in fact. Joseph holds 
their fate in his hands, and resolves to show them mercy. But first, he must labor to 
ensure that they have been suitably humbled, and brought to a true knowledge of the 
depth of their sin. So he toys with them, hiding his identity and stringing them along 
till Gen. 45:1, when the fratricidal brothers—crushed by guilt and remorse, and at their 
wits’ end—at last hear the evangelical words: “I am Joseph!”  
In the wise, powerful, and merciful exercise of this “game,” playful to Joseph 
but sheer death and hell to his brothers,552 Luther finds not only an example of true 
holiness, but a pattern of God’s “marvelous” dealings with his saints (cf. Ps. 4:4 and 
67:37 Vg; farther on this theme in cp. 4.1 below). Indeed, as Luther introduced his 
lengthy and for our purposes rather rich comments on Gen. 42:7 sometime in mid 
1544, he stated at the outset that it is “the Holy Spirit’s principal design in this history” 
                                                        
550 On Gen. 37:34-6, WA 44.304.20-27 (cf. LW 6.407): Talis igitur vita fuit sanctissima et summorum 
Patriarcharum, ad quos Monachi et Episcopi nostri ne conferendi quidem sunt. Nihil sunt ieiunia et 
miracula illa, quae recitantur in legendis nostrorum sanctorum, Francisci, Ambrosii, Augustini etc. 
Das heißt gelebt, jenes ist eiter kinderspil. Haec sunt exempla, quae ostendunt, qualis sit vita 
Christiana, quae sint vera exercitia pietatis et pacientiae. Wolan, er ist hin Joseph, da lassen wir jn 
ruhen in inferno. Iam sepultus est Ioseph, sinamus eum quiescere in Sheol, ut ait pater, in seiner 
Schul. 
551 On Gen. 40:20-3, WA 44.394.12-21 (cf. LW 7.129): Atque ita sanctissimus et optimus Ioseph 
crucifixus, mortuus, sepultus est, et descendit ad inferos hoc biennio. Nunc veniet Dominus et 
liberabit, glorificabit et magnificabit eum, sicut ipsum vocavit, iustificavit et dedit spiritum sanctum 
et filium, qui descendit cum eo in carcerem. Nun ist die marter wochen auß. Mox enim vivificabitur et 
resurget. Est profecto pulcherrimum exemplum proponendum ecclesiae Dei et omnibus adflictis ac 
tribulatis quocunque modo, Wir wuerden schwerlich so vil leiden. Et ad hunc modum agnoscendus est 
Deus, quod sit mirabilis in sanctis suis, iuxta illud Psalm 4.: ‘Scitote quoniam mirificavit Dominus 
sanctum suum: Dominus exaudiet me, cum clamavero ad eum’. 
552 WA 44.466.9-13: Hic enim videmus Ioseph fratres suos mirabiliter tractare et ludere cum iis ludum 
quendam mirificum, sed talem tamen qui ipsos vehementer humiliat, et exercet, ac res magnas et 
serias secum trahit. Ea enim ratione perducuntur ad agnitionem peccati et periculo mortis et inferni 
obiiciuntur. 
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to display through Joseph’s manner of handling his brothers “the wonderful spectacle 
and certain and faithful example of God’s way of governing in the saints 
(administrationis Dei in sanctis).”553 Thus in the old Luther’s still keen and active 
exegetical imagination, the brothers kneel before Joseph as fallen but impenitent men 
kneel before the holy God, who, in his mercy, intends to cause in them a contrition 
and exact from them a confession suitable to the gravity of their hidden wickedness, 
not to destroy but to save them in Christ. To do this, Joseph must “pretend that he is 
alien toward them (alienum se simulabat erga ipsos), and speak roughly with them,” as 
Gen. 42:7 reads in WA 44.554 Rather like a Tauler, a Gerson, or a Staupitz, Luther the 
mystical Seelsorger would have his students know that “in trials (in tentationibus) God 
conducts himself toward his saints just as Joseph conducts himself toward his 
brothers,” namely, with an apparent harshness that masks his true intention “to search 
out their repentance and thus drive them to an acknowledgment of their sin and to 
the mercy of God.”555 Here is the well-known movement in Luther’s theology from 
God’s legal and wrathful opus alienum—itself already a token of grace hidden sub 
contrario—to the gracious and evangelical opus proprium, long based on Isa. 28:21 Vg. 
but now embedded within the text of Gen. 42:7 and exemplified in the divine 
comportment of Joseph with his brothers.  
                                                        
553 WA 44.466.5-7, cf. LW 7.224. 
554 WA 44.465.31, cf. LW 7.224. The translation of v. 7 given here is puzzling. In the 1529 Wittenberg 
revision of the Vulgate, we find (WA DB 5.62.33): agnovisset eos, quasi ad alienos durius loquebatur. 
The 1532/45 German translation of the Pentateuch reads (WA DB 8.168.7): er sahe sie an vnd kand 
sie, vnd stellet sich frembd gegen sie, vnd redet hart mit yhn, vnd sprach zu yhn, wo her kompt yhr? 
The translation in WA 44, as well as the interpretation Luther bases upon it, seems to follow the 
German Bible rather than the Vulgate revision. 
555 WA 44.466.13-21, cf. LW 7.225. 
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This, then, is the exegetical and spiritual context that shapes Luther’s 
elaboration of his theology of grace and gift in the lecture on Gen. 42:7. Two further 
prefatory remarks are required, however, to clear up an ambiguity in the text. In light 
of my argument thus far, the impenitent fratricides556 would presumably stand before 
Joseph/God as “total” sinners, like fallen David before the renewal of his repentance 
and faith. Yet it is the ongoing presence of residual sin in the baptized, faithful, and 
“graced” Christian, and the need for God’s fatherly chastisements to progressively 
remove it through the Spirit’s “gift,” that dominates Luther’s lecture. That is, the 
theology Luther draws out of his exegesis assumes that the brothers are already in a 
state of grace and gift. What are we to make of this?  
First, I draw attention to the way Luther’s theology of predestination lies just 
beneath the surface of some critical remarks in the lecture. The theme of God’s 
fatherly affection for his afflicted but chosen children fills the lecture on Gen. 42:7, 
primarily on the basis of Heb. 12:3-11 (also Jas. 1:12)557 and the Staupitzian pastoral 
theology that Luther builds upon it:  
Thus the Epistle to the Hebrews (12:5-7) teaches: “My son, do not regard lightly 
the discipline of the Lord, nor lose courage when you are punished by him. For 
the Lord disciplines him whom he loves, and chastises every son whom he 
receives [Prov. 3:11-12]. If you endure punishment as sons, God offers himself to 
you (vobis offert se Deus)… When you are exercised by various difficulties and 
hardships of every kind, consider that God is playing with you, and that this 
game is wonderful for you and delightful to God. For if he did not embrace you 
with his fatherly heart (paterno animo vos complecteretur), he would not play 
with you this way. Therefore this is proof of ineffable mercy (ineffabilis 
                                                        
556 See, e.g., WA 44.474.17-21, LW 7.236: “They are smug, and they are not mindful of the atrocious 
sin of which they were conscious, as though they had never committed a sin against their decrepit 
father or their innocent brother… These coarse fellows have not done penance (die groben gesellen 
non agunt poenitentiam.).” 
557 WA 44.467.5-10, LW 7.226. 
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misericordiae) toward you, that you are in the number of those in whom God 
delights (delectatur), with whom they are his delights (deliciae).558 
 
This is the scriptural and traditional language of the Augustinian doctrine of election 
by free grace: God’s affection and delight for the numerus electorum results in the 
grant of mercy to the same; embraced by God’s fatherly heart, his adopted children 
endure the disciplines he knows will best fit them to “share his holiness” (Heb. 12:10); 
and in the process, the very chastisements that seem to manifest his anger and wrath 
testify rather of his ineffable mercy and strong love for the adopted child in whom he 
delights.559 This election by the Father’s love is the eternal spring from which both 
Christ’s grace and the Spirit’s gift flow to God’s chosen ones.560 So, God knows what 
the impenitent but predestined fratricides do not, namely, that he has chosen them as 
his own sons and therefore purposed to forgive and cleanse them from their sins. And 
whereas Luther, in keeping with the Augustinian tradition, typically disavows the 
possibility of knowing one’s election with certainty561—with Staupitz, this is to be 
sought in Christ’s wounds by faith, and confirmed experientially by one’s own heart-
wounds endured in Anfechtungen562—as hagiographic interpreter of Genesis, he has 
                                                        
558 WA 44.467.1-4, 21-25, cf. LW 7.226. 
559 The grace of adoption is implicit in Heb. 12’s language of “sonship” (cf. Heb. 2:11-12, 2:16-17, 6:12, 
6:17, 9:15, 11:7, 13:1), but in that passage it is not linked to election as it is in Rom. 8:14-30 and Eph. 
1:4-5. When Luther goes on to say that God “gives you his promise, Word, and sacrament as most 
certain symbols and testimonies of grace, that he has adopted you as his son” (WA 44.467.25-7, LW 
7.226), he probably has these and other texts, e.g. Gal. 3:25-4:7, in mind. 
560 de servo arbitrio 7.8, WA 18.772.39, Packer, 297: gratia ex proposito seu praedestinatione venit. Cf. 
praed. sanct. 10.19: Inter gratiam porro et praedestinationem hoc tantum interest, quod 
praedestinatio est gratiae praeparatio, gratia vero iam ipsa donatio. 
561 See, e.g., civ. dei 11.12 (CCSL 48.333, Bett. 444): “Can any man be sure that he will persevere to the 
end in the practice of righteousness, making progress in it? No one can, unless he is assured by 
some revelation from him who, according to his just but secret decision, instructs only a few, but 
deceives no one.” 
562 In addition to the above-cited excerpt, in the lecture on Gen. 42:7 Luther also states that “the 
sense of divine wrath is a sure sign of life” (WA 44.472.14-5, LW 7.233) and that “one must carefully 
impress on those who are afflicted that God is not angry with them and that what they interpret as 
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certain knowledge of the patriarchs’ election to grace and gift, adoption and glory. In 
every respect—in their election by grace; in the grievousness of their sin; in the 
consequent renewal of their repentance and faith through the gratuitous bestowal of 
God’s free grace and gift; in the interpreter’s scripturally revealed knowledge of their 
true situation sub specie aeternae praedestinationis—the brothers’ case closely follows 
St. David’s, which Luther cites as a spiritual parallel.563 I submit that this functions as 
something of a (for the most part) hidden premise in the lecture on Gen. 42:7, freeing 
Luther to blur the distinction between God’s operation in bringing a “total” sinner to 
repentance and faith, and his similar but distinct operation in purging away the sin 
that remains in the saints.  
 Second, in Luther’s eyes the fact that the brothers have smugly ignored or even 
forgotten their past actual sins strongly evokes the surreptitious nature of the 
remnants of original sin in the saints, which lurk in secret until God brings them out 
into the open through his fatherly chastisements. The loving Father takes no pleasure 
in his rod, “but the sin that adheres in nature (peccatum haerens in natura) is hidden 
from our eyes, and he brings it to light” through the gift of affliction.564 In the saints, 
all sins, actual and residual, have been forgiven and covered by grace; but the residual 
sin has not yet been completely cleansed away. This is a sobering reality that the flesh-
bearing saints are exceedingly prone—like Joseph’s brothers—to forget. “Although we 
don’t care about these [dregs] and do not groan (gemimus) because of such a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
desertion is acceptance and the surest proof of divine grace, since he chastises every son whom he 
receives” (WA 44.474.10-3, LW 7.235). This is a wise and ever-present theme in Luther’s pastoral 
theology. 
563 WA 44.468.39-469.11, LW 7.228-9. 
564 WA 44.468.22-8, cf. LW 7.228. 
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disgraceful fall, yet God sees. Therefore he tries to purge our impure nature.”565 It is 
this parallel between the brothers’ smug forgetfulness of their actual sin on the one 
hand, and the furtive and self-deceiving quality of original sin’s “dregs” (fex) on the 
other, that makes the circumstances of Gen. 42:7 such fertile ground for Luther to set 
out his theology of grace and gift, in the spiritual context of the saints’ ongoing 
purgation through the endurance of Joseph-like opera aliena. 
 I turn now to the two foremost presentations of Luther’s dogmatics of grace 
and gift in the lecture on Gen. 42:7. Rather tellingly, they bookend a concise summary 
of the Reformer’s objections to the Roman Catholic doctrine of penance, which comes 
complete with a reminiscence of the 1517 Ablaßthesen and a quotation of the first: 
“When at the beginning of the theses which I published I taught that the whole life of 
believers is repentance (totam vitam fidelium esse poenitentiam), the papists were 
driven almost to madness.”566 In 1544, Luther’s objections are in essence unchanged. 
But in the intervening twenty-seven years, his formal presentation of Rome’s twofold 
error in doctrina poenitentiae has arguably gained clarity by its correlation to his 
theology of grace and gift. In the first place, Rome errs by teaching that original sin is 
not only forgiven (remissum), but also taken away (ablatum) in baptism. Nothing 
intrinsically sinful is left over in the baptized, only the morally neutral “tinder” 
(fomitem) or “a certain natural weakness” (naturalem quandam infirmitatem).567 Rome 
                                                        
565 For gemimus, cf. Rom. 8:26. WA 44.469.28-35: Remissa quidem et tecta sunt peccata omnia, sed 
nondum expurgata, ac haeret in nobis non tantum libidinis, superbiae, odii, iracundiae et aliarum 
cupiditatum crassior fex, sed etiam interiora illa mala, et occultae maculae, dubitatio de Deo, 
diffidentia, impacientia, murmuratio, quae tum demum se aperiunt, quando vexatur conscientia lege 
et terroribus peccati. Ac nos quidem ea non curamus, nec gemimus propter tam faedam labem, Deus 
autem videt, ideo conatur naturam immundam purgare. Cf. LW 7.229. 
566 WA 44.473.11-2, LW 7.234. 
567 WA 44.473.13-4, LW 7.234.  
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therefore focuses exclusively on the removal of actual sins through sacramental 
penance, and says nothing “about purging out sin” (de expurgando peccato) in lifelong, 
daily, Thesis 1-styled repentance.568 This will be met with his theology (and mystical 
spirituality) of the “gift.” In the second place, Rome teaches that actual postbaptismal 
sins confessed to and absolved by a priest must be expiated “by good works and 
satisfactions, vigils, prayers, monastic vows, etc.”569 In fact, “a far greater expiation and 
satisfaction is required, viz., the Son of God.”570 This is the evangelical theology of 
“grace.” In short, as he saw the matter, Luther’s opponents (a) derogated the glory of 
redemption and justification in Christ to their own penitential works, thus obscuring 
“grace,” and (b) “were too little concerned about purging out sin,”571 thus reducing the 
heart-transforming, nature-renewing power of the Spirit’s “gift” to the mere 
externalism of virtue and piety. 
 (1) The first of the two bookends is the more colloquial, as Luther imagines our 
Lord God’s own explanation of the matter: 
Then the Lord says: “I pardon you freely, without any merits on your part, 
neither on account of contrition, nor on account of satisfaction. For there is no 
sin that can be expiated or, if I may so say, satisfied for by us, but only through 
the Son of God. But this I will do: when I forgive you your sin, I will make you 
an heir and son of the kingdom of God, that I may declare my love toward you. 
But in this way: I will first wash away your filth. I must first wipe and wash you 
(Jch muß dich vor wischen und waschen)!” Thus a mother does not place her 
baby into a cradle without first washing and cleaning it. Nor does the baby’s 
wailing and weeping prevent her from washing it.572 
  
                                                        
568 WA 44.473.15, cf. LW 7.234. 
569 WA 44.473.15-20, cf. LW 7.234. 
570 WA 44.473.19-20, cf. LW 7.234. Cf. WA 44.468.9-13: nullam esse satisfactionem in genere humano 
pro peccatis, nisi civilem, quam Magistratus requirit, verum ea nihil ad Theologiam pertinet, in qua 
unica victima est Christus Dominus noster, qua irae Dei satisfactum est. Caeterum longe maiora sunt 
peccata, quam ut ulla satisfactione expiari et deleri queant. 
571 WA 44.473.22, LW 7.234. 
572 WA 44.472.39-473.5, cf. LW 7.234. 
 202
The riches of God’s “grace” of forgiveness are free, lavished upon the undeserving for 
the sake of the expiation and satisfaction that are through the cross of God’s Son. But 
the Father’s saving purpose does not terminate in even this great grace. For he intends 
not only to forgive but to wash away our filth, cleansing his adopted children from the 
pollution of their sins—in spite of their foolish cries, amidst the unrecognized gift of 
purifying suffering, that he stop doing this—with all the loving care of a diligent 
mother, and in this way preparing and fitting his children to inherit the kingdom he 
has promised them.573 This is the work of God’s “gift,” ordered to the glory of his 
coming kingdom. In short, concludes Luther, we have been called to God’s kingdom, 
we have the forgiveness of sins, we are sons and heirs of God—now, in the present, by 
God’s “grace” in Christ; but there still adheres (haeret adhuc) in us the indolence and 
sloth of body and soul alike, “a plague which God determines to remove in our whole 
life.”574 
 (2) The second of the two bookends expressly employs the quasi-technical 
terms gratia and donum and integrates Luther’s mystical theology of affliction into the 
overarching theology of grace, gift, and residual sin:  
We have been received into grace (gratiam) through baptism, not only for the 
forgiveness of sins but also for purging them out. Forgiveness is free, which 
takes place on account of God’s Son alone, without any worthiness, merit, or 
contrition on our part. Vexation, distress, tribulation, mortification follow this 
forgiveness; they all pertain to this end, that sin may be abolished (aboleatur 
peccatum), so that it has not only been forgiven and pardoned by divine grace 
(gratia) and mercy, but may also be purged out by the gift of the Holy Spirit 
                                                        
573 See the similar text at WA 44.469.34-8, with its allusion to Rev. 21:27: Deus autem videt, ideo 
conatur naturam immundam purgare, sic cogitans: Tu quidem illuminatus et baptisatus es, sed 
adhuc foetes et multis magnis viciis plena est caro tua, ideo mundare eam me oportet: Nam quod 
immundum et inquinatum est, non intrabit regnum coelorum. Cf. LW 7.229. 
574 WA 44.473.6-9: Sic nos vocati sumus ad regnum Dei, habemus remissionem peccatorum, sumus 
filii et haeredes Dei, sed haeret adhuc in nobis ignavia et veternus corporis et animi, quam luem 
cogitat Deus tollere in universa vita nostra. Cf. LW 7.234. 
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(dono spiritus sancti expurgetur)—in order that you may learn to understand 
how great is the malice and perversion of human nature. For that darkness and 
blindness is innate in us, and permits us to recognize neither our misery nor 
the immense mercy of God; but it is a certain stupor, which completely 
oppresses our body and soul. To take this away, the fiercest upheavals are 
needed, which shake out this sloth and indolence. For this a sharp bur reed is 
needed, to arouse in us, with the Holy Spirit co-operating (cooperante spiritu 
sancto), acknowledgment and admiration of God’s infinite kindness and of the 
immense love with which he has embraced us.575 
 
Free forgiveness, flowing from God’s mercy and secured through and for the sake of 
God’s Son—this is “grace,” as Luther twice calls it here. But the sinner’s reception into 
God’s grace by baptism is ordered to the abolition of sin by the Spirit’s “gift.” The 
trouble is, the remnants of original sin, innate in fallen human nature and not yet 
entirely removed by baptism, blind the saints from realizing either the sinfulness of 
sin or the immensity of God’s merciful love in Christ. The Father has embraced them 
in love through the death of his Son, but residual sin’s operations are so stealthy and 
soporific that the completely forgiven but only partly renewed saints need to be 
shaken out of their stupor by the “fierce upheavals” which their wise and good Father 
sends to further their sanctification. As in the third part of the On the Councils and the 
Church, so here, suffering in its various forms is the experiential means employed by 
the Holy Spirit to co-operatively advance the progress of the “gift” in the lives of the 
saints.  
                                                        
575 WA 44.473.35-474.7: Sumus enim recepti in gratiam per Baptismum non solum ad remissionem 
peccatorum, sed etiam ad expurgationem. Remissio est gratuita, quae contingit propter solum filium 
Dei, sine ulla dignitate, merito et contritione nostra. Hanc remissionem sequitur vexatio, angustia, 
tribulatio, mortificatio, quae omnia eo pertinent, ut aboleatur peccatum, ita ut non solum sit 
remissum et condonatum divina gratia et misericordia, sed etiam dono spiritus sancti expurgetur et 
ut discas intelligere, quanta sit malicia et depravatio humanae naturae. Caligo enim et caecitas illa 
  nobis innata nec miseriam nostram nec misericordiam Dei immensam nos sinit agnoscere, sed est 
stupor quidam, qui penitus oppressit corpus et animam nostram. Ad hunc tollendum opus est 
vexationibus vehementioribus, quae excutiant veternum et ignaviam hanc, Es gehort ein scharpffer 
ygels kolb dazu ut excitent in nobis cooperante spiritu sancto agnitionem et admirationem infinitae 
Dei benignitatis et immensi quo nos complexus est amoris. Cf. LW 7.235. 
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I conclude my reading of the lecture on Gen. 42:7 with three observations. 
First, the only “simul” that fits what Luther says here about grace, gift, and afflictive 
but fatherly chastisements is that of the partial or Augustinian variety, which centers 
on the progressive abolition of residual sin. Peccatum haerens in natura absconditum 
est ab oculis nostris.576 This is why Luther cites Ps. 90:8 prominently (cf. Ps. 19:12-13).577 
God sees the secret or hidden sins of the flesh that the graced and gifted saints cannot 
see, precisely because they are advancing in real holiness through habitually refusing 
consent to the fleshly desires that they are aware of. Take an example: with the Spirit’s 
help, an adolescent saint kills sexual lust. But without realizing it, he becomes proud 
of his victory, and forgets both the abiding sinfulness manifested in this very boasting 
and the immensity of God’s grace and love toward him, who embraces the proud little 
saint as his dear child nonetheless, and knows full well how he will cure the boy of his 
pride. Hence it is people who are really growing in holiness who need the gift of 
purgative afflictions. “To us,” teaches Luther as he explains Ps. 90:8, “the deformity 
and foulness of vicious nature is unknown. Therefore, in order to manifest it and 
purge it, God uses violent and bitter remedies. If he is to sweep out the evil, he must 
take a broom and sharp sand and scrub until the blood flows.”578 
Second, for all the forcefulness of the Father’s agency in purging his adopted 
children through the Spirit’s gift, we must not lose sight of Luther’s cooperante spiritu 
                                                        
576 WA 44.468.26-7, LW 7.228. 
577 WA 44.468.28-31, LW 7.228. 
578 WA 44.468.31-34: Nobis vero deformitas et foeditas naturae viciosae ignota est. Itaque ad 
manifestandam et purgandam eam utitur Deus remediis violentis et acerbis. Soll er das malum 
außfegen, so muß er nemen ein Strowisch, und ein scharpffen sand, und schewren, das blut hernach 
gehet. Cf. LW 7.228. 
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sancto.579 By the operation of the gift, the Spirit does not secure progress in holiness 
through abolishing or overriding the saint’s own agency. Rather, the Spirit quickens 
and sustains in being the renewed spiritual agency by which the believer undergoing 
purgatorial afflictions mortifies his flesh and clings by faith and hope to the God 
who—contrary to the saint’s present sense of abandonment—has given himself to the 
believer in the Promise. In the depths of hellish spiritual suffering, it is God’s vivifying 
Spirit who sees to it that the “faintly burning wick” (Isa. 42:3) of faith does not go out, 
to be sure; but the Spirit-gifted believer himself exercises this faith, in co-operation 
with the Spirit. This spiritual cooperatio is the occasion for the graced deepening of 
that most Lutheran of virtues, to wit, defiant hope in the promise of the gospel 
heroically exercised amidst extreme Anfechtungen.  
Third, this restoration to spiritual agency, which entails both a deepening 
grasp of the sheer wickedness of sin and a growing astonishment at the goodness of 
God, brings us back from Gen. 42 to Gen. 1-3. The “sin” exposed in the saints through 
affliction is Adam’s, which became their own by natural inheritance but which, after 
their regeneration by the Spirit in the Last Adam, remains operative in their residual 
flesh (the “old Adam”) contrary to their own renewed and holy will. In affliction, the 
Spirit brings the saint face to face with the dreadful consequences of Adam’s 
                                                        
579 Even amidst the heated polemics of de servo arbitrio, when Luther stresses the Spirit’s sovereign 
work emphatically, he does not abolish Spirit-empowered human cooperation. WA 18.754.8-15 
(Packer, 268): Homo antequam renovetur in novam creaturam regni spiritus, nihil facit, nihil 
conatur, quo paretur ad eam renovationem et regnum; Deinde recreatus, nihil facit nihil conatur, quo 
perseveret in eo regno, Sed utrunque facit solus spiritus in nobis, nos sine nobis recreans et 
conservans recreatos, ut et Iacobus dicit: Voluntarie genuit nos verbo virtutis suae, ut essemus 
initium creaturae eius; loquitur de renovata creatura. Sed non operatur sine nobis, ut quos in hoc 
ipsum recreavit et conservat, ut operaretur in nobis et nos ei cooperaremur. Cf. WA 18.634.37-9 
(Packer, 102): si Deus in nobis operatur, mutata et blande assibilata per spiritum Dei voluntas iterum 
mera lubentia et pronitate ac sponte sua vult et facit, non coacte. 
 206 
ruination, and of his own share in them all. But in and through this painful and 
mortifying humiliation, the Spirit quickens the saint into deepened trust in the gospel 
of grace in Christ; and in so doing, he leads him from the fall in Gen. 3:1ff through the 
first promise at Gen. 3:15 back to the gladdening and intoxicating experience of God’s 
kindness and goodness that unfallen Adam enjoyed in Gen. 1-2. He had 
“acknowledged God’s goodness, rejoiced in God, and felt safe in God’s goodness,”580 
taught Luther back in 1535; here in 1544, the Spirit’s restorative operations sub 
contrario lead the affliction-awoken saint to “an acknowledgment and admiration of 
God’s infinite kindness and of the immense love with which he has embraced us.”581 In 
light of his protological anthropology, Luther’s lecture on Gen. 42:7 thus sets forth a 
theology of the saints’ progressive restoration (by the Spirit’s gift) to the unfallen glory 
of faithful and holy human persons, men and women who are alive because they live 
in intimate fellowship with the God whose infinite love embraces them in Jesus Christ. 
This, I submit, is Luther’s mature dogmatics of holiness. In the next part of this 
book, we shall have to see whether my assertions of its deeply Augustinian character 
hold water. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
580 On Gen. 3:1. WA 42.107.16-7: agnoscebat Dei bonitatem, laetabatur in Deo, securus erat in 
bonitate Dei. LW 1.142-3. 
581 WA 44.474.5-7: ut excitent in nobis cooperante spiritu sancto agnitionem et admirationem 
infinitae Dei benignitatis et immensi quo nos complexus est amoris. Cf. LW 7.235. 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART II 
AUGUSTINE AND LUTHER, LUTHER AND AUGUSTINE 
 
 
The nature of Luther’s debt to—and grasp of—Augustine’s theology of sin and grace 
has been in dispute since the first days of the Reformation. I have no illusions about 
settling the matter here. That said, as it has already cropped up plentifully in chapter 
2, and as the res ipsa demands, some account must be given of how the Reformer’s 
mature theology relates to that of the Church’s illustrious doctor gratiae. That is the 
burden of the second and third Parts of this book. To put it in hugely understated 
terms, assessing the extent, depth, precision, and appropriateness of Luther’s 
appropriations of Augustinian theology is a rather difficult and disputatious problem. 
Augustin bei Luther, Luther und Augustinus, Luther’s Augustinianism: however one 
frames the issue, this is a hard nut to crack; for in it, historical complexity and 
confessional conviction are perhaps inextricably intertwined. 
This has been so from the initium evangelii, as Luther, probably in imitation of 
St. Paul (cf. Phil. 4:15),582 sometimes styled the period of the Ablaßstreit.583 By 1521, 
both the Reformer and insightful opponents such as John Eck of Ingolstadt584 and 
                                                        
582 Cf. Timothy J. Wengert, “Martin Luther’s Movement toward Apostolic Self-Awareness as 
Reflected in his early Letters,” Lutherjahrbuch 61 (1994): 71-92. 
583 E.g., the 1545 lecture on Gen. 48:20 (WA 44.711.15-20, cf. LW 8.181): “Toward the beginning of the 
rebirth of the Gospel (initium renascentis Euangelii), I heard a certain monk—after he’d cast off the 
papal superstition and heard and clearly understood the purer doctrine—say this: ‘Good God! I 
never heard anything about the promises in my whole life.’ And he congratulated himself from the 
heart because he was permitted to hear and understand this word, ‘promise.’” 
584 See Eck’s position in the 1519 Leipzig Disputation, in Otto Seitz, ed., Der authentische Text der 
Leipziger Disputation (Berlin, 1903), e.g. p. 242: Accipio posteriorem sententiam Augustini, qui 
aliquando fuit in sententia Paulini, et tunc dico concupiscentiam illam legem membrorum, quamvis 
fuerit peccatum ante baptismum, tamen post baptismum non est peccatum… In summa dico 
concupiscentiam infirmitatem illam et malam valetudinem, legem membrorum, legem carnis, non 
esse peccatum nec mortale nec veniale, et post baptismum non originale. 
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Jacobus Latomus of Louvain585 had come to see that at the heart of the dogmatic 
controversy provoked by Luther’s theology lay competing evaluations of the nature of 
evil desire (concupiscentia) in the baptized.586 Does evil desire in the faithful retain an 
intrinsically sinful and guilt-bearing quality, as Luther asserted on scriptural but also 
on Augustinian grounds? Or, as his opponents countered—perplexingly, also on 
Augustinian grounds—has the power of infused grace denuded concupiscentia of its 
sinfulness and guilt and rendered it a bothersome and potentially dangerous weakness 
instead?  
Springing up from this central issue were competing theological explanations 
of why the presence of evil desire in a regenerate person does not separate him or her 
from the grace of God in Christ. The traditionalists held an uncomplicated position: 
since postbaptismal concupiscence is no longer “sin” in the proper sense of the word, 
it does not pose an intrinsic threat to the regenerate person’s fellowship with the holy 
God. The baptized person only falls away from God’s grace in the event that his free 
and responsible consent to evil desire ignites the “tinder” of concupiscence into the 
fire of actual sin and consequently, guilt. Luther’s doctrine, while less straightforward, 
claimed an equally Augustinian pedigree; and it will be noted that Luther arrived at 
                                                        
585 J.E. Vercruysse, “Die Stellung Augustins in Jacobus Latomus’ Auseinandersetzung mit Luther,” in 
M. Lamberigts, ed., L’Augustinisme à l’Ancienne Faculté de Théologie de Louvain (Leuven: University 
Press, 1994), 7-18, esp. 12-13. Luther’s June 1521 Rationis Latomianae Confutatio or Antilatomus 
replies to Latomus’ Articulorum doctrinae fratris M. Lutheri per theologos Lovaniensis damnatorum 
ratio ex sacris literis et verteribus tractoribus of the previous month. In 1533 at table, Luther spoke 
highly of this worthy opponent: “Latomus has been the one excellent writer against me. Mark this 
well: Latomus is the one man wrote against Luther; all the rest, even Erasmus, are croaking frogs.” 
WA Tr 1.202.5-7, #463, cf. LW 54.77. Of course, no one needed to twist Luther’s arm to move him to 
criticize Erasmus after 1524. 
586 I say “dogmatic,” as opposed to the church-political controversy over papal primacy, that great 
distraction from the heart of the matter peremptorily introduced by John Tetzel and Sylvester 
Prierias in early 1518. See David V. N. Bagchi, Luther’s Earliest Opponents: Catholic 
Controversialists, 1518-1525 (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 19-22, 27-30. 
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his position, complete with proof-texts from Augustine, several years prior to the 
outbreak of the Ablaßstreit, as a 1514 sermon587 and especially the 1515/16 Lectures on 
Romans amply demonstrate. Luther argued that evil desire in the regenerate is itself 
sinful and guilty per se, but that it is not imputed or reckoned to the baptized person’s 
account—on one condition: the mercy of non-imputation only obtains so long as the 
believer refuses to consent to the sinful desire which puts him in need of this mercy in 
the first place. Now, as Risto Saarinen has observed, this means that as to the necessity 
of refusing consent to residual evil desire, the two parties came much nearer to one 
another than has sometimes been appreciated.588 On this point at least, both sides of 
the Reformation controversy upheld received Christian teaching in the definite shape 
which Augustine had impressed upon it and bequeathed to the medieval Church.  
The real quarrel centered rather in the dispute over the nature of this residual 
evil desire itself: and, therefore, in the necessity, nature, and role of the non-
imputation of this unique kind of “sin” (so Rom. 6:12-14, Rom. 7:7ff, Heb. 12:1, 1 John 
1:8) as it is set forth in the teaching of St. David (“the Prophet,” in Luther’s 
judgment589) and St. Paul (Ps. 32:1-2, Rom. 4:6-8). Being catholic theologians on all 
                                                        
587 “On the Feast of the Conception of Blessed Mary the Virgin, and about Congenital Sin,” WA 
4.691.30-692.2: Cum dicitur in baptismo originale peccatum dimitti, quomodo ergo tu dicis, quod 
remaneat et cum eo pugnandum esse? Respondet Divus Augustinus: ‘Dimittitur quidem peccatum 
gentilitium in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut non imputetur’. Sicut Samaritanus ille apud Lucam c. 
decimo, quando infudit oleum et vinum in vulnera semivivi, non statim eum sanavit, sed in stabulum 
eum posuit. Ita per baptismum omnia peccata tolluntur, sic tamen, quod Deus non imputat: sed non 
ideo non sunt, immo sananda sunt et coepta sanari. Verum in morte sanantur absolute omnia. See 
chapter 5.2 below. 
588 Risto Saarinen, “Klostertheologie auf dem Weg der Ökumene,” 269-90, on this point esp. 281-8; 
idem, “Desire, Consent, and Sin: The Earliest Free Will Debates of the Reformation,” in Kent 
Emery, Jr., Russell L. Friedman, and Andreas Speer, eds., Philosophy and Theology in the Long 
Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 471-83, esp. 482. 
589 Spring 1532 lecture on Ps. 2:12, WA 40/2.297.33-4 [Dr], LW 12.82: Sic Apostolum intelligimus: 
Paulum, Prophetam: Davidem, Philosophum: Aristotelem.  
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sides, neither Luther nor his sparring partners rested their case on Scripture alone. 
Each side appealed to various patristic and medieval authorities in defense of their 
cause, the peerless Augustine being at once the most desirable of all possible patrons 
and, as it happens, perhaps the most vexingly difficult to claim unreservedly as totus 
noster.590 
For what modern Augustine scholars (and not a few Luther scholars) have 
recognized is that a certain fluidity characterizes Augustine’s position on the nature of 
evil desire in the baptized and, eo ipso, its doctrinal correlate, the non-imputation of 
evil desire as sin.591 Augustine’s thought on this crucial point developed over the 
course of his nearly two-decade long battle with “Pelagianism,” prior to 418 facing 
Pelagius and Coelestius and then till his death in 430 the more resourceful Julian of 
Eclanum. In general it can be said that in anti-Pelagian writings prior to 418, 
Augustine’s position seems to favor Eck and Latomus as the better interpreters of the 
great church father: concupiscence comes from sin and leads to sin in turn, but it is 
not sin stricto sensu apart from the grant of consent (see, e.g., pecc. mer. 1.39.70, 2.4.4, 
2.22.36, nupt. conc. 1.23.25). But in the writings against Julian in the 420s, Augustine’s 
                                                        
590 On medieval and Reformation-era attempts to claim that Augustinus totus noster est, see 
Markus Wriedt, “Via Augustini. Ausprägungen des spätmittelalterlichen Augustinismus in der 
observanten Kongregation der Augustinereremiten,” in Christoph Bultmann, Volker Leppin, and 
Andreas Lindner, eds., Luther und das monastische Erbe (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 9-39, esp. 
12-14; idem, “Produktives Mißverständnis?” esp. 213-4. 
591 Adolf Hamel, Der junge Luther und Augustin, I/17-23, II/14-19; Malcolm E. Alflatt, “The 
Development of the Idea of Involuntary Sin in St. Augustine,” Revue d’études augustiniennes 20 
(1974), 113-34; Christoph Markschies, “Taufe und Concupiscentia bei Augustinus,” 92-108, esp. 102-4; 
Frederick Van Fleteren, “Augustine’s Evolving Exegesis of Romans 7:22-23 in its Pauline Context,” 
AugS 32/1 (2001), 89-114; Risto Saarinen, “Klostertheologie,” 269-90; idem, Weakness of Will in 
Renaissance and Reformation Thought, 23-6, 119-27; idem, “Desire, Consent, and Sin,” 471-83; Timo 
Nisula, Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence, 122-7, 251, 262, 331, 345-50; Pereira, Augustine 
of Hippo and Martin Luther on Original Sin and Justification of the Sinner, 151-7, 179-86, 369-80, 
though on p. 25 Pereira disclaims any material shifts in Augustine’s theology of original sin and 
justification after 418. 
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increasingly negative evaluations of evil desire as “sin,” and the increasingly high 
profile of non-imputation (or simply forgiveness) as an ongoing necessity for the 
saints of God during this fragile life of exile, pilgrimage, and hope, seem rather to favor 
Luther.592 Take this example from c. Iul. op. imp. 3.210, noting that in the context of 
the preceding §209 it is clear that Augustine has evil desire in the regenerate in mind: 
Why is it, I ask, that you say that “concupiscence is not sin”? Do you not see 
that you thus argue against the apostle? For he demonstrated quite clearly that 
sin is evil desire (peccatum esse concupiscentiam), where says, “I would not 
have known sin except through the law; for I would not have known evil desire 
if the law had not said, ‘Do not desire evilly’ [Exod. 20:17]” (Rom. 7:7). What 
could be said more clearly than this testimony? what more vainly than your 
opinion?593 
 
Now, it is not altogether certain whether Luther read c. Iul. op. imp.,594 which 
Augustine wrote through sleepless nights c. 427—30. But it is beyond question that 
the earlier writings against Julian c. 418/19—421 (nupt. conc. bk. 1 in 418 or 419; nupt. 
                                                        
592 So Markschies, “Taufe und Concupiscentia bei Augustinus,” 103: “He can, in some places and 
above all in his writings against Julian of Eclanum, hold that concupiscence is even true and real 
sin.” With Markschies, I wish to be clear that the general shift in the “420s Augustine” toward 
identifying evil desire and “sin” is not uniform. The older usage of the “410s Augustine” persists as 
well, and the underlying reason why Augustine can shift between the two positions is that amor sui 
as the universal root of all sin is conceptually quite close to concupiscentia as evil desire (103-4). 
With a nod to Hamel (II/18-9), Markschies concludes (108) that Luther’s doctrine of evil desire as 
“sin” is “an attempt to transfer the terminological vacillation of Augustine before the background of 
a radical conception of ‘sin’ into a consistent theory.” Cf. Risto Saarinen’s rewarding article on 
Luther’s “Klostertheologie.” Saarinen draws on Markschies’ article, Simo Knuuttila’s Emotions in 
Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, and his own expertise in medieval theories of volition and argues 
that the ambiguity in Augustine’s texts gave rise to two variant traditions: (1) the “Stoic,” which 
upholds the moral neutrality of the initial pro-passio, and found expression in Johannes Buridan, 
Bartholomäus Arnoldi von Usingen, and the Council of Trent; (2) the “Gregorian,” which held that 
the pro-passio already constituted a venial sin prior to volitional consent, and passed through 
Gregory the Great, Peter Lombard, and no little Klostertheologie to the young Luther. My typology 
matches up nicely with Saarinen’s: Eck and Latomus fall in the first category predominant in the 
“410s Augustine,” while Luther falls in the second characteristic of the “420s Augustine.”  
593 CSEL 85/1.503.11-17 (cf. WSA I/25.381): Quid est, rogo, quod dicis “nec concupiscentiam peccatum 
esse”? Itane contra apostolum te disputare non vides? Ille namque peccatum esse concupiscentiam 
satis omnino monstravit, ubi ait, Peccatum non cognovi nisi per legem; nam concupiscentiam 
nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: Non concupisces. Quid hoc testimonio clarius, quid tua sententia vanius 
dici potest? On the significance of Exod. 20:17 for Paul’s argument in Rom. 7:7-25, see sp. litt. 4.6. 
594 Cf. Hans-Ulrich Delius, Augustin als Quelle Luthers: Eine Materialsammlung (Berlin: 
Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1984), 189, who notes three possible references.  
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conc. bk. 2 in 420 or 421; c. ep. Pel. and c. Iul. in 421) exercised immense influence on 
the formation of Luther’s theology. In the event, a few lines from Augustine’s initial 
sortie against Julian played a large part in setting in motion the series of attacks and 
counter-attacks that comprise the dogmatic tennis match of the 420s: 
… dimitti concupiscentiam carnis in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut in 
peccatum non inputetur. Quamuis autem reatu suo iam soluto, manet tamen, 
donec sanetur omnis infirmitas nostra.  
 
… the evil desire of the flesh is forgiven in baptism, not so that it no longer 
exists, but so that it is no longer imputed as sin. Although its guilt has already 
been unshackled, it nevertheless remains until our whole weakness will be 
healed.595  
 
Eleven centuries later, these controversial lines from nupt. conc. 1.25.28—together 
with Augustine’s subsequent defenses and explanations thereof in c. Iul.—played a 
massive role in the Reformation-era struggle for Augustine.596 Present and possessed 
of decisive dogmatic force already in the 1514 sermon I mentioned above, we shall 
meet with Luther’s idiosyncratic citation of this passage throughout Parts II and III of 
this book. 
                                                        
595 BA 23.116-8; cf. WSA I/24.46. Peter Lombard cites this text when discussing quomodo originale 
peccatum dimittatur in baptismo, cum et post sit illa concupiscentia quae dicitur originale peccatum 
at Sent. II d. 32 cp. 1.6 (Grott. I/513), but he already hinted at it earlier in the same chapter, §2: Nec 
post baptismum remanet ad reatum, quia non imputatur in peccatum, sed tantum poena peccati est; 
ante baptismum vero poena est et culpa (Grott. I/511). 
596 Grane (Modus loquendi, 35) recognized the disproportional weight of nupt. conc. 1.25.28 in 
Luther’s theology: though Luther only cites it directly in the Romans lectures twice, “aber dafür ist 
das eine Zitat davon vielleicht das wichtigste überhaupt, das Luther bei Augustin gefunden hat.” 
Delius (Augustin als Quelle, 182 n. 1568) notes its appearance at WA 2.414.11f; 4.691.32f; 7.110.5f and 
345.10-12; 8.93.7f; 17/2.285.16-18; 39/1.95.23f, 121.26f, 125.1-3; 44.508.18f; 56.273.10-274.1; WA Tr 
1.140.8f/25f; 5.406.8/14-16. This list is not exhaustive. NB that at WA Tr 1.140.17-27 (#347, Rörer, 
Summer/Fall 1532), Luther first praises Augustine for having taught truly “about the grace of God,” 
then explains how his ardor for Augustine cooled after having learned from St. Paul “what the 
righteousness of faith was.” But then, he states that there are “two principle and best sayings in 
Augustine” of abiding significance. The first is Luther’s standard rendition of the contentious lines 
from nupt. conc. 1.25.28: “Die Sünde wird vergeben, nicht, daß sie nicht mehr da sey, sondern, daß 
sie nicht zugerechnet wird.” In Veit Dietrich’s hand (ll. 8-10): Peccatum dimittitur, non ut non sit, 
sed ut non damnet et dominetur. (The second is from Retr. 1.19: “Das Gesetz wird als denn erfüllet, 
wenn das verziehen wird, das nicht geschicht noch gethan wird.”) 
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 From what I can gather, nineteenth-century Luther scholars grasped the 
fundamental dogmatic issues at stake here, if not always the precise contours of 
Augustine’s shifting positions in the 410s and 20s. For this reason, the older 
presentations of Luther’s theology of sin and salvation by Julius Köstlin and Reinhold 
Seeberg are not far from the position I have argued for in Part I.597 Much changed with 
the fortuitous discovery of Luther’s previously unpublished 1515/16 Romans lectures in 
the Vatican library in 1899. Heinrich Denifle, O.P., the learned medievalist and 
Vatican archivist, drew core elements of his polemic against Luther der Halbwisser 
from these lectures, and published his interpretation of the Reformer’s ignorant and 
heretical theology in his multivolume Luther und Luthertum beginning in 1904.598 In 
essence, Denifle picked up the “410s Augustine” championed by Eck and Latomus—
and by then, of course, the Council of Trent as well599—and argued forcefully that 
                                                        
597 Julius Köstlin, The Theology of Luther, II/4.435-45, 455-58, 465-6; Reinhold Seeberg, The Text-
Book of the History of Doctrines, II/3.260-5. Manfred Schloenbach (Heiligung, 5) concurs, naming 
Seeberg and Holl but not Köstlin.  
598 Heinrich Denifle, Luther und Luthertum in der ersten Entwickelung, 2nd ed. (Mainz: von 
Kirchheim & Co., 1906), esp. I/2.438-519. On Denifle and the Romans lectures, see Mickey L. 
Mattox, “Martin Luther’s Reception of Paul,” 102-3. 
599 Session 5 (17 June 1546), the Decree on Original Sin §5: “If anyone says that the guilt (reatum) of 
original sin is not remitted through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ which is conferred in 
baptism, or even asserts that the whole of that which pertains to the true and proper definition of 
sin is not taken away (non tolli totum id, quod veram et propriam peccati rationem habet), but says 
that it is only shaved off or not imputed (tantum radi aut non imputari): let him be anathema. For 
God hates nothing in the reborn, because there is nothing of condemnation [Rom. 8:1a Vg.] for 
those who are truly buried together with Christ through baptism into death [Rom. 6:4], who do not 
walk according to the flesh [Rom. 8:1b Vg.] but, putting off the old man and putting on the new 
who is created according to God [cf. Eph. 4:24], are made innocent, immaculate, pure, blameless 
and beloved children of God, heirs indeed of God and coheirs of Christ [Rom. 8:17], so that nothing 
at all might delay their entrance into heaven. The holy synod confesses and senses that in the 
baptized, concupiscence or the tinder (fomitem) remains; which, since it is left for the struggle, is 
not able to harm those who do not consent (consentientibus) and manfully fight back against it 
through the grace of Christ Jesus. In fact, he who competes legitimately will be crowned [2 Tim. 
2:5]. This concupiscence (concupiscentiam), which the Apostle sometimes calls sin (peccatum), the 
holy synod declares the church catholic has never understood to be called sin because it is truly 
and properly sin in the reborn (vere et proprie in renatis peccatum sit), but because it is from sin 
and it inclines to sin (ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat). If anyone however holds the contrary: 
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Luther’s theology from 1515 on perniciously celebrates the invincibility of 
concupiscence in the baptized: “Die Concupiszenz ist völlig unbesiegbar.”600 This being 
so, Denifle asserts that Luther’s theology upholds the necessity of consent on the part 
of the regenerate person to his residual sinful desire. For invincible concupiscence 
does not merely attract, but defines and determines the will of the justified human 
being: 
Die Concupiszenz kann dann nicht mehr bloß als ein Gewicht oder als eine 
Lüsternheit erscheinen, durch die der Wille zur Sünde angelockt, nicht aber 
bestimmt wird, im Gegenteil, sie muß sich als das Grundübel im Menschen 
aufdrängen, da der Wille unwiderruflich in den Versuchungen zur Sünde in 
dieselbe einwilligt.601 
 
Concupiscence, then, can no longer appear merely as a weight or a 
lasciviousness, through which the will is attracted to sin but not determined by 
it. On the contrary, concupiscence must impose itself as the fundamental evil 
in the human being, since in temptations to sin the will irrevocably consents to 
the same. 
 
This sets the stage for an interpretation of Luther’s theology of justification which—in 
comparison to such benchmarks as the theologies of Chemnitz, Gerhard, or Sartorius, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
a. s.” DEC II/667, my translation. The background to radi is in Julian’s polemics, who charged 
Augustine with teaching that in baptism the roots of original sin were left intact, as when hair is 
shaved off one’s head. See c. ep. Pel. 1.13.26 (CSEL 60.445.8-15, cf. WSA I/24.129): “‘They even say,’ 
says [Julian], ‘that baptism does not give the full forgiveness of sins or take away crimes, but shaves 
them off (rarare), so that the roots (radices) of all sins are retained in the evil flesh.’ Who but an 
unbeliever would maintain this against the Pelagians? We therefore say that baptism gives the 
forgiveness of all sins and takes away crimes; it does not shave them off, neither are the roots of all 
sins retained in the evil flesh, quasi shavings of hair from the head, whence they grow back again, 
sins that need to be trimmed.”  
600 Denifle, I/2.441-2 (original emphasis). Notably, Denifle does not cite a text from Luther’s works 
to justify this stark claim. The real proof, both for Luther in the construction of his own theology 
and for Denifle in his interpretation thereof, lies in the fact that Luther himself was overcome by 
concupiscence in his own experience (442); he was a proud, self-righteous man who culpably failed 
to seek grace (450-64); und so weiter. Denifle often leaves little for the imagination in his 
explanations of how Luther’s wickedness and his forensic theology of justification intertwined, e.g., 
I/2.519: “Luther began with the sentence, ‘it is impossible to fulfill the command, You shall not 
desire’; he ended in the arms of a runaway consecrated virgin with the confession: ‘continence is an 
impossible thing’; he ended by throwing overboard everything that imposes self-denial or self-
overcoming upon us.” 
601 Denifle, I/2.442 (original emphasis). Cf. pp. 470, 475-6. 
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or the Lutherdeutungen of Köstlin and Seeberg—was unprecedented at the time 
Denifle wrote his big book. (That is, unprecedented amongst modern scholars aspiring 
to engage in substantive Lutherforschung,602 for early polemicists like John Fisher, 
Henry VIII, and John Cochlaeus anticipated Denifle’s Luther interpretation in many 
respects.603) The “simul”-statements that Denifle found peppering Luther’s scholia on 
Rom. 4:7 stand at the center of this radical theology of justification.604 Since invincible 
concupiscence and irreversible consent to sin necessarily rule out the possibility of 
real renewal in holiness, justification by faith becomes a purely forensic or “external” 
affair. “In reality sinners, but righteous by the imputation of the merciful God,” as 
Luther put it in 1515.605 Or, as Denifle summarized in 1904: 
… die Rechtfertigung sich in ein bloßes äußeres Zudecken des Elendes auflösen 
mußte. Von einem innerlich gerecht werden, von einer Durchdringung der 
Seele durch die Gnade, kurz, wie früher bereits bemerkt wurde, von einer 
Rechtfertigung konnte keine Rede mehr sein. Luthers Innere ließ keine 
eingegossene, heiligmachende Gnade als eine Wirkung Gottes zu, die uns 
reinigt, heilt, erhebt, kurz, die ein neues Lebens- und Tätigkeitsprinzip in der 
Seele wird.606 
 
… justification had to disintegrate into a mere external covering up of misery. 
Of an inner becoming righteous, of a penetration of the soul by grace, in short 
                                                        
602 Denifle, who wrote extensive books on John Tauler, medieval universities, and the welfare of the 
Church in France during the Hundred Years War (1337-1453), clearly intends to be doing the same 
kind of critical historical work in Luther und Luthertum. At e.g. I/2.447, he states that the recently 
discovered Romans lectures are of great importance “für die Lutherforschung.” At I/2.515, Denifle 
takes (1) Seeberg to task for his “untenable” account of Luther’s critique of gratia infusa (viz., that 
Luther rejected it because it attributed not too much but too little to God’s transforming power), 
and likewise (2) Dieckhoff for his baseless claim that in the Ablaßstreit Luther protested against the 
overly lax—not overly rigorous—demand for contrition then regnant in the Church’s penitential 
teaching and practice. In hindsight, it is clear that Denifle’s criticisms were wrong on both counts. 
But the very fact that he engaged in criticism of major late nineteenth-century Luther scholars 
shows that he regarded his own work as part of the ongoing scholarly conversation. 
603 Bagchi, Luther’s Earliest Opponents, 127-8, 159-63, 168-73. 
604 Denifle, I/2.443-5. 
605 WA 56.269.29, cf. LW 25.258. 
606 Denifle, I/2.514-5 (original emphasis). Cf. p. 443: “Von einem innerlichen Gerechtwerden kann 
da keine Rede mehr sein; weder die Eingießung der heiligmachenden Gnade, noch die Austreibung 
der Sünde im Akte der Rechtfertigung haben hier mehr einen Sinn.” 
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(as has been noted earlier already) of a justification, there could no longer be 
any talk. Luther’s inner life did not allow for infused, sanctifying grace as an 
effect of God that purifies, heals, and elevates us, in short, for a new principle 
of life and action in the soul.   
 
My reader will perhaps recall Luther’s warm treatment in 1539 of “der neue heilig 
leben in der seele,” which is comprised of the three theological virtues, faith, hope, 
and love (cp. 2.3.2); but I digress. For now what matters is this: according to Denifle’s 
interpretation, invincible concupiscence and inexorable consent vitiate any pretended 
claims that Luther might make to a doctrine of the soul’s real renewal by grace into 
spiritual life and action; the justified person is a sinner—Punkt—whose “justification” 
is exclusively external to his being, life, and action, which remain sinful through and 
through. To illustrate this radical Lutheran “simul,” Denifle refers to the sixteenth-
century mura spagnole surrounding Milan: 
“Christ’s righteousness covered those who are to be justified” (“Die 
Gerechtigkeit Christi bedeckt die zu Rechtfertigenden”).607 When God sees the 
sinner and wants to enter into judgment with him, he does not see him as 
such. Rather, God sees the wall upon which—as necessity may require—
another picture or coloring appears: quickly Christ appears, as he sheds his 
blood for all and bears the sins of the world; quickly he appears who alone 
fulfills the law, etc. Behind the wall, the scoundrel may have sinned just as 
much as it was possible for him to do, he may pursue what he wishes: if only he 
has confidence that he is well protected and concealed by the wall, and God’s 
glance is deflected from his inner life and his pursuits by the pictorial 
representations on the wall, then none of this harms him at all; God forgives 
him, but the rogue remains! That is the Lutheran justification!608 
 
                                                        
607 Citing Luther in n. 2, Christi iustitia eos tegit, et eis imputatur. The closest match to this that I 
can find in the Romans lectures is from the scholia on Rom. 7, WA 56.347.9-14: simul Sancti, dum 
sunt Iusti, sunt peccatores; Iusti, quia credunt in Christum, cuius Iustitia eos tegit et eis imputatur, 
peccatores autem, quia non implent legem, non sunt sine concupiscentia, Sed sicut ȩgrotantes sub 
cura medici, qui sunt re vera ȩgroti, Sed inchoatiue et in spe sani seu potius sanificati i. e. sani fientes, 
quibus nocentissima est sanitatis presumptio, quia peius recidiuant. Cf. LW 25.336 and see below, cp. 
3.1.6. 
608 Denifle, I/2.516. 
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Das ist die Luthersche Rechtfertigung! In the end, “the whole thing boils down to the 
proposition: God declares righteous the person who remains unrighteous; God sees 
the person who remains immoral as moral.”609 In short, on Denifle’s reading, there is 
no “Wiederherstellung (reparatio, restauratio)” in Luther’s theology: no healing grace, 
no sanctifying gift, no inner renovatio, no real renewal in holiness.610 
One last matter in regards to Denifle. Having derided Luther for not having 
read the theological texts of the high middles ages, Denifle was not one to miss the 
fact that this “modern” (i.e., Ockhamist) Augustinian attempted to anchor his 
theology in Augustine’s own writings. Indeed, it is one of Denifle’s foremost concerns 
to show that Luther had no right to claim Augustine as an ally for Reformation 
theology. In particular, Denifle observes that nupt. conc. 1.25.28 and c. Iul. 2.4.8, 2.5.12, 
and 6.17.51 were extraordinarily important passages for Luther’s theology; and he 
devotes some thirty-four pages to proving that Luther was wrong (and mischievous) to 
claim them in every case.611 If Denifle does not always go about his work with the care 
and nuance of a modern Augustine scholar, he does so with great confidence (and 
such “confidence,” as Owen knew, “is the only relief which enraged impotency adheres 
unto and expects supplies from”612). For example, after dispatching Luther’s 
interpretation of nupt. conc. 1.25.28 in the scholia on Rom. 4:7, Denifle declares: “St. 
Augustine therefore says just the opposite of what Luther puts in his mouth.”613 
Indeed, upon close examination Luther’s erroneous gloss of Augustine’s original 
                                                        
609 Denifle, I/2.520-1. 
610 Denifle, I/2.520. 
611 Denifle, I/2.480-514. 
612 John Owen, A Brief Declaration and Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity: as also of the 
Person and Satisfaction of Christ (1669), WJO 2.373. 
613 Denifle, I/2.483. 
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“concupiscentiam carnis” as “peccatum” appears for what it really is: “eine Fälschung,” 
and an “intentional” falsification at that.614 Later on, vis-à-vis c. Iul. 2.5.12 as it factors 
in the Rom. 7:17 scholia, Denifle states that Luther has either “misunderstood” 
Augustine’s meaning or else “willed to misunderstand” it; and the result is that “an 
author has probably never been so falsely construed by his pupil as St. Augustine is 
here.”615 Further instances could be multiplied. But for the purpose of my argument, 
what counts is the insight that protecting heilige Augustinus from being tarred with 
Luther’s brush was not at all tangential to Denifle’s project. Rather, Saint Augustine—
to be precise, the “410s Augustine” of Eck, Latomus, and Tridentine orthodoxy—stands 
at the heart of Luther und Luthertum as the star witness for the prosecution in its 
historical and dogmatic case against Luther and Lutheranism.616  
 Denifle wrote before the era of polite ecumenically-sensitive theology had 
begun, and his unprovoked salvo had the effect of marshaling the deeply offended 
Lutherans to defend their sainted hero.617 With an eye to its long-term impact, the 
most significant of the replies contra Denifle was probably Rudolph Hermann’s 1930 
monograph Luthers These “Gerecht und Sünder zugleich.”618 Engaging his Dominican 
provocateur often text by text, Hermann’s book necessarily invests great attention in 
                                                        
614 Denifle, I/2.483. In n. 1, Denifle cites Domingo de Soto’s like judgment in his 1547 de natura et 
gratia 1.11.48: Hunc locum praevericatus est Lutherus. 
615 Denifle, I/2.487. 
616 For this very reason, I find reading Denifle an oddly refreshing exercise: dismissive, tendentious, 
and mean as he often is, the formidable Dominican grasped that dogmatic truth and the catholicity 
of Church doctrine are invariably at stake in historical evaluations of Luther’s appeals to Augustine. 
He therefore polemicized against Luther’s would-be Augustinianism with all the commitment and 
zeal that one could hope to find in a catholic and ecclesial theologian, if not with all the sobriety, 
generosity, historical nuance, scriptural attentiveness, and evangelical joy one hopes for too. 
617 Cf. Robert Kolb, Martin Luther as Prophet, Teacher, and Hero. 
618 Rudolf Hermann, Luthers These “Gerecht und Sünder zugleich.” I am grateful to Michael Root for 
pointing me in Hermann’s direction. See his unpublished paper, “The Work of Christ and the 
Deconstruction of Twentieth-Century Lutheranism,” esp. pp. 7-8. 
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Luther’s appropriation of the anti-Pelagian Augustine. But whereas his Reformation-
era Lutheran forbearers—including Luther himself—had fought to claim Augustine 
for their side,619 Hermann granted no little ground to Denifle’s reading of Augustine’s 
theology in general in light of the “410s Augustine” in particular. In addition, he 
labored—like Denifle—to distance Luther from Augustine on the decisive question of 
the role of consent in the Christian life.620 (And it will be remembered that in regards 
to the non consentire concupiscentiis, Augustine’s position did not shift at all during 
the last decade of his life; accordingly, as Saarinen has seen, the later heirs of either 
“Augustine” do not disagree on this point.) 
The momentous turning-point in Hermann’s argument comes in the course of 
an interpretation of Luther’s scholia on Rom. 7:17-18. The brooding Augustinian’s 
explanation of St. Paul revolves around the concept of consent, and he quotes 
Augustine repeatedly and at length, appealing to his authority to defend an exegesis of 
Paul that Luther knew cut against the grain of the recentiores doctores.621 After citing 
an especially important discussion of the relation between residual sin, non-consent, 
and non-imputation,622 which will occupy our attention below, Hermann comments: 
                                                        
619 Not that the effort to claim Augustine was limited to the Lutherans. Arnoud Visser, Reading 
Augustine in the Reformation: The Flexibility of Intellectual Authority in Europe, 1500-1620, narrates 
how Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed theologians, and even Erasmian humanists, all 
managed to lay claim to Augustine’s authority. The struggle for Augustine continued well into the 
seventeenth century, Robert Bellarmine being the foremost defender of Trent (and of Augustine’s 
Tridentine orthodoxy) and numerous evangelical theologians arguing for the Augustinian 
credentials of the Reformation confessions, e.g., Martin Chemnitz, John Gerhard, John Davenant, 
and John Owen. I will return to Davenant’s 1631 Disputatio de justitia habituali et actuali in the 
conclusion of this book. 
620 This is the burden of chapters 6-8 in Hermann’s book.  
621 Following a lengthy excerpt from c. Iul. 3.26.62, which effectively concludes his exegesis of Rom. 
7, Luther allows that he takes great comfort in the agreement of his exegesis with Augustine’s, 
despite what the “more recent doctors” say. WA 56.354.14-26, LW 25.343. 
622 WA 56.351.11-17: Concupiscentia sit ipsa infirmitas nostra ad bonum, que in se quidem rea est, Sed 
tamen reos nos non facit nisi consentientes et operantes. Ex quo tamen mirabile sequitur, Quod rei 
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“Grave words, which sound just like Augustine!”623 “Really,” he continues, “should Heil 
und Unheil now again be shifted to the absence or occurrence of our consensus 
voluntatis?”624 That is just not a possible option for the liberating theology of the 
Reformation. If Luther means what he seems to mean, it would only lead to the 
confessional and its casuistry,625 i.e., to Roman Catholicism. Therefore, Luther cannot 
mean what he seems to mean. Some other explanation of the grave, Augustinisch-
sounding texts (and their moral-psychological theory of consent) must be posited; and 
in the heady days of the Luther Renaissance, nearly thirty years before the publication 
of Bizer’s Fides ex auditu and forty-one before Bayer’s Promissio, dismissing Luther’s 
Römerbrief as vorreformatorisch is not yet on the table. 
So Hermann proposes a solution to the problem that he has discovered in the 
scholia on Rom. 7. The sinfulness of the reliquiae peccati, and the identity of the 
justified with this sin (infirmitas illa nos ipsi sumus), must mean that there is a kind of 
incessant consent to sin even in the justified:  
Das bedeutet, wenn man so will, einem immer noch—auch im Gerechten—
vorhandenen consensus mit der Sünde.626  
                                                                                                                                                                     
sumus et non rei. Quia Infirmitas illa nos ipsi sumus, Ergo ipsa rea et nos rei sumus, donec cesset et 
sanetur. Sed non sumus rei, dum non operamur secundum eam, Dei misericordia non imputante 
reatum infirmitatis, Sed reatum consentientis infirmitati voluntatis. Cf. LW 25.340. 
623 Hermann, 192. 
624 Hermann, 192-3. 
625 Hermann, 193-4. 
626 Hermann, 192, continued through 195; the emphasis is Hermann’s. Hamel (II/23), having 
approached the threshold of a sound interpretation of Luther on this point, pulls back at just the 
last moment: “Luther in Gegensatz zu Augustin keine Konkupiszenz kennt, die nicht irgendwie, 
und sei es so verborgen, Willensakt und darum Schuld wäre.” What does Hamel mean by “an act of 
will”? If, following Hermann, he means consensus voluntatis, I believe he is wrong. But if Hamel 
means that the regenerate will is itself divided between flesh and spirit, and that in this true but 
restricted sense the renewed person who is the flesh he bears really does “will” his sinful desires 
against his holy will—then his Willensakt claim is sound enough. But in that case, Hamel is wrong 
to differentiate between Luther and Augustine, for they hold the same theory of the affectively 
divided will. On the face of it, Hamel seems to favor Hermann; but his very good analysis of 
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“Luther does not of course say that,” Hermann promptly admits.627 But this is the only 
sense he is able to make of how Luther’s eerily Augustinian claims about consent 
square with his radical doctrines of sin, justification, and the “simul.” And, as 
Hermann had declared when discussing the consent-concept earlier in the book, 
“Should we find no inner transformation of the Augustinian doctrine in Luther”—
which is just the problem facing Hermann in the scholia on Rom. 7:17-18—“then we 
will have to try to refute Luther by Luther.”628 In taking the crucial step of positing a 
kind of consent within the residual sin that comprises the saint’s flesh, I grant that 
Hermann has opposed Luther, but he has fallen short of refuting him; and whether he 
has come by his opposition to Luther durch Luther is another question entirely.629 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Luther’s appropriation of the Augustinian facere/perficere distinction (II/69-71) seems to argue the 
other way. 
627 Hermann, 192.  
628 Hermann, 140. At another point (p. 159), when discussing Luther’s appropriation of the 
facere/perficere distinction, Hermann asks whether this isn’t just the same old Augustinian and 
ascetic theory, and then declares: “We know ja, that that can’t be the case!” 
629 To my surprise, Saarinen (“Klostertheologie,” 282 n. 41) writes that “Trotz vieler neuer Arbeiten 
bleibt Hermanns Analyse m.E. bei vielen Luther-Stellen die meist nuancierte Interpretation.” His 
note attends the following, more or less accurate comments on Luther’s interpretation of Rom. 7: 
“Paulus will mit dem ganzen Willen das Gute, aber wegen des fleischlichen Widerstands kann er 
nicht mit derselben Leichtigkeit und Spontaneität das Gute verwirklichen, wie er es in seinem 
inneren Willen wünscht. So kann der Apostel zwar Gutes tun, aber nicht auf vollendete Weise. 
Diesen Gedankengang Luthers hat Rudolf Hermann exemplarisch herausgearbeitet. Hermann 
betont [p. 189]: ‘Es fehlt also offenbar nicht an Werken. Sie kommen auch aus einem gereinigten 
Herzen. Es fehlt inhnen nur das eine, dass der gute Wille nicht zur Vollendung gediehen ist.’” I 
grant that Hermann reads some aspects of Luther’s theology with real insight, the passage Saarinen 
cites on the reality of good works flowing from a pure heart (despite the resistance of the flesh) 
being a case in point. That said, on the real issues at stake for the interpretation of the “simul,” I 
dissent from Saarinen’s general approbation; indeed, his high praise for Hermann puzzles me, since 
Saarinen’s reading of Luther clashes with Hermann’s at just the same neuralgic points that I will 
engage in my own argument. At e.g. p. 285, Saarinen observes the complexity of the consent-
concept in Luther, credits Hermann for bringing it into the scholarly conversation, then states 
“dass auch nach der Radikalisierung der augustinischen Harmartiologie die menschliche 
Zustimmung zur Sünde ein wichtiger Gedanke bei Luther bleibt.” This gives the impression that 
Hermann and Saarinen hold the same position. But the way in which Hermann reads the 
“radicalization” of the doctrines of sin and consent in Luther stands at odds with Saarinen’s 
interpretation, for the German’s assertion of a kind of constant consensus peccato within the saint’s 
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Prima facie, it would seem more like that he came to his opposition to Luther durch 
Denifle. 
 The result of Hermann’s decisive move is therefore rather ironic. For despite 
his taking up cudgels against Denifle, his interpretation of Luther’s theology of sin and 
justification is fundamentally akin to Denifle’s own (if not simply derivative 
therefrom). Denifle insisted that Luther misunderstood—and misrepresented—
Augustine; Hermann argued that Luther, despite superficial similarities, had 
profoundly transformed Augustine’s theology. Denifle argued that Luther viewed 
concupiscence as invincible, even in the saints, and that the justified irrevocably 
consent to sin; Hermann, that residual sin presupposes the presence of a kind of 
consent to sin, auch im Gerechten. Denifle argued that the justification of the 
concupiscence-conquered sinner must, for Luther, come about by the sheer 
imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness to his account; Hermann agreed, the 
difference, of course, being that the modern Lutheran championed what the 
Tridentine Dominican abhorred. 
In a thorough 2001 article, Wolf-Dieter Hauschild argues that Hermann’s book 
proved to be a watershed in Luther research, and documents how—with few 
exceptions—its thesis of a radical “simul” comprised of inevitable and incessant 
consensual sin (semper peccator) and forensic justification sans real inner renewal (et 
iustus) eventually became a communis opinio in modern Lutheran theology, an agreed 
                                                                                                                                                                     
flesh is deeply corrosive to the robust non consentire peccato which the Finn rightly urges in his 
article. Perhaps part of the problem lies in the fact that Saarinen seems to assume that the 
Radikalisierung in question is a post-Augustinian development in the tradition that is not already 
present in Augustine’s own works: for if this is indeed the case, then Hermann’s efforts to distance 
Luther from Augustine on this point might not appear to be as problematic as in fact they are. 
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Charakteristikum of genuinely reformational theologies of justification.630 As Hermann 
himself put it in the first sentence of his paradigm-setting book: 
The formula “righteous and sinner at the same time” embodies the whole of 
Lutheran theology.631 
 
Indeed:  
 
The concepts themselves with which the formula is concerned, even its very 
terms, stand so close to the Mittelpunkt of all Lutheran thinking that without 
reference to them no theological statement of Luther’s can be understood.632  
 
—including “Luthers Gottesanschauung.” 
Now, if I may borrow a magnificent turn of phrase from Lewis’ The Weight of 
Glory: as history, Hermann’s exaggerations are self-evidently false, or at least ought to 
be; but they are true as prophecy. Take, for example, Luther’s view of God: must the 
“simul” have a say in our interpretation of the theological statement “unus sit Deus in 
essentia et trinitas in personis” if we are to understand its meaning?633 But if 
Hermann’s hyperbolic claims are false as history, Hauschild skillfully narrates how 
they have had their fulfillment in the subsequent course of twentieth-century 
historical and dogmatic theology. Hauschild does not quite grasp, however, that what 
this really amounts to is the startling insight that Heinrich Denifle’s truculent 
Lutherdeutung has set the terms for much of what modern Lutherforschung and 
Lutheran dogmatics have taken for granted about the Reformer’s theology of 
justification vis-à-vis both the sinfulness of the saints and their renewal—or rather, 
                                                        
630 Wolf-Dieter Hauschild, “Die Formel ‘Gerecht und Sünder zugleich’ als Element der 
reformatorischen Rechtfertigungslehre – eine Entdeckung des 20. Jahrhunderts,” in Theodor 
Schneider and Gunther Wenz, eds., Gerecht und Sünder zugleich? Ökumenische Klärungen 
(Freiburg: Herder and Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 303-349. 
631 Hermann, 7. 
632 Hermann, 7. 
633 From the 10th argument of The Disputation Concerning the Passage, “The Word was made Flesh” 
(John 1:14), held in Wittenberg on 11 Jan. 1539. WA 39/2.18.10 [A], LW 38.252. 
 225 
their lack thereof. For at bottom of Hermann’s Luther is Denifle’s; and at bottom of 
Denifle’s Luther, and so twentieth-century Lutheranism’s Luther, is a Luther who 
departed drastically (whether to his eternal shame or his great credit) from the 
theology of Augustine.634 
 In the course of expositing the Reformer’s dogmatics of holiness in its maturity, 
I have asserted (and on a few occasions, proved by textual comparison) that it 
continues to assume a fundamentally Augustinian form. The old Luther sometimes 
maintains this himself. For example, in his 1544 lecture on Gen. 42:29-34, he sets out a 
basic statement of his theology of grace, gift, and “the simul”—viz., sin is forgiven 
perfectly in baptism but not yet completely taken away—then adds simply, ut inquit 
Augustinus,635 most likely intending a reference to nupt. conc. 1.25.28. He then 
proceeds to sketch a christological, soteriological, and in its patristic roots eminently 
Augustinian interpretation of the Parable of the Good Samaritan636 that is virtually 
                                                        
634 Hauschild—who assumes the validity of the modern Lutheran Simullehre—tells the story ably. 
There is a clear line running from Hermann’s book to (say) Anders Nygren, “Simul iustus et 
peccator bei Augustin und Luther,” Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie vol. 16 (1 January 1939), 
364-79, through Ebeling’s 1964 Luther and Grane’s (in other respects useful) 1975 Modus Loquendi 
Theologicus, to Daphne Hampson’s grossly flawed Christian Contradictions: The Structures of 
Lutheran and Catholic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
635 WA 44.508.17-9: “Nature is vitiated. But the papists interpose that it has been healed (sanatam) 
through baptism and that sins have been forgiven. True enough, but they have not yet been taken 
away (ablata), as Augustine says.” Cf. LW 7.281. 
636 WA 44.508.21-30, cf. LW 7.281-2: “To be sure, the wounds of the half-dead man have been bound 
up, as the parable in Luke 10[:25-37] has it. Wine and oil have been poured in (infusum), the gift 
(donum) of the Holy Spirit has begun. Nevertheless, the wounds are still deadly. He has been taken 
up into care (in curam), that he may be healed (sanetur). But he has not yet been completely 
restored (restitutus). If you want to say that there is no wound, that there is no danger, find out 
whether a half-dead man is able to walk, labor, and do the duty of a healthy man. He is carried by 
the beast on which he has been placed. He does not labor. He does not walk. Thus through 
baptism, we have been taken upon God’s beast, that is, the most precious sacrifice for us or the 
humanity of Christ, by which we are carried and accepted once indeed (semel quidem recepti), but 
we are being cured and healed from day to day (de die vero in diem curamur et sanamur).” For its 
roots in Augustine, see En. Ps. 30/2.1.8 and 125.15, Io. Tr. 43.2, Sermo 171.2, Trin. 15.27, Nat. grat. 
52.60, c. Iul. 1.3.10 and 1.7.32 (referring in both cases to Ambrose, In. Luc. 7.73). Cf. Hamel, I/115-9, 
II/75-85. 
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identical to the ones the young theologian had set forth in the very same doctrinal 
context both in the 1514 sermon637 and while exegeting Rom. 4:7 and 7:17 in the winter 
semester of 1515/16.638  
However, for complex reasons that need not detain us here, in general it can be 
said of the older Luther that he is less invested in citing Augustine chapter and verse 
than he had been as a young man.639 Often enough, the positions he arrived at as a 
young theologian (through the intricate interplay of scriptural exegesis, patristic 
study, readings in German mysticism, his own spiritual experiences as an afflicted soul 
and as a pastor to the same, and dogmatic controversy) carry over into the works of 
his maturity with little more than a broken trail of bread crumbs indicating the path 
that led him there. Put differently, the Weimar Ausgabe and Luther’s Works are often 
missing footnotes to (say) Tauler but especially to Augustine, thus giving the 
impression of a novelty that masks a deeper dependence and therefore obscures the 
true originality that arose through Luther’s fresh engagement with tradition in light of 
Holy Scripture, philosophical shifts, experientia spiritualis, etc.640 A good example of 
                                                        
637 “On the Feast of the Conception of Blessed Mary the Virgin, and about Congenital Sin,” WA 
4.691.30-692.2. See note 6 above, and chapter 5.2 below. 
638 WA 56.272.3-273.2, LW 25.260 (on Rom. 4:7), WA 56.351.11-22, LW 25.340 (on Rom. 7:17). 
639 For example, 1. in the wake of the 1519 Leipzig Disputation, sola scriptura as an operating 
principle grows in importance and, to the extent that it does so, the auctoritas patrum diminishes 
(though for Luther, as for the other catholic or magisterial Reformers, it never disappears); 2. 
Luther recognizes and accepts the differences de imputatione that distinguish his mature theology 
of justification from Augustine; 3. as with most all theologians, once Luther has digested a doctrinal 
truth from the tradition he often simply reiterates it without further comment; 4. this is not merely 
a matter of practice, but of conviction: for truth, and theological truth above all, is “public” and no 
one person’s private possession (see trin. 3.2 and Paul J. Griffiths, Intellectual Appetite: A 
Theological Grammar [Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009]); 5. 
particularly in sermons, I think Luther realizes that brandishing patristic erudition sometimes 
distracts his hearers from the real matter at hand. 
640 Thus Volker Leppin (Martin Luther, 133) argues that it is Luther’s ability to connect otherwise 
previously disparate strains of thought—Augustine, German mysticism, and humanism—that 
makes for “die besondere Originalität Luthers.” 
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this phenomenon is Luther’s final sermon at Wittenberg on 17 Jan. 1546, where his 
mature theology of grace, gift, and residual sin is presented via the medium of 
Christus Samaritanus just as it had been in the 1510s and 1544, but now without any 
mention on the preacher’s part (or in the critical apparatus) to its roots in 
Augustine.641  
One great exception to this overall pattern is the role Augustine’s sp. litt. plays 
in the famous preface Luther wrote for the 1545 edition of his Latin works. In narrating 
his reformational “Durchbruch” to God’s gift of righteousness as the real meaning of 
Rom. 1:17, Luther recalls the joy he experienced in finding praeter spem that his 
apparently novel—and if novel, heretical—exegesis agreed with Augustine’s own 
affirmation of the free gift of iustitia passiva, “with which God clothes us when he 
justifies us.”642 Since Denifle’s initial provocations, whole library shelves have been 
filled with volumes devoted to explaining the relation between the old Luther’s 
memory of his progress to the actual events of the 1510s.643 I am not so foolhardy as to 
enter into this fray here, except for two brief observations. First, Luther’s mention of 
                                                        
641 WA 51.125.1-14 [A], LW 51.373. 
642 WA 54.186.16-8, cf. LW 34.337, referring to sp. litt. 9.15 (CSEL 60.167.7-8, WSA I/23.152): iustitia 
dei, non qua deus iustus est, sed qua induit hominem, cum iustificat impium. In the context, 
Augustine is exegeting Rom. 3:20-24, and here he uses Rom. 4:5 to that end. At sp. litt. 11.18 (CSEL 
60.171.5-6, WSA I/23.154), Augustine cites Rom. 1:17 and explains: iustitia dei dicitur, quod 
impertiendo eam iustos facit. Cf. Markus Wriedt, “Produktives Mißverständnis?,” 217. 
643 To begin, see Otto Hermann Pesch, “Zur Frage nach Luthers reformatorische Wende: Ergebnisse 
und Probleme der Diskussion um Ernst Bizer, Fides ex auditu,” Catholica 20 (1966), 216-43, 264-80; 
idem, “Neuere Beiträge zur Frage nach Luthers ‘Reformatorische Wende,’” Catholica 37 (1983), 259-
87 and 38 (1984), 66-133; Martin Brecht, Martin Luther: His Road to Reformation (1483-1521), trans. 
James L. Schaaf (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1985), 221-37; Volker Leppin, Martin Luther, esp. 107-117; 
Berndt Hamm, The Early Luther: Stages in a Reformation Reorientation, trans. Martin J. Lohrmann 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014). I favor Leppin’s argument for a gradual, piecemeal development 
rather than the sudden break-through sought for by “early-daters” like Holl and Vogelsang and 
“late-daters” like Bizer and Bayer. For my present purposes, it is Leppin’s argument for Luther’s full 
acceptance of Augustinian gratia by 1516/17 that counts most, a point that Bayer (Promissio, 140) 
fully agrees with despite his contention for a Reformation breakthrough in 1518. 
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sp. litt. has, I think, had the effect of over-focusing scholarly attention on the role of 
this single text in the Reformer’s development.644 As I argued in chapter 2, I believe 
Luther does indeed carry insights gleaned from this comparatively early (412 or 413) 
anti-Pelagian writing into his mature theology of the Spirit’s gift of inner renewal 
through the bestowal of spiritual delight. Thus while I in no way mean to 
underestimate its importance, I do want to suggest that its prominence in the 1545 
preface has sometimes distracted scholars from the greater debt Luther owes to 
Augustine’s works against Julian. Which leads to my second point. In the 1545 preface, 
Luther follows his happy recollection of finding his theology of justification by grace 
confirmed in sp. litt. with this major qualification: “Although this was still said 
imperfectly, and he did not explain everything about imputation clearly, it was 
nevertheless pleasing that the righteousness of God by which we are justified was 
taught.”645 To say the least, to teach less than clearly de imputatione was not a small 
matter for Martin Luther. Is he not taking away with one hand the credit he had just 
given to Augustine with the other?  
Luther is quite right to think that his theology of imputed righteousness is not 
to found in sp. litt.,646 the whole focus of which is Augustine’s classically 
                                                        
644 Bernhard Lohse, e.g., argued in 1965 that sp. litt. is the real “hub” for the question of the 
Augustine/Luther relationship, “since no other writing of the bishop of Hippo stands so close to 
Luther’s reformation theology as this.” See his “Die Bedeutung Augustins für den jungen Luther,” 
15. Leif Grane (Modus Loquendi, 35) likewise asserts that sp. litt. is the most important Augustinian 
text in terms of its influence on Luther’s theology, and that other anti-Pelagian writings, while by 
no means inessential, are “subordinate” to it. This, despite the fact that on the same page, Grane 
notes that Luther cites c. Iul. more than any other work, esp. in the Rom. 7 scholia, and rightly 
observes the disproportionate significance of nupt. conc. 1.25.28. 
645 WA 54.186.18-20: Et quamquam imperfecte hoc adhuc sit dictum, ac de imputatione non clare 
omnia explicet, placuit tamen iustitiam Dei doceri, qua nos iustificemur. Cf. LW 34.337. 
646 As Lohse puts it, Luther “over-interprets” Augustine on iustitia dei in his own Lutheran or 
“declarative” way. “Zum Wittenberger Augustinismus. Augustins Schrift De Spiritu et Littera in der 
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“Augustinian,” 2 Cor. 3:6- and Rom. 5:5-centered account of the Christian’s ongoing 
inner renovation through the grace of the Holy Spirit over against the Pelagian theory 
of self-cultivated virtue. For this reason, to the extent that the modern student of 
Luther first identifies the Reformer’s theology of justification with imputed 
righteousness, and then secondly equates Augustine’s theology of justification with 
real inner renewal, he or she will conclude—on the basis of Luther’s own authority in 
the 1545 preface—that despite his eager protestations to the contrary, Luther’s 
theology really is of a basically different kind than Augustine’s. Now, if due attention 
is paid to what I have argued is the Reformer’s mature theology of the “gift,” the 
speciousness of this conclusion appears readily enough: for Luther’s dogmatics of 
holiness does comprise an Augustinian theology of real spiritual renewal. On the other 
hand, if the nature of Augustine’s mature position against Julian in the 420s and its 
role in Luther’s theology from 1514/5 on is fully appreciated, the gap between the 
Church’s late ancient doctor gratiae and late medieval doctor iustificationis closes 
further.  
To begin to prove this decisively would require, first, a comprehensive study of 
Augustine’s theology of sin and grace in the 420s, which of course I cannot attempt 
here; and secondly, an equally comprehensive examination of the texts from 
Augustine’s oeuvre that shaped the young Luther and left a permanent stamp on his 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Auslegung bei Staupitz, Luther und Karlstadt,” in Kenneth Hagen, ed., Augustine, the Harvest, and 
Theology (1300-1650) (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 89-109, here 99-100. 
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theology.647 In lieu of such a great project, I propose here something of a more modest 
shortcut.  
A handful of Augustinian excerpts figure prominently in Luther’s early scholia 
on Rom. 4:7 and 7:17-18. On this point, Denifle, Hermann, Adolf Hamel, and Leif 
Grane648 are all agreed. In essence, these scholars have—from their different 
perspectives and to differing degrees, Hamel being the most insightful and 
sympathetic—argued that Luther’s interpretation of these Augustinian texts was 
flawed at certain decisive points, and that his appropriation thereof to buttress his in 
reality highly innovative theology with the much-desired auctoritas patris Augustini 
was therefore mistaken. My aim in the next two chapters is to closely examine how 
these excerpts factor in the early scholia,649 and to argue just the reverse: Luther’s 
                                                        
647 For all their real strengths, both Hamel’s (Der junge Luther und Augustin, 1934/5) and Pereira’s 
(Augustine of Hippo and Martin Luther on Original Sin and Justification of the Sinner, 2013) studies 
of Augustine and Luther fall short in this regard. (1) Hamel depends heavily on Reinhold Seeberg’s 
account of Augustine’s theology in his Lehrbuch (II/53-67), and Seeberg’s one-sided interpretation 
of Augustine’s theology of justification as inner Gerechtmachung sets up Hamel for over-stated 
contrasts between the church father and the Reformer (II/85-102). Hamel is also clearly influenced 
by Hermann’s monograph on the “simul,” which was published in 1930 just a few years before 
Hamel’s own work, such that at times Hamel’s position approaches the interpretation I will argue 
for in this book only to hesitate due to the authority of Hermann’s thesis (II/84-5, 132). (2) In his 
Helsinki dissertation, Pereira states that he intends to focus on the “mature/old Augustine,” i.e., the 
anti-Julian Augustine (p. 24), and his argument is informed by Timo Nisula’s insightful work on 
Augustine and concupiscentia. This is a step in the right direction. Still, I think Pereira is hampered 
by his operating assumption that there is no real development in Augustine’s position after 418 (p. 
25); relatedly, Pereira takes for granted the validity of the scholarly prioritization of sp. litt. which I 
am challenging in this book (see, e.g., pp. 35, 225-43, 294-8). This, I am afraid, means that to some 
extent Pereira has tied his own hands as an interpreter of Luther, for it is just those refinements 
which the old Augustine achieves while writing contra Iulianum that animate the young Luther and 
inspire his theology of sin, grace, and holiness. Further progress is therefore needed in terms of 
locating the roots of Luther’s dogmatics in the “420s Augustine.” These criticisms aside, I have 
learned much from both Hamel and Pereira and am in deep sympathy with many of their 
judgments. 
648 Leif Grane, Modus Loquendi, 32-6.  
649 With Hamel, Lohse, Grane, Steinmetz, Wriedt, Leppin, Saarinen, and Pereira—pace one of 
Heiko Oberman’s biggest theories—it is not necessary to posit the existence and influence of a late 
medieval Augustinian school in order to explain Luther’s Augustinianism, above all because we 
know that by 1514 or 1515 Luther had read Augustine himself in the 1506 Amerbach edition of his 
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interpretation of texts from the “420s Augustine” contra Iulianum in 1515/16 is 
intelligent and sound, and his appropriation thereof therefore carries real weight and 
force for theologians who practice their art within the Augustinian tradition.650 In 
effect, I am arguing that the young medieval Augustinian picked up in 1515/16 where 
the old and battle-weary church father left off when he died in 430, and that he 
intended to do this.651 It will then remain to compare the young Augustinian’s 
theology of sin and grace with the old and battle-weary Reformer’s dogmatics of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
works and cites extensively therefrom. The same cannot be said, e.g., of Luther vis-à-vis Gregory of 
Rimini, who does not seem to have been much noticed by the Reformer until the 1519 Leipzig 
Disputation. See Hamel, I/9-10, II/1-2; Lohse, “Die Bedeutung Augustins für den jungen Luther,” 15; 
Grane, Modus Loquendi, 24-31; David C. Steinmetz, Luther and Staupitz: An Essay in the Intellectual 
Origins of the Protestant Reformation (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1980), 17, 23-30; Wriedt, 
“Via Augustini,” esp. 35-9; idem, “Produktives Mißverständnis?” esp. 214-5; Leppin, Martin Luther, 
65, 93-5; Saarinen’s foreword to Pereira’s book, p. 11; Pereira, Augustine of Hippo and Martin Luther. 
But note Oberman’s partial adjustment at Masters of the Reformation: The Emergence of a New 
Intellectual Climate in Europe, trans. Dennis Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 
71: “Now that the Amerbach edition was being sold at the book fairs in Leipzig and Frankfurt, the 
coming generation had no desire to travel the detour through Gregory’s writings in order to make 
Augustine’s acquaintance.” 
650 Ad mentem Augustini, it is a matter of course that any derivative or ministerial authority which 
Augustine may enjoy as a doctor of the Church stands underneath the magisterial authority of the 
Word of God. Even so, dogmatic arguments drawn from “proper” and “probable” authorities within 
the catholic tradition of the Church are nothing to sneeze at. See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
theologiae I q. 1 a. 8 ad. 2: … etiam auctoritatibus philosophorum sacra doctrina utitur, ubi per 
rationem naturalem veritatem cognoscere potuerunt; sicut Paulus, actuum XVII, inducit verbum 
Arati, dicens, sicut et quidam poetarum vestrorum dixerunt, genus Dei sumus. Sed tamen sacra 
doctrina huiusmodi auctoritatibus utitur quasi extraneis argumentis, et probabilibus. Auctoritatibus 
autem canonicae Scripturae utitur proprie, ex necessitate argumentando. Auctoritatibus autem 
aliorum doctorum Ecclesiae, quasi arguendo ex propriis, sed probabiliter. Innititur enim fides nostra 
revelationi apostolis et prophetis factae, qui canonicos libros scripserunt, non autem revelationi, si 
qua fuit aliis doctoribus facta. Unde dicit Augustinus, in epistola ad Hieronymum, solis eis 
Scripturarum libris qui canonici appellantur, didici hunc honorem deferre, ut nullum auctorem eorum 
in scribendo errasse aliquid firmissime credam. Alios autem ita lego, ut, quantalibet sanctitate 
doctrinaque praepolleant, non ideo verum putem, quod ipsi ita senserunt vel scripserunt. Note 
Thomas’ appeal to Augustine’s ep. 82.1.3 (PL 33.277), an apt illustration of the Augustinian 
principles articulated in this reply. Though I doubt Augustine would have credited the philosophers 
per se with any authority at all, as Thomas at least seems to do here: for authority belongs to the 
Truth, not to the one who perceives and attests him only because he is illumined by him (cf. John 
1:9, 14:6). 
651 Thus seconding Pereira’s judgment (p. 38): “When it comes to soteriological and anthropological 
insights, Luther understood Augustine very well and was much more faithful to him than modern 
scholars tend to assume he was.” 
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holiness, as I have set forth the latter in Part I, to see whether my contention for the 
persistence of these Augustinian appropriations in shaping his theology of grace, gift, 
and the “simul” right up to his death in 1546 is in fact justifiable. That endeavor I 
reserve for the third part of this book. 
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3. AUGUSTINE CONTRA IULIANUM IN THE EARLY 1516 SCHOLIA ON 
ROMANS 7: THE AUGUSTINIAN “SIMUL” 
 
 
I begin with the scholion on Rom. 7, because Luther’s exegesis of Rom. 4:7 
presupposes (and at key moments exhibits) convictions rooted in Augustine’s final 
interpretation of Rom. 7:14-25 as St. Paul’s autobiographical confession. For Luther’s 
exegesis of Paul, and indeed for his entire dogmatic and spiritual theology of holiness, 
it is of paramount importance that the Apostle speaks here “in his own person and in 
the person of all the saints.”652 In the marginal gloss on Rom. 7:10, Luther names 
Nicholas of Lyra et alii as representatives of the alternate interpretation, viz., “that the 
Apostle is speaking in the person of some befuddled man (hominis obfuscati) and not 
in his own person,” in effect citing Lyra’s loquitur apostolus in persona generis humani 
sic obfuscati.653 In his note in WA 56, Johannes Ficker suggests that at this stage in the 
young exegete’s development et alii often refers to the great French humanist Faber 
Stapulensis. This may well be the case; but behind them both lies the influence of 
Jerome’s interpretation of Paul.654 Berndt Hamm has shown that Jerome was much 
                                                        
652 WA 56.68.12-13, cf. LW 25.61. 
653 WA 56.68.9-10. I draw the citation of Lyra’s Postillae perpetuae in universam S. Scripturam from 
Johannes Ficker’s critical note on the text. Cf. LW 25.61. 
654 Cf. Letter #27 to Spalatin, 19 Okt. 1516, WA Br 1.70.33-40: almost all the comments on the Bible 
written after Augustine—including those by Lyra, Stapulensis, and Erasmus—accept the “literal, 
i.e., the dead intelligentia.” Given Luther’s polemics against allegory, this sounds quite strange at 
first. But Luther’s remarks earlier in the letter contrasting Jerome and Augustine on the meaning of 
iustitia legis and justification show that in this case, a “spiritual and living interpretation” is simply 
one that agrees with the theology of law, grace, and iustitia that Augustine formulated in sp. litt. In 
doing so, he read 2 Cor. 3:6 as a summary statement of St. Paul’s contrast between law and grace, 
over against the interpretation of the same verse as a kind proof-text for allegorical hermeneutics 
preferred by Origen et al. In other words, Luther’s remark amounts to saying that after Augustine, 
hardly anyone interpreted the Bible in the correct Augustinian way. Cf. WA Br 1.70.8-19, LW 48.24: 
“Had Erasmus read the books Augustine wrote against the Pelagians, especially de spiritu at litera, 
likewise de peccatorum meritis et remissione, likewise contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, likewise 
contra Iulianum, which are all to be found in just the eighth part of the works; and had he seen how 
nothing is of Augustine’s own sense, but that he grasps everything in the sense of the most 
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preferred to Augustine by modish humanists prior to at least 1521. Furthermore, 
beyond the elite circles of humanism it was not Augustine, but Jerome, who best 
suited “the performance mentality and merit-orientation of late medieval piety and 
Frömmigkeitstheologie.”655 In 1524/5, the looming conflict between Erasmus’ “Jerome” 
and Luther’s “Augustine” finally broke out into the open. But already in October 1516, 
shortly after completing his lectures on Romans, Luther had confided his growing 
concerns with Jerome and Erasmus alike to Georg Spalatin.656 This being said, it is just 
as likely that Gabriel Biel (and the medieval theologians whose insights he “harvested” 
in his Collectorium) as well as the Erfurt philosophers Jodocus Trutfetter and 
Bartholomäus Arnoldi von Usingen are the real inimici gratiae whom Luther, as of 1515 
a voracious reader of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings, has in his sights as he sets his 
hand to explain Rom. 7. 
 
1. The excursus at Rom. 7:7 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
excellent fathers Cyprian, Nazianzus, Rheticus, Irenaeus, Hilary, Olympius, Innocent, and 
Ambrose; then perhaps he would not only correctly understand the Apostle, but he would also hold 
Augustine in higher esteem than he has so far done. Plainly in this I do not hesitate to dissent from 
Erasmus, because in interpreting the scriptures I esteem Jerome after Augustine, just as much as 
Erasmus esteems Augustine after Jerome in everything.” 
655 Berndt Hamm, “Hieronymus-Begeisterung und Augustinismus vor der Reformation. 
Beobachtungen zur Beziehung zwischen Humanismus und Frömmigkeitstheologie (am Beispiel 
Nürnbergs),” in Kenneth Hagen, ed., Augustine, the Harvest, and Theology (1300-1650) (Leiden: 
Brill, 1990), 127-235, here 156. On p. 157, Hamm adds: “Jerome, the doctor of ascetic virtue, 
faithfulness to the law, and judgment according to works, displaced in substance (not as a cited 
authority) Augustine, the doctor of grace and mercy,” and explains that when Augustine is cited as 
an authority, he is inserted into and interpreted within the popular hieronymianischen virtue, 
perfection, merit, and reward-oriented framework. Cf. Hamel, II/133-5; Oberman, Masters of the 
Reformation, 72-4. 
656 Letter #27, 19 Okt. 1516, WA Br 1.70-1, LW 48.23-6. Cf. Letter #57b to Spalatin, 18 Jan. 1518, WA Br 
1.133-34, LW 48.52-55, where Luther reiterates the same concerns and directs Spalatin to three of 
the four works he had listed in the letter from 1516: sp. litt., c. Iul., and c. ep. Pel. See too Luther’s 
exegesis of Gal. 5:16-17 in early 1517, WA 2.583.27-588.20, where he ominously notes Jerome’s 
dependence on Origen and cites Augustine contra Iulianum repeatedly. 
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The long scholion on Rom. 7:7 actually ranges over the entire chapter, as Luther 
marshals no less than twelve arguments to prove that Paul speaks here in his own 
person and in the present as “Saint” Paul, a homo spiritualis.657 In v. 7 Vg., Paul writes 
that he would not have known peccatum apart from the law, then argues for this 
general principle from the particular instance of the 10th Commandment: nam 
concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: non concupisces. The identification of sin 
with concupiscence disappears after v. 8 (cf. Eph. 5:5, Col. 3:5), but in the broad 
Augustinian tradition “evil desire” becomes the key concept for interpreting the 
peccatum, malum, lex peccati, and caro that dominate the rest of the chapter (as well 
as Rom. 6:12-14 and 8:1-14). Luther signals his firm standing in this tradition and his 
basic concern in the scholion by heading off this section with the three words from St. 
Paul, Nam Concupiscentiam nesciebam.658 In what follows I will forgo detailed study of 
each of the many references and allusions to Augustine in the scholion on v. 7 in favor 
of a few observations that get to the heart of the matter. 
(1) First, Luther begins his exegesis not with a thesis of his own, but with a 
lengthy paragraph comprised of excerpts from Retr. 1.23 and c. Iul. 2.5.13-14 that aims 
to establish the genuinely Augustinian provenance of his interpretation of Paul. The 
paragraph itself begins thus: “That the apostle from this text [v. 7] to the end speaks in 
his own person and as a spiritual man, and not at all in the person of a merely carnal 
man, blessed Augustine first asserted richly and firmly in the book against the 
                                                        
657 WA 56.339.4-6, LW 25.327; the twelve arguments continue to WA 56.347, LW 25.336. Grane 
(Modus Loquendi, 53-6) correctly notes that whereas Augustine locates the beginning of Paul’s 
present-tense confession at v. 14, Luther reads v. 7 already in this sense and, what’s more, 
mistakenly thinks that in this respect he follows Augustine. But Grane uses this point as a wedge to 
drive apart Luther from Augustine with respect to the chapter as a whole, a non sequitur both 
logically and exegetically. 
658 WA 56.339.4, LW 25.327. 
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Pelagians.”659 Luther probably has in mind Augustine’s single work in four books c. ep. 
Pel. (c. 420/1). Though he had toyed with the idea earlier, modern scholarship 
recognizes that this is in fact roughly the time that Augustine began to assert it with 
real confidence.660 That Luther saw this suggests a certain subtlety on his part as a 
humanistic and historical interpreter of Augustine, which other scholars have pointed 
to in his ability to discriminate between genuine and spurious Augustinian works 
bound up together in the Amerbach edition661 and which Adolar Zumkeller argues had 
been a distinguishing mark of the O.E.S.A. since Rimini’s day.662 Regardless, what 
really stands out here is the fact that Luther demurs from staking out a position of his 
own and presents his exegesis of Rom. 7 as, in literally the first place, an interpretation 
that stands in intentional continuity with Augustine’s. This is clear from the first 
sentence right on through the Augustinian excerpts that form the first paragraph, 
which concludes with Luther pointing to the second half of c. Iul. 6 as “the clearest 
interpretation of all.”663 Only at this point does Luther continue, “But let us elicit these 
same things from the very words of the apostle.”664 Even then, as we shall see 
                                                        
659 WA 56.339.5-8, cf. LW 25.327. 
660 See, e.g., Frederick Van Fleteren, “Augustine’s Evolving Exegesis of Romans 7:22-23 in its Pauline 
Context,” esp. 109-13, who rightly points to the 417 s. 151-7 as a major advance which is then 
completed in nupt. conc. and c. ep. Pel. Van Fleteren’s article depends on M.-F. Berrouard, 
“l’exégèse augustinienne de Rom. 7:7-25 entre 396-418 avec remarques sur les deux premières 
périodes de la crise pélagienne,” Recherches Augustiniennes 16 (1981): 101-96. Van Fleteren’s 
excursus on Luther and Augustine vis-à-vis Rom. 7 leaves much to be desired (113-14), and perhaps 
suggests why he seems so keen to emphasize the more “optimistic” stance that Augustine held in 
the early to mid 390s (113). 
661 Oberman, Masters of the Reformation, 74 n. 56, pointing to Luther’s rejection of the De vera et 
falsa poenitentia in Oct. 1516, WA Br 1.65.24-6: Est enim… nihil ab Augustini eruditione et sensu 
remotius; cf. Brecht, Road to Reformation, 96. 
662 Adolar Zumkeller, O.S.A., “The Augustinian School of the Middle Ages,” in idem., Theology and 
History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages, ed. John E. Rotelle (Augustinian Heritage 
Institute: Augustinian Press, 1996), 11-79, here 13-14. 
663 WA 56.340.3-4, LW 25.328. 
664 WA 56.340.5, cf. LW 25.328. 
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presently, the ensuing exegesis is shot-through with express citations of Augustine’s 
works and implicit allusions to his mature theology. As Hermann, Hamel, and Grane 
have recognized, Luther’s evident and eager intention in the Rom. 7 scholion is to 
follow in the exegetical, theological, and spiritual footsteps of b. Augustinus.665 What 
remains to be seen is whether this intention was well-meant but mistaken, as 
Hermann and Grane argued, or in fact successfully executed.  
(2) We can begin with Luther’s fourth argument, which starts out with v. 16b 
Vg666 but then swings back to include vv. 15-18. Paul’s text reads thus: 
[15] Quod enim operor, non intelligo: non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago: sed 
quod odi malum, illud facio. [16] Si autem quod nolo, illud facio: Consentio legi 
Dei, quoniam Bona est. [17] Nunc autem iam non ego operor illud, sed quod 
habitat in me peccatum. [18] Scio enim quia non habitat in me, hoc est in carne 
mea, bonum. Nam velle, adiacet mihi: perficere autem bonum, non invenio. 
 
[15] I do not understand what I work: for I do not do the good I want, but I do 
the evil that I hate. [16] But if I do what I do not want, I consent to the law of 
God, since it is good. [17] But now I myself do not do that, but the sin that 
dwells in me. [18] For I know that the good does not dwell in me, that is in my 
flesh. For to will the good is present to me, but to complete the good I do not 
find. 
 
Luther’s first concern is to avoid taking Paul to mean that he does the evil he hates 
and does not do the good he wants—i.e., just what v. 15 says—moraliter et 
methaphysice, “as if he did nothing good but all evil; for taken in a human sense, his 
words sound that way.”667 But Paul’s apostolic “way of speaking” (modus loquendi) 
must be carefully attended to. He is not, as Grane rightly emphasizes, speaking as an 
Aristotelian moral philosopher. But neither is Paul—nor Luther—speaking as a kind of 
modern existential Lutheran theologian born before his time. Rather, to explain Paul, 
                                                        
665 Hermann, 23, 139-40, 155-8, 192-5; Hamel, II/16-23; Grane, Modus Loquendi, 56, 59-60, 80, 99. 
666 WA 56.341.20, LW 25.330. 
667 WA 56.341.27-30, cf. LW 25.330. 
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Luther turns to the very augustinischer Redeweise that Grane warns us not to be fooled 
by,668 at the heart of which stands the facere/perficere distinction that Luther explains 
b. Augustinus li. 3 in fine contra Iulianum copiose docet.669 The reference is to c. Iul. 
3.26.62, which Luther cites in full as the conclusion to his scholion on Rom. 7, and to 
which we shall return below. “One must note,” explains Luther, “that the Apostle 
distinguishes between ‘to do’ (facere) and ‘to complete’ (perficere), as blessed 
Augustine teaches.”670 In other words, Paul’s meaning is rightly grasped only when the 
apparent human sense of his words is overcome by the proper “Augustinian” sense 
that Paul actually had in mind, that Augustine explained copiously at the end of c. Iul. 
3, and that Luther purposes to carry forward in his own interpretation. And in point of 
fact, when Luther explains Rom. 7:15-18 he displays a full command of Paul’s modus 
loquendi augustinianus. Paul means 
… that he does not do the good as often and as much and with as much ease as 
he wants. For he wants to act in the purest, freest, and most joyful way, 
without the vexations of the flesh fighting back. This he cannot do. It is as with 
a man who proposes to be chaste: he would want not to be assailed by any 
titillations, and to have chastity with the greatest ease. But this is not 
permitted by the flesh, which by its movements and thoughts makes chastity 
most bothersome and acts by its own impure desires, even though the spirit is 
unwilling (Inuito spiritu). He who proposes to keep vigil, to pray, to work for 
his neighbor will always find rebellious flesh devising and desiring other 
things. Hence one must singularly note here that the Apostle distinguishes 
between “doing” and “completing” (facere et perficere), as blessed Augustine 
copiously teaches at the end of contra Iulianum book 3. Here, “to do” (facere) is 
taken to mean to try, to devise, to experience desires, to will, etc., such things 
as without intermission the flesh works against the spirit and the spirit works 
against the flesh [Gal. 5:17]. For if “to do” meant “to fulfill by a work,” the 
Apostle would not have said: “I do the evil I do not want, the good I want I do 
                                                        
668 Grane, 80. 
669 WA 56.342.6-7, cf. LW 25.330. On the distinction, cf. Hamel (II/69-71) and Pereira (373-80), who 
rightly observes that it is “one of the cornerstones of Luther’s doctrine of simul iustus et peccator” 
(p. 373) and that “in the righteous sinner there is no consent” (p. 380). 
670 WA 56.342.6-7, cf. LW 25.330. 
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not do,” by which words he most evidently expresses the battle between flesh 
and spirit. For he wants something other than what he does. That is, he has 
good pleasure and will (voluntatem) through spiritum, by outpoured charity, 
prompt toward the good and to hatred toward evil; and nevertheless, with the 
flesh and adverse concupiscence resisting, he is not able to fulfill and complete 
this will (voluntatem). For if he would complete and fulfill it, he would work 
the good without resistance, delightfully; for this is what his will (voluntas) 
wants. Now, however, he does not work in this way; therefore, what he wants, 
he does not do, but what he does not want, he does. He, however, who is 
without a fight and follows the flesh and obeys concupiscences certainly does 
not resist. He does not say, “I do what I do not want.” He does not delight in 
what is contrary to what he does, but he delights in what he works. But “to 
complete” (perficere) is to fulfill what one wants or desires. Thus the Spiritus 
completes the good it wants when without rebellion it works according to 
God’s law, which is not of this life, because “to complete I do not find” [v. 18]. 
But flesh completes when, with delight and without repugnance and difficulty, 
it works according to concupiscences. And this is of this life, rather of death 
and the perdition of the world; for it is easy to work evil. Therefore I have said 
that this word proves that Paul speaks here not as a carnal but as a most 
spiritual man.671 
 
This, as Luther correctly indicates, is stock-in-trade exegesis of Rom. 7:15-18 (and Gal. 
5:17) for the mature Augustine writing contra Iulianum. St. Paul fights against himself, 
                                                        
671 WA 56.341.30-342.29: … non tot et tantum bonum nec tanta facilitate faciat, quantum et quanta 
vult. Vult enim purissime, liberrime et lȩtissime, sine molestiis repugnantis carnis agere, quod non 
potest, Vt qui castus esse proponit, Vellet nullis titillationibus impugnari, Sed cum omni facilitate 
castitatem habere. Sed non sinitur a carne, quȩ suis motibus et cogitationibus facit molestissimam 
castitatem et agit sua immunda desideria, etiam Inuito spiritu. Qui Vigilare, orare, operari proximo 
proponit, semper Inueniet rebellem carnem et alia machinantem atque cupientem. Vnde singulariter 
hic Notandum est, Quod ‘facere’ et ‘perficere’ Apostolus distinguit, Vt b. Aug⌊ustinus li. 3. in fine 
contra Iulianum copiose docet. ‘Facere’ enim hic pro conari, machinari, desideria mouere, velle etc. 
accipitur, Qualia sine intermissione caro contra spiritum et spiritus contra carnem operatur. Si enim 
pro ‘opere implere’ acciperetur, Non deberet Apostolus dicere: ‘Quod nolo malum, facio, quod volo 
bonum, non facio’, quibus verbis euidentissime expressit pugnam inter carnem et spiritum. Quia ‘vult 
aliud quam facit’, hoc est, habet beneplacitum et voluntatem per spiritum diffusa charitate promptam 
ad bonum et odium ad malum, et tamen resistente carne et aduersa concupiscentia non potest hanc 
voluntatem implere et perficere. Si enim perficeret et impleret, sine resistentia bonum operaretur et 
delectabiliter; hoc enim vult voluntas eius. Nunc autem non ita operatur; ideo quod vult, non facit, 
Sed quod non vult, facit. Is autem, qui sine pugna est et carnem sequitur et concupiscentiis obedit, 
vtique non resistit, non dicit: ‘Quod nolo, hoc facio’, non delectatur in contrario quam facit, Sed in eo, 
quod operatur. ‘Perficere’ autem est implere, quod vult vel concupiscit. Vt Spiritus perficit, quod vult 
bonum, quando sine rebellione operatur secundum legem Dei, quod non est huius vitȩ, quia ‘perficere 
non Inuenio’. Caro autem perficit, quando cum delectatione sine repugnantia et difficultate operatur 
secundum concupiscentias. Et hoc est huius vitȩ, immo mortis et perditio mundi; facile est enim 
malum operari. Ideo dixi hoc verbum probare non carnalem, Sed spiritualissimum hominem Paulum 
hic loqui. Cf. LW 25.330-1. 
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because his being is divided between the competing desires that comprise his “spirit” 
and his “flesh.” He is a most spiritual man because his renewed self, his spiritus, does 
not permit his flesh to gain the upper hand. To be sure, the flesh “does” things 
(facere): it titillates, vexes, rebels, etc. But because Paul fights back against it, his flesh 
is not able to bring its evil desires (concupiscentiae) to the completion in act that it 
longs for (perficere). Contrariwise, Paul’s spiritus does things too (facere): it resists the 
impulses of the flesh it is forced to suffer unwillingly; it heartily and promptly wills the 
good, through out-poured love (Rom. 5:5); and it longs to act in the purest, freest, and 
most joyful manner, in accord with the divine law in which it delights. But in this life, 
prior to the eschatological completion of the resurrection, St. Paul must contend 
against his flesh, and is not able to complete (perficere) his holy voluntas for the 
freedom and delight that marks the unchecked obedience and love of the saints in 
glory.672 This is the mature Augustine’s spirit/flesh “simul,” and by both his express 
statement of intention and his skillful exposition of its content, Luther shows that he 
adopts it in toto.673  
                                                        
672 Cf. the interlinear gloss on Rom. 7:18, WA 56.70.14-20: Scio enim per spiritum et experientiam 
repugnantiȩ eius quia non habitat in me: vt carnali, vnde sequitur: hoc est in carne mea in exteriori 
homine bonum. i.e. inconcupiscentia seu puritas Nam uelle adiacet mihi: i.e. quod volo non 
concupiscere, e spiritu sancto est per charitatem perficere autem vt non sit in me amplius bonum i.e. 
non-concupiscentiam non inuenio. in hac vita, sed erit in futura. Cf. LW 25.63. 
673 Note as well that in the first marginal gloss on Rom. 7:18 (WA 56.70.22-3), Luther adds: Deus in 
Christo regenerat hominem generatum sanatque vitiatum a reatu statim, ab infirmitate paulatim. 
Luther does not draw attention to, nor does Ficker recognize, the fact that this is an exact quote of 
c. Iul. 2.4.8 (NBA I/18.524, PL 44.679): God in Christ regenerat hominem generatum, sanatque 
vitiatum, a reatu statim, ab infirmitate paulatim. Hamel, however, observed the citation and 
commented (II/83): “Völlig mit Augustin übereinstimmend sagt Luther, daß Gott durch Christus 
den Menschen in der Taufe sofort von der Schuld und Erbsünde, dagegen allmählich von der noch 
verbleibenden Schwäche heilt. Ganz wie Augustin redet er von einem Wachsen der Gnade.” In the 
second marginal gloss, Luther adds two further apt but brief (and slightly altered) excerpts from c. 
Iul. 2.3.7 and 2.4.8. From 2.3.7 (WA 56.70.24-71.3): B. Aug. li. 2. contra Iul: “Christianorum est ista 
pugna fidelium. In Baptismate fit remissio omnium peccatorum. Et cum baptisatis quasi ciuile bellum 
remanet vitiorum.” At the corresponding place in NBA I/18.522, we find: Christianorum est ista 
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 In this light, the several totus homo statements that appear in fifth the through 
the twelfth arguments gain considerably in clarity.  
 (3) The fifth begins with Rom. 7:20: Non ego operor illud, Sed quod habitat in me 
peccatum.674 This proves that Paul is a spiritual man who does not sin, “because the 
flesh desires evilly while he dissents, yes indeed properly he himself does not desire 
evilly, because he dissents from the evil desires of the flesh.”675 The flesh concupiscit, 
but spiritual Paul is properly differentiated from the concupiscences of his flesh 
because he does not consent to them and, therefore, does not sin. Still, v. 19 stands: “I 
do not do the good I want,” etc., because Paul’s flesh with its evil desires—despite his 
battle against them—is still Paul’s flesh. 
For the same person is spirit and flesh; therefore, what he does by flesh, the 
whole man (totus) is said to do. Nevertheless, because he resists, the whole 
man (totus) does not do it (facere), but a part of him (pars eius) is rightly said 
to do so.676  
 
In other words, in v. 19 Paul speaks improperly the same truth that he speaks properly 
in the next v. 20. It is said of the whole Paul that he does not do the good he wants, 
and that he does evil instead. But properly, rightly, this ought only to be said of that 
“part” of him which is his flesh—i.e., v. 20’s indwelling sin—because the Paul who 
unwillingly suffers the flesh’s impulses resists them and refuses to consent to them. 
Because spirit and flesh together constitute eadem persona, it is truthful to say both 
                                                                                                                                                                     
pugna fidelium, non infidelium Iudaeorum. Crede, si non pugnas; agnosce, si pugnas, et ista pugna 
rebellem quoque superbiam Pelagiani erroris expugna. Iamne discernis, iamne perspicis, et cum 
baptizatis quasi civile bellum interiorum remanere vitiorum? Luther adds, from 2.4.8 (WA 56.71.3-5): 
Et iterum: “Lex peccati repugnans legi mentis, que in tanti quoque Apostoli membris erat, remittitur 
in baptismate, non finitur. Cf. NBA I/18.524—just a few lines prior to the above-noted citation from 
the same place: Lex itaque peccati repugnans legi mentis, quae in tanti quoque apostoli membris erat, 
remittitur in Baptismate, non finitur. 
674 WA 56.342.30, cf. LW 25.331. 
675 WA 56.342.31-3, cf. LW 25.331. 
676 WA 56.342.33-343.2, cf. LW 25.331. 
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that Paul operatur (because his flesh is part of him) and that he himself does not do 
so, but only the “sin that dwells in me” (because his spirit resists and triumphs), v. 
20.677 In all this, Luther anticipates the famous christological analogy we will see him 
develop further in a moment. But already, in classic Augustinian fashion, Luther 
clarifies the point where the analogy breaks down. Paul is not upholding that spirit 
and flesh are two substances that together make up a single person, as a Manichean 
might think: “for mind and flesh are not only of one person, but even of one will (vnius 
voluntatis).”678 For Luther, following Augustine, “spirit” (or in this case, “mind,” from 
Rom. 7:23 and 25) and “flesh” denominate contrary desires, delights, loves, or 
affections that divide the renewed person’s will (or heart)—and only the renewed 
person’s will. For the one who consents to his flesh becomes flesh pure and simple, 
whereas the flesh-fighting homo spiritualis experiences the inner division of his 
affections. 
 (4) The christological analogy comes into its own in the sixth and seventh 
arguments, both handling Rom. 7:18. In the sixth, Luther first observes how Paul 
attributes flesh to himself quasi he himself were flesh, whereas in fact it is but a part of 
him. This is the import of v. 18, and it also explains why and in what sense Paul 
confesses carnalis sum in v. 14. He confesses that he is evil, because he “does” evil—in 
his flesh. But propter spiritum he is spiritual and good, and does good. “Thus it must 
be noted,” explains Luther, “that this word ‘I will’ and ‘I hate’ [vv. 15, 19-20] refer to the 
                                                        
677 WA 56.343.2, cf. LW 25.331. 
678 WA 56.343.6-7: quia iam non tantum vnius sunt personȩ mens et caro, Sed etiam vnius voluntatis. 
Cf. LW 25.331. 
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spiritual man or spirit, ‘I do’ however and ‘I work’ [vv. 15-17, 19-20] to the carnal or ad 
carnem.”679 To make better sense of this, he sets out his analogy: 
But because the same one total man consists of flesh and spirit, therefore 
[Paul] attributes both contraria to the whole man, which come from his 
contrary parts. For in this way a communio Ideomatum takes place, because the 
same man is spiritual and carnal, righteous and sinner, good and evil. Just as 
the same person of Christ is dead and alive simul, suffering and blessed simul, 
at work and at rest simul, etc., because of the communionem Ideomatum, 
although what is proper to one of the natures does not agree with what is 
proper to the other, but they dissent with the greatest contrariety, as is known. 
But these things have no place at all in the carnal man, where the whole man is 
completely flesh, because God’s Spirit does not remain in him. Therefore, the 
carnal man is not able to say: “in me, that is in my flesh” [v. 18], as if he himself 
were something different from the flesh per voluntatem. But he is the same 
with the flesh per consensum to his evil desires.680 
 
To understand Luther’s Augustinian anthropology of the spiritual human person, we 
must grasp (as David Luy has cogently argued) the traditional orthodoxy of his 
christology.681 In the one Lord Jesus Christ, what is proprium to his divine nature 
disagrees contrariissime with what is proprium to the human nature he assumes into 
the unity of his person. Yet because of this real union of the two natures (with their 
diverse properties) in his person, what is stricto sensu proper to only one or the other 
of the natures may be truthfully predicated of the one person as a whole. This is the 
traditional catholic doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum, which Luther gladly 
appropriates in his own christology; but here, he puts it to work to explain Rom. 7.  
                                                        
679 WA 56.343.8-16, cf. LW 25.331-2. 
680 WA 56.343.16-27: Sed quia ex carne et spiritu idem vnus homo constat totalis, ideo toti homini 
tribuit vtraque contraria, que ex contrariis sui partibus veniunt. Sic enim fit communio Ideomatum, 
Quod idem homo est spiritualis et carnalis, Iustus et peccator, Bonus et malus. Sicut eadem persona 
Christi simul mortua et viua, simul passa et beata, simul operata et quieta etc. propter communionem 
Ideomatum, licet neutri naturarum alterius proprium conueniat, Sed contrariissime dissentiat, vt 
notum est. Hȩc autem in Carnali homine nequaquam habent locum, Vbi omnino totus homo caro est, 
quia non permansit in eo spiritus Dei. Ideo carnalis non potest dicere: ‘in me id est in carne mea’, 
quasi ipse aliud a carne per voluntatem sit, Sed est idem cum carne per consensum in concupiscentias 
eius. Cf. LW 25.332. 
681 David J. Luy, Dominus Mortis: Martin Luther on the Incorruptibility of God in Christ. 
 244
There is only one person, St. Paul, but the apostle is comprised of diverse 
affections. These retain their respective properties and apply properly only to the 
“parts” of him that they name, viz., either spirit or flesh, righteous man or sinner, etc. 
But both can be truly predicated of Paul as a concrete whole, on account of the 
communio of competing and contrary desires that he empirically is. He is not actually 
either wholly saint or wholly sinner, wholly spirit or wholly flesh, but by virtue of the 
communio idiomatum he may be named as either or as both simul. But, Luther insists, 
the analogy only applies to the spiritual person, not the carnal. The “carnal man” is so-
called because by consenting to his evil desires he has become nothing but flesh, 
omnino totus homo caro est. Because the spiritual man retains a voluntas contrary to 
the evil desires he still experiences, he is like the orthodox Jesus in being a person 
made up of two “parts”: in Christ’s case, two natures or substances in one person; in 
Paul’s, contrary affections in one will. But the carnal man is like the heretical Jesus 
preferred by some theologians both ancient and modern: pure flesh in the one 
matching pure humanity in the other, with nothing divine about either.  
It is probably not an accident that the totus/totus dialectical “simul” favored by 
some modern scholars (e.g., Theobald Beer) matches the dialectical christologies 
championed by the same.682 I do not mean to assert a necessary logical connection 
between rejecting Chalcedonian orthodoxy and rejecting an Augustinian account of 
embattled holiness. But when the careful distinctions of Luther’s robustly catholic 
christology are abandoned, and in its place an alien modern christology is then read 
into his analogy, the anthropological result is an ambiguously (or dialectically, or 
                                                        
682 Theobald Beer, Der fröhliche Wechsel und Streit: Grundzüge der Theologie Luthers (Leipzig: St. 
Benno, 1974). I am thankful to my friend David Luy for pointing me to Beer in this regard. 
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imputationally) “holy” saint who is a sinner simul et totaliter. And as we have seen, 
this is quite mistaken as an interpretation of what Luther actually sets forth in the 
text. Only when the orthodoxy of Luther’s christology is fully appreciated can the 
basic Augustinianism of its analogical anthropological application be so as well.   
 (5) The seventh argument starts out from Rom. 7:18b (Velle mihi adiacet, 
perficere autem non Inuenio). Alluding to Rom. 5:5, Luther explains that this “willing” 
is the “readiness of the spirit” (promptitudo spiritus) which comes from charity. Its 
completion is the bonum that Paul confesses he wants but cannot yet attain in v. 19. 
Even in its present imperfection, Paul’s spiritual readiness for the good corresponds to 
David’s description of the blessed man at Ps. 1:2 Vg., viz., in lege Domini Voluntas eius. 
Luther then takes up Ps. 1:2’s Voluntas as the key to interpret Rom. 7:18’s velle, and 
explains that both refer to “the pleasure and delight in the good (beneplacitum et 
delectatio boni) that the law commands.”683 This brings Luther to Rom. 7:22, and the 
second major totus passage: 
“I delight in the law of God according to the interior man” [Rom. 7:22], but “to 
complete” (perficere), viz., this good of the law, he is not able to do with the 
flesh resisting. Because he wills to not desire evilly (Vult non concupiscere) and 
judges that it is good to not desire evilly; and yet, he desires evilly, and he does 
not complete this willing of his (non perficit hoc velle suum). And so he fights 
with himself. But because spirit and flesh are so intimately connected as one 
(coniunctissime sunt unum)—even though they feel diversely (diuerse 
sentiant)—he therefore attributes the work of both to himself as a whole, as if 
he were totally flesh and totally spirit at the same time (quasi simul sit totus 
caro et totus spiritus). Nevertheless, by these words he declares his position 
and responds to the objection that one might raise: “If you do not do what the 
law commands, but do what you do not want, and do not do what you want to 
do, how then do you not sin (non peccas)?” Paul responds: “Because he does 
(facit) the good, but does not complete (perficit) it, since he does not 
extinguish the evil desire of the flesh.” Therefore this willing (Velle) and this 
will (voluntatem), which Ps. 1[:2] attributes to the blessed man and the Spirit 
                                                        
683 WA 56.344.23-7, cf. LW 25.333. 
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alone gives through charity [Rom. 5:5]—how is a merely carnal man able to 
have this, who has rather a not-willingness (noluntatem)?684  
 
Once again, a deeply Augustinian vision emerges: the Holy Spirit gives (donat) the 
charity that produces delight in and desire for the completion of holiness commanded 
by the law,685 and St. Paul thus delighting, willing, and loving is “spirit.” But “flesh” 
remains for the fight, with desires of its own. He wants to be free from concupiscentia, 
yet continues to desire evilly against his own holy voluntas. He does the good but 
cannot yet complete it, fighting against the flesh which resists his holy desire and 
yet—at the same time—remains part of his divided self. ita secum ipse pugnat or, in 
Jon Foreman’s words, “I am the war I fight.”686 Because Paul is his spirit and his flesh, 
what he “feels” in either part, or the “work” of either part, may be attributed to him as 
a whole. But he is not wholly the one or the other, and when Paul does use this form 
of predication he speaks “as if” he were simul totus caro et totus spiritus. 
Luther’s quasi in this sentence must be carefully noted and weighed, for it is an 
explicit rejection on his part of the (in Joest’s terminology) “total simul” in favor of the 
Augustinian “partim/partim simul” that he has been advocating in his exegesis of Rom. 
7 all the while. Oppressed by his own flesh, Paul confesses he has not yet been 
                                                        
684 WA 56.344.27-345.9: ‘Condelector legi Dei secundum interiorem hominem’, Sed ‘perficere’, scil. hoc 
bonum legis, resistente carne non potest. Quia Vult non concupiscere et bonum Iudicat non 
concupiscere, et tamen concupiscit et non perficit hoc velle suum Et ita secum ipse pugnat, Sed quia 
spiritus et caro coniunctissime sunt vnum, licet diuerse sentiant, ideo vtriusque opus sibi toti tribuit, 
quasi simul sit totus caro et totus spiritus. Veruntamen istis verbis declarat se et obiectioni respondet, 
si diceretur: Si non facis, que lex Iubet, Sed facis, que non vis, et non facis, que vis, quomodo ergo non 
peccas? Respondet, Quod facit, Sed non perficit bonum, quia non extinguit concupiscentiam carnis. 
Hoc itaque Velle et hanc voluntatem, quam beato viro tribuit psalmus 1. et solus spiritus donat per 
charitatem, quomodo potest mere carnalis habere, qui noluntatem potius habet? Cf. LW 25.333-4. 
685 Cf. WA 56.346.5-7 (argument #9): Ista delectatio est ex spiritu sancto per Charitatem, vt sepe 
dictum est, sine qua Impossibile est diligi legem et Iustitiam. Cf. LW 25.334. 
686 Switchfoot, “The War Inside,” #3 in the album Vice Verses (lower case people records/Atlantic, 
2011). 
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perfected in the holiness of love that he longs for. But because he is filled with the 
charity and delight that the Holy Spirit produces in his heart, he resists his flesh and 
does not sin. In this regard, Luther’s anticipation—on Paul’s behalf—of a possible 
objection to Paul’s words is especially illuminating. “If you do not do what the law 
commands, how do you not sin?” Denifle’s and Hermann’s modern Lutheran Paul 
might reply: “I do sin, boldly; but I rejoice more boldly still, because Christ’s alien 
righteousness covers me!” By stark contrast, Luther’s Augustinian Paul replies: “You 
are mistaken, for I do not sin; I delight in God’s law and I do the good—though I 
confess not yet completely, as I heartily wish I could.”  
 (6) The proper role of imputation comes into view in the twelfth and final 
argument, replete with striking “simul” statements, on Rom. 7:25b: Igitur Ego ipse 
mente seruio legi Dei, Carne autem legi peccati. “This,” writes Luther, “is the most 
express proof of them all.” 
Look, as one and the same man (vnus et idem homo) he serves the law of God 
and the law of sin at the same time, he is righteous and he sins at the same 
time! For he does not say: “My mind serves the law of God,” nor “My flesh 
serves the law of sin,” but “I, he says, the whole man, the same person (totus 
homo, persona eadem), I serve both servitudes.” Therefore he also gives thanks 
that he serves the law of God, and he seeks mercy because he serves the law of 
sin. Who would assert this about the carnal man, that he serves the law of 
God? Now look at what I said above, that at the same time as the saints are 
righteous, they are sinners: righteous, because they believe in Christ, whose 
righteousness covers them and is imputed to them; but sinners because they 
do not fulfill the law, they are not without concupiscence (non sunt sine 
concupiscentia). They are like sick people under the care of a physician, who 
really are sick, but are healthy in a beginning way and in hope, or rather they 
are being healed, i.e., becoming healthy.687 
                                                        
687 WA 56.347.2-13: Vide, vt vnus et idem homo simul seruit legi Dei et legi peccati, simul Iustus est et 
peccat! Non enim ait: Mens mea seruit legi Dei, Nec: Caro mea legi peccati, Sed: ego, inquit, totus 
homo, persona eadem, seruio vtranque seruitutem. Ideo et gratias agit, Quod seruit legi Dei, et 
misericordiam querit, quod seruit legi peccati. Quis hoc de Carnali asserat homine, quod seruiat legi 
Dei? Vide nunc, quod supra dixi, Quod simul Sancti, dum sunt Iusti, sunt peccatores; Iusti, quia 
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Grane reads Luther’s “totus” and “simul” language here dialectically and 
paradoxically—i.e., the whole person is righteous, the whole person is a sinner, 
simul—and sets it against Augustine’s more pedestrian spirit/flesh “simul.”688  This 
might perhaps appear to be the case at first glance if extracted from its context in the 
scholion on Rom. 7:7. But Luther’s vnus et idem homo and persona eadem clearly link 
this passage back to the christological analogy worked out in the preceding 
arguments. Once more, Luther is showing why Paul is not a Manichean theologian: 
the one person St. Paul, Ego ipse, confesses he serves a twofold servitude, to wit, to 
God’s law with his renewed mind or spirit on the one hand, and to the law of the flesh 
with his flesh on the other. That he serves the law of sin—or, as Luther has it at the 
top of the excerpt, that he “sins” and is a “sinner”—is reduced to a single cause: he is 
not without concupiscence, and therefore does not fulfill the law; for the law forbids 
evil desire entirely. There are two causes, however, for Paul’s (or any other Christian’s) 
being holy and righteous. First, he does in fact serve the law of God: a spiritual reality 
for which he gives thanks, this being not the result of his own moral striving but the 
gift of God’s grace. Second, Christ’s righteousness covers him and is imputed to his 
account. In this, we see Luther’s mature theology of “gift” and “grace” in its germinal 
form, with real but imperfect renewal in holiness complemented by the iustitia Christi 
imputata.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
credunt in Christum, cuius Iustitia eos tegit et eis imputatur, peccatores autem, quia non implent 
legem, non sunt sine concupiscentia, Sed sicut ȩgrotantes sub cura medici, qui sunt re vera ȩgroti, Sed 
inchoatiue et in spe sani seu potius sanificati i. e. sani fientes. Cf. LW 25.336. 
688 Grane, Modus Loquendi, 57. 
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What’s more, the “gift”-style sanative analogy that concludes the excerpt—so 
favored, in its several permutations, by Karl Holl,689  and firmly emphasized by 
Hamel690—points to the rationale behind the abiding need for the “grace” of Christ’s 
righteousness imputed to faith, which Hermann, Grane, et al. prefer. The saints in the 
care of Christus Medicus really are being healed of the disease of evil desire that afflicts 
them.691 But even as the saints convalesce, being not yet fully cured of concupiscence, 
they are already entirely sub cura medici, with Christ’s righteousness covering their 
sinful imperfections. This is the point where Holl’s analytic theory falters, and the 
more confessional emphasis on the free imputation of Christ’s righteousness to faith in 
the present stands on firmer ground. Only when the strengths of the two 
interpretative schools are held together—thus correcting their respective 
weaknesses—can both (a) the Augustinian debt of Luther’s sanative theology of real 
progressive sanctification and (b) the Reformer’s genuine novelty vis-à-vis what he 
later came to regard as Augustine’s Achilles heel (de imputatione non clare omnia 
explicet!)692 be rightly esteemed in their mutual relation one to the other, which I have 
referred to in this study as his dogmatics of gift (“a”) and grace (“b”). But in light of 
                                                        
689 See Holl’s essay of 1910, “Die Rechtfertigungslehre in Luthers Vorlesung über den Römerbrief 
mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Frage der Heilsgewißheit.” 
690 Hamel, I/115-19, II/49-50, 57-9, 83-5. 
691 On this image in Luther’s theology, see Johann Anselm Steiger, Medizinische Theologie: Christus 
medicus und theologia medicinalis bei Martin Luther und im Luthertum der Barockzeit. Mit Edition 
dreier Quellentexte (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 3-47. Steiger observes the roots of the metaphor in patristic 
theology, especially Augustine and Gregory the Great (p. 3). But in light of my argument here, I 
think Steiger’s assumption of a one-sided Simullehre leads him to place too much emphasis on 
imputation as the content of Christ’s healing work (e.g., 4-5, 16-8). 
692 But cf. the somewhat exceptional c. Iul. op. imp. 1.57, CSEL 85/1.55 (cf. WSA I/25.85): … sic 
imputari generatis parvulis iniustitiam primi hominis ad subeundum supplicium, quemadmodum 
imputatur parvulis regeneratis iustitia secundi hominis ad obtinendum regnum caelorum; c. Iul. op. 
imp. 3.148, CSEL 85/1.454 (cf. WSA I/25.350): Si autem parvuli propter iustitiam secundi hominis, qui 
regenerationis est auctor, deputantur iusti, cur non propter peccatum primi hominis, qui generationis 
est auctor, deputantur iniusti? Also: c. Iul. op. imp. 3.49, 6.22-3. 
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Luther’s unannounced citation of c. Iul. 2.4.8 in the first marginal gloss on Rom. 7:18, 
even this real novelty regarding imputation should not be exaggerated beyond its 
proper bounds. For in early 1516, Luther very much intends to recover and carry 
forward Augustine’s teaching that “God in Christ regenerates the man who was born, 
and heals the wounded man: from guilt instantly, from weakness bit by bit.”693 
 
2. The scholia on Rom. 7:17-18 
 
In the concluding portion of his exegesis of Rom. 7, Luther cites nupt. conc. once and 
c. Iul. four times: the first four references interspersing his own extensive exegesis of v. 
17, the last and longest standing essentially by itself as Luther’s adopted commentary 
on v. 18, in place of any substantive exegetical remarks of his own. To grasp the role 
played by each quotation, and to assess its textual accuracy and theological fittingness 
in Luther’s argument, it is vital to observe their place in the overall flow of his 
exegesis. I will therefore examine in turn each Augustinian quotation in Luther’s 
scholia on these two verses from St. Paul. I also count nine excerpts from (or strong 
allusions to) Augustine’s mature works against Julian in the glosses on Rom. 7:15-24: 
one likely alluding to nupt. conc. 1.25.28, the rest taken from c. Iul. itself.694 Some of 
these have already factored in my exposition of the scholion on Rom. 7:7 above, and 
others will be brought in here to illumine the scholia on Rom. 7:17-18. 
 
2.1. On Rom. 7:17 
                                                        
693 WA 56.70.22-3, NBA I/18.524, PL 44.679. Cf. Hamel, II/83. 
694 1. Interlinear gloss on v. 17, c. Iul. 2.5.14 (citing Ambrose); 2. first marginal gloss on v. 18, quoting 
from (but not referring to) c. Iul. 2.4.8; 3. & 4., second marginal gloss on v. 18, c. Iul. 2.3.7 and 2.4.8; 
5. first marginal gloss on v. 19, c. Iul. 3.26.62; 6. and 7., second marginal gloss on v. 19, c. Iul. 2.3.5 
and 2.3.6 (citing Cyprian); 8. marginal gloss on v. 20, naming Augustine without reference, but 
alluding to nupt. conc. 1.25.28 or any number of passages in c. Iul. explicating that contentious text; 
9. marginal gloss on v. 24, c. Iul. 2.3.6. 
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2.1.1. c. Iul. 2.5.12. Luther first sets his interpretation in the context of the question that 
would soon factor so critically in the Ablaßstreit, to wit: is “sin” abolished by baptism 
and by sacramental penance, such that the baptized/absolved person is without sin 
simpliciter, or does it in some real sense remain? As I explained above, modern 
scholars recognize that Augustine’s position on this question shifted during the 410s 
and 20s, in general viewing postbaptismal concupiscentia as an “evil” that is not 
properly sinful apart from the consent of the will in the 410s, but then in the 420s 
evincing an increasing willingness to speak of it as sinful (or simply as “sin” or 
“iniquity”) already prior to such consent.695 Luther’s use here of three late Augustinian 
texts contra Iulianum displays his awareness of Augustine’s two positions, the sense in 
which he too can affirm both of them, and his clear preference for the latter.  
It was, after all, St. Paul himself who started the controversy by writing at v. 17 
that “it is no longer I who do it, but sin (peccatum) that dwells in me.” Hence, says 
Luther, when “our theologians” assert that sin is “abolished” (aboleri) in baptism (or 
penance), and think it “absurd” for Paul to say what he in fact says in v. 17, it only goes 
                                                        
695 The foundational discussion in c. Iul. op. imp. takes place at 1.47 (CSEL 85/1.35-6, cf. WSA 
I/25.73-4), where Augustine distinguishes three types of sin: 1. fully volitional sin, which Augustine 
limits to Adam’s original rebellion (peccatum), 2. the penalty of sin, which one suffers rather than 
commits, e.g., when a murderer is executed (poena peccati), and 3. sin that is also sin’s punishment 
(ita peccatum ut ipsum sit etiam poena peccati). The peccatum in Rom. 7[:19] is of the third sort: 
tertium vero genus, ubi peccatum ipsum et poena peccati, potest intellegi in eo qui dicit: Quod nolo 
malum hoc ago. Original sin, the just penalty of Adam’s freely chosen rebellion, belongs to the third 
category: pertinet originale peccatum ad hoc genus tertium, ubi sic peccatum est ut ipsum sit et 
poena peccati. Augustine develops this theme throughout this last great but unfinished work 
against Julian, e.g., 2.38, 3.210, 4.48, 4.103, 5.28 (CSEL 85/2.224-5: … hoc autem, ubi facit homo quod 
non vult et tamen peccatum esse apostolus clamat [Rom. 7:15-20] … Quomodo enim liberum est 
abstinere ubi clamatur: Quod nolo hoc facio? Aliter ergo natura humana peccavit, quando ei liberum 
fuit abstinere a peccato, aliter nunc peccat perdita libertate, quando eget  liberatoris auxilio; et illud 
tantummodo peccatum erat, hoc autem est etiam poena peccati), 5.50, 5.59, 5.61 (CSEL 85/2.276: 
Unde [Paulus] posteaquam peccati habitantis in carne sua, quo cogebatur malum agere quod nolebat, 
necessitatem poenamque deflevit, mox ad quem confugiendum esset ostendens: [citing Rom. 7:24-5]), 
6.8, 6.17. 
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to show the depth of their deception at the hands of fallax Aristotelis methaphysica.696 
As Oberman, Dieter, Leppin, and others have established over against the monolithic 
Antischolastik posited by a Hermann, an Ebeling, or a Hampson, Luther has Gabriel 
Biel especially in mind, as well as his Erfurt teachers Trutfetter and Usingen.697 In this 
light, it is important to recognize that in 1515/16 Luther is reacting against the position 
he himself had held as recently as his (incomplete) 1509/10 Sentenzkommentar, and is 
instead championing the bracing Augustinianism of Peter Lombard which—as a good 
student of Biel, Usingen, and Trutfetter—he had once rejected in no uncertain 
terms.698 Luther had been deceived too: but by 1515 the anti-Pelagian writings bound 
                                                        
696 WA 56.349.23-6, cf. LW 25.338. 
697 See Biel, Collectorium II d. 32 q. 1 (W & H II/580-84) on utrum per sacramentum baptismatis 
tollatur reatus culpae originalis and IV d. 4 q. 1 a. 2 (W & H IV/1.150-63) on utrum effectus baptismi 
in non indigne suscipiente sit infusio virtutum et gratiae ac remissio culpae et poenae. In the first 
place, fascinatingly, Biel discusses the mature Augustinian solution of non-imputation, and 
explains that God could have dealt this way de potentia eius absoluta—citing Ps. 32:2/Rom. 4:8 to 
this effect! But this is purely hypothetical: Deus tamen de potentia sua ordinata non remittit, nisi 
illud restituat quod peccatum privat, et hoc in se formaliter vel aequivalenter virtualiter. Biel argues 
for the virtual equivalent suggested here: Infundendo autem gratiam tollit debitum habendi iustitiam 
originalem et ipsum commutat in debitum habendi gratiam (W & H II/580-1). In the second place, 
Biel argues that baptism’s effect includes universalis remissio culpae, which given his position in 
book II requires that it tollit omne peccati inquinamentum and tollit mundanam omnem maculam 
originalem, etc. (W & H IV/1.150). At IV d. 4 q. 1 a. 2 conc. 3 (W & H IV/1.155-6), however, Biel does 
think Paul speaks autobiographically in Rom. 7, only insisting that Paul’s “sin” is really the fully 
remitted fomes peccati. This is Augustine’s typical stance in the 410s (Biel cites pecc. rem. 2.7.9) and 
would become the doctrine of the Council of Trent. For an overview with bibliography, see Brecht, 
Road to Reformation 161-74, esp. 167 and 173-4 for Luther’s personal break with Trutfetter and 
Usingen. 
698 WA 9.75-6, on Sent. II d. 32. So, e.g., 9.75.11-13: because concupiscentia remains after baptism, 
patet, quod peccatum originale non est ipsa concupiscentia seu fomes, quia non tota aboletur, sed 
tantum debilitatur, peccatum autem originale totum aboletur. Or ll. 16-19: illa concupiscentia in 
carne est nihil aliud nisi inoboedientia carnis ad spiritum quae de se non est culpa, sed poena, quia si 
esset aliquo modo culpa et non dimitti in baptismo diceretur, injuria fierit baptismo et gratiae dei. 
Indeed, ll. 21-23, after baptism concupiscence non est mala nisi occasionaliter inquantum ratio 
contra eam sibi in pugnam pro poena inoboedientiae primae relictam debet certare. Thus in winter 
1509/10, Luther rejects Peter’s Augustinian definition of original sin as fomes, languor naturae, 
tyrannus, etc. (ll. 26-8), and interprets Paul accordingly, 9.76.1-4: Unde dicit Apostolus, quod 
concupiscentia non nocet his qui secundum Christum vivunt, quia non est malum deleta culpa, sed 
tantum pondus et inclinatio ad malum quam sic deus esse voluit in poenam Adae. NB that Lombard 
compiles copious excerpts from Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings in d. 32, including (at d. 32.1.6) 
the momentous line from nupt. conc. 1.25.28: dimittitur concupiscentia carnis in baptismo, non ut 
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up in vol. 8 of the Amerbach edition have opened his eyes to grasp the real meaning of 
the Apostle.699  
Thus with the rational force of a settled conclusion obtained by the twelve 
arguments in the excursus at Rom. 7:7, together with the zeal of a convert, Luther 
asserts that v. 17’s “peccatum”—combined with the bad premise, common to the line 
of Pauline interpretation stemming from Origen,700 that as a saint the Apostle “had 
absolutely no sin”—plunged his opponents into the false and dangerous opinion that 
Paul “was not speaking in his own person, but in that of a carnal man.”701 By thus 
framing his debate with nostros theologos as an interrelated choice between (a) either 
Paul or Aristotle, either the Bible or human philosophy, on the one hand, and on the 
other (b) either a spiritual and apostolic or a pre-conversion and carnal Paul as the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
non sit, sed ut non imputetur in peccatum. In spring 1532, Luther declared at table: “Peter Lombard 
was adequate as a theologian; none has been his equal. He is quasi the method of theology. He read 
Hilary, Augustine, Ambrose, Gregory, and also all the councils. He was a great man. If he had by 
chance come upon the Bible, he would no doubt have been the greatest.” WA Tr 1.85.17-20, #192, cf. 
LW 54.26. 
699 Grane (Modus Loquendi, 59-61) argues that Luther first discovered his theology in Paul, then in 
effect read it back into Augustine’s without ever quite realizing it. Apart from the fact that this 
theory is basically indemonstrable, and reflects a Protestant historiographical bias (first Bible, then 
tradition), Grane assumes the very Hermann-styled Lutheran divergence from Augustine that I am 
contending against in this book. In passing, it’s worth noting that Thomas Aquinas experienced a 
similar change in mind after reading some of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings in his second 
Parisian period, abandoning the semi-Pelagianism of his Sentenzkommentar in favor of the robust 
Augustinian doctrine of predestination and grace found in the Summa Theologiae. 
700 Origen, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. Books 1-5, trans. Thomas P. Scheck. The 
Fathers of the Church, vol. 103 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 55: “In 
him who was always carrying around the death of Jesus in his own body, certainly never did the 
flesh lust against the spirit, but rather the flesh had been subjected to him since it had been put to 
death in the likeness of Christ’s death.” Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. Books 6-10, trans. 
Thomas P. Scheck. The Fathers of the Church, vol. 104 (Washington: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2002), 37: “When he says, ‘But I am of the flesh, sold into slavery under sin’ (Rom 
7.14), as if a teacher of the Church, he has now taken upon himself the persona of the weak.” For an 
overview of Origen and Augustine as readers of Paul, and of Augustine’s knowledge of Origen’s 
exegesis, see C. P. Bammel, “Augustine, Origen, and the Exegesis of St. Paul,” Augustinianum 32/2 
(Dec. 1992), 341-68; idem., “Justification by Faith in Augustine and Origen,” JEH 47/2 (April 1996), 
223-35. 
701 WA 56.349.26-30, cf. LW 25.338. 
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subject of Rom. 7, Luther situates his opponents on both counts squarely in the 
position of Julian of Eclanum and volunteers himself for the role of Augustine 
redivivus contra pelagianos modernos.702  
 Luther advances his position—viz., that “sin” remains in the baptized—in two 
steps, then supports it with the first major excerpt from Augustine. In the first step, 
the earnest young friar blends the penitential spirituality that Jarod Wicks703 has 
emphasized with the basic dogmatic components of his Augustinian “simul.” The 
Bielish position on sin’s abolition in penance is spiritually pernicious, because it 
inculcates false security, presumption, and laziness at just the point where penitents 
ought rather to be exhorted to fight against and purge out the sin that remains with 
groaning, tears, lamentation, and labor.704 This, in early 1516, is the spiritual doctrine 
of lifelong repentance that will commence the famous theses of October 1517, which 
Leppin has compellingly linked to Tauler’s mystical Bußtheologie.705 It also shares a 
deep (and in the Western Church, common) root in the mature spirituality of 
                                                        
702 As I noted above, this is not quite fair in Biel’s case at least, for he does think Paul speaks 
autobiographically in Rom. 7, but in the manner of Augustine in the 410s (Collectorium IV d. 4 q. 1 
art. 2 conc. 3) as opposed to Augustine in the 420s. For Augustine the biblical and patristic 
theologian versus Julian the Aristotelian philosopher, see e.g. c. Iul. 1.4.12. After citing numerous 
patristic authorities, Augustine lectures Julian thus: “I brought you, not into the lecture hall of 
some philosopher, but into the peaceful and honorable assembly of the holy fathers. May it be 
worth the effort! I beg you, see how they look upon you and kindly and gently say to you, ‘Julian, 
our son, are we Manichees?’ I ask you: What will you answer? How will you face them? What 
arguments will help you out? What categories of Aristotle? For, when you attack us like a skillful 
debater, you want to appear well trained in his categories.” NBA I/18.450, WSA I/24.274. Cf. c. Iul. 
2.10.34, 2.10.37 (“As if you, who complain so much that ‘you are denied an episcopal hearing and 
judgment,’ could find a council of Peripatetics in which a dialectical decision has been pronounced 
against original sin on the basis of subjects and those things which are in subjects [i.e., 
accidents]!”), 3.2.7, 4.15.75-8, 5.14.51, 6.18.53-7, 6.20.64; c. Iul. op. imp. 2.51, 5.23.3: “I am happy to 
have as my teacher, not Aristotle or Chrysippus, much less Julian, a fool despite all his banter, but 
Christ.” CSEL 85/2.211, WSA I/25.544. 
703 Jared Wicks, S.J. Man Yearning for Grace. Luther’s Early Spiritual Teaching (Wiesbaden: Franz 
Steiner, 1969), esp. 95-125. 
704 WA 56.350.1-4, cf. LW 25.338-9. 
705 Volker Leppin, “‘Omnem vitam fidelium penitentiam esse voluit.’” 
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Augustine, which increasingly gravitated to the graced weakness St. Paul speaks of as 
the remedy for spiritual pride at 2 Cor. 12:7-10.706 Luther continues: “Therefore sin is 
left over (relictum) in the spiritual man for the exercise of grace, for the humbling of 
pride, for the repression of presumption.”707 Sin in its fragmentary form, sin as evil 
desire in the saints, is useful to them because it humbles them and keeps them in a 
spiritual posture of deepening dependence upon God. In the context of this 
Augustinian and taulerisch spiritual theology, Luther adumbrates his basic dogmatics 
of sin and grace: 
… for we are not called to ease, but to labor against passiones. These passions 
would not be without guilt (for they are truly sins and indeed damnable), but 
for the mercy of God not imputing it. However, he does not impute it only to 
those who, assailed by their vices and invoking God’s grace, manfully fight 
against them.708    
 
The peccatum relictum which Paul speaks of as a unitary reality in Rom. 6-8 (“sin”) is 
in fact a bundle of vicious passions suffered by the spiritual man in his divided soul.709 
Being vicious in quality, such passions are intrinsically blameworthy, vere peccata et 
quidem damnabilia. But God in his mercy does not reckon these sinful passions to the 
account of those who prayerfully fight against them, precisely because they do so. 
                                                        
706 On this point in Augustine, see Thomas F. Martin, O.S.A.’s fine study, “Paul the Patient: Christus 
Medicus and the “Stimulus Carnis” (2 Cor. 12:7): A Consideration of Augustine’s Medicinal 
Christology,” AugS 32/2 (2001), 219-56; Hombert, Gloria Gratiae, 310-12. 
707 WA 56.350.5-6, cf. LW 25.339. 
708 WA 56.350.8-12: Non enim ad ocium vocati sumus, Sed ad laborem contra passiones. Quȩ non 
essent sine culpa (sunt enim vere peccata et quidem damnabilia), nisi misericordia Dei non imputaret. 
Non Imputat autem solum iis, Qui viriliter aggressi cum suis viciis gratiam Dei Inuocantes pugnant. 
Cf. LW 25.339. 
709 NB that in the interlinear gloss on Rom. 7:5, Luther simply equates the “old man” with evil 
desires. WA 56.65.9-11 (cf. LW 25.59): cum enim essemus in carne extra gratiam passiones 
peccatorum affectus, pronitates et motus mali, qui sunt vetus homo et vir prior. In the context, 
Luther is referring to a person who is sheer flesh, sub lege et ante gratiam (to use Augustine’s 
terms). In the regenerate, the “old Adam” remains in fragmentary form as the reliquiae peccati: but 
precisely as such, “he”/they retain this same mode of being as evil affections, propensities, passions, 
impulses, etc. 
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Once again, the saints are sinners in the one quite exact sense that they suffer the 
presence of unlawful passions in their souls. But they are real saints for two reasons: 
first, by God’s misericordia and non-imputation; second, by virtue of the real renewal 
evidenced in their fight against “sin” and their earnest prayer for gratiam. At this early 
stage in Luther’s development, “grace” in this context most likely refers to the gratia 
sanans so well-explicated by Wicks; by 1521 at the latest, it will morph terminologically 
into the donum I studied in chapter 2 above, while retaining the same dogmatic 
content.710 So we have the “grace” of God’s merciful non-imputation together with the 
“gift” of inner healing joining hands to deal with the ongoing reality of vicious and 
afflictive passions in the renewed soul: not, to be sure, in their mature gratia/donum 
form; nor yet with the gladness and parrhesia that will soon characterize Luther’s 
theology (and preaching) of the gospel promise of free forgiveness in Christ and new 
life in the Spirit. Even so, the seeds that will blossom into the Reformer’s mature 
evangelical and creedal theology of holiness are already recognizably present in their 
basic dogmatic substance.  
 In the second step, Luther pauses to clarify the privative ontology of the saints’ 
“sin,” “flesh,” internum vitium peccati, or even (as he allows here) fomes.711 St. Paul does 
not want us to think that  
… spirit and flesh are a sort of twosome, but one single reality (quaedam velut 
duo, Sed vnum omnino), just as a wound and flesh are one. For although what is 
proper to the wound (proprium vulneris) is one thing and what is proper to 
flesh (proprium carnis) is another, nevertheless, because the wound and the 
flesh are one, and the wound is not some thing besides the wounded or weak 
flesh itself, therefore what belongs to the wound is attributed to the flesh. In 
                                                        
710 A point which Wicks has recently noticed in passing: “Half a Lifetime with Luther in Theology 
and Living,” Pro Ecclesia 22/3 (2014), 307-36, here 311. See below, chapter 5.3. 
711 WA 56.350.21, cf. LW 25.339. 
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the same way, the same man is spirit and flesh at the same time. But the flesh 
is his weakness or wound. And insofar as he loves the law of God, he is spirit; 
but insofar as he desires evilly, it is the weakness of the spirit and the wound of 
sin, which has begun to be healed. Thus Christ says: “The spirit indeed is ready, 
but the flesh is weak” [Matt. 26:41].712 
 
As the second quotation (c. Iul. 3.20.39) in the Rom. 7:17 scholion shows,713 to which I 
will attend in its place below, this is pure Augustine. One single man, St. Paul, is spirit 
and flesh “simul,” not because he is comprised of two contrary substances, but because 
even the spiritual man undergoing progressive renewal or healing still suffers the 
lingering effects of the infirmitas and vulnus that originally besets him as a son of 
Adam. Paul’s “flesh” simply names this as yet imperfectly healed weakness or wound. 
To the extent that he has been healed, and thus loves (diligit) God’s law, he is spirit: 
this is his real being. But to the extent that he still concupiscit—this remnant of 
original sin in the form of evil desire (“flesh”) is not an entity of its own, but rather the 
wound that scars the really but inchoately and partially renewed person. Indwelling 
sin or “flesh” thus names a privation and lack, not a being in its own right; its shadowy 
reality as this lack is purely parasitic upon the real being, will, and affections of the 
renewed spiritus, the spiritual man. To explain this difficult ontological point further, 
Augustine once spoke of seeing darkness and hearing silence (c. dei 12.7). In 1516, 
Luther is taking up his teacher’s anti-Manichean metaphysics of good and evil and 
                                                        
712 WA 56.350.22-351.2: Est autem Notandum, Quod Apostolus non velit intelligi spiritum et carnem 
esse quedam velut duo, Sed vnum omnino, Sicut vulnus et caro sunt vnum; Vbi etsi aliud sit proprium 
vulneris, aliud proprium carnis, tamen quia vulnus et caro vnum sunt, et non est aliud quam ipsa 
vulnerata caro seu infirma, ideo carni tribuitur, quod est vulneris. Sic idem homo simul est spiritus et 
caro. Sed Caro est eius infirmitas seu vulnus, Et inquantum diligit legem Dei, Spiritus est; inquantum 
autem concupiscit, est infirmitas spiritus et vulnus peccati, quod sanari incipit. Sic Christus ait: 
‘Spiritus quidem promptus est, Caro autem infirma.’ Cf. LW 25.339. 
713 WA 56.352.10-2. NBA I/18.624: [concupiscentiam carnis] usque adeo malum esse, ut repugnans 
expurgando vincatur, donec sicut vulnus in corpore, ita perfecta curatione sanetur. 
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applying it to the very polemical and exegetical use that Augustine had already put it 
to himself in the late 410s and 20s contra Iulianum.714 
 This bring us to the first major excerpt, from c. Iul. 2.5.12: 
And blessed Augustine, in book 2 against Julian, says: “we understand our vices 
(vitia) in a catholic way: they resist the law of the mind because of the law of 
sin. When these vices have been separated from us, they will not be somewhere 
else, but having been healed in us they will be nowhere. Then why do they not 
perish in baptism? Or do you not yet confess that their guilt (reatus) has 
perished, but weakness (infirmitas) remains? Not the guilt (reatus) by which 
they [sc., vitia] were guilty (rea), but the guilt by which they made us guilty 
(nos reos) in the evil works to which they drew us. Neither does their weakness 
so remain, as if they were some kind of animals which were weakened, but they 
themselves [sc., vitia] are our weakness.”715 
 
Luther’s citation matches our best modern edition closely.716 There is one elision of 
some importance: in the first sentence, Luther changes Augustine’s catholice istos 
equos intellegimus vitia nostra to Catholice intelligimus vitia nostra. This editorial 
redaction affords Luther the freedom to reproduce the substance of Augustine’s 
remarks while avoiding the (to his purposes) unnecessary complication of explaining 
the matter of istos equos—though it does leave the quasi aliqua animalia near the end 
of the excerpt hanging somewhat in the air. For our purposes, however, “these horses” 
                                                        
714 nupt. conc. 2.3.7-10, 2.29.49-50; c. Iul. 1.5.16, 1.8.36-41, 2.3.6-7, 2.8.28, 3.26.63, 4.1.1, 5.6.24, 6.18.53-7; 
c. Iul. op. imp. 1.24, 1.63, 1.114, 2.8-9, 2.228, 3.37, 3.53-7, 3.95, 3.153-216, 4.1-2, 4.23, 4.109, 4.120, 5.19, 
5.25, 5.30, 5.38, 6.5, 6.14. 
715 WA 56.351.3-10: Et b. Aug li. 2. contra Iul: ‘Catholice intelligimus vitia nostra, que legi mentis ex 
lege peccati resistunt. Non hȩc vitia a nobis separata alicubi alibi erunt, Sed in nobis sanata nusquam 
erunt. Veruntamen quare non in baptismate perierunt? An nondum fateberis, quod reatus eorum 
perierit, infirmitas manserit? Non reatus, quo ipsa rea fuerunt, Sed quo nos reos fecerant in malis 
operibus, quo nos traxerant. Nec ita eorum mansit infirmitas, quasi aliqua sint animalia, que 
infirmantur, Sed nostra infirmitas ipsa sunt.’ Cf. LW 25.340. 
716 NBA I/18.530-2, reproducing PL 44.682: catholice istos equos intellegimus vitia nostra, quae legi 
mentis ex lege peccati resistunt. Non a nobis haec vitia separata, alicubi alibi erunt, sed in nobis 
sanata nusquam erunt. Verumtamen quare non in Baptismate perierunt? An nondum fateberis, quod 
reatus eorum perierit, infirmitas manserit, non reatus quo ipsa rea fuerant, sed quo nos reos fecerant 
in malis operibus, quo nos traxerant? Nec ita eorum mansit infirmitas, quasi aliqua sint animalia 
quae infirmantur: sed nostra infirmitas ipsa sunt. I count three minor differences: the first I discuss 
in the argument; the second shifts the order of PL’s Non a nobis haec vitia separata to WA’s Non hȩc 
vitia a nobis separata; the third, PL’s ipsa rea fuerant to WA’s ipsa rea fuerunt.  
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help get to the heart of the position that Augustine contended for in 421 and, 
therefore, to a sound evaluation of what Luther was arguing for in 1516.  
Horses ruled by a charioteer are a commonplace Platonic metaphor for either 
the soul’s parts, its faculties, or its passions, depending on one’s psychology (see 
Phaedrus 246a-254e; cf. vera rel. 45.83). In the case at hand, it stems from a passage in 
Ambrose’s de Isaac et anima 8.65 that Augustine is urging against Julian in the 
catalogue of patristic citations that forms c. Iul. books 1 and 2.717 Ambrose writes: 
A good horseman reins in and holds back evil horses, and spurs on good ones. 
The good horses are four: prudence, temperance, fortitude, iustitia. The evil 
horses are: wrathfulness, concupiscentia, fear, iniquitas.718 
 
This supplies weighty evidence in Augustine’s case for the catholicity of his doctrine of 
concupiscentia mala. But because Julian levels the charge of Manichaeism against this 
doctrine of evil desire, Augustine must demonstrate that Ambrose’s “evil horses”—
which include concupiscentia in their number—are not substances, but vices: that is, 
affective “wounds” which afflict the good soul characterized by the four cardinal 
virtues. In the passage cited above, Luther excerpts the central portion of Augustine’s 
argument to this effect. I provide it here in full, with the material excerpted by Luther 
underlined: 
In the book de Isaac et anima, Ambrose says: “A good horseman reins in and 
holds back evil horses, and spurs on good ones. The good horses are four: 
prudence, temperance, fortitude, iustitia. The evil horses are: wrathfulness, 
concupiscentia, fear, iniquitas.” He doesn’t say, A good horseman has good 
horses, he does not have evil horses, does he? No, he says: “he spurs on the 
good ones, he reins in and holds back the evil ones.” Where do these evil 
horses come from? To be sure, if we say or think that they are substantias, we 
side with or belong to the madness of the Manichees. But to keep that madness 
                                                        
717 See Mathijs Lamberigts, “Augustine’s Use of Tradition in His Reaction to Julian of Aeclanum’s Ad 
Turbantium: Contra Iulianum I-II,” AugS 41/1 (2010), 183-200. 
718 NBA I/18.530, WSA I/24.314. For de Isaac et anima 8.65, see PL 14.527; cf. Nisula, 33-4. 
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far from us, in a catholic way we understand that those horses are our vices, 
which resist the law of the mind because of the law of sin. When these vices 
have been separated from us, they will not be somewhere else, but having been 
healed in us they will be nowhere. Then why do they not perish in baptism? Or 
do you not yet confess that their guilt has perished, but weakness remains? Not 
the guilt by which they were guilty, but the guilt by which they made us guilty 
in the works to which they drew us. Neither does their weakness so remain, as 
if they were some kind of animals which were weakened, but they themselves 
are our weakness. Nor should it be thought that among these evil horses he 
named that iniquity (iniquitatem) which is destroyed in baptism. For that was 
the [iniquity] of the sins which we did, which were all forgiven and now do not 
exist at all. The guilt of those sins remained in force, when the sins themselves 
happened and then passed away. But this law of sin—which remains after its 
guilt is forgiven in the sacred font—he called iniquity (iniquitatem) precisely 
because it is iniquitous (iniquum) that the flesh should desire (concupiscat) 
against the spirit [Gal. 5:17a]: although there is iustitia in our renovation, 
because it is just (iustum) that the spirit desire (concupiscat) against the flesh 
[Gal. 5:17b], that we may walk by the spirit and not complete the desires of the 
flesh [Gal. 5:16]. And to be sure, we find this, our iustitiam, named among the 
good horses.719 
 
Several factors, all central to Augustine’s polemic against Julian, converge in this 
paragraph. First, Augustine defends his basic contention, viz., that inherited 
concupiscence is evil, by arguing that this evil is to be understood psychologically, 
privatively, and affectively rather than ontologically, i.e., as evil desire that wounds 
                                                        
719 c. Iul. 2.5.12, NBA I/18.530-2, PL 44.681-2 (cf. WSA I/24.314-5): In libro de Isaac et Anima idem 
dicit: “Bonus ergo rector malos equos restringit et revocat, bonos incitat. Boni equi sunt quattuor: 
prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo, iustitia; mali equi: Iracundia, concupiscentia, timor, iniquitas.” 
Numquid ait: Bonus rector bonos equos habet, malos non habet? Sed ait: "Bonos, incitat, malos 
restringit et revocat". Unde isti sunt equi? Nempe si eos substantias dicimus vel putamus, 
Manichaeorum favemus vel haeremus insaniae: quod ut absit a nobis, catholice istos equos 
intellegimus vitia nostra, quae legi mentis ex lege peccati resistunt. Non a nobis haec vitia separata, 
alicubi alibi erunt, sed in nobis sanata nusquam erunt. Verumtamen quare non in Baptismate 
perierunt? An nondum fateberis, quod reatus eorum perierit, infirmitas manserit, non reatus quo ipsa 
rea fuerant, sed quo nos reos fecerant in malis operibus, quo nos traxerant? Nec ita eorum mansit 
infirmitas, quasi aliqua sint animalia quae infirmantur: sed nostra infirmitas ipsa sunt. Nec in his 
equis malis iniquitatem nominasse putandus est illam, quae deletur in Baptismo: illa namque 
peccatorum quae fecimus, fuit, quae cuncta remissa sunt, atque omnino iam non sunt, quorum reatus 
manebat quando ipsa fiebant atque transibant. Istam vero legem peccati, cuius manentis reatus in 
sacro fonte remissus est, propterea vocavit iniquitatem, quia iniquum est ut caro concupiscat 
adversus spiritum: quamvis adsit in nostra renovatione iustitia; quia iustum est ut adversus carnem 
spiritus concupiscat, ut spiritu ambulemus, et concupiscentias carnis non perficiamus. Hanc quippe 
iustitiam nostram inter bonos equos invenimus nominatam. 
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and weakens the renovated spiritus, and not as a substance existing in its own right 
(whether in the Manichean sense or, by extension, as the lowest part of the kind of bi- 
or tripartite soul theorized paradigmatically by Plato).720 Even the good horseman has 
evil horses to deal with: but the metaphor breaks down if carried to the point of 
thinking that these unruly and rebellious evils are things, when in fact they name the 
lack, wound, disease, or weakness that continues to beleaguer the affections of the 
imperfectly renovated soul itself.  
Second, Augustine distinguishes between the guilt that accrues to a person 
because of this evil desire on the one hand, and its operations in the just soul on the 
other. In a way, it was this distinction, classically formulated in nupt. conc. 1.25.28-
26.29, that animated the vigorous polemics of the 420s.721 In the case of actual sin, its 
                                                        
720 Cf. nupt. conc. 1.25.28, BA 23.118: Non enim substantialiter manet, sicut aliquod corpus aut 
spiritus, sed affectio est quaedam malae qualitatis, sicut languor. 
721 BA 23.116-120 (cf. WSA I/24.46-7): 25.28. Si autem quaeritur, quomodo ista concupiscentia carnis 
maneat in regenerato, in quo uniuersorum facta est remissio peccatorum, quandoquidem per ipsam 
seminatur et cum ipsa carnalis gignitur proles parentis etiam baptizati, aut certe, si in parente 
baptizato potest esse et peccatum non esse, cur eadem ipsa in prole peccatum sit: ad haec 
respondetur dimitti concupiscentiam carnis in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut in peccatum non 
inputetur. Quamuis autem reatu suo iam soluto, manet tamen, donec sanetur omnis infirmitas 
nostra, proficiente renovatione interioris hominis de die in diem, cum exterior induerit 
incorruptionem. Non enim substantialiter manet, sicut aliquod corpus aut spiritus, sed affectio est 
quaedam malae qualitatis, sicut languor. Non ergo aliquid remanet, quod non remittatur, cum fit, 
sicut scriptum est: Propitius Dominus omnibus iniquitatibus nostris, sed, donec fiat et quod sequitur: 
qui sanat omnes languores tuos, qui redimit de corruptione uitam tuam, manet in corpore mortis 
huius carnalis concupiscentia, cuius uitiosis desideriis ad illicita perpetranda non oboedire 
praecipimur, ne regnet peccatum in nostro mortali corpore. Quae tamen concupiscentia cotidie 
minuitur in proficientibus et continentibus, accedente etiam senectute multo maxime. Qui vero ei 
nequiter seruiunt, tantas in eis uires accipit ut plerumque, iam aetate deficientibus membris 
eisdemque partibus corporis ad illud opus admoueri minus ualentibus, turpius et procacius insanire 
non desinat. 26.29. In eis ergo, qui regenerantur in Christo, cum remissionem accipiunt prorsus 
omnium peccatorum, utique necesse est ut reatus etiam huius licet adhuc manentis concupiscentiae 
remittatur, ut in peccatum, sicut dixi, non inputetur. Nam sicut eorum peccatorum, quae manere non 
possunt, quoniam cum fiunt praetereunt, reatus tamen manet et, nisi remittatur, in aeternum 
manebit, sic illius, quando remittitur, reatus aufertur. Hoc est enim non habere peccatum, reum non 
esse peccati. Nam si quisquam verbi gratia fecerit adulterium, etiamsi numquam deinceps faciat, reus 
est adulterii, donec reatus ipsius indulgentia remittatur. Habet ergo peccatum, quamuis illud quod 
admisit iam non sit, quia cum tempore quo factum est praeteriit. Nam si a peccando desistere hoc 
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guilt remains in force long after the sinful act itself has transpired. Conversely, argues 
Augustine, the reatus owing to mala concupiscentia is abolished in baptism, but its 
malicious operations remain in force.  
The third factor is the most difficult point to interpret and, at the same time, 
the most decisive: the question of whether the evil desire that remains in the holy soul 
and is forgiven in baptism retains in itself an intrinsic guiltiness. That is to say, is the 
concupiscentia which Augustine emphatically asserts to be mala also rea, even in the 
baptized/forgiven person who has been set free from the bond of all guilt? As noted 
above, modern scholarship recognizes that Augustine’s position on this point 
fluctuates; but there are two strong reasons to count c. Iul. 2.5.12 amongst the places in 
his works where he affirms the intrinsic guiltiness of evil desire in sanctis. It is easier, I 
think, to begin with the second instance, where Augustine explains the “evil horse” 
named iniquitas vis-à-vis baptismal forgiveness and the inner conflict described in Gal. 
5:16-17. This Ambrosian horse is not, argues Augustine, to be mistaken for the iniquity 
pardoned in baptism: the guilt of all sins was destroyed in that sacred font, including 
the guilt of original sin or concupiscence, the lex peccati that binds all Adam’s 
children. Rather, explains Augustine, when Ambrose spoke of iniquitas, he meant the 
law of sin itself: and he spoke rightly, because it is iniquum for the flesh to lust against 
the spirit. The evil operation of the flesh is iniquitous or unjust. By contrast, the 
renovated soul or spiritus possesses real iustitia by virtue of the fact that it fights back 
against this evil and iniquitous desire with its own holy desire, and does not complete 
                                                                                                                                                                     
esset non habere peccata, sufficeret, ut hoc nos moneret Scriptura: Fili, peccasti, non adicias iterum; 
non autem sufficit, sed addidit: et de pristinis deprecare, ut tibi remittantur. Manent ergo, nisi 
remittantur. Sed quomodo manent, si praeterita sunt, nisi quia praeterierunt actu, manent reatu? Sic 
itaque fieri e contrario potest, ut etiam illud maneat actu, praetereat reatu. 
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the desires of the flesh. Now, to call concupiscence iniquitas and to assert that its 
operation in the baptized is iniquum is at most a hair’s breath from naming it 
peccatum and affirming its intrinsic reatus; and a cursory glance at (say) Augustine’s 
sermon on Ps. 5o[51] demonstrates the real semantic equivalence that obtains amongst 
these overlapping scriptural terms.722 It is, I suggest, reasonable to assume that 
Luther’s interpretation of the material he excerpted from c. Iul. 2.5.12 is influenced by 
its immediate context. But we must look into the first and more important instance 
directly, which so greatly interested Luther in 1516. 
Augustine first repeats the familiar refrain: the guilt (reatus) of the vices that 
comprise the believer’s flesh perishes in baptism, but their weakness (infirmitas) 
remains. But then he continues: non reatus quo ipsa rea fuerant, sed quo nos reos 
fecerant in malis operibus, quo nos traxerant. This sentence is a further specification of 
the guilt that is forgiven in baptism. In the context, it is clear that the antecedent of 
the ipsa that Augustine says had been rea is vitia. So the sentence, somewhat amplified 
to clarify its meaning, comes roughly to this: 
The guilt of the vices perishes in baptism, but the weakness remains. The guilt 
that perishes is not the guilt by which the vices themselves had been guilty. 
Rather, the guilt that perishes is that by which the vices made us guilty by 
doing the evil works to which our vices drew us. 
 
There would be little to perplex in Augustine’s sentence if his fuerant read sunt 
instead: if it did, this would amount to an unambiguous statement of the intrinsically 
                                                        
722 CCSL 38.599-616, WSA III/16.410-29. This semantic equivalence arises naturally from the Psalm 
itself, in Augustine’s old Latin version of the Psalter: v. 3, dele iniquitatem meam (CCSL 38.603.6.12); 
v. 4, lava me ab iniustitia mea, et a delicto meo munda me (38.603.7.1-5); v. 5, quoniam iniquitatem 
meam ego agnosco, et delictum meum contra me est semper (38.603.8.1-2); v. 7, in iniquitatibus 
conceptus sum, et in peccatis mater mea in utero aluit (38.606.10.3-29); v. 11, averte faciem tuam a 
peccatis meis, et omnes iniquitates meas dele (38.610.14.1-2). 
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guilt-bearing quality of the vicious and evil passions with which the just soul must 
contend by grace. But even as it stands, the text leans in this direction. From the 
momentous nupt. conc. 1.25.28 on in his debate with Julian, Augustine upholds his key 
distinction between reatus and vitium. But it appears that here he makes a further 
distinction. There is, on the one hand, a guilt by which the renewed soul’s vices were 
themselves guilty (ipsa rea). On the other, there is a guilt by which the pre-baptized 
person as a morally responsible person had become guilty (nos reos) when his vicious 
passions had led him into consensual sinful acts. In my judgment, this signals an (at 
this point) still somewhat opaque yet latent and ultimately germinal distinction 
between the guiltless person and his guilt-bearing flesh: and it begs the question how 
a baptized person battling intrinsically guilty vitia in his soul can nonetheless be fully 
set free from guilt. The most plausible solution, which is arguably already present at 
nupt. conc. 1.25.28, is that God in his mercy does not impute to the baptized person the 
guilt that ought to accrue to him by right on account of his evil flesh.  
This, as it happens, is the solution Augustine himself provides explicitly at c. 
Iul. 6.17.51—note well, in defense of nupt. conc. 1.25.28: 
I said that “the concupiscence of the flesh is forgiven in baptism, not so that it 
does not exist, but so that it is not imputed as sin; although its guilt has already 
been released, it remains nevertheless.” Against these words of mine you argue, 
clever fellow that you are, as if I had said that concupiscence itself is set free 
from guilt through Baptism (tamquam ipsam concupiscentiam dixerim per 
Baptismum reatu liberari), since I said, “its guilt has already been released” 
(reatu suo iam soluto)—as if I had said “its (suo)” [guilt, meaning the guilt] by 
which concupiscence itself is guilty (quo ipsa rea est); and its guilt having being 
released, concupiscence itself would remain, absolved. If I had really thought 
that, I would surely not have said that concupiscence is evil, but that it had 
been so. And in this way, according to your marvelous understanding, when 
you hear that the guilt of murder in some person has been released, you think 
that the murder itself, not the man, has been absolved from guilt! Who would 
think this way, except someone who is not embarrassed to praise that with 
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which he is compelled to fight? And how can you boast and exalt in refuting 
this opinion, which is plainly not mine but yours? You say the sort of things 
that ought to be said to those who affirm that through Baptism the 
concupiscence of the flesh has become sanctified and faithful in the regenerate 
people in whom it remains. But it is fitting rather for you, who declare it to be 
good, to say that “the good of sanctification is added to its natural goodness,” 
as you say to infants, and that the concupiscence of the flesh is God’s holy 
child. We, however, who say that concupiscence is evil, and that it nevertheless 
remains in the baptized, although its guilt—not the guilt by which it itself was 
guilty (for it is not some persona), but the guilt by which it was making a man 
guilty from his origin—was forgiven and wiped away: heaven forbid that we 
should say that it is sanctified since, if they have not received the grace of God 
in vain, the regenerate must fight with it as though with an enemy in a civil 
war, and they must desire and pray to be healed of that plague.723 
 
Augustine’s quo ipsa rea est here in bk. 6 closely matches his quo ipsa rea fuerant in 
bk. 2: in fact, it is just the hypothetical shift in verb tense that I had suggested might 
clear up Augustine’s meaning. And here it is: concupiscentia ipsa rea est, in the 
present, in the regenerate; but it is not imputed to the person who has been baptized, 
absolved, and set free from all his guilt. A murderer can be set free from guilt by God’s 
grace, but the act of murder itself is always guilty. In the same way, the evil desire of 
the flesh is and can only ever be guilty per se, but the flesh-bearing regenerate person 
                                                        
723 NBA I/18.930-2, PL 44.852-3 (cf. WSA I/24.510-11): a me dictum est, “dimitti concupiscentiam 
carnis in Baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut in peccatum non imputetur; quamvis autem reatu suo iam 
soluto, manet tamen.” Adversus haec mea verba sic argumentaris homo acutissimus, tamquam ipsam 
concupiscentiam dixerim per Baptismum reatu liberari; quoniam dixi, “reatu suo iam soluto”: velut 
“suo” dixerim, quo ipsa rea est, eoque soluto illa permaneat absoluta. Quod utique si sensissem, 
profecto eam malam esse non dicerem, sed fuisse. Ac per hoc, secundum mirabilem intellegentiam 
tuam, quando audis in aliquo homicidii reatum solutum, non hominem, sed ipsum homicidium a 
reatu existimas absolutum. Sic intellegat quis, nisi qui non erubescit laudare, cum qua compellitur 
dimicare? Et quomodo te iactas et exsultas in redarguendo istam sententiam, non meam plane, sed 
tuam? Talia quippe dicis, qualia dicenda sunt in eos, qui per Baptismum sanctificatam et fidelem 
factam concupiscentiam carnis affirmant in eis, in quibus regeneratis manet tamen. Sed hoc tibi 
potius qui eam bonam praedicas, convenit dicere, “ut bono eius naturali,” sicut de infantibus dicitis: 
“bonum sanctificationis accedat,” et sit carnis concupiscentia sancta Dei filia. Nos autem qui eam 
malam dicimus, et manere tamen in baptizatis, quamvis reatus eius, non quo ipsa erat rea (neque 
enim aliqua persona est), sed quo reum hominem originaliter faciebat, fuerit remissus atque 
vacuatus; absit ut dicamus sanctificari, cum qua necesse habent regenerati, si non in vacuum Dei 
gratiam susceperunt, intestino quodam bello tamquam cum hoste confligere, et ab ea peste desiderare 
atque optare sanari. 
 266
emerges from the water of baptism washed entirely clean from all guilt. And, to be 
sure, the regenerate and forgiven person is instantly enrolled in a lifelong prayerful 
“civil war” against the evil of his flesh, which God does not reckon to his account, 
longing to be completely healed (sanari) from the affective disease that afflicts him 
and displeases God. 
 That, at any rate, may serve us as Augustine’s own interpretation (from the 
same work) of the text from c. Iul. 2.5.12 that Luther cites in his scholion on Rom. 
7:17.724 And it will be remembered that at the head of the great excursus on Rom. 7:7, 
Luther had pointed to the end of c. Iul. 6—which of course includes the striking 
passage at 6.17.51—as “the clearest explanation of all.”725 Well, here is the 
interpretation of c. Iul. 2.5.12 that Luther offers himself: 
From this beautiful authority it is clear how concupiscence is our very 
weakness toward the good, which in itself is certainly guilty (rea), but 
nonetheless does not make us guilty (reos nos) unless we consent and work. 
Now something marvelous follows from this: that we are guilty and not guilty. 
For we ourselves are that weakness, therefore it is guilty and we ourselves are 
guilty, until it ceases and is healed. But we are not guilty, so long as we do not 
work in accord with it: for God’s mercy does not impute the guilt of the 
weakness (reatum infirmitatis), but the guilt of the one who consents to the 
weakness of the will (reatum consentientis infirmitati voluntatis).726 
 
                                                        
724 According to Hans-Ulrich Delius, though Luther cites nupt. conc. 1.25.28 with great frequency he 
does not seem to have quoted c. Iul. 6.17.51. Augustin als Quelle Luthers, 181-6. That said, we do 
know that Luther read c. Iul. as a whole, and in the introduction to his long excursus at Rom. 7:7 he 
states that omne clarissime li. 6. contra eundem c. XI vsque in finem (WA 56.340.3-4). So it is 
plausible to infer that impressions formed from his reading of book 6 informed his interpretation of 
2.5.12 and, for that matter, nupt. conc. 1.25.28. 
725 WA 56.340.3-4: Et omne clarissime li. 6. contra eundem c. XI. vsque in finem. Cf. LW 25.328. 
726 WA 56.351.10-7: Ex ista pulchra authoritate patet, Quomodo Concupiscentia sit ipsa infirmitas 
nostra ad bonum, que in se quidem rea est, Sed tamen reos nos non facit nisi consentientes et 
operantes. Ex quo tamen mirabile sequitur, Quod rei sumus et non rei. Quia Infirmitas illa nos ipsi 
sumus, Ergo ipsa rea et nos rei sumus, donec cesset et sanetur. Sed non sumus rei, dum non operamur 
secundum eam, Dei misericordia non imputante reatum infirmitatis, Sed reatum consentientis 
infirmitati voluntatis. Cf. LW 25.340. 
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This is the place where Rudolf Hermann exclaimed: “Grave words, which sound just 
like Augustine!”727 In arguing that this resonance is merely apparent, Hermann takes 
two steps to pit the two theologians’ real positions against each other. First, he points 
out that Luther speaks of a reatus that belongs to one’s infirmitas as such: and this 
Hermann regards as a material advance beyond Augustine’s actual position.728 Second, 
he asserts that Luther’s non consentire cannot be the same as Augustine’s, because 
Luther’s claim that (a) the flesh’s weakness is guilty per se, combined with (b) the 
claim that we are this guilty weakness, must mean (c) that there is a kind of consensus 
in operation within the saint’s rea concupiscentia, i.e., a consent already in being prior 
to the full-blown consent of which Luther speaks in such a beguilingly Augustinian 
way. Thus unlike Augustine, concludes Hermann, when Luther sets forth his non 
consentire as the condition for God’s merciful non-imputation, it is not a matter of 
refusing consent to an individual sinful act, but rather of refusing consent to one’s 
total self-destruction: “a whole-hog messing up of one’s life.”729 Otherwise, as I noted 
above, an Augustinian Luther would send his modern spiritual descendants back to 
the confessional, quod impossibile est. Q.E.D. And thence, perhaps, to what Michael 
Root identifies as one of the central “constructions” at bottom of twentieth-century 
Lutheranism: the radical “simul” and the indifference/hostility to real growth in 
holiness that attends it.730 
                                                        
727 Hermann, 192. 
728 Hermann, 193-4. 
729 Hermann, 194-5. For similar reasons but with greater reserve, Adolf Hamel’s (II/18) 
interpretation of the same passage concluded: “that is more than Augustine, in the texts cited, 
actually says.” 
730 Michael Root, “The Work of Christ and the Deconstruction of Twentieth-Century Lutheranism,” 
esp. 7-8, 12-14. 
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 But let us examine the two fateful steps which Hermann took in 1930. Luther at 
the very least intends to be restating in his own words the doctrinal content of the 
excerpt he has just related from c. Iul. 2.5.12. On this attempted reditio of Augustine’s 
traditio, all sides are agreed. In essence, Luther states that concupiscence is 
intrinsically guilty, but that it does not make the regenerate person guilty apart from 
his consenting to its evil desires: God mercifully declining to impute the real and 
intrinsic reatum infirmitatis to the person who refuses to consent to his own infirmitas 
voluntatis. Hermann first asserts that Augustine does not hold concupiscence to be 
guilty in itself. But as I have proven at least plausibly with respect to c. Iul. 2.5.12, and I 
believe demonstrably with respect to c. Iul. 6.17.51, Augustine upholds this very point: 
tamquam ipsam concupiscentiam dixerim per Baptismum reatu liberari! ipsa rea est. 
Luther thus proves himself both a better interpreter of the “420s Augustine” than 
Hermann and, at least in this respect, a faithful “Augustinian” in his own right. 
Secondly, Hermann posits that Luther’s infirmitas illa [rea] nos ipsi sumus 
involves a kind of consent within the flesh’s evil desires which dramatically erodes the 
significance of refusing consent to these evil desires. But as we have seen in the entire 
scholion on Rom. 7 up to this point, when Luther teaches that the saints are their own 
weakness, he stands on firm Augustinian ground. This is the whole force of the 
affective and privative vulnus psychology that Luther had exposited immediately prior 
to the excerpt from c. Iul. 2.5.12,731 and of the spirit/flesh communio idiomatum 
elaborated in the scholion on Rom. 7:7.732 Augustine argues that our vices are not 
some separate substance, but that they belong to us as the affective defect, weakness, 
                                                        
731 WA 56.350.22-351.2, LW 25.339. 
732 WA 56.343.16-27, LW 25.332. 
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sickness, or wound afflicting our partly renovated souls. When Luther says that we are 
this weakness, he is simply reiterating—via the synecdoche of the communio 
idiomatum—the anti-Manichean ontology of privation that factors so centrally in 
Augustine’s psychology of the affectively divided regenerate will. Luther is thus not 
claiming that the regenerate are nothing but this weakness. Rather, he is upholding 
the basic Augustinian conviction that this weakness belongs to the regenerate as 
intimately as a wound belongs to a man being healed: which is why Luther affirms 
Augustine’s sanata with a sanetur of his own, and proceeds directly to the Parable of 
the Good Samaritan to explain the ongoing nature of this healing further.733 For Luther 
the Augustinian, the sick or sinful desires of the “flesh” are precisely that privative 
“part” (so to speak) of the divided will to which this same embattled will does not 
consent,734 because holy delectatio victrix, infused into the heart by the Holy Spirit to 
renew the will into “spirit,” holds its ground.  
Once this point is grasped, Hermann’s hypothesis of a consensus within the 
flesh itself is not only rendered unnecessary, it is shown to be groundless. Like 
Augustine in c. Iul. 2 and 6, Luther upholds the intrinsic reatum infirmitatis. And 
when Luther maintains that the regenerate are this remaining (and in itself, guilty) 
weakness, he does so in the Augustinian fashion I have just described. For Luther as 
for Augustine, the partially renewed will’s refusal to succumb to its own weakness is 
the condition sine quo non for God’s merciful non-imputation of the reatum 
infirmitatis. On the surface, Luther’s “we are guilty and we are not guilty” appears to 
                                                        
733 WA 56.351.17-22, LW 25.340. 
734 WA 56.343.6-7: quia iam non tantum vnius sunt personȩ mens et caro, Sed etiam vnius voluntatis. 
Cf. LW 25.331. 
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be the sort of paradox that Hermann, Grane, et al. have taken it to be. But upon close 
examination of its meaning in light of the Augustinian theology that Luther is 
explicitly (and rather learnedly) appropriating, the soon-to-be Reformer’s nascent 
rhetorical verve communicates more forcefully essentially the same position that 
Augustine held against Julian centuries before. The regenerate Christian is “guilty” in 
the restricted sense that his evil and guilt-laden fleshly desire would make him so 
personally if God held his concupiscentia rea against him. But so long as he keeps up 
the fight against the evil desires that remain within him by not consenting to them, 
God forgives the intrinsic guilt of these desires and does not impute any guilt 
whatsoever to the baptized person’s account. God does not impute the guilt of the 
weakness that wounds the renewed person’s will: he only imputes the guilt of the 
person who consents to this weakness, and in so doing foolishly flees from the 
medicus whose grace had begun to heal his soul. Whether or not such words are 
“grave” depends on one’s own theological convictions, but I believe Hermann is right 
to think that they sound just like Augustine. 
We can afford greater brevity in considering the final three excerpts from 
Augustine’s works against Julian in the scholion on Rom. 7:17. 
 
2.1.2. c. Iul. 3.20.39. On the heels of his traditio of the excerpt from c. Iul. 2.5.12, Luther 
explains the logic of progressive sanative renewal amidst the disease of residual sin via 
the christological interpretation of Luke 10:25-37. Taking the homo semivivus into his 
care and pouring (Infundens) wine and oil into his wounds, the Good Samaritan did 
not heal him instantly, but began to heal him (incepit sanare). Luther shifts quickly to 
the now familiar Augustinian language of one and the same man (idem homo) who is 
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rightly described in various ways insofar as (Inquantum) the gracious healing of his 
affections has progressed. The same sick man is both weak and getting well: insofar as 
he is healthy he desires good things, but as one who is still weak he desires alia; 
indeed, he is “compelled” (cogitur) to yield to his weakness, “which he himself does 
not want.”735 This is an unremarkable restatement of the theory of involuntary 
affective “peccatum” that became increasingly important for Augustine’s 
interpretation of Rom. 7 in the late 420s,736 here set within the overarching context of 
the partially renewed person’s ongoing healing by grace. Christ’s patient suffers the 
ongoing operations of his affective disease invitus,737 against the good desires of his 
own holy will which Christ’s Spirit pours into him: reading Luther’s Infundens as a 
implicit reference to gratia infusa et sanans. 
At just this point and from this Augustinian vantage, Luther engages in a brief 
and highly allusive debate with ancient and medieval philosophical psychologies; and 
this forms the context for his citation of c. Iul. 3.20.39: 
                                                        
735 WA 56.351.17-22, cf. LW 25.340. 
736 c. Iul. op. imp. 5.61, CSEL 85/2.276 (cf. WSA I/25.588): Unde [Paulus] posteaquam peccati 
habitantis in carne sua, quo cogebatur malum agere quod nolebat, necessitatem poenamque deflevit, 
etc.; cf. c. Iul. op. imp. 4.103.4, CSEL 85/2.107 (cf. WSA I/25.464): … profecto in homine mole 
consuetudinis presso simul esse possunt et iustitiae voluntas et peccati necessitas, quoniam velle 
adiacet mihi [Rom. 7:18b] professio est voluntatis, perficere autem bonum non invenio [Rom. 7:18c] 
confessio est necessitatis; 5.50.1-2, CSEL 85/2.255-6 (Cf. WSA I/25.574): Attende eum qui dicit: Quod 
nolo malum hoc ago [Rom. 7:19] et responde utrum necessitatem non habeat agendi malum, qui non 
quod vult facit bonum, sed quod non vult malum hoc agit. Quod si apostolo repugnare non audes, 
ecce homo a necessario malum agens definitiones tuas dirumpit et dissipat; necessitate quippe malum 
agit qui non vult et agit… Notum est quod primus homo voluntate malum egit non necessitate, sed 
iste qui dicit quod nolo malum hoc ago, necessitate se ostendit malum agere, non voluntate, et flens 
miserias suas ridet definitiones tuas. Also: c. Iul. op. imp. 2.38, 5.28, 5.59. Cf. Nisula, 126, 345-50. 
737 Cf. the interlinear gloss on Rom. 7:15, WA 56.70.2-7: Non enim quod uolo per spiritum 
Charitatis bonum i.e. non concupiscere, Vt lex dicit hoc ago: i.e. vtique concupisco contra legem sed 
quod odio secundum interiorem hominem per spiritum malum i.e. concupiscere illud Quia 
concupiscentiam non odit, qui non est spiritualis facio. non opere, Sed quia concupiscentia fit et 
surgit, etiam Inuito spiritu. Cf. LW 25.63. 
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In light of these points the frivolous and delirious commentum of the 
metaphysical theologians is plain to see, when they dispute about contrary 
appetites, whether they are able to exist in the same subject (de appetitibus 
contrariis, an possint in eodem esse subiecto). They invent the idea that spirit, 
sc. reason, is a thing separate by itself and absolute and integral and perfect in 
its own kind. Likewise sensuality or flesh by opposition is some contrary thing, 
equally integral and absolute. And because of these, their foolish phantasies, 
they are driven to forget that flesh is the weakness itself or wound of the whole 
man, who through grace has begun to be healed in the reason or spirit (Caro sit 
ipsa infirmitas velut vulnus totius hominis, qui per gratiam in ratione seu spiritu 
cȩptus est sanari). For who imagines that in a sick man there are thus two 
contrary realities (duas res contrarias)? since it is the same body, which seeks 
health and yet is compelled to do things which belong to its weakness: the 
same body under both conditions. Book 3 contra Iul. c. 20: “concupiscence is so 
great an evil, that as it resists it is conquered by being assaulted until, like a 
wound in a body, it is healed by the perfect cure” (Concupiscentia vsque adeo 
malum est, Vt repugnans expugnando vincatur, donec sicut vulnus in corpore 
perfecta curatione sanetur).738 
 
In the first place, I note that Luther’s text in the excerpt matches our best modern 
edition’s without any substantial variations.739  
As to the content of the passage: from what I can gather from the detailed 
researches of Pekka Kärkkäinen and Theodor Dieter,740 Luther seems to be taking up 
some tenets of his Erfurt teachers’ philosophical psychology. Kärkkäinen has shown 
that in the Buridanian strand of the via moderna regnant in early sixteenth-century 
Erfurt, Trutfetter and Usingen rejected the plurality of substantial forms in one subject 
in favor of the real unity of the soul and, in the course of their commentaries on 
Aristotle’s de anima, defended their positions against both live philosophical 
alternatives (e.g., Thomas’, Scotus’, or Ockham’s psychology) and historical stances no 
                                                        
738 WA 56.351.23-352.12, cf. LW 25.340-1. 
739 NBA I/18.624, PL 44.722 (cf. WSA I/24.361): … tanquam nos dicamus, mentis excellentiore natura 
concupiscentiam carnis non posse frenari. Sed dicimus, usque adeo malum esse, ut repugnans 
expurgando vincatur, donec sicut vulnus in corpore, ita perfecta curatione sanetur. 
740 Pekka Kärkkäinen, “Psychology and the Soul in Late Medieval Erfurt,” Vivarium 47 (2009), 421-
443, esp. 426, 430, 437-9; Theodor Dieter, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles, 41, 130-36. 
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longer currently held by a particular school. Amongst the latter category, Usingen 
discussed Anaxagoras, Plato, and Averroës.741 Is it possible that Luther the Erfurt 
magister artium turned Wittenberg doctor in biblia is doing something similar here? 
Of the three historical positions mentioned by Usingen, it seems to be Plato’s 
psychology (in Phaedo, as opposed to Republic) that most nearly resonates with what 
Luther dismisses as a frivolous invention, to wit: reason or spirit juxtaposed with 
sensualitas as contrary entities with contrary appetites that together make up a single 
subject, with the nod going to ratio as the better and more real of a human being’s two 
constituent parts. On this reading, Luther sets the Erfurt/Buridanian rejection of the 
soul’s division into real parts (or faculties really distinct from the essentia animae) 
against a broadly Platonic interpretation of Rom. 7:14-25’s confessing subject as an 
akratic spirit or mens unable to control its lower and impassioned partes.742  
 There is, I think, a more plausible interpretation to consider. When Luther 
denounces the “frivolous and delirious commentum of the metaphysical theologians,” 
he probably has the de anima commentaries contained within the eighth book of 
Trutfetter’s Summa in totam physicen and Usingen’s Exercitium de anima especially in 
mind,743 and perhaps relevant loci from Biel’s Collectorium.744 Luther had, after all, 
introduced his comments on Rom. 7:17 just a few pages earlier by lamenting the fallax 
Aristotelis methaphysica that has deceived “our theologians.”745 But if this is the case, 
we must inquire farther into the exact nature of Luther’s disagreement with his 
                                                        
741 Kärkkäinen, “Psychology and the Soul in Late Medieval Erfurt,” 439. 
742 Recently Emma Wasserman, “The Death of the Soul in Romans 7: Revisiting Paul’s Anthropology 
in Light of Hellenistic Moral Psychology” JBL 126/4 (2007): 793-816, has revived this Platonic 
interpretation.  
743 On these two works, see Kärkkäinen, “Psychology and the Soul in Late Medieval Erfurt,” 423-6. 
744 Esp. IV d. 4 q. 1 art. 2 conc. 3. 
745 WA 56.349.23-4, cf. LW 25.338. 
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teachers, for his rejection of an aspect of their philosophical psychology does not 
involve a blanket repudiation of philosophical psychology as such, as is commonly 
assumed.746 Take, for example, the specific question at hand: Luther clearly agrees 
with his Erfurt teachers in rejecting a real partition of the soul. So what is the issue at 
stake between them?  
Dieter’s research is particularly useful in answering this question. He has 
shown that Usingen still uses the conceptual (as opposed to real) distinctions amongst 
the soul’s several faculties to diversely apportion the conflicting desires that exist 
within the single subject of the soul as if its faculties were really distinct after all.747 
This is just the philosophical problem that Luther names here: disputant de appetitibus 
contrariis, an possint in eodem esse subiecto. What Dieter has recognized is that 
Luther rejects Usingen’s solution to this problem as self-defeating and illusory, for 
Usingen’s treatment of contrary desires ends up maintaining de facto a kind of real 
partition that contradicts the deeper tenets of his own psychology. That is to say, 
Usingen ends up with a division between spiritus/ratio as one integral res and 
sensualitas/caro as another integral res separate therefrom.748 So does Biel: gratia and 
the concupiscent fomes are not formally opposed to one another, because grace is 
                                                        
746 As I discussed in cp. 1, this is the dominant position in scholarship that takes its bearings from 
Joest and Ebeling, e.g., Notger Slenczka, “Luther’s Anthropology,” OHMLT, 212-32. 
747 Dieter, 131-2, in n. 426 citing Usingen’s Exercitium de anima lib. 3 tract. 2, fol. 73v: In eodem 
animali secundum eandem potentiam appetitus non contrariatur appetitui sed bene secundam 
diversas [sc. potentias]. 
748 Thus Usingen contrasts ratio and sensualitas in precisely the manner Luther rejects in his 
Exercitium de anima lib. 3 tract. 2, fol. 74r (Dieter, 134 n. 437): Continentes qui operantur bona sed 
cum luctu et renitentia propterea quod sensualitas non est omnino rationi subiecta, vincit tamen 
ratio sensum atque debellat et in illis appetitus sensitivus contrariatur intellectivo. Incontinentes qui 
operantur mala cum luctu et resistentia propterea quod ratio non est omnino suppressa atque 
sensualitati subiecta, vincit tamen sensualitas rationem in surgentibus passionibus in appetitu 
sensitive. 
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infused into the soul (anima) while concupiscence is merely in carne vel in aliqua 
virtute corporali.749 Ironically, Luther attacks this in the scholion on Rom. 7:17 at least 
in part because he actually shares with Usingen a common belief in the real unity of 
the soul. This is all quite helpful. 
However, Dieter’s interpretation of the constructive position that Luther 
advances against “the metaphysical theologians” of Erfurt is unsatisfying. He realizes 
the Augustinian influences in play in the text, noting in particular the presence of the 
familiar spiritus/caro, facere/perficere, non consentire, and vulnus themes. But in a 
book on Luther und Aristoteles, Dieter’s attention fixes a little too quickly on the 
young Luther’s evolving concerns with the traditional language of sin as a bad 
qualitas, habitus, or vitium of the soul. No one can possess the moral disposition 
“virtue” and the moral disposition “vice” at the same time; as Usingen put it in a 
textbook example taken up endlessly by his pupil Luther, Inest autem contrarietas 
qualitati ut album, nigrum.750 Any given subject can only be qualified by the one or the 
other at a given time. Thus, continues Dieter—still soundly at this point—it is Luther’s 
judgment that if a theologian thinks consistently in these Aristotelian terms, St. Paul’s 
spirit/flesh “simul” cannot be adequately grasped and thematized. But then to resolve 
the matter, Dieter turns to Luther’s Worttheologie as a kind of deus ex machina: when 
the Word of God seizes a person, it sets his identity into a conflict which can only be 
expressed in the form of two contradictory “total” definitions.751 There is, I think, more 
of Hermann, Ebeling, Joest, and Grane in this than Dieter might care to admit, and 
                                                        
749 Collectorium IV d. 4 q. 1 art. 2 conc. 3 (W & H IV/1.156). 
750 Parvulus loyce cum figuris, tract. 5 fol. I IVr, cited by Dieter, 136. 
751 Dieter, 134-6. 
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not a little of his teacher Bayer too. But on my reckoning, the real problem is that 
there is not enough of Augustine. 
Taking up Dieter’s sound diagnosis of the problem, I propose a different 
interpretation of Luther’s solution. He does take up his teachers’ emphasis on the real 
unity of the soul. But when he addresses the philosophical-psychological problem 
posed by appetitus contrarii—which is at once the exegetical problem posed by Rom. 
7:14-25—Luther outmaneuvers Usingen’s failed effort to uphold this unity in terms of 
nominalistic Aristotelianism by instead appropriating the heavily modified Stoicism 
embedded within the mature Augustine’s theology of grace.752 To be clear, I am not 
suggesting that Luther quite realized he was doing this: hence my emphasis on its 
embeddedness in Augustine’s theology. In Luther’s mind, he was simply recovering 
the anti-Pelagian theology of grace common to both St. Paul and Augustine and 
setting it against the Aristotelian (and Pelagian) aberrations of his teachers. But 
Luther’s straightforwardly Augustinian reply to the “metaphysical theologians”—
which culminates in the citation of c. Iul. 3.20.39 as a proof from authority—contains 
within it a prepackaged affective philosophical psychology better suited to achieving 
the twofold end of maintaining both the real ontological unity of the soul and the 
mysterious reality of its inner division. Augustine’s modified Stoicism accomplishes 
this end, not by positing separate psychological parts, but by confessing the diverse 
passions that rend apart the entire regenerate soul.753 St. Paul’s “flesh” does not name a 
                                                        
752 Cf. my discussion at cp. 2.2.1 above. Timo Nisula’s (254) claim that “to Augustine, concupiscentia 
has moved beyond philosophical competence” eloquently captures the thoroughgoingness with 
which Augustine has both appropriated and transformed eclectic elements of ancient philosophy in 
light of the Bible (see 2 Cor. 10:5). 
753 On this point, see esp. Byers, “Augustine on the ‘Divided Self’: Platonist or Stoic?” 
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part of the soul, or even a vicious qualitas animae, but rather a vicious affectio animae 
operating within and vitiating all the soul’s faculties in a habitual manner.754 Likewise, 
Paul’s “spirit” and “mind” refer to neither Plato’s immortal logistikon nor Aristotle’s 
nous, but to the good, virtuous, and holy affections which vie against the vicious 
desires of the flesh within the battlefield of the one graced soul. This is all basic to 
Augustine’s simultaneously anti-Manichean and anti-Pelagian psychology. Classically 
stated at nupt. conc. 1.25.28, the “weakness” left behind in the regenerate after baptism 
does not remain “substantially,” for it is not a body or a spirit of some kind, but a 
vicious desire afflicting the holy soul: “a certain affection of an evil quality, like a 
disease” (affectio est quaedam malae qualitatis, sicut languor).755 Thus as Timo Nisula 
nicely has it, Augustine labors to unsettle Julian’s confidence in the “citadel of virtue” 
that is the magnanimous (pagan and Pelagian) soul by stressing that for the Christian, 
“no intact ground is left: the battle has to be fought inside the citadel.”756  
In the scholion on Rom. 7:17, Luther sets a philosophical psychology (and 
theology of healing grace) formulated in just these characteristically Augustinian 
terms against the substantia- and qualitas-oriented positions of his Aristotelian 
teachers. To wit: Christ progressively heals the half-dead man, who is healthy insofar 
as he desires (cupit) good things but sick to the extent that he still desires other things 
against his own will; “flesh” is a vulnus affecting not just a part, but the whole man; 
                                                        
754 That the affection is itself already vicious prior to the affected person’s volitional consent to it 
marks the vital modification of the Stoic theory of pro-passions and consent which Augustine 
develops in the context of his anti-Pelagian theology of grace.  
755 BA 23.118, cf. WSA I/24.46, which omits the crucial word affectio from its translation. 
756 Nisula, 338; cf. Hombert’s (Gloria Gratiae, 267-8 n. 61.) extensive note on Julian’s rationalism, 
Aristotelianism, and “undeniable superbia” justly denounced by Augustine. Hombert supports his 
judgment by adding that of F.-J. Thonnard, “L’aristotélisme de Julien d’Éclane et saint Augustin,” 
REA 11 (1965), 296-304. 
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through grace the man’s “spirit” has begun to be healed (sanari) of this evil affective 
disease; and, on the authority of c. Iul. 3.20.39, this disease and wound is conquered in 
this life by battling against it, till the day it will be healed with the perfect cure of the 
eschatological resurrection.757 Luther then expands upon Augustine’s analogy of the 
wounded man being healed with one of his own devising: a dilapidated house 
undergoing renovations. Like the wound and the wounded man in process of being 
healed, the remaining imperfectio of a ruined house and its constructio upon 
beginning to be restored (instaurari) are not two separate things: eadem res est.758 On 
account of the fact that it is being rebuilt, the house is truly said to be a house and to 
be making progress (proficere). But on account of its imperfection, it is also said simul 
to not yet be a house and to fall short of what is proper to a house (deficere a 
proprietate domus). In both cases, true predications are made of one and the same 
house, but in different respects and on the basis of the mechanism of suppositional 
carrying that Luther has translated from its native christological sphere of discourse to 
make sense of Paul’s anthropology. As in Augustine’s vulnus analogy, Luther’s domus 
analogy moves firmly and unequivocally from the terminus a quo of the house’s 
original state of ruination, through its progressive renovation, to the terminus ad quem 
of its eventual completion. This is why Luther momentarily leaves off the analogy to 
cite Rom. 8:23 and Jas. 1:18: “we have the firstfruits of the spirit, we have become the 
beginning of God’s creature,” then returns to it via 1 Pet. 2:5 and Eph. 2:21: “we are 
being built up into a spiritual house, and a building thus constructed grows into a holy 
                                                        
757 WA 56.351.17-352.12, cf. LW 25.340-1. 
758 WA 56.352.12-15, cf. LW 25.341. 
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temple in the Lord.”759 Luther’s new analogy, which is meant to explain Augustine’s 
old one, demonstrates how deeply he has grasped the logic of Augustine’s idem homo 
spirit/flesh “simul” within the overarching context of Augustine’s theology of 
progressive renewal, healing, or renovation by grace. 
Once Luther’s appropriation of Augustine’s philosophical psychology, precisely 
as an integral thread in the fabric of the church father’s theology of grace, is 
adequately grasped, it should be plain to see that his polemic against the 
“metaphysical theologians” does not signal a proto-Heideggerian rejection on his part 
of the Substanzmetaphysik that (per Ebeling et al.) dominated medieval Scholasticism. 
Luther the young O.E.S.A. lecturer on Romans is not anticipating the philosophy of 
late modernity. Nor, for that matter, is he rejecting philosophy per se for the Bible, as 
his rhetoric (and Augustine’s before him) might lead us t0 think. Rather, Luther is 
recovering a kind of paleo-Augustinianism that champions the very same affective 
psychology and theology of efficacious grace that had perplexed and indeed enraged 
Julian, the virtue-oriented Aristotelian moral philosopher, in late antiquity. On the eve 
of the Reformation, Luther is at least beginning to realize that “our theology and St. 
Augustine” would have much the same effect upon the early modern Church and its 
several schools of theology.760  
 
                                                        
759 WA 56.352.15-20, cf. LW 25.341. 
760 Thus the famous lines from Luther’s 18 May 1517 letter to Johannes Lang, prior of the Erfurt 
Augustinians, WA Br 1.99.8-13 (#41): Theologia nostra et S. Augustinus prospere procedunt et 
regnant in nostra universitate Deo operante. Aristoteles descendit paulatim inclinatus ad ruinam 
prope futuram sempiternam. Mire fastidiuntur lectiones sententiariae, nec est, ut quis sibi auditores 
sperare possit, nisi theologiam hanc, id est bibliam aut S. Augustinum aliumve ecclesiasticae 
autoritatis doctorem velit profiteri. Cf. LW 48.42. 
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2.1.3. c. Iul. 2.9.32. Both the third and fourth Augustinian excerpts appear in Luther’s 
comments on Rom. 7:17b: Sed quod habitat in me peccatum. Indeed, Luther begins his 
exegesis by yielding the floor to Augustine: 
Blessed Augustine book 2 contra Iulianum: “How then is sin dead, since it 
operates so many things in us even with us struggling against it? What are 
these many things? Nothing except foolish and harmful desideria, ‘which 
plunge those who consent (consentientes) into destruction,’ etc. [cf. 1 Tim. 6:9]. 
How then do we say that this sin is dead in baptism and how do we confess 
that it dwells in our members and operates many desideria, unless that it has 
died in its guilt (reatu), by which it was holding us (quo nos tenebat), and that 
until it is healed by the perfection of burial, it both rebels and is dead? 
Although now it is not called sin in the same way, by which it makes guilty 
(facit reum), but because it came about by the first man’s guilt, and because by 
rebelling it strives to draw us into guilt (ad reatum).”761 
 
Comparison with our best modern edition shows that although Luther has 
compressed Augustine’s text through three elisions, the sense remains intact. After 
quoting Rom. 7:23 and 7:18, Augustine writes: 
Behold, that mighty soldier of Christ and faithful doctor of the Church [i.e., 
Ambrose] shows what a great fight we have with dead sins. How then is sin 
dead, since it operates so many things in us even with us struggling against it? 
What many things, if not foolish and harmful desideria which plunge those 
who consent into destruction and perdition? Certainly to endure such things, 
and not consent to them, is a struggle, a conflict, a fight. A fight between 
whom, if not good and evil: not of nature against nature, but of nature against 
a wound (vitium) that is already dead, but that still has to be buried 
(sepeliendum), that is, to be completely healed (sanandum)? How then do we 
say that this sin is dead in baptism, just as that man [i.e., Ambrose] said, and 
how do we confess that it dwells in our members, and operates many desideria 
even though we struggle against them and resist by not consenting to them, 
just as this man confesses—unless that it has died in its guilt, by which it was 
holding us, and that until it is healed by the perfection of burial, it both rebels 
and is dead? Although now it is not called sin in the same way, by which it 
                                                        
761 WA 56.352.22-30: B. Aug li. 2. contra Iul: ‘Quomodo enim peccatum mortuum est, cum multa 
operetur in nobis reluctantibus nobis? Quȩ multa? Nisi desideria stulta et noxia, “quȩ consentientes 
mergunt in interitum”’ etc. ‘Quomodo ergo mortuum dicimus hoc peccatum in baptismate et 
quomodo habitare in membris fatemur et multa operari desideria, nisi quia mortuum est in eo reatu, 
quo nos tenebat, et donec sepulturȩ perfectione sanetur, rebellat et mortuum? Quamuis iam non 
eodem modo appelletur peccatum, quo facit reum, Sed quod sit reatu primi hominis factum, et quod 
rebellando nos trahere nititur ad reatum.’ Cf. LW 25.341. 
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makes guilty; but because it came about by the first man’s guilt, and because by 
rebelling it strives to draw us into guilt, unless the grace of God through Jesus 
Christ our Lord helps us, lest even the sin that is dead in this way should rebel 
and, by thus conquering us, come back to life and reign.762 
 
For Luther exegeting Rom. 7:17b, the main object is to illumine what Paul means by 
the “sin” which he confesses still indwells him, and the c. Iul. excerpt is suitable to this 
purpose. Taking up Ambrose’s apt remarks and then drawing them further into the 
decisive Pauline context of Rom. 6 and 7, Augustine maintains essentially the same 
position I exposited above vis-à-vis c. Iul. 2.5.12, 6.17.51, and 3.20.39. St. Paul’s “sin” is 
not a Manichean nature of darkness, but an evil affective and privative wound that 
continues to operate many vicious desideria despite the fact that in baptism it has 
“died” with respect to the guilt by which it had once held the unbaptized person 
bound in the chains of Adam’s sin and guilt. Though already “dead” in this guilt-
related sense, Paul’s “peccatum” has not yet been “buried”: an implicit allusion to Rom. 
6:4. En route to its burial, the grotesque corpse of dead indwelling sin continues to 
fight its fate, rebelling against its burial through the operation of its evil desires and 
even coming back to life if the baptized person consents to them. By contrast, when 
the Christian fights against the evil desires he continues to suffer by not consenting to 
                                                        
762 NBA I/18.562, PL 44.696: Ecce quantam nos pugnam cum mortuis habere peccatis, ille strenuus 
Christi miles, et Ecclesiae fidelis doctor ostendit. Quomodo enim peccatum mortuum est, cum multa 
operetur in nobis reluctantibus nobis? Quae multa, nisi desideria stulta et noxia, quae consentientes 
mergunt in interitum et perditionem? Quae utique perpeti, eisque non consentire, certamen est, 
conflictus est, pugna est. Quorum pugna, nisi boni et mali, non naturae adversus naturam, sed 
naturae adversus vitium iam mortuum, sed adhuc sepeliendum, id est, omnino sanandum? Quomodo 
ergo mortuum dicimus hoc peccatum in Baptismate, sicut etiam iste vir dicit, et quomodo habitare in 
membris fatemur, et multa operari desideria reluctantibus nobis, quibus non consentiendo resistimus, 
sicut etiam hic vir fatetur; nisi quia mortuum est in eo reatu quo nos tenebat, et donec sepulturae 
perfectione sanetur, rebellat et mortuum? Quamvis iam non eo modo appelletur peccatum, quo facit 
reum; sed quod sit reatu primi hominis factum, et quod rebellando nos trahere nititur ad reatum, nisi 
adiuvet nos gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum, ne sic etiam mortuum peccatum 
rebellet, ut vincendo reviviscat et regnet. Cf. WSA I/24.330. 
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them, the ongoing “burial” of dead (but operative!) indwelling sin carries on apace; 
that is—switching back to Augustine’s preferred metaphor—the baptized and forgiven 
person’s wounded nature continues to be healed. Meanwhile, Augustine clarifies, this 
“dead sin” (whose rebellious operations Mary Shelley might have admired) is not 
called “sin” in the same way it had been so called prior to the great disruption of 
baptismal grace, i.e., in the sense that previously it had made the unbaptized person 
guilty of Adam’s rebellion. The grace of forgiveness in baptism breaks the chain that 
held the heirs of Adam’s vitiated nature bound by Adam’s guilt. But as the regenerate 
still endure the lamentable effects of the original wounding, the “dead” or guilt-
released “sin” that indwells them is called “sin” both on account of its source in 
Adam’s reatus and because it strives to entice the reborn to consent to its allurements 
and thus drag them out of life in Christ and back into Adam’s death, ad reatum.  
 Luther adds only one brief comment: “Therefore, it [i.e., Rom. 7:17b’s 
peccatum] is the original vice of the tinder” (est ipsum originale vitium fomitis).763 In 
itself, and given the content of the excerpt from nupt. conc. 1.23.25 that follows shortly 
thereupon (and indeed the tenor of the entire scholion), this suggests that Luther has 
adopted the excerpted material from c. Iul. 2.9.32 without modification as a 
satisfactory explication of Rom. 7:17b. I shall comment further on the conceptual links 
between these two excerpts in §4 below, especially regarding the nature and role of 
Augustine’s non consentire as it relates to the sinfulness of concupiscentia. But just 
prior to the next excerpt, Luther inserts a short back-reference to his comments in the 
first corollarium in the scholion on Rom. 7: “about this original vitium fomitis, it was 
                                                        
763 WA 56.353.1, cf. LW 25.341. 
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said above that we are more aptly said to die to it than it to us, and that while it 
remains, we are turned away (diuerti) from it in this life through grace.”764 Since this 
earlier text is sometimes taken to signal a complete break on Luther’s part with any 
kind of broadly Augustinian theology of progressive renovation, I need to look into it 
farther here. Given what we have seen thus far in the scholion on Rom. 7 both vis-à-vis 
Luther’s defensible grasp of Augustine’s meaning in its original context and his 
intention to appropriate this “420s Augustine” in his own theology, it is prima facie 
unlikely that the interpretations advanced by Grane, Forde, and others are sound. But 
let us see for ourselves what Luther wrote. 
 
Excursus on the corollarium at Rom. 7:1: Paul’s Augustinian modus loquendi 
 
As Grane has famously observed, Luther contrasts Paul’s apostolic modus loquendi 
with the metaphysical or moral modus in vogue in late medieval theology. Thus Paul 
says 
… that a man rather is taken away, with sin remaining as a relic, and a man is 
purged (expurgari) from sin rather than the contrary. However, the human 
sense says the contrary: sin is taken away, with the man remaining, and the 
man rather is purged (purgari). But the Apostle’s sense is the best of all, and 
more proper, and perfectly divine.765  
 
Luther’s exact meaning in these few lines is cryptic: peccatum remanens or relictum is 
familiar enough and resonates with what Luther writes in his back-reference at Rom. 
7:17b. But what is the import of the contrast he draws between (a) taking the man 
                                                        
764 WA 56.353.1-3, cf. LW 25.341. 
765 WA 56.334.14-19: Modus loquendi Apostoli et modus methaphysicus seu moralis sunt contrarii. 
Quia Apostolus loquitur, vt significet sonet hominem potius aufferri peccato remanente velut relicto 
et hominem expurgari a peccato potius quam econtra. Humanus autem sensus econtra peccatum 
aufferri homine manente et hominem potius purgari loquitur. Sed Apostoli sensus optime proprius et 
perfecte diuinus est. Cf. LW 25.322. Note the humanist ring to Luther’s praise of Paul’s sensus 
divinus. 
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away from sin, which is St. Paul’s sense, and (b) taking the sin away from the man, 
which is the all too human sensus Luther sets out to oppose? The initial obscurity is 
further complicated by the fact that in both cases Luther states that man is “purged” 
or “cleansed,” first using the more emphatic expurgari, then purgari in the second 
instance. Grane argues that Luther is drawing a contrast between his (or Paul’s) 
theology and that of die Scholastik. But the great Dane too hastily explains this in 
terms of a contrast between Lutheran or Pauline justification on the one hand, and the 
Scholastic or Catholic theologies of qualitative transformation on the other. 
Rechtfertigung is not about etwas am Menschen being transformed, states Grane, but 
about the man himself being changed. He is paraphrasing Luther’s own words at this 
point, and out of context it might sound as if Grane is envisioning a real renovation of 
some kind. Not exactly. Grane explains that the 
… renovatio or mutatio of grace expresses itself in the attitude (Haltung) of the 
person who expects only the action of God, and completely abandons a 
fulfilling of the law of his own. Where this renewal takes place, sin has died, 
even though it still remains in the flesh.766 
 
In other words, the “change” that takes place in justification is seated in the attitude, 
bearing, or self-understanding of the person who confesses his status as a total sinner 
before God, and thus awaits God’s gracious bestowal of iustitia aliena. Sin ist 
gestorben in such a person—the emphasis is Grane’s—because “sin” is correlative to 
the wrath-working law (Rom. 4:15); and the sinner who thus postures himself before 
God, renouncing all claims to a righteousness of his own, no longer stands under the 
law’s sentence. But sin in itself still remains in the flesh, indeed it must remain, for the 
whole rationale behind the justification of the sinner is his (self-) recognition of his 
                                                        
766 Grane, Modus Loquendi, 96. 
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total sinfulness. Thus sin has “died” only in the person in whom it remains, and who 
confesses its totalizing effect upon himself. This is the (I dare say) rather paradoxical 
Erneuerung that Grane sets forth to explain the obscure Lutherrede that opens the first 
corollary in the Rom. 7 scholion. This he sets against the “metaphysical” and “moral” 
theories of die Scholastik, with their literally misplaced concern for the transformation 
of psychological qualities or external works in advance of the deeper renovation of the 
person in his “psyche” (in the modern sense of the word) that Luther upholds.767 
 What are we to make of this? Dieter has properly upbraided Grane (and 
Ebeling) for their monolithic accounts of scholastic theology. (Not unjustifiably, he 
has also taken Luther to task for much the same reason.)768 That said, the often 
impassioned polemics against scholastic Sawtheologen in the Romans lectures are 
plain as day,769 and Grane is right to emphasize the either Paul or Aristotle/Scholastik 
dichotomy (which is, after all, Luther’s own invention) as a crucial factor in the scholia 
on Rom. 7 and 4 in particular. But as I have shown above, the roots of this very 
dichotomy lie in Augustine’s own polemical self-definition as a simple biblical 
theologian of grace over against Julian the clever Aristotelian moralist: and the modus 
                                                        
767 Grane, Modus Loquendi, 95-6. Cf. Berndt Hamm’s remarks on this text in his essay, “What was 
the Reformation Doctrine of Justification?” (in The Reformation of Faith, 212): Luther “sees the 
interest of scholastic theology as being bent on human morality, man’s moral quality before God, 
and his natural quality in accordance with his creation, its diminution through sin and its 
restoration and improvement through the metaphysical quality of grace. Luther sees the Pauline 
approach to theology, on the other hand, as leaving aside the entire field of virtue and morality, 
physics and metaphysics, and man’s ability to act for better or worse. He is not concerned with 
man’s human ability but with his new creation by God, and a new relationship between the 
merciful God and sinful man in which man is outside himself in Christ. Consequently Luther can 
formulate the whole mold-breaking antithesis to the Catholic doctrine of the Middle Ages, the 
contrast between the two approaches, cogently as follows: Paul says that man is removed but sin 
remains. The moral approach, however, says that sin is removed and man remains” (citing WA 
56.334.14-9 in n. 108). 
768 Dieter, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles, 28-37 for Grane and Ebeling; 27-28 et passim for Luther. 
769 On Rom. 4:7, WA 56.274.14, cf. LW 25.261.  
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loquendi that Luther advocates here contra pelagianos modernos has much in common 
with both the technical terminology and the theological substance developed by 
Augustine in his debate with Julian. If Grane falters in failing to diagnose the problem 
Luther takes himself to be facing with quite the degree of sophistication that Dieter 
provides, on my reading the real issue at stake is Grane’s failure to recognize the 
mature Augustinian character of the solution that Luther commends here as truly 
apostolic theology. A close reading of Luther’s elaboration of his puzzling claim that 
the man must be taken away from his sin, rather than the sin from the man, bears this 
out. 
 Luther confirms Paul’s modus loquendi by supplying parallel texts from Ps. 81:6, 
Rom. 6:17, the Exodus narrative, and Ps. 21:12, then explains: 
The reason for this kind of speaking is this: that grace and spiritual 
righteousness destroy and change (tollit et mutat) the man himself, and turn 
him away from sins—although sin is left behind (relinquat), so that while it 
justifies the spirit, it leaves behind (reliquit) concupiscence in the flesh and in 
the midst of the sins in the world. And this way of speaking is a most powerful 
engine against the self-righteous. But human righteousness endeavors to 
destroy and change (tollere et mutare) sins first, and to preserve the man 
himself; therefore, it is not righteousness, but hypocrisy. Therefore, as long as 
the man himself lives and is not destroyed and changed through the 
renovation of grace (tollitur ac mutatur per renouationem gratiȩ), by no works 
is he able to forestall his being under sin and the law.770 
   
Thomists (et amici evangelici like Hooker, Owen, or Bavinck) accustomed to the axiom 
that gratia non tollit naturam sed perficit instinctively cringe at Luther’s language at 
this point; and for that matter, in the Lectures on Genesis Luther himself energetically 
upholds this very axiom in his polemics against “the monks” (and Thomas Müntzer) 
                                                        
770 WA 56.334.24-335.4, cf. LW 25.323. 
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who aim to destroy human nature by their asceticism.771 But we should not jump too 
quickly to the conclusion that Luther in 1516 is actually affirming that grace destroys 
nature: which, to be clear, he never actually says here. Rather, grace destroys ipsum 
hominem, that is, the man himself as a son of Adam apart from Christ, and changes 
him: which is why Luther can and does speak of the entire process of destruction and 
change—in St. Paul’s terms, of death and new life—as renovatio gratiae. Luther is 
presupposing a bleak Augustinian account of human nature’s vitiation in Adam, but 
not its abolition. Grace and spiritual righteousness abolish the old Adam’s inherited 
vitiation in order to change and renovate the graced man himself in the depths of his 
being. Not, to be sure, all at once: grace iustificat spiritum, but concupiscentia in carne 
is left behind as a kind of relic. This, then, is what Luther means when he says that the 
man must be taken away from his sin, rather than the other way around.  
And this is why he forcefully opposes the alternative. So long as homo ipse as a 
son of Adam remains intact, it will do no good—as the iustitiarii presume—to take 
away this or that sinful deed or vicious quality and in its place to cultivate a virtue or 
do a good work. For as Luther will say in the 1518 Heidelberg Disputation, “Adam is 
                                                        
771 Asendorf, Lectura in Biblia, 75; Forsberg, Das Abrahambild, 101-5. In cp. 2.2.2 above, I pointed to 
WA 44.493.3-26, LW 7.261. In addition, see e.g. (1) WA 44.525.34-526.3, LW 7.305 (on Gen. 42:38): 
Ea igitur doctrina Spiritus sancti in hoc exemplo proponitur, quae in omnibus Historiis patrum 
admodum celebris est et alibi quoque traditur, quod στοργὰς φυσικὰς quae efficiunt hunc luctum et 
dolorem, maneant in sanctis, et quod Deus non sit author destruendae naturae, sed sanandae. 
Spiritus sanctus non facit ex hominibus truncos et insensatos, quando infundit fidem, sed conservat, 
et auget quicquid in natura boni est, στοργὰς paternas, filiales, etc. Sunt enim creaturae Dei. 
Infirmantur quidem in multis, et tolluntur per Diabolum, sed Deus non tollit eas, sicut Monachi et 
fanatici faciunt. Nam et Ioseph vir est fortis, et sanctus, tamen plorat, sicut audivimus supra. (2) WA 
44.552.27-33, LW 7.340 (on Gen. 43:30): Vide quanta vis sit naturae, quae quanto melior est et 
integrior, tanto excellentiores atque ardentiores στοργὰς habet nec tollit aut corrumpit eam gratia et 
spiritus sanctus, ut monachi somniarunt, sed corruptam sanat et restituit in integrum. Id enim ex hoc 
exemplo Ioseph apparet, qui adeo vincitur στοργῆ,ͅ ut cor et oculi eius liquescant et solvantur in 
lachrymas. Totus stupet et obmutescit prae nimia miseratione, qua adficitur erga fratrem et parentes. 
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rather edified by good works.”772 This is ramped-up Luther rhetoric at its finest, but in 
the sequel Luther explains with necessary precision exactly what he means: “For it is 
impossible for a person not to be puffed up by his own good works, unless he has first 
been emptied out and destroyed by sufferings and evils, until he knows that he 
himself is nothing and that the works are not his own, but God’s.”773 The theologus 
gloriae in 1518 and the iustitiarii in 1516 are identical, and suffer from the same deadly 
brew of a Bielish theology and a Pelagian spiritual pathology, to wit: the presumption 
of their own fundamental integrity; the failure to grasp the depths of their perversion; 
the vain notion (at once dogmatic and spiritual) that just a little bit of gratia elevans is 
needed to boost their naturalia integra into the state of grace that will permit them to 
achieve condign merit and, in the end, eternal life.  
No, says Luther—as theologian certainly, but also as Staupitzian Seelsorger—
that path only leads the “penitent” to re-inscribe ever more deeply in his proud heart 
the lust for his own autonomous “self” that felled Adam in the Garden.774 It is not 
enough to take away this or that sin from the man and lift him up to a state of grace, 
so long as he remains in the depths of his being the filius Adae he had been all along, 
originaliter. A more powerful remedy is needed to match the severity of the case facing 
Adam’s ruined children: who, on top of it all, are blind to their own ruination! They 
                                                        
772 Thesis 21. WA 1.362.29-1: Ideo amici crucis dicunt crucem esse bonam et opera mala, quia per 
crucem destruuntur opera et crucifigitur Adam, qui per opera potius aedificatur. cf. LW 31.53. 
773 WA 1.362.31-33: Impossibile est enim, ut non infletur operibus suis bonis, qui non prius exinanitus 
et destructus est passionibus et malis, donec sciat seipsum esse nihil et opera non sua sed Dei esse. 
Cf. LW 31.53. 
774 Cf. Heidelberg Disputation #16, WA 1.360.25-30: Homo putans, se ad gratiam velle pervenire 
faciendo quod in se est, peccatum addit peccato, ut duplo reus fiat. Quia ex dictis patet: dum facit 
quod est in se, peccat et sua querit omnino. At si per peccatum putet se dignum fieri gratia aut aptum 
ad gratiam, iam superbam addit praesumptionem et peccatum non peccatum et malum non malum 
credit, quod est nimis grande peccatum. 
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are in desperate straits calling for desperate measures: gratia sanans as a kind of 
spiritual chemotherapy, grace that puts the congenitally cancerous Adam infecting 
them to death, and changes and renews the whole person (homo ipse) in Christ.775 The 
man himself must be ripped away from his sin, emptied and destroyed and crucified 
with Christ in order to be torn out of the first Adam’s flesh and changed and raised up 
per renovationem gratiae into the newness of life that is to be had only in the Last, the 
Life-Giving Spirit (1 Cor. 15:45). This gracious and “radical” (in the sense that it reaches 
down to the roots) renovation must take place first if one’s works are to become truly 
good: otherwise, the most pious and industrious doer of good works manu is only 
reinforcing his inherited Adamic pathology in corde, and fooling himself as to his own 
holiness in the bargain. There is not a little of John Tauler and the Theologia Deutsch 
in this.776 But for my present purposes, it is more vital to recognize (as Grane failed to 
do) that this complex of doctrines—involving the depth of human nature’s vitiation in 
Adam, the corresponding necessity of a strong healing grace to renovate what had 
fallen into disrepair, the fragmentary “relic” of the old Adam left behind as the new 
justified spiritus advances in the course of its ongoing renewal—bears upon it the 
                                                        
775 Cf. Heidelberg Disputation #17, WA 1.361.12-21: Patet quod non desperatio, sed spes potius 
praedicatur, quando nos esse peccatores praedicatur. Illa enim praedicatio peccati est praeparatio ad 
gratiam seu potius agnitio peccati et fides talis praedicationis. Tunc enim surgit desiderium gratiae, 
quando orta est peccati cognitio. Tunc aeger querit medicinam, quando intelligit malum sui morbi. 
Sicut itaque non est causam desperationis vel mortis dare, quando aegroto dicitur periculum sui 
morbi, sed potius est eum provocare ad curam medicinae querendae, Ita dicere quod nihil sumus et 
semper peccamus, quando facimus quod in nobis est, non est desperatos (nisi sint stulti) sed sollicitos 
ad gratiam Domini nostri Ihesu Christi facere. Cf. LW 31.51. 
776 Especially in the need for a “radical” transformation of the whole person, and the connection 
between this theme and the stark Adam/Christ contrast. Consider the title Luther gave to his 
(incomplete) 1516 publication of the Theologia Deutsch (WA 1.153): Eyn geystlich edles Buchleynn. 
von rechter vnderscheyd und vorstand Was der alt und new mensche sey. Was Adams und was gottis 
kind sey. und wie Adam yn uns sterben und Christus ersteen sall. 
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characteristic marks of Augustine’s mature theology, which, as I have shown, Luther 
begins to quote copiously just a few pages farther on in his scholion on Rom. 7. 
This interpretation is further confirmed if we follow Luther’s argument just a 
few lines farther down this page in the WA. Keep in mind the perplexing contrast that 
orients these paragraphs: for the moral philosopher, man remains intact and sin is 
taken away; for the Apostle, the man is taken away but sin remains. Paul’s repeated 
statements about “dying to sin” in Rom. 6-7 form the immediate context for Luther’s 
paradox. In his comments on Rom. 7:1-6 in particular, Luther as exegete needs to 
explain what it means that “the law is binding on a person only as long as he lives” (v. 
1), and, relatedly, what it means to be set free from the law by dying to sin. This is just 
the kind of context where an interpreter of Grane’s persuasion might expect the young 
Luther’s nascent forensicism (or existential personalism) to come to the fore. In fact, 
what we find is an Augustinian account of the inner renovation of the will by grace 
and the Spirit.777 Thus Luther: 
When a man has been mortified from sin and been taken away from it, then sin 
has already been beautifully taken away and has died. But when a man has not 
been mortified and taken away, with utter vanity is sin taken away and 
mortified. It is therefore plain to see that the Apostle understands that sin is 
taken away spiritually (i.e., the desire for sinning [voluntatem peccandi] is 
mortified). They, however, want the works of sin and sinful desires 
(concupiscentias) to be taken away metaphysically, like whiteness from a wall 
or heat from water.778  
                                                        
777 As might be expected given Luther’s explanation of “dying to sin” in the scholion on Rom. 6:2. 
Luther first supplies an excerpt from Augustine’s (early) ex. prop. Rm. 35, then comments (WA 
56.320.20-29): Ex quibus verbis clare patet Intelligentia verborum Apostoli. Quia omnes iste 
propositiones: 1. Mortuum esse peccato; 2.Viuere autem Deo; 3. Seruire mente legi Dei et carne legi 
peccati, Non est aliud quam non consentire concupiscentiis et peccato, licet peccatum maneat. Idem 
est 4. peccatum non dominari, non regnare, Sed 5. Iustitiam regnare etc. Vnde infra c. 13.: ‘Et carnis 
curam ne fȩceritis in desideriis’, q. d. desideria peccati, que et ipsa peccatum sunt scil. originale et 
reliquum hȩreditatis paternȩ ex Adam, manent, Sed ne obediatis eis. Item, Vt destruatur corpus 
peccati, quod fit per non-consensionem et repugnantiam spiritus. Cf. LW 25.308. 
778 WA 56.335.7-13, cf. LW 25.323. 
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The “metaphysical” way to holiness proceeds by replacing evil deeds with good ones 
and, at the deeper level of motivation, extinguishing the sinful desires that prompt 
them: all of which lies in the hands of the devout person qui facit quod in se est, whose 
“self” remains intact—and in control—as the acting subject propelling, directing, and 
mastering the project of self-cultivation in virtue. Luther’s “spiritual” and apostolic 
alternative begins, as we saw above, with the dismantling of this “self” (however 
impressive its show of virtue may appear) in the gracious death of the Adam within. 
The person who boasts, with William Ernest Henley, “I am the master of my fate: I am 
the captain of my soul,” even—and precisely!—the person who would manfully steer 
the ship of his soul into the placid waters of moral excellence, must die.779  
Now, when this actually happens by grace, and homo ipse dies and has been 
mortified and taken away from sin: then, Luther explains, sin does in fact die too. 
Indeed, it is taken away pulcherrime. But what does this actually mean? Not, as 
Luther’s opponents maintain and as he himself once thought, the complete 
eradication of that “sin” which is evil desire, but rather the mortification of one’s 
voluntas peccandi. The renewed person has fleshly concupiscentiae as his perpetual 
foe: but because, as justified spiritus through the renovation of grace, his will has been 
changed, he no longer wants to sin and, therefore, does not in fact commit sin by 
consenting to the evil desires that continue to afflict him. The moralist refrains from 
                                                        
779 Cf. Plotinus, Ennead 1.6.9: “If you do not yet see yourself beautiful, then, just as someone making 
a statue which has to be beautiful cuts away here and polishes there and makes one part smooth 
and clears another till he has given his statue a beautiful face, so you too must cut away excess and 
straighten the crooked and clear the dark and make it bright, and never stop ‘working on your 
statue’ till the divine glory of virtue shines on you, till you see ‘self-mastery enthroned upon its holy 
seat.’” Trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 259. 
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sinful acts out of fear of punishment or hope of reward, i.e., ex amore sui, the primal 
and morbid drive for self-preservation and exaltation impelling all Adam’s orphaned 
children, which lies hid beneath the dazzling fig leaves of the virtuous self like a 
rotting corpse in a whitewashed tomb (Matt. 23:27). St. Paul’s homo spiritualis refrains 
from sinful acts too, but he does so because his will to sin has been put to death and 
he, in his heart’s deepness, has been made alive voluntate per spiritum.780  
Luther sums up his corollarium with a compact statement of the same 
doctrine: “First, therefore, one must beg for grace, that a man may be changed in 
spiritu, and will and do all things with a glad and voluntary heart, not in servile fear or 
puerile cupidity, but with a free and manly soul. And this the Spirit alone 
accomplishes.”781 Gratia sanans infused into the heart by the Holy Spirit to transform 
one’s self-bent will from within: nothing less than this can set a son or daughter of 
Adam free for holiness and joy. In the end, therefore, Luther’s perplexing and obscure 
contrast between St. Paul and the philosophers turns out to be yet another iteration of 
his stoutly Augustinian opposition to the high Ockhamist theology and popular pious 
meritocracy of his day.  
 
2.1.4. nupt. conc. 1.23.25. We return now to the scholion on Rom. 7:17b. I left hanging in 
the air Augustine’s claim, in c. Iul. 2.9.32, that “dead,” guilt-denuded “sin” 
(concupiscentia) is no longer called “sin” in the baptized for two reasons or better, in 
two respects: first, it no longer makes the forgiven person guilty; second, because it 
                                                        
780 WA 56.335.21-3, cf. LW 25.323. 
781 WA 56.336.14-17: Primum itaque gratia est imploranda, Vt homo mutatus in spiritu hilari corde et 
voluntario omnia velit et agat, non seruili timore aut puerili cupiditate, Sed liberali et virili animo. 
Hoc autem solus agit spiritus. Cf. LW 25.324. 
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stems from Adam’s guilt originally, and by its rebellion strives to draw us back into a 
state of guilt through consent to its desires. At first glance, this appears to fit the 
evaluation of concupiscentia mala more characteristic of Augustine in the 410s, viz., 
that it is not intrinsically guilty apart from consent, rather than the farther advanced 
position evinced at c. Iul. 2.5.12 and 6.17.51. That said, Augustine’s basic distinction 
between (a) the person no longer rendered guilty because of concupiscence, and (b) 
the evil and dangerous nature of concupiscence itself, is still very much in play. For 
our present purposes, we must bear in mind that on Luther’s reading of the texts, 
Augustine articulates exactly the same point at nupt. conc. 1.25.28 in the distinct but 
related terms of the non-imputation of concupiscence as “sin”: dimitti 
concupiscentiam carnis in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut in peccatum non inputetur. 
At any rate, in commenting on Rom. 7:17b Luther adopts c. Iul. 2.9.32 without critique 
or redefinition within paragraphs of explaining c. Iul. 2.5.12 at Rom. 7:17a, where he 
had set forth the nuanced sense in which evil desire is rea in sanctis without making 
the saints guilty as persons. One might be led to think that Luther can do this because 
he has not recognized the two different ways Augustine tackles the problem. But I 
think it is more likely that he has, and that he is either interpreting Augustine in the 
charitable medieval fashion by reconciling contradictions into a coherent whole, or 
has perhaps concluded that there is no real contradiction at all. I am inclined to this 
judgment in large part because at just this point in the scholion, Luther quotes 
approvingly—with some modifications—the unequivocally “410s”-styled evaluation of 
concupiscentia at nupt. conc. 1.23.25: 
And book 1 to Valerius, c. 23: “Concupiscence is not now a sin in the 
regenerate, so long as there is no consent to it: so that even if what is written 
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doesn’t happen: ‘Non concupiscas’ [Exod. 20:17, Rom. 7:7], at least let what is 
read elsewhere happen, Ecclesiast. 18[:30]: ‘Do not go after concupiscentias 
tuas.’ But in a certain modo loquendi it is called sin, because it was both made 
by sin and if sin conquers the sinner, it makes him guilty.”782 
 
Our best modern text reads: 
 
To be sure, concupiscence itself now is not a sin in the regenerate, so long as 
there is no consent to it resulting in forbidden works, and the members are not 
given up to perpetrate them [cf. Rom. 6:12-13] by the ruling mind; so that even 
if what is written doesn’t happen: ‘Non concupiscas,’ at least let what is read 
elsewhere happen, ‘Do not go after concupiscentias tuas.’ But because in a 
certain way of speaking it is called sin, because it was both made by sin and it 
makes sin if it conquers, its reatus prevails in one who has been born, quem 
reatum Christ’s grace—through the forgiveness of all sins—does not permit to 
prevail in the reborn, if the reborn does not obey it [Rom. 6:12] when it 
somehow commands him to do evil works.783 
 
There follows Augustine’s famous analogies: we call speaking a “tongue” because our 
tongues produce it, and we call one’s handwriting his “hand” because his hand 
produces it. So too concupiscence is called “sin” because sin (i.e., Adam’s sin) 
produced it, and it in turn produces sin through consent. But in the regenerate, who 
withhold consent and do not obey the desires they still suffer, non sit ipsa peccatum: 
concupiscence per se is not “sin.”784  
                                                        
782 WA 56.353.5-10: Et li. 1. ad Vale c. 23.: ‘Concupiscentia iam non est peccatum in regeneratis, 
quando illi non consentitur, Vt si non fit, quod scriptum est: “Non concupiscas”, fiat saltem, quod 
alibi legitur, Ecclesiast. 18.: “Post concupiscentias tuas non eas”. Sed modo quodam loquendi 
peccatum vocatur, quod et peccato facta est et peccatum peccantem si vicerit, reum facit.’ Cf. LW 
25.342. 
783 BA 23.110-12: Nam ipsa quidem concupiscentia iam non est peccatum in regeneratis, quando illi ad 
inlicita opera non consentitur, atque ut ea perpetrent a regina mente membra non dantur, ut si non 
fit quod scriptum est: Non concupiscas, fiat saltem quod alibi legitur: Post concupiscentias tuas non 
eas. Sed quia modo quodam loquendi peccatum uocatur, quod et peccato facta est et peccatum, si 
uicerit, facit, reatus eius ualet in generato, quem reatum Christi gratia per remissionem omnium 
peccatorum in regenerato, si ad mala opera ei quodam modo iubenti non obediat, ualere non sinit. Cf. 
WSA I/24.44. 
784 BA 23.112, WSA I/24.44. On the role of this text at Trent, and Seripando’s gallant but futile 
advocacy for the “420s Augustine” that I am arguing Luther appropriated, see Peter Walter, “Die 
bleibende Sündigkeit der Getauften in den Debatten und Beschlüssen des Trienter Konzils,” in 
Theodor Schneider and Gunther Wenz, eds., Gerecht und Sünder zugleich? Ökumenische Klärungen 
(Freiburg: Herder and Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 268-302; Anthony N. S. Lane, 
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 Luther’s excerpt differs subtly from our modern critical text: most significantly, 
near the end of his excerpt the second rationale Augustine gives for Paul’s modus 
loquendi shifts from Augustine’s “[conc.] makes sin, if it conquers” to Luther’s 
confusing “if sin conquers the sinner, it makes him guilty.” In the context of nupt. 
conc. 1.23.25, Luther’s alteration seems to amount to a telescoping of the following 
sentences—which concern reatus, grace, baptism, and non-consent—into one 
compressed claim: “sin”/concupiscence, if it triumphs over the regenerate person, 
brings him back into a state of guilt. The question is: Does this change Augustine’s 
meaning? Or is this a legitimate summary of his position? What Augustine writes here 
comes quite close to c. Iul. 2.9.32. In both places, concupiscence is called “sin” for two 
reasons: (a) it was caused by Adam’s “sin” (nupt. conc. 1.23.25) or “guilt” (c. Iul. 2.9.32), 
and (b) when the regenerate person consents to it, it leads him back into guilt or “sin,” 
meaning actual and guilt-laden sinful acts, reatus being emphasized in both places. In 
light of this comparison, Luther’s editorial compression appears to retain the 
substance of Augustine’s original text; what’s more, the comparison helps to explain 
how Augustine’s assertion of the non-sinfulness of the regenerate person’s 
concupiscentia fits with both his more ambiguous claim just a few paragraphs later at 
nupt. conc. 1.25.28 and with his bolder pronouncements in the 420s. The grace and 
forgiveness of Christ in baptism liberate the regenerate person from the guilt of all 
sins, both original and actual. Inherited evil desire, which had naturally (or racially) 
bound this person to Adam’s guilt prior to the great interruption of baptism, 
continues to infect and afflict the regenerate person as his “flesh,” but it no longer 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Justification by Faith in Catholic—Protestant Dialogue: An Evangelical Assessment (New York: T & T 
Clark, 2002), 60-5. 
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binds him to Adam’s guilt—unless, that is, by consenting to his evil desires he falls out 
of Christ’s grace and plunges himself back into Adam’s guilt. If Augustine’s evaluation 
of the intrinsic sinfulness of concupiscentia in the baptized is something of a moving 
target, his dogmatic and spiritual response to the problem it poses stays basically the 
same: Christ’s grace does not permit its guilt to prevail in the regenerate (1.23.25), that 
is, it is forgiven and not imputed as sin (1.25.28), so long as—by the same grace of 
Christ, and the operations of his Spirit—the regenerate do not consent to it.  
 In 1516, Luther solidly grasps Augustine’s nuanced interpretation of how gratia 
Christi liberates ruined and guilty people from both reatus and concupiscentia. At this 
early stage in his development, flat-out concupiscentia rea texts like c. Iul. 2.5.12 (“420s 
Augustine”) and non sit ipsa peccatum texts like nupt. conc. 1.23.25 (“410s Augustine”) 
can stand alongside one another. Indeed, as he does on the heels of quoting nupt. 
conc. 1.23.25, Luther can even adopt a faintly Thomist solution to the discrepancy—
which he probably learned from Biel785—by distinguishing between the “weak” (if you 
will) sinfulness of concupiscence causaliter et effectualiter in non-consenting 
regenerate people on the one hand, and on the other its full-blown sinfulness/guilt 
formaliter upon the grant of consent to its evil desires.786 But from the initial 
Reformation crisis on into the works of his maturity, this distinction will no longer 
appear serviceable to Luther. Concupiscentia rea increasingly takes the field, and to 
the extent that it does so, the non-imputation of its intrinsic guiltiness (which is 
                                                        
785 See Biel, Collectorium II d. 3o q. 2, utrum peccatum originale sit aliquod positivum in anima vel in 
carne, esp. art. 1 (W & H II/562-8). 
786 WA 56.353.8-10: ‘… Sed modo quodam loquendi peccatum vocatur, quod et peccato facta est et 
peccatum peccantem si vicerit, reum facit’ i. e. causaliter et effectualiter, non formaliter. Cf. LW 
25.342. 
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already there in the mature Augustine) and the positive imputation of Christ’s iustitia 
aliena (which but for a few rare exceptions is not) grows in equal proportion. But as I 
demonstrated above in chapter 2—and now in concert with what I have shown in this 
chapter regarding both Augustine in the 410s and 20s and Luther in 1516—right up 
into the 1540s the regenerate Christian’s refusal of consent (non consentire) to the 
“sin” that indwells him continues virtually unaltered as the moral-psychological 
lynchpin that holds together Luther’s “simul” within the overarching dogmatic reality 
of forgiveness by Christ’s grace and renewal by the Spirit’s gift. For the old Luther not 
a whit less than for Augustine in either of the two decades of his controversy with 
Pelagius and Julian, Spirit-empowered non-consent to the regenerate person’s flesh is 
the conditio sine qua non for his abiding in statu gratiae (et doni). 
 This brings us to the scholion on Rom. 7:18. 
 
2.2. On Rom. 7:18 
 
2.2.1. c. Iul. 3.26.62. Luther follows the subject-line heading Perficere autem non Invenio 
with the terse but telling comment: “There is a difference between to do/to complete 
(facere/perficere) in this place,” then relates Rom. 7:18 to its parallel at Gal. 5:16-17 by 
relaying the longest of his many Augustinian excerpts: 
Blessed Augustine book 3 against Julian at the end: “Remember what the 
Apostle writes to the Galatians, who were certainly baptized people: ‘But I say,’ 
he says, ‘walk by the spirit (Spiritu) and do not complete (non perfȩceritis) the 
concupiscences of the flesh’ [Gal. 5:16]. He does not say: Do not do (Ne 
fȩceritis), because they were not able to not have them, but ‘do not complete’ 
(ne perfeceritis), that is, do not fulfill the works of these [concupiscences] by 
the consent of the will (consensu voluntatis). If, therefore, one does not 
consent to the concupiscences of the flesh, although they are incited by 
emotions (agantur motibus), nevertheless they are not brought to completion 
(perficientur) by works. Accordingly, when flesh desires (concupiscit) against 
spirit and spirit against flesh, so that we do not do (faciamus) the things we 
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want to do, neither are the flesh’s concupiscences completed (perficiuntur), 
although they happen, nor are our good works completed (perficiuntur), 
although they happen. For just as the concupiscence of the flesh is completed, 
when the spirit consents to it in order to bring it into operation—so that the 
spirit does not desire against it, but with it—so too our good works will then be 
completed, when the flesh will so consent to the spirit that even it will no 
longer desire against the spirit. To be sure, this is what we want (volumus) 
when we desire (concupiscimus) the perfection of righteousness. But because 
we are not able to complete this in this corruptible flesh, therefore [Paul] said 
to the Romans: ‘To want (Velle) lies at hand for me, but to complete (perficere) 
the good I do not find’ [Rom. 7:18] or, as Greek codices have it, ‘To want lies at 
hand for me, but not to complete the good,’ i.e., to complete the good does not 
lie at hand for me. He does not say: To do (facere), but ‘to complete (perficere) 
the good.’ Because to do the good is to not go after concupiscences [Ecclus. 
18:20]: but to complete the good is non concupiscere. Therefore, what’s written 
to the Galatians: ‘Do not complete the flesh’s concupiscences’ [5:16], this from 
the opposite angle is written to the Romans: ‘To complete I do not find’ [7:18]. 
Because neither are those [concupiscences] completed in evil, when the assent 
of our will (nostre ̧voluntatis assensus) does not accede to them, nor is our will 
completed in good, so long as the movement of those concupiscences—to 
which we do not consent—remains. The spirit therefore does (facit) a good 
work by not consenting to evil concupiscence, but it does not complete it 
(perficit), because it does not destroy the evil desires (desideria) themselves. 
And the flesh does (facit) an evil desire (desiderium), but it does not complete 
it (perficit) either, because when the spirit does not consent to it, it too does 
not arrive at works subject to damnation.’787  
 
                                                        
787 WA 56.353.14-354.13: B. Aug li. 3. contra Iul in fine: ‘Recole, quid scribat Apostolus ad Gal, certe 
homines baptisatos: “Dico autem”, inquit, “Spiritu ambulate et concupiscentias carnis non 
perfȩceritis.” Non ait: Ne fȩceritis, quia eas non habere non poterant, Sed “ne perfeceritis”, idest, ne 
opera earum consensu voluntatis impleatis. Si ergo non consentiatur concupiscentiis carnis, quamuis 
agantur motibus, non tamen perficientur operibus. Proinde cum Caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum 
et spiritus aduersus carnem, vt non ea, que volumus, faciamus, nec carnis concupiscentiȩ 
perficiuntur, quamuis fiant, Nec nostra perficiuntur bona opera, quamuis fiant. Sicut enim tunc 
perficitur carnis concupiscentia, cum consentit ei spiritus ad operanda, vt non concupiscat aduersus 
illam, Sed cum illa, Sic et bona opera nostra tunc perficientur, quando ita spiritui caro consenserit, vt 
aduersus eum etiam ipsa non concupiscat. Hoc enim volumus, cum perfectionem Iustitiȩ 
concupiscimus. Sed quia id perficere in ista corruptibili carne non possumus, ideo dixit ad Romanos: 
“Velle adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non Inuenio”, Vel sicut habent Codices grȩci: “Velle 
adiacet mihi, perfi ere autem bonum non”, i. e. non adiacet mihi perficere bonum. Non ait: facere, Sed 
“perficere bonum”. Quia facere bonum est post concupiscentias non ire; perficere autem bonum est 
non concupiscere. Quod ergo est ad Gal: “Concupiscentias carnis ne perfeceritis”, hoc econtrario est 
ad Ro: “Perficere non Inuenio.” Quia nec illȩ perficiuntur in malo, quando non eis accedit nostrȩ 
voluntatis assensus, Nec nostra voluntas perficitur in bono, quamdiu illarum, cui non consentimus, 
permanet motus. Spiritus ergo facit bonum opus non consentiendo concupiscentiȩ malȩ, Sed non 
perficit, Quia ipsa mala desideria non absumit. Et caro facit malum desiderium, Sed nec ipsa perficit, 
Quia non sibi consentiente spiritu et ipsa ad opera damnanda non peruenit.’ Cf. LW 25.342-3. 
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When compared to our best modern edition of c. Iul., it is clear that apart from a 
handful of minor reversals in word order, and three ellipses to pare away redundancies 
in the argument, Luther reproduces Augustine’s text accurately.788 In context, 
Augustine is arguing that Adam’s sin vitiated human nature and that—against Julian’s 
interpretation of Rom. 7—the holy Apostle confesses that he too suffers the lingering 
effects of this deeply set wound (c. Iul. 3.26.59-61). He next turns from Rom. 7:18-25 to 
Gal. 5:16-20: even if Julian stubbornly insists that Rom. 7 refers to an as yet unbaptized 
catechumen, he cannot deny that in Gal. 5 Paul addressed baptized Galatian 
                                                        
788 NBA I/18.650-2, PL 44.733-4: recole tamen quid scribat ad Galatas, certe homines baptizatos. Dico 
autem, inquit, spiritu ambulate, et concupiscentis carnis ne perfeceritis. Non ait: Ne feceritis, quia eas 
non habere non poterant; sed: Ne perfeceritis; id est, ne opera earum, consensu voluntatis impleatis. 
Caro enim, inquit, concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem: haec enim invicem 
adversantur; ut non ea quae vultis faciatis. Vide si non hoc est ad Romanos: Non enim quod volo facio 
bonum, sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago. Deinde ad Galatas addit et dicit: Quod si spiritu ducimini, non 
adhuc estis sub lege. Vide si non hoc est ad Romanos: Iam non ego operor illud; et: Condelector legi 
Dei secundum interiorem hominem; et: Non regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corpore, ad 
oboediendum desideriis eius. Si enim non oboediatur concupiscentiis, quas necesse est esse in carne 
peccati atque in corpore mortis huius, non perficietur quod perfici vetat Apostolus dicens: 
Concupiscentias carnis ne perfeceritis. Ipsa quippe sunt opera, de quibus totum mire sequitur, et dicit: 
Manifesta autem sunt opera carnis, quae sunt fornicationes, immunditiae luxuriae, idolorum servitus, 
et cetera. Si ergo non consentiatur concupiscentiis carnis, quamvis agantur motibus, non tamen 
perficientur operibus. Proinde cum caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem, ut 
non ea quae volumus faciamus; nec carnis perficiuntur concupiscentiae, quamvis fiant; nec nostra 
perficiuntur bona opera, quamvis fiant. Sicut enim tunc perficitur carnis concupiscentia, cum 
consentit ei spiritus ad opera mala, ut non concupiscat adversus illam, sed cum illa: sic et bona opera 
nostra tunc perficientur, quando ita spiritui caro consenserit, ut adversus eum etiam ipsa non 
concupiscat. Hoc enim volumus, cum perfectione[m] iustitiae concupiscimus; hoc intentione non 
intermissa velle debemus, sed quia id perficere in ista corruptibili carne non possumus, ideo dixit ad 
Romanos: Velle adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non invenio. Vel, sicut habent codices graeci: 
Velle adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non; id est, non mihi adiacet perficere bonum. Non ait: 
Facere; sed: perficere bonum. Quia facere bonum, est post concupiscentias non ire: perficere autem 
bonum, est non concupiscere. Quod ergo est ad Galatas: Concupiscentias carnis ne perfeceritis; hoc e 
contrario est ad Romanos: Perficere autem bonum non invenio. Quia nec illae perficiuntur in malo, 
quando eis non accedit nostrae voluntatis assensus; nec nostra voluntas perficitur in bono, quamdiu 
illarum cui non consentimus permanet motus. Ipse autem conflictus, in quo etiam baptizati velut in 
agone decertant, cum caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem; ubi et spiritus 
facit bonum opus, non consentiendo concupiscentiae malae, sed non perficit, quia ipsa mala desideria 
non absumit; et caro facit malum desiderium, sed nec ipsa perficit, quia non sibi consentiente spiritu, 
et ipsa ad opera damnanda non pervenit: iste ergo conflictus non Iudaeorum, nec quorumlibet 
aliorum, sed plane Christianorum fidelium et bene vivendo in hoc certamine laborantium, breviter 
ostenditur ad Romanos, ubi ait: Igitur ipse ego mente servio legi Dei, carne autem legi peccati. Cf. 
WSA I/24.374-5. 
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Christians. Therefore, to quote the passage which immediately follows Luther’s 
excerpt, the spirit/flesh conflictus narrated in Gal. 5:16-17 refers to the agonizing 
struggle of “Christians who are faithful and are laboring in this contest by living well.”  
In the excursus at Rom. 7:7, Luther has already made his case that St. Paul 
himself, as the paradigmatic homo spiritualis, is the subject of the chapter. What 
interests him in c. Iul. 3.26.62 is the light it sheds on the nature of the spiritual 
person’s struggle with his residual flesh. Augustine’s explanation of the two 
interwoven texts from Paul supplies all the vital concepts for grasping the precise 
nature of the Christian’s agon with himself. The flesh has its desires, but in the 
Christian flesh only “does” (facere) these evil desires, i.e., the Christian experiences or 
suffers them as loathsome impulses, desideria, or motus to which he does not yield the 
consent (or assent) of his will. Thus the still lamentably active flesh cannot bring the 
desires it “does” to their “completion” (perficere) in act, for the renewed person’s 
refusal of consensus voluntatis suae stands in the way. On the other hand, as renewed 
spiritus the baptized Christian “does” (facere) good deeds, both in terms of the 
internal renovation of the heart and its desires and in terms of the good works that 
flow therefrom. But because of his residual flesh, which divides his affective being and 
therefore blemishes his nonetheless real holiness, the baptized Christian cannot yet 
bring to completion (perficere) the single-minded and whole-hearted love for God that 
he longs for. In terms of Rom. 7:18, St. Paul can and does “do” the good, i.e., he does 
not go after his evil desires by consenting to them (Ecclus. 18:20); but he cannot yet 
“complete” the good as he heartily wishes to do, i.e., he is not yet entirely free from the 
very presence of such desires, as he will be in the eschatological resurrection and as 
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God’s holy law already requires of him in the present (Exod. 20:17/Rom. 7:7). In short, 
the spiritually-renewed Christian’s will is itself divided by the new and holy desires 
that are his being as spiritus and the old and evil desires that comprise his residual 
caro—yet with the upper-hand unequivocally belonging to his new affective and 
volitional being as “spirit,” for (a) he battles against his flesh by not consenting to it, 
and (b) he wishes for and desires the end of this battle in the total victory of spiritual 
delight. “That,” says Augustine, “is what we want when we desire (concupiscimus) the 
perfection of righteousness.” In 1516, Luther quite simply agrees, and so much so that 
he lets his long excerpt from c. Iul. 3.26.62 speak for itself and offers no comment of 
his own upon Rom. 7:18. 
 That is to say, apart from the brief but significant paragraph that follows the 
excerpt and completes the Rom. 7 scholion. In it, Luther bears autobiographical 
witness to the consolation which Augustine’s interpretation of Paul affords weak, 
suffering, battle-scarred, angefochtenen Christians like himself. Granted, he allows, 
“the more recent doctors” have said the same things about first motions, extinguishing 
the tinder, delight, and consent.789 But because they do so in the Aristotelian or 
human way, rather than the genuinely scriptural and divine manner, they do not really 
understand the Augustinian terms they are parroting. “Now, however, since the 
ancient doctors, thinking with the Apostles, say the same thing more clearly, we are 
warmed by the gift of a more quiet comfort and more easily healed from scruples of 
conscience.”790 Luther can (without scruple) use the plural Doctores antiqui largely on 
                                                        
789 WA 56.354.14-19: licet Recentiores doctores eadem dicant de primis motibus, de fomite 
extinguendo, de delectatione et consensu. 
790 WA 56.354.17-19, cf. LW 25.343. 
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the strength of the references to Ambrose and others in c. Iul. 1-2, including 2.5.12. But 
as we have seen in this study, and as Hilton Oswald nicely puts it in a footnote to 
another place in the lectures on Romans, “for Luther antiqui patres often means 
Augustine.”791 High and late medieval theologians could not but have rehearsed—and 
to varying degrees adopted—the terminology that lies at the heart of the complex 
intersection of Augustine’s theology of grace, moral-psychology, anti-Pelagian 
spirituality, and Pauline exegesis: for those verba (and no little of their Augustinian 
res) are there to be dealt with on the pages of Peter Lombard’s Sententiae. But Luther 
is convinced that the intrusion of an Aristotelian metaphysics of the soul, together 
with its attendant moral psychology, into the Church’s Augustinian inheritance has 
cut off from the start the very possibility of grasping what these words actually mean.  
There is no need to repeat here what we saw above regarding Luther’s 
opposition to Biel and Usingen de appetitibus contrariis in eodem subiecto and their 
corresponding interpretation of “spirit” and “flesh” in Paul. In this seelsorgerlich finale 
to his exposition of Rom. 7, Luther now concludes that to the extent that a theory of 
virtue and vice drawn ex Aristotele holds the ascendency in an exegete’s philosophy, 
“the distinction of spirit and flesh has completely ceased to be understood.”792 That is 
to say, St. Paul’s meaning is obscured in medieval commentaries on the Bible, and 
Augustine’s meaning—which Luther champions as identical to Paul’s—is obscured in 
medieval commentaries on the Sentences. Reading the undiluted Augustine’s works in 
                                                        
791 LW 25.300, note 13. 
792 WA 56.354.22-6: Quocirca futilis est et noxia eorum phantasia, dum ex Aristotele Virtutes et vitia 
velut albedinem in pariete, Scripturam in assere et formam in subiecto occidentissimis verbis et 
metaphoricis docuerunt in anima herere. Sic enim Spiritus et carnis differentia penitus cessauit 
intelligi. Cf. LW 25.343. 
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the Amerbach edition has opened Luther’s eyes to the original meaning of well-worn 
traditional terms like motus, fomes, delectatio, and consensus, and thus provided the 
at once dogmatic, moral-psychological, spiritual, and hermeneutical key he needed (as 
doctor in biblia) to open up the locked door of St. Paul’s perplexing teaching de spiritu 
et carne. And this, in turn, gave Luther the spiritual solatium he needed, not as a 
learned doctor of theology, but as a perplexed and suffering penitent.  
As a devout monk, and thus at a much deeper level than the “merely” 
theological, Luther had taken as granted that extinguishing every last bit of fleshly 
desire from his soul was the goal of his severe asceticism. But try as he had, frater 
Martinus failed to attain this end; and being the devout man that he was, the 
undeniable (and endlessly confessed) experientia of evil desire—which lesser men 
think less or little of—drove him to the point of despair. Dr. Staupitz, the kind and 
compassionate father-confessor, pointed Luther away from himself to the bleeding 
wounds of Christ crucified: an indispensible remedy for the scrupulous and self-
obsessed soul.793 But it was the polemicizing old Augustine who taught young 
suffering Luther that right up to drawing their last breath, the little homines 
spirituales who look to such a Christ as this still have wounded and bleeding souls.794 
What John Wesley might have thought of all this I dare not venture to say; but in this 
concluding paragraph to the scholion on Rom. 7, Luther bears unmistakable witness 
                                                        
793 Prof. David Steinmetz’s summary of Staupitz’s counsel to Luther is without peer: Luther and 
Staupitz, 30-4. 
794 On this point in Augustine, see John Cavadini’s beautiful article, “The Darkest Enigma: 
Reconsidering the Self in Augustine’s Thought,” AugS 38/1 (2007), 119-32. 
 304
to the way reading Augustine’s trenchant works against Julian had left his troubled 
heart strangely warmed.795 
 With this I conclude my study of the Augustinian roots of Luther’s theology of 
grace, gift, and the “simul” as he—like Augustine before him—painstakingly worked it 
out in the exegetical laboratory of Rom. 7.796 The emphasis on spiritual consolation in 
its conclusion is an especially fitting segue backwards in the lectures to the scholion 
on Rom. 4:7, where the experiential depths of penitential suffering, the false comforts 
of die Sawtheologen, and the true solace of St. Paul’s “Augustinian” theology are 
driving concerns for Luther. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
795 WA 56.354.17-19: Nunc Vero Cum Doctores antiqui cum Apostolis sentientes eadem apertius 
dicunt, quietioris solatii nos munere fouemur et Scrupulis conscientiȩ facilius medemur.  
796 In his Marquette lectures on Augustine, Prof. Michel René Barnes describes Rom. 7 as 
Augustine’s moral-psychological laboratory.  
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4. AUGUSTINE CONTRA IULIANUM IN THE LATE 1515 SCHOLIA ON 
ROMANS 4:5-8: THE SAINTS’ “SIN,” THEIR RENEWAL, AND  
GOD’S MERCIFUL NON-IMPUTATION 
 
 
Some of the most influential Lutherreden for twentieth-century theology, both 
historical and dogmatic, are found in the scholia on Rom. 4:7. Its first, thesis-type 
sentence reads: “The saints are always sinners intrinsically, and therefore are always 
justified extrinsically.”797 From this point forward, eye-popping—a Gerhard Forde 
might say “radical”—declarations of the sinner’s justification ex sola Dei reputatione 
punctuate Luther’s exegesis like the refrain in a Psalm. These include in their number 
explicit statements of the “simul,” e.g., to God the saints “are righteous and 
unrighteous at the same time,”798 or near equivalents, e.g., the saints “are sinners in 
reality, but righteous by the imputation of God, who has mercy.”799 Denifle, Hermann, 
Elert, Joest, Ebeling, Pinomaa, Nilsson, Grane, Beer, Forde, Hamm, Jüngel, Hampson, 
et al. have found in these and other like assertions ample proof for a Simullehre that 
ignores, sidelines, downplays, or even disparages real renewal in holiness in favor of a 
purely forensic/imputational interpretation of justification.800 In the 1910 essay to 
which I referred briefly above, Karl Holl offered a quite different interpretation of the 
same texts; broadly speaking, post-Lortzian Roman Catholic and/or Finnish scholars 
like Iserloh, Peter Manns, Wicks, Mannermaa, Peura, Saarinen, Vainio, and Pereira 
have followed his lead. In certain respects, my own interpretation does so as well: I 
                                                        
797 WA 56.268.27-8, cf. LW 25.257. 
798 WA 56.269.21-2: simul sunt Iusti et Iniusti. Cf. LW 25.258. 
799 WA 56.269.29: Re vera peccatores, Sed reputatione miserentis Dei Iusti. Note the allusion to Rom. 
9:16. Cf. LW 25.258. 
800 Berndt Hamm, “What was the Reformation Doctrine of Justification?,” in The Reformation of 
Faith, esp. 193-7. 
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share Holl’s concern to recognize Luther’s teaching in the Rom. 4:7 scholia regarding 
the ongoing “healing” (sanari) of the saints. However, it seems to me that the great 
Berliner’s “analytic theory” failed to do full justice to the imputational side of the 
iustitia fidei rightly (if disproportionately) emphasized by the other school of 
interpretation.  
As in the scholia on Rom. 7, but to an even greater degree, I believe this failure 
to hold together the two aspects of Luther’s theology of “grace”—which in 1515/16 he 
does not yet distinguish terminologically from “gift”—and the correlative failure to 
grasp the real meaning of his striking “simul”-statements stems from an anterior 
scholarly misapprehension of the role played in these scholia by the “420s Augustine.” 
As I explained above in the introduction to Part II, it was Denifle’s polemics that set 
the ball rolling: Luther, he charged, had intentionally misquoted the all-important 
sentence from nupt. conc. 1.25.28. Hermann pushed it along by basically agreeing with 
Denifle’s historical analysis—touché, as it were—but then, as a modern Lutheran 
theologian, he championed what Denifle derided, i.e., the clean dogmatic break in loco 
iustificationis from Augustinian Catholicism that Luther’s newly-discovered “simul” 
powerfully encapsulated and symbolized. One is tempted, at this point, to try his hand 
at an allegorical interpretation of Luke 23:12—but I hold my peace. To rightly 
understand the young Luther’s ruminations on St. Paul, we shall have once more to 
retrace the steps he took with Augustine as his principal guide.  
 Two interrelated comments are in order before turning to Luther’s exegesis of 
Rom. 4:7. First, St. Paul supplies the words “reputare” in vv. 3-5 (from Gen. 15:6) and 
(non-) “imputare” at v. 8 (from Ps. 32:2). For Luther, immersed in vol. 8 of the 
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Amerbach edition of Augustine’s works, this ineluctably evokes Augustine’s mature 
baptismal theology of the non-imputation of concupiscentia carnis as “sin” in the 
regenerate. Luther gives us the crucial excerpt from nupt. conc. 1.25.28—with one 
highly significant variation, so obnoxious to Denifle—several pages into the 
scholion,801 but the doctrine he believed to be contained in it is in play from the very 
start. I will substantiate this claim shortly.  
Second, much as I urged in the introduction to chapter 1 regarding Luther’s 
1532 comments on Ps. 51, we must keep in mind (as Wicks rightly stresses) the ethos of 
penitential spirituality that shapes this entire scholion. Luther is, after all, expositing 
Ps. 32 in order to exposit Rom. 4; and Ps. 32 is fertile scriptural soil for a decidedly 
monastic and experiential theology of sin, repentance, forgiveness, and renewal. Is this 
not just the sort of theology we should expect from Luther, the earnest, scrupulous, 
and observant Augustinian Eremite, in 1515? Thus his short comments on Rom. 4:6 in 
effect draw a contrast between two kinds of monks: the one content with the external 
performances of piety, the other longing for his “heart” (cor) to be “justified and 
healed from base desires.”802 “Iustificari” here is synonymous with “Sanari,” and their 
common object is the heart’s renovation through its being healed of its evil 
concupiscentiae.803 This is the unmistakable stuff of an Augustinian theology of inner 
renewal by grace; and the presence or absence of this renewal in one’s heart, explains 
                                                        
801 WA 56.273.9-274.1: b. Aug preclarissime dixit ‘peccatum | concupiscentiam | in baptismate remitti, 
non vt non sit, sed vt non imputetur’. Cf. LW 25.261. 
802 WA 56.268.9-15: Nam similia operantur etiam Iusti, Sed non simili corde. Iusti scil., vt Iustitiam 
per ipsa querant et impetrent, Impii vero, vt per ipsa Iustitiam ostentent ac Inuentam presumant. Illi 
non contenti factis operibus cor etiam querunt Iustificari et Sanari a prauis concupiscentiis, isti Vero 
interiora nihil curantes externe factis operibus contenti sunt. Ideo sunt simulatores, hipocrite i. e. 
similes Iustis exterius et non vere Iusti interius. Cf. LW 25.256. 
803 Hamel, II/83-4, calls this “sanative Rechtfertigung oder reale Gerechtmachung.” 
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Luther, is the factor that determines whether or not “God counts righteousness apart 
from works” to him. The time-serving churchman and the devout monk do exactly the 
same works, “but not with the same heart.”804 The former confidently presumes—
whether by virtue of popular piety’s common sense (think Johannes von Paltz), or in 
the learned “Aristotelian” fashion of the schools (Biel et al.), or both—that doing 
righteous works has made him a righteous person.805 He knows “how much and what 
one must do, in order to be righteous.”806 But the latter sort, being true penitents of 
vintage late medieval variety, humbly confess their sinfulness before God, live 
vigilantly poised between fear and hope, and 
… do not know when they are righteous, because they are only righteous ex 
Deo reputante. And no one knows God’s reputationem, but ought only to ask 
and hope. Therefore, the former sort have a time when they do not think that 
they are sinners. But the latter always know that they are sinners.807 
 
Jacob A. O. Preus tidied up Luther a bit here in his translation for Luther’s Works, so 
that “no man knows His accounting fully” (my italics). But in 1515 Luther is still far too 
Augustinian and “medieval” in his theology and piety to admit Preus’ consolatory 
adverb. No one knows God’s accounting—Punkt! This is the precarious hinge on 
which the great matter of one’s eternal destiny turns. Only the self-righteous presume 
to know God’s just reputatio, on the basis of their piety and good works. By stark 
contrast, Luther’s ideal penitent—praying his Psalter ex corde contrito—knows that 
God reckons righteousness apart from works only to the kind of person who humbly 
                                                        
804 WA 56.268.9-10: Nam similia operantur etiam Iusti, Sed non simili corde. 
805 One thinks at once of Chesterton on our being born Aristotelians, and Spurgeon’s 
autobiographical confession: “Born, as all of us are by nature, an Arminian…”—to Spurgeon’s 
advantage. 
806 WA 56.268.20: Illi sciunt, quantum et quid operandum, Vt Iustus quis sit. Cf. LW 25.256. 
807 WA 56.268.21-4: Isti vero ignorant, quando Iusti sunt, quia ex Deo reputante Iusti tantummodo 
sunt, cuius reputationem nemo nouit, Sed solum postulare et sperare debet. Ideo illi habent tempus, 
quando se non putent esse peccatores. Isti Vero semper sciunt se esse peccatores. Cf. LW 25.256-7. 
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confesses that God’s merciful reputatio is his sole hope of salvation. Luther’s true 
penitent does not know, and by definition cannot know, if in fact God’s mercy pertains 
to him. What he does always know is that he is a “sinner.”  
But in what sense? He does his good works as zealously as the hypocrite, but as 
he does them he prays for the healing of his heart a pravis concupiscentiis. The very 
presence of these base desires requires the perpetual confession that he is a peccator. 
But as the “very rare man who confesses and believes he is a sinner,”808 and therefore 
longs for the justification and healing of his broken heart, this lifelong confession no 
longer needs to be exacted from him invitus. This is the major theme of the scholia on 
Rom. 3:4ff, where St. Paul quotes—not incidentally—Ps. 51:4: quite as it had been two 
years earlier in Luther’s Dictata on the same verse.809 Just a few paragraphs farther 
into the scholia on Rom. 4:7, Luther states in classic monastic fashion, and in terms 
virtually identical to those of the 1513 Psalter lecture,810 that “the righteous man, in 
principle, is his own accuser.”811 
 This “inward”-oriented penitential spirituality—with its Augustinian focus on 
the Rom. 7-styled battle against the evil desires at work in one’s heart, and the longing 
for heart-deep renovation that accompanies it—forms both the historical Sitz im 
Leben in which Friar Martin wrote and the monastic-theological context for his 
brooding meditations on God’s merciful reputatio/imputatio in the scholia on Rom. 
                                                        
808 Scholion on Rom. 3:7, WA 56.231.24-5, LW 25.216. 
809 WA 3.287-92, LW 10.235-41. 
810 WA 3.288.31: Iustus enim primo est accusator sui et damnator et iudex sui. Cf. LW 10.236. 
811 WA 56.270.6-7, cf. LW 25.258. 
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4:7.812 Hence it is right on the heels of describing the confession of the true penitent—
semper peccator—and his “yearning” (as Wicks styles it) for both the gratia sanans 
that will heal his evil desires and the merciful imputation of iustitia to his account 
despite these desires, that Luther transitions from 4:6 into 4:7: 
 Therefore, in order that Beati, quorum remisse etc. [Rom. 4:7/Ps. 32:1] may be
 understood— 
 
and then elaborates the two-sentence thesis that sets the tone for the rest of the 
scholion: 
 
The saints are always sinners intrinsically, therefore they are always justified 
extrinsically. 
But hypocrites are always righteous intrinsically, therefore they are always 
sinners extrinsically.813 
 
Here we have in embryonic fashion the powerful—but often misunderstood—
paradoxes that Luther would soon become famous for. Taken out of its textual context 
in the scholion, and its monastic or “spiritual” setting in Luther’s life, the first sentence 
at least can be construed as a bold assertion of a purely forensic doctrine of 
                                                        
812 For further insight into Luther’s Augustinian (that is, O.E.S.A.) Sitz im Leben, see Eric L. Saak, 
High Way to Heaven. The Augustinian Platform between Reform and Reformation, 1292-1524 
(Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2002). Saak works closely with writings of Jordan of Quedlinburg, a 
fourteenth-century Augustinian monastic or “pastoral theologian” (1300-c. 1370/80). In his 
exposition of Jordan’s teaching on grace and holiness (412-17), Saak states: “Jordan affirmed that the 
presumption of one’s own righteousness is indeed a sin. No one is able to know for sure whether 
his works are really true, for a false righteousness deceives many. No human work is ever pure; 
works are always contaminated by sin. Indeed, ‘there has never been a righteous person or saint 
who was free from sin’ (n. 235: … nec quicumque iusti et sancti sunt sine peccato),” citing Jordan’s 
Opus Postillarum, sermo 374B, fol. 90rb—90va. In OP sermo 376A, Jordan writes: “A humble sinner is 
better than a proud righteous person (melior est peccator humilis quam iustus superbus), because 
by the very fact that a sinner humbles himself, he is no longer a sinner; and the righteous person, 
by the very fact that he is proud, now is not righteous” (417, n. 236). Saak exclaims: “Here we have a 
fourteenth-century version of Luther’s simul iustus et peccator!” but then points to differences 
between Jordan and Luther that depend on the mistaken interpretation of Luther’s “simul” that I 
am arguing against in this book (417). In fact, if Saak’s reading of Jordan’s theology is sound, it 
would seem that he and the young Luther stand quite close to one another in their monastic 
theologies of sin, penitence, grace, and holiness. 
813 WA 56.268.27-30: Sancti Intrinsece sunt peccatores semper, ideo extrinsece Iustificantur semper. 
Hipocritȩ autem intrinsece sunt Iusti semper, ideo extrinsece sunt peccatores semper. Cf. LW 25.257. 
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justification: in themselves, the saints are always and nothing but sinners; but in God’s 
mercy, they are forgiven, justified, and so forth. But in light of what I have shown from 
Luther’s exposition of Rom. 4:6, this is clearly not the case. For precisely by confessing 
their sinfulness, the saints demonstrate the reality of the inchoate renovation of their 
hearts: which, to be sure, is hidden from their own eyes. For how else could their 
confession of sin be truthful ex toto corde? To take pleasure in the humility of one’s 
confession is the quintessence of spiritual pride. So Luther, friar and 
Humilitastheologe, explains his meaning: “I say Intrinsece, i.e., how we are in 
ourselves, in our own eyes, in our own estimation.”814 This is not an “objective” 
dogmatic claim about the ontology of the saint, i.e., it is not an assertion that the saint 
is a sinner totaliter, nothing more. This is spiritual theology in its monastic vein, and 
the decisive question at this juncture for Luther is this: What does the truly—not just 
apparently—holy person, that is the “saint,” think about himself? The answer to this 
question lies ready to hand in Rom. 7, once that chapter has been shown—with the 
mature Augustine’s help—to express the autobiographical confession of St. Paul as a 
spiritual man. That answer is: ego carnalis sum (v. 14), i.e., I am a sinner. As I have 
demonstrated above, this by no means implies that St. Paul is not a spiritual man after 
all. To the contrary, it is because of his heightened “spirituality” (if you will) that Paul 
recognizes and confesses the depths of his fleshly and sinful affectivity. The confessing 
saint who passes experientially through Rom. 7 arrives at Rom. 8:1—though in late 
1515, the true penitent has no assurance of his arrival into the grace of St. Paul’s great 
                                                        
814 WA 56.268.31-2, cf. LW 25.257. 
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nihil damnationis in Christo (as Bayer rightly argues815). Here in the scholion on Rom. 
4:7, Luther’s confessing saint is very much passing through the Rom. 7 experientia, but 
now he arrives at the same (though to himself painfully hidden) evangelical truth by 
way of Ps. 32:1-2. They who confess that they are sinners in their own eyes, and mean 
this and feel it in their hearts, are the saints of God: the Beati. Despite the reality of 
their sinfulness—which is the only thing they see in themselves and yet which, 
paradoxically, they could not possibly see if they had not first begun to be renewed—
these sinner-saints are righteous Extrinsece or apud Deum or in his reputatio.816  
In short, and to summarize Luther’s “monastic” exegesis in terms of Rom. 4:5-
6: To the person broken in his own self-estimation by the experience of evil desire, 
who therefore does not rely on his good works to establish his righteousness before 
God, and instead trusts in the God who justifies the ungodly—his faith reputatur ad 
iustitiam (Rom. 4:5). In the same way, David pronounces that man beatus to whom 
God reputat Iustitiam sine operibus (Rom. 4:6).817 Or, as St. David goes on to say in Ps. 
32:2/Rom. 4:8, “Blessed is the man to whom the Lord does not imputavit peccatum.” 
This is the real dogmatic and spiritual substance that underlies and—rightly 
interpreted—finds expression in the first of Luther’s several intrepid paradoxes in the 
Rom. 4:7 scholion, quoted above. At the heart of it—as of the entire scholion and 
indeed the lectures on Romans as a whole—lies this intensely “inward” monastic piety 
                                                        
815 Bayer, Promissio, 74-5. 
816 WA 56.268.32-269.2, cf. LW 25.257. Cf. the Lutheran theologian and pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
writing on the saints in his 1937 classic Nachfolge: “The saints are only conscious of the strife and 
distress, the weakness and sin in their lives; and the further they advance in holiness, the more they 
feel they are fighting a losing battle and dying in the flesh… their whole life must be an act of faith 
in the Son of God.” The Cost of Discipleship, 285. 
817 WA 56.267.30-268.1: Construatur sic: Reputatur fides eius ad Iustitiam, Sicut et Dauid dicit (i. e. 
asserit) Beatitudinem hominis (i. e. quod is homo sit beatus, siue beatitudinem huius esse hominis 
solum), cui Deus reputat Iustitiam sine operibus. Cf. LW 25.255-6. 
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revolving around the experience of concupiscentia in the regenerate after baptism and 
penance alike, which for Luther gave rise to the need for a dogmatic explanation of 
this undeniable (and intractable: though not invincible) phenomenon. In what 
follows, we shall see this again and again. And as in the comments on Rom. 7 studied 
in chapter 3, here too it is the “420s Augustine” who decisively aids Luther’s exegetical 
efforts to untie the dogmatic and spiritual knot that puzzled his mind and afflicted his 
soul. 
 
1. Mirabilis Deus in sanctis suis 
 
Luther’s second set of paradoxical theses comes on the next page of the WA: 
“God is marvelous in his saints” [Ps. 67:37 Vg.], to whom they are righteous and 
unrighteous at the same time. 
And God is marvelous in hypocrites, to whom they are unrighteous and 
righteous at the same time.818 
 
In slightly different forms, Luther read that God is “marvelous” in his saints in Ps. 4:4 
and 67:37 Vg.819 Commenting on Ps. 4:4 in his 1513 Dictata on the Psalter, Luther 
interpreted its singular mirificavit dominus Sanctum suum christologically: “God is 
indeed marvelous in his Holy One, because he hands him over to tribulations and thus 
crowns him.”820 In the long run, it is the moral/tropological or “mystical” 
interpretation of these verses—itself intimately related to Christ’s cross—that gains 
the upper hand. This is already present in the Dictata on Ps. 51:4, where (as I hinted 
earlier) Luther expounds the same “monastic” and humility-oriented spiritual theology 
                                                        
818 WA 56.269.21-4: ‘Mirabilis Deus in sanctis suis,’ Cui simul sunt Iusti et Iniusti. Et Mirabilis in 
hipocritis Deus, Cui simul sunt Iniusti et Iusti. Cf. LW 25.258. 
819 On this theme and its roots in the two Psalm verses, see Lennart Pinomaa, Die Heiligen bei 
Luther (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola, 1977), 38-42. 
820 WA 3.62.36-7: Scitote quoniam mirificavit dominus Sanctum suum. Mirabilis enim in sancto suo 
est, quod eum in tribulationes tradit et sic coronat. Cf. LW 11.239. 
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we find in the Rom. 4:7 scholion. Referring to Job 25:1-6, Isa. 40:17, and 1 Tim. 1:15, 
Luther explains that as the stars are unclean before God, so “the saints are not saints 
before him.” For God’s humble sancti confess readily that they themselves maxime are 
unclean, and therefore always pray Ps. 51:4.821 This, says Luther, is why “God is 
marvelous in his saints” (67:37 Vg.): 
‘Mirabilis est Deus in sanctis suis.’ For it is true: he who is most beautiful before 
God, the same person is most deformed. And vice versa: he who is most 
deformed is the most beautiful. In this way: he who is most beautiful to himself 
(pulcherrimus sibi) is the ugliest before God.822  
 
The 30/1 year old Psalter-praying and exegeting Augustinian friar goes on to cite St. 
Mary’s Magnificat (Luke 1:48), then adds: “These things are the marrow of Scripture 
and the fat of the heavenly grain, amabilior than all the glory of riches.”823  
 From the first page of the 1515 lectures on Romans, Luther announces that this 
same humility-theology is the Summarium of Paul’s epistle, which purposes “to tear 
down and uproot and destroy all the wisdom and righteousness of the flesh.”824 That 
Luther cites Augustine’s sp. litt. 7.12 to back up his claim825 becomes especially 
intriguing in light of Pierre-Marie Hombert’s magisterial study of the way “boasting in 
the Lord” (gloriari in Domino, from 1 Cor. 1:31) rather than in one’s self (1 Cor. 4:7) is 
the spiritual glue that holds together Augustine’s theology of grace. In particular, 
Hombert draws attention to Augustine’s claims about Paul’s intentio in Rom. 9 (at 
                                                        
821 WA 3.290.15-22, LW 10.239. 
822 WA 3.290.22-5, cf. LW 10.239. 
823 WA 3.291.3-5, LW 10.239-40. 
824 WA 56.157.2-3, cf. LW 25.135. 
825 WA 56.157.7-11: Unde b. Aug c. 7. de spi. et lit. ait: Paulus Apostolus ‘multum contra superbos et 
arrogantes ac de suis operibus presumentes dimicat’ etc. ‘Deinde ad Romanos ipsa questio pene sola 
versatur tam pugnaciter, tam multipliciter, vt fatiget quidem legentis intentionem, Sed tamen 
fatigatione vtili et salubri.’ Cf. LW 25.135. Luther’s excerpt substantially agrees with the text in CSEL 
60.163-4. 
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Simpl. 1.2826) and indeed the uniuersa facies and uultus of the entire Bible (at Ench. 
25.98827). The gospel of God’s undeserved grace in Christ humbles the proud heart and 
reorders its vain “glorying” from the idol of one’s “self” back to the true praise of God. 
This, for Augustine, is the Bible’s main point.  
Augustine’s claim to this end at Ench. 25.98 is especially similar to Luther’s 
statement regarding the Bible’s “marrow,” “fat,” and amabilia in the Dictata. The 
humility-driven Frömmigkeitstheologie epitomized in Mary’s Magnificat and summed 
up in the paradox that God is “marvelous” in his saints is the richest portion of the 
Scriptures. For Luther in 1513/14, nothing is more loveable than the sweetness of 
humility tasted in God’s Word, and nothing more spiritual than the confession of 
one’s misshapenness before the God who is only ever marvelous in such “ugly” saints 
as these. For Luther in 1515, it is St. Paul’s object in his great letter to establish this 
same spiritual theology of sin, grace, humility, and right boasting in God. “What else 
does the whole Scripture teach,” asks Luther in the scholion on Rom. 2:12, “but 
humility?”828 
Thus from the initial Summarium and the excerpt from sp. litt. Luther proceeds 
for several pages to sketch the Augustinian contrast between false and true “boasting.” 
The most noble of the self-righteous in history—i.e., the virtuous pagans of antiquity, 
held in highest esteem by Renaissance humanists like Erasmus—“would take pleasure 
                                                        
826 Hombert, Gloria Gratiae, 105. Ad. Simp. 1.2.2, CCSL 44.24: Et primo intentionem apostoli, quae per 
totam epistulam uiget, tenebo, quam consulam. Haec est autem, ut de operum meritis nemo 
glorietur. Ibid, 1.2.21, CCSL 44.53: Nulla igitur intentio tenetur apostoli et omnium iustificatorum, per 
quos nobis intellectus gratiae demonstratus est, nisi ut qui gloriatur in domino glorietur. 
827 Hombert, 325. Ench. 28.98, CCSL 46.101: non volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis est dei. 
Altissimo quippe ac saluberrimo sacramento uniuersa facies atque, ut ita dixerim, uultus sanctarum 
scripturarum bene intuentes id admonere inuenitur, ut qui gloriatur in domino glorietur. 
828 WA 56.199.30: Quid enim aliud tota Scriptura docet quam humilitatem? Cf. LW 25.183. 
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in themselves and would at all events glory (gloriarentur) among themselves in their 
hearts as wise, righteous, and good men.”829 This self-complacence and vain-glorying 
vitiated their semblance of virtue at its core: like the rotting corpses in white-washed 
tombs denounced by the Lord Jesus (Matt. 23:27), these are of course the vitia 
splendida meticulously accounted for in civ. dei 14 and 19 and c. Iul. 4.3.14-33—even if 
Augustine himself never quite employed that splendid phrase.830 Luther’s well-known 
(and sometimes abused) exhortation to “an exodus from the virtues to Christ’s 
grace”831 is thus in its substance an Augustinian summons to repent and turn away 
from the false-boasting of self-cultivated virtue to the true boasting in God’s grace in 
Christ that characterizes humble misshapen saints. God’s lavish gift of gratia in Christ 
redounds to the praise of the gloria gratiae (Eph. 1:3-14). Christ wills for “our whole 
affective being” to be “so stripped bare” that we will neither fear embarrassment for 
our vices, nor love gloriam and vain joy for our virtues, nor “glory” (gloriari) before 
men on account of the true righteousness which is in us from Christ, nor be dejected 
because of the sufferings and evils which are brought upon us by Christ.832 In short, 
nothing, not one’s virtue nor even his iustitia ex Christo, is in fact “his”: “The true 
Christian ought to have absolutely nothing that belongs to himself.”833 The spiritual 
conclusion follows apace from the Pauline premises: the saints praise, thank, and glory 
in God alone. Soli Deo gloria. 
                                                        
829 WA 56.157.17-19, cf. LW 25.136. 
830 See Brett Gaul, “Augustine on the Virtues of the Pagans,” AugS 40/2 (2009), 233-49. 
831 WA 56.158.17-19: omnis egressus populi Israel olim istam egressionem significauit, quam de viciis 
ad virtutes exponunt. Et magis etiam de virtutibus ad gratiam Christi oportet exponi. Cf. LW 25.136. 
832 WA 56.158.22-159.4: Nunc Christus vult omnem affectum nostrum ita esse exutum, vt non solum 
pro nostris viciis non timeamus confusionem et pro nostris virtutibus non amemus gloriam et vanam 
letitiam, Sed nec de ipsa externa, que ex Christo in nobis est, Iustitia, gloriari coram hominibus 
debeamus neque de passionibus et malis, que ex ipso nobis inferuntur, deiici. Cf. LW 25.137. 
833 WA 56.159.4-5: Sed omnino Christianus verus ita debet nihil proprium habere. Cf. LW 25.137. 
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Now, at one level Luther’s nihil proprium has a straightforward monastic 
connotation vis-à-vis the vow of poverty. But in the Augustinian polemic against self-
originated “virtue” that constitutes this prelude to the Romans lectures, Luther refers 
primarily to the iustitia sua at Rom. 10:3 or mea at Phil. 3:9, i.e., to iustitia (and 
sapientia) propria. This, of course, is just the sort of “righteousness” that the radical 
ascetic is invariably tempted to claim as his own. In Luther’s judgment, Biel et al. had 
fashioned it into the “half-merit” (meritum de congruo) acquired by that soul who does 
what lies within his power to do. Thus iustitia propria—which St. Paul delicately 
defined as “rubbish,” “dung,” or “crap” (σκύβαλα) at Phil. 3:8—became the late 
medieval entryway to obtaining gratia gratum faciens. Monasticism provided the fast 
track—or at least the safer route, via securior—through that entryway to the “full-
merit” (meritum de condigno) acquired in a state of grace and leading up to the state of 
glory.834 In this dogmatic and spiritual schema, each step in the Christian’s via en 
route to eternal glory affords the possibility of an affirmative answer to Paul’s question 
at Rom. 3:27: “What then becomes of our boasting?” For in this schema, gloriari in se is 
not excluded, but established. 
                                                        
834 That the monastic life was the “safer way” to reach heavenly glory was a common conviction of 
the medieval Church: Bernard had promoted it with great effect in the twelfth century; Thomas 
Aquinas (e.g.) theorized its superiority in the thirteenth (ST II/2 q. 88 a. 6, qq. 182, 184, 186; note too 
q. 189 a. 3 ad. 3: rationabiliter autem dici potest quod etiam per ingressum religionis aliquis 
consequatur remissionem omnium peccatorum… unde in vitis patrum legitur quod eandem gratiam 
consequuntur ingredientes quam consequuntur baptizati); and on the eve of the Reformation it 
formed a central theme in Johannes von Paltz’s Frömmigkeitstheologie. Paltz was one of the 
brothers in the Erfurt Augustinian cloister when Luther entered it in 1505. See Leppin, Martin 
Luther, 36; Bernhard Lohse, Mönchtum und Reformation: Luthers Auseinandersetzung mit dem 
Mönchsideal des Mittelalters (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963), 171: “Tatsächlich ist das 
Mönchtum bei Paltz zu einem himmlischen Versicherungsunternehmen geworden”; Berndt 
Hamm, Frömmigkeitstheologie am Anfang des 16. Jahrhunderts. Studien zu Johannes von Paltz und 
seinem Umkreis (Tübingen, 1982), esp. 291-99. 
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But St. Paul replied: “It is excluded.” For he had just announced the gospel of 
God’s freely given righteousness, through Christ’s atoning blood, for everyone who 
believes in Rom. 3:21-26, and will declare emphatically in v. 28 that “one is justified by 
faith apart from works of the law.” Therefore: no more boasting (cf. Eph. 2:8-10). The 
Pauline and (as Hombert has magnificently documented) Augustinian Christian has 
nothing of his own of which he might boast before God, for all he has came to him 
from God as a free gift in Jesus Christ (1 Cor. 1:26-30). Hence the twin verses from 1 
Corinthians that Hombert has shown to stand at the center of Augustine’s spiritual 
theology of grace: 
What do you have that you did not receive? If you received it, why then do you 
boast (quid gloriaris), as if you had not received it? (1 Cor. 4:7)  
 
It is from God that you are in Christ Jesus, who became for us wisdom from 
God, and righteousness and sanctification and redemption: in order, as it is 
written, that the one who boasts might boast in the Lord (ut qui gloriatur, in 
Domino glorietur, 1 Cor. 1:30-1). 
 
It is no accident that Luther concludes his Augustinian prelude on false and true 
boasting by pitting the natural desire for—and Bielish theology of—acceptance and 
reward on the basis of one’s works over against the fixa sententia of Rom. 9:16,835 a 
proof-text ubiquitously cited by Augustine in defense of his spiritual doctrine of 
predestination and grace. As for Augustine, so for Luther, the object of true “glorying” 
lies not in the one who wills or the one who runs, but in God alone, who has mercy. 
But to return to Rom. 4:7—This Augustinian and monastic spiritual theology 
forms the real content of Luther’s otherwise perplexing (and perhaps startling) 
assertion that “God is marvelous in his saints, to whom they are righteous and 
                                                        
835 WA 56.159.17-24, cf. LW 25.138. 
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unrighteous simul.” In fact, what he writes here is essentially identical to the passage 
from the Dictata noted above. Ps. 67:37 Vg. attests the “marvelous” truth of the God of 
grace, who is seated on high yet regards the lowly, who is incomparably beautiful in 
his holiness yet dwells with those who confess the ghastliness of their sinful hearts. 
The man who is most beautiful in his own eyes is the ugliest in God’s, but the man 
who abases himself in confession before God is beautiful in God’s sight (cf. Luke 18:9-
14). For in confession, this self-abasing person begins to become true. Thus Luther’s 
explanation of his bold thesis runs as follows: 
For while the saints always have their own sin before their eyes, and implore 
righteousness from God according to his mercy, for this very reason (eoipso) 
they are always also reputed (reputantur) righteous by God. Therefore to 
themselves and in truth they are unrighteous, but they are righteous to God 
reckoning them so because of (propter) this confession of sin. In reality sinners, 
but righteous by the reckoning of the God who has mercy [Rom. 9:16]. 
Unknowingly righteous and knowingly unrighteous. Sinners in fact, but 
righteous in hope. And this is what he says here: “Blessed are they whose 
iniquities are forgiven and whose sins are covered” [Ps. 32:1]. Hence it follows: 
“I said, I will confess against myself my unrighteousness” [Ps. 32:5] (i.e., I will 
always have my sin before my eyes, because I confess to you). Therefore, “and 
you forgave the ungodliness of sin” [Ps. 32:5], not only to me, but to all. Hence 
it follows: “For this, every saint will pray to you” [Ps. 32:6]. Behold, every saint 
is a sinner and prays for his sins. In this way, the righteous man is, in principle, 
his own accuser.836 
 
                                                        
836 WA 56.269.25-270.7: Quia dum sancti peccatum suum semper in conspectu habent et Iustitiam a 
Deo secundum misericordiam ipsius implorant, eoipso semper quoque Iusti a Deo reputantur. Ergo 
sibiipsis et in veritate Iniusti sunt, Deo autem propter hanc confessionem peccati eos reputanti Iusti; 
Re vera peccatores, Sed reputatione miserentis Dei Iusti; Ignoranter Iusti et Scienter inIusti; 
peccatores in re, Iusti autem in spe. Et hoc est, quod dicit hic: ‘Beati, quorum remisse iniquitates et 
tecta peccata.’ Vnde sequitur: ‘Dixi: confitebor aduersum me Iniustitiam meam’ (i. e. in conspectu 
meo semper habebo peccatum meum, quod tibi confitear). Ideo ‘et tu remisisti impietatem peccati’, 
Non solum mihi, Sed omnibus. Vnde sequitur: ‘Pro hac orabit ad te omnis sanctus.’ Ecce omnis 
sanctus est peccator et orat pro peccatis suis. Sic Iustus in principio est accusator sui. Cf. LW 25.258. 
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My reader may recall from chapter 2 how Luther wove together these very verses from 
Ps. 32 in just this way in late 1538, adding playfully, “Rhyme that if you can!”837 At this 
early stage in his development, the gist of his mature exegesis and theology is already 
in place; but I think it is fair to say that young Luther “yearning for grace” (Wicks) and 
still unassured of its reality in the promissio evangelii (Bayer) has yet to gain a playful 
soul. But farther on this point in its place. Three observations are in order here, 
leaving aside for the moment the precise nature of the “sin” that the saints confess 
they have for the next section of this chapter.  
First, note that while Paul only quotes Ps. 32:1-2, Luther reads Rom. 4 in light of 
the rest of the Psalm: and in a way, it is vv. 5-6 of Ps. 32 that spiritually and logically 
drive Luther toward his “simul.”838 If one prays Ps. 32—and for that matter the rest of 
the Psalter, as Luther did “religiously” as an Augustinian—the notion that saints pray 
to God for their sins seeps into the very bones of one’s soul. Second, note Luther’s 
clear allusion to Rom. 9:16. The true penitent who always has his sin before his eyes 
lodges all his hope for salvation in the merciful reputatio of the miserentis Dei. This, 
and not just the spe/re contrast, ties Luther’s meditations here unmistakably to 
Augustine. Third, notice “Holl’s propter”: for the very reason (eoipso) that the saints 
confess their sin and beg God for iustitia to be granted to them by his mercy, God does 
in fact reckon them as righteous; again, although they are truly unrighteous and see 
this fact all too well, God reckons them righteous because of (propter) their confession 
                                                        
837 WA 39/1.507.19-508.1 [A], cf. ATD, 153: “What is this? How do these things fit together? How 
does it agree, to be holy and to pray for sin? It is truly a marvelous thing. It is truly a fine thing. 
Reim da, wer reimen kan.” 
838 This is a rather sophisticated hermeneutical strategy, which Richard B. Hays has advocated in 
his book Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). 
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of sin. In his 1910 essay on justification in the Romans lectures, Holl emphasized these 
and other like claims in Luther’s writings and set them over against the propter 
Christum of the Lutheran confessions. Holl posed the question: does Luther’s propter 
smuggle “Catholic” merit or “Melanchthonian” synergism into Reformation theology? 
An appeal to God’s Alleinwirksamkeit freed Holl to answer his own question with a 
decisive “No,” for the faith, humility, or confession propter quod God justifies the 
sinner is always itself the gift of God’s prevenient grace and thus the temporal effect of 
his eternal predestination.839 This will not be the last time we meet “Holl’s propter.” 
For the time being, what matters is that we recognize how God’s marvelous and 
merciful reputatio of the sinner as “righteous” does indeed have a point of contact in 
the real renewal of the sin-confessing, Psalter-praying sanctus. Holl grasped this point 
well. In reality, the saint is a sinner, and his sin is all that he can see when he kneels 
before the Holy One in prayer. But the very fact that he sees and acknowledges his 
sinfulness with even the smallest measure of truth, and confesses his sin as sin before 
God, and seeks God’s mercy in hope’s humble prayer, shows that Luther’s sinful saint 
is not nothing but a peccator without remainder—and this “in re,” too, however 
hidden, inchoate, partial, and fragile the present reality of one’s gracious renewal in 
holiness may be. 
 
2. The kind of “sin” that saints have, and its healing and forgiveness 
 
This becomes clearer in the following corollarium, which takes its initial bearings from 
Rom. 7 and Ps. 32. Luther first states that in Ps. 32—as well as Ecclus. 39:5 and Ps. 
38:18, which had also been cited—the “sins” in question are not only sinful deeds “in 
                                                        
839 Holl, “Die Rechtfertigungslehre in Luthers Vorlesung über den Römerbrief,” 126-9. 
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work, word, and thought,” but also regard “the tinder” (de fomite). He immediately 
directs the reader infra 7., and quotes Rom. 7:17/20 (“Not I, but the sin that dwells in 
me”). “In the same place,” explains Luther, referring to Rom. 7:5, Paul “calls it [ipsum, 
viz. peccatum] ‘the passions of sins’ i.e., desyderia, affectiones et inclinationes for sins, 
which he says operate fruit for death.”840 St. David did not think in the first place of 
adultery and murder when he wrote his great Psalms, and neither did St. Paul in Rom. 
7: 
Therefore actual sin (as it is called by the theologians) is more truly the sin, i.e., 
the work and fruit of sin; sin, however, is the passion itself, the tinder, and 
concupiscence or proneness toward evil and difficulty toward good, just as it 
says below: “I would not have known that concupiscence is sin” [Rom. 7:7]. If 
indeed they “work” (operantur) [7:5, 13, 15, 17, 20], therefore they are not 
themselves works (opera), but workers (operantes), in order that it may bear 
fruit (Vt fructificet); therefore, they are not the fruit.841  
 
Grane was right to underline that for Luther the decisive matter was grasping Paul’s 
meaning, not Augustine’s per se: but here once more, as in the Rom. 7 scholia, Luther 
is evidently employing Augustinian conceptuality to interpret the apostolic modus 
loquendi. In Rom. 7, “sin” means sinful passion itself—not actual sin—which in its 
residual being in the regenerate “operates” all manner of evil desires by its bent toward 
evil and aversion from the good. Drawn from Augustine through Peter Lombard, 
violent (and indeed, tyrannical) affective pronitas ad malum et difficultas ad bonum are 
amongst the terms Luther will use shortly to define original sin in the scholion on 
                                                        
840 WA 56.271.2-6, cf. LW 25.259. 
841 WA 56.271.6-11: Ergo Actuale (sicut a theologis vocatur) verius est peccatum i. e. opus et fructus 
peccati, peccatum autem ipsa passio | fomes | et concupiscentia siue pronitas ad malum et difficultas 
ad bonum, sicut infra: ‘Concupiscentiam nesciebam esse peccatum.’ Si enim ‘operantur’, ergo non 
sunt ipsa opera, Sed operantes, Vt fructificet; ergo non sunt fructus. Cf. LW 25.259. 
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Rom. 5:12.842 It is this sin—not peccatum actuale—for which the saint pleads 
forgiveness in Ps. 32:1-6: “the very bending away from good (declinatio a bono) and 
propensity for evil (inclinatio ad malum)” that he inherits originally from Adam. The 
“works” or “fruits” of this root sin are the sinful deeds that grow organically and 
necessarily therefrom in the unregenerate.843  
But as I have argued above and as we shall see again presently, in the 
regenerate person—who suffers the presence of his vicious affectivity unwilling—sin’s 
“fruits” only grow back into being in opere, verbo et cogitatione through the consent of 
his will. This distinction between “sin” as evil affectivity and sin’s “work”/“fruit” as 
peccata actualia “will be seen more clearly below in chapters 7 and 8,” writes Luther; 
but just as importantly, he clarifies that “all the previously related texts must be 
understood de tali peccato.”844 Just to be sure we grasp his point, Luther then repeats 
Ps. 32:1, 32:5-6, and 51:3-4, and throws in 1 John 1:8 for good measure. In short, the 
affective malum that St. Paul bluntly names as “sin” in Rom. 6 and 7 is re vera 
                                                        
842 On Rom. 5:12, WA 56.312.6-313.12: secundum Apostolum et simplicitatem sensus in Christo Ihesu 
Est non tantum priuatio qualitatis in voluntate, immo nec tantum priuatio lucis in intellectu, virtutis 
in memoria, Sed prorsus priuatio vniuersȩ rectitudinis et potentiȩ omnium virium tam corporis quam 
animȩ ac totius hominis interioris et exterioris. Insuper et pronitas ipsa ad malum, Nausea ad bonum, 
fastidium lucis et sapientiȩ, dilectio autem erroris ac tenebrarum, fuga et abominatio bonorum 
operum, Cursus autem ad malum. Sicut psalmo 13. Scriptum est: ‘Omnes declinauerunt, simul inutiles 
facti sunt.’ Et Genes. 8.: ‘Sensus enim et cogitatio cordis humani ad malum proni sunt.’ Non enim 
Istam priuationem tantum Deus odit et Imputat (sicut multi peccatum suum obliti et non 
agnoscentes), Sed vniuersam ipsam concupiscentiam, Qua fit, vt inobedientes simus huic mandato: 
‘Non concupisces.’ Sicut Apostolus 7. c. infra clarissime disputat. Hoc enim preceptum ostendit nobis 
peccatum, sicut Apostolus ait: ‘Concupiscentiam nesciebam esse peccatum, nisi lex diceret: Non 
concupisces.’ Igitur Sicut Antiqui patres Sancti recte dixerunt: Peccatum illud originis Est ipse fomes, 
lex carnis, lex membrorum, languor naturȩ, Tyrannus, Morbus originis etc. Est enim simile cum 
ȩgroto, Cuius ȩgritudo mortalis non tantum est vnius membri priuata sanitas, Sed Vltra sanitatem 
omnium membrorum priuatam debilitatio omnium sensuum et virium, Insuper Nausea eorum, que 
salubria sunt, et cupiditas eorum, que noxia sunt. Ista ergo Est hidra illa multiceps, monstrum nimis 
pertinax, cum quo pugnamus in Lerna huius vitȩ vsque ad mortem. Hic Cerberus, latrator 
incompescibilis, Et Anthȩus in terra dimissus insuperabilis. Cf. LW 25.299-300. 
843 WA 56.271.13-15, cf. LW 25.259. 
844 WA 56.271.15-16, cf. LW 25.259. 
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peccatum; and the reason St. David pled with God for mercy in the Psalter is that he 
grasped the marrow of Paul’s theology. The saints, then, are “sinners” in the precise 
“420s Augustine” sense that they bear in their souls, against their own renewed wills, 
the residual evil of vicious desire. This matches exactly what we found earlier in 
Luther’s scholia on Rom. 7 and, indeed, in the works of his maturity.  
 Having clarified the nature of the saints’ “sin,” Luther presses on to explain 
both the manner of its non-imputation and the rationale for the same. This brings us 
to the early roots of his theology of gift and grace. Parallel to his distinction between 
“sin” and its “fruit,” Luther distinguishes between “our righteousness from God” 
(Iustitia nostra ex Deo) on the one hand and its fruits in good works on the other. The 
saint’s iustitia ex deo consists in the inner reversal of the deepest inclinations of his 
heart. This reversal is brought about by the heart’s renovation through the infusion of 
grace. “Our righteousness from God” is itself “the very propensity toward good 
(Inclinatio ad bonum) and turning away from evil (declinatio a malo) which is given 
inwardly through grace.”845 And as “sin” brought forth its “fruit” in peccata actualia, so 
this inner righteousness—received as a gift by grace, renovating the heart, and thus 
reversing its affective propensities—brings forth its fruits in good works: opera autem 
sunt potius fructus Iustitiȩ.846 This real renewal of the heart is the foundation-stone 
upon which Luther proceeds, in two successive attempts, to erect a nuanced spiritual 
theology of sin, confession, mercy, non-imputation, and progressive healing by 
Christ’s grace. As I now exposit each in turn, we do well to keep this real affective 
                                                        
845 WA 56.271.11-13: Sicut Iustitia nostra ex Deo Est ipsa ipsa Inclinatio ad bonum et declinatio a malo 
interius per gratiam data. Cf. LW 25.259. 
846 WA 56.271.13, cf. LW 25.259. 
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renewal in mind: Iustitia nostra ex Deo est ipsa ipsa inclinatio ad bonum et declinatio a 
malo interius per gratiam data. 
 (1) The evil passions of sin that remain, that is the “concupiscence” unmasked 
by the 10th Commandment as “peccatum,” are truly sin and require the confession of 1 
John 1:8. Of itself, as sin, it is by nature worthy only of damnation. But God forgives it  
… through his non-Imputation, out of mercy, to all who acknowledge and 
confess and hate it and plead to be healed from it (ab eo sanari).847 
  
In other words, God mercifully forgives and/or declines to reckon the intrinsic guilt of 
evil desire to the kind of true penitents described earlier, despite the fact that this evil 
desire is at work within their hearts. As true penitents, the forgiven do not hide, but 
confess and hate their “sin” and therefore plead with God to be healed of it (sanari). 
That is, they beg for an increase of gratia sanans to carry on the renewing work—
hidden to the saints, but evinced by their very yearning for grace—that God has begun 
in their hearts. Luther next contrasts this penitential spirituality of healing grace and 
undeserved mercy with its mistaken counterfeit: the “error” that “this evil can be 
healed through works.”848 As I argued above regarding the autobiographical 
conclusion to the scholia on Rom. 7, so here, Luther is not merely taking aim at 
alternative late medieval spiritualities/theologies. Rather, he writes as a man who tried 
valiantly to extinguish his concupiscentiae through the normally suggested means, and 
failed. This, I think, is why Luther appeals immediately not to Scripture, but to 
experience: “For Experientia testifies, that in whatsoever we work well, this 
concupiscentia ad malum is left behind (relinquitur), and no one is clean from it, not 
                                                        
847 WA 56.271.21-2, cf. LW 25.259. 
848 WA 56.271.24, cf. LW 25.259. 
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even an infant one day old.”849 Job 14:5 (in the Old Latin rendering of the LXX known 
to Luther either through Augustine, e.g., c. Iul. 5.13.49,850 or perhaps through a living 
spiritual tradition in the O.E.S.A.851) enters in at the tail-end of Luther’s confession, 
but the real weight in the argument is his appeal to this eminently monastic 
experience.  
Pace Denifle, however, Luther does not find release from this experience of 
spiritual failure in a doctrine of invincible concupiscence; nor, relatedly, does he take 
refuge in a doctrine of sheer imputation and a totus/totus “simul.” The brute 
experience of illicit desire in the regenerate is for Luther an incontestable fact of the 
godly life. But while the unwanted presence of this “sin” (together with its unruly and 
vexatious operations) is intractable in this life, for the regenerate person this 
concupiscentia—“evil” and indeed “guilty” as it intrinsically is in Luther’s judgment—is 
certainly not invincible. Luther did not find consolation in the kind of “cheap grace” 
that proclaims free justification to the sinner who gives way to his evil desires rather 
than calling him to fight against them in repentance. Far from it. Instead, the battle-
weary Augustinian friar found consolation in the battle-proven old Augustine’s 
teaching that even the most furious sin-fighters are obliged to suffer in their “flesh” 
the very emotions, passions, desires, or affections which they hate with the pure and 
                                                        
849 WA 56.271.24-7: Et error est, Quod hoc malum possit per opera sanari, Cum Experientia testetur, 
quod in quantumlibet bene operemur, relinquitur concupiscentia ista ad malum et nemo mundus ab 
illa, nec Infans vnius diei. Cf. LW 25.259. 
850 NBA I/18.834, PL 44.811: Sed cum etiam sancti Iob testimonium tam loquaciter adhiberes, quare 
non tibi venit in mentem quod ait idem ipse homo Dei, cum de peccatis sermo eius esset humanis, 
‘neminem mundum a sorde, nec infantem cuius est unius diei vita super terram’? Cf. WSA I/24.464. 
851 Jordan of Quedlinburg cites Job 14:5 in concert with Isa. 64:6, a vital proof-text for Luther’s 
doctrine of the “sinfulness” of the good works done by the regenerate, at OP sermo 374B, fol. 90rb—
90va; in Saak, 416, n. 235. Saak notes that here Jordan draws from his teacher Albert of Padua 
O.E.S.A. “virtually word for word.” For a brief introduction to Albert, see Adolar Zumkeller, O.S.A., 
“The Augustinian School of the Middle Ages,” 35. 
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holy odium peccati (Ps. 139:22, Rom. 7:15) that is only ever found in spiritually 
renovated, law-delighting hearts (Ps. 1:2, Rom. 7:22). So long as they keep up the holy 
war against their own old selves by not consenting to the affective vetustas they bear 
within, the regenerate continue both in the process of healing (or renovation) 
underway in their hearts and in the forgiveness of God. As Luther sets forth this 
doctrine of residual sin, renewing grace, and pardoning mercy, he alludes to nupt. 
conc. 1.25.28 for the first time in the scholion:  
But it is the mercy of God that this (hoc, viz., peccatum or concupiscentia) 
remains and is not reckoned for sin to those who call upon Him and groan for 
their liberation [cf. Rom. 8:23-6]. For such people also take care for works 
easily, because they seek to be justified with all zeal. Sic, ergo, in ourselves we 
are sinners and nevertheless we are righteous by God’s reckoning through 
faith. For we believe the One who promises that he will liberate us, provided 
that (dummodo) in the meantime we persevere, lest sin should rule [cf. Rom. 
6:12]; but we bear with it, until He takes it away.852 
 
Note well Luther’s little Sic ergo! Evil affective “sin” remains in the saints, to be sure, 
but they “groan” (gemunt) in the manner of Rom. 8:23-6 for liberation from this evil. 
And since they are the sort of holy people who zealously seek to be justified—
Iustificari, in this case as in the Rom 4:6 scholion a rough equivalent for sanari—they 
see to it that they do good works facile. For real saints, doing good works manu is the 
easy part: for the duration of his theological career, Luther more or less takes this for 
granted. The real issue is the complete renovation, healing, or liberation of the heart 
itself from its evil affective vitiation, disease, or bondage. The reality of the saints’ 
renewal is not in question. But the present imperfection of this renewal, owing to the 
                                                        
852 WA 56.271.27-272.2: Sed misericordia Dei est, Quod hoc manet et non pro peccato reputatur iis, 
qui Inuocant eum et gemunt pro liberatione sua. Tales enim facile et opera cauent, quia querunt 
Iustificari omni studio. Sic ergo in nobis sumus peccatores Et tamen reputante Deo Iusti per fidem. 
Quia credimus promittenti, quod nos liberet, dummodo interim perseueremus, ne peccatum regnet, 
sed Sustineamus ipsum, donec auferat ipsum. Cf. LW 25.259-60. 
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indwelling peccatum the saints continue to groan about to God, requires God’s 
merciful non-reckoning of their residual evil desires pro peccato. That they still have 
“sin” in this quite restricted sense (and 1 John 1:8 requires their confession of this fact) 
is enough to render the saints peccatores coram Deo. But through God’s merciful 
“overlooking” of this sin, the saints are Iusti per fidem.  
At just this point, the eschatological orientation of justification (which Holl did 
well to emphasize) enters the scene. The mercifully pardoned Iusti believe the God 
who promises to bring to completion the liberation he has already begun. In this text, 
faith in deus promittens does not entail the free bestowal of Christ’s alien 
righteousness in the present (as it will more or less consistently by 1520), but rather a 
Rom. 8:23-26-style “hope” for eschatological liberatio from one’s bondage to affective 
evil.853 This liberation has begun; and until it reaches its completion, what is left of the 
old dominion of sin cannot bring the saints into condemnation, sheltered as they are 
                                                        
853 At some points in the Romans lectures, Christ’s alien righteousness (or the “exchange” theme) 
comes to the fore, as does the promissio-fides correlation. But I think Bayer is right to argue that 
Luther has not yet quite fit together these two pieces of the later doctrine of justification. For 
iustitia aliena in 1515, see, e.g., (1) the scholion on Rom. 1:1, WA 56.158.10-14, LW 25.136: Deus enim 
nos non per domesticam, Sed per extraneam Iustitiam et sapientiam vult saluare, Non que veniat et 
nascatur ex nobis, Sed que aliunde veniat in nos, Non que in terra nostra oritur, Sed que de celo venit. 
Igitur omnino Externa et aliena Iustitia oportet erudiri. (2) On Rom. 2:15, WA 56.204.15-28, LW 
25.188: Cor enim credentis in Christum, si reprehenderit eum et accusauerit eum contra eum 
testificans de malo opere, Mox auertit se et ad Christum conuertit dicitque: Hic autem satisfecit, hic 
Iustus est, hic mea defensio, hic pro me mortuus est, hic suam iustitiam meam fȩcit et meum 
peccatum suum fȩcit. Quod si peccatum meum suum fecit, iam ego illud non habeo et sum liber. Si 
autem Iustitiam suam meam fecit, iam Iustus ego sum eadem Iustitia, qua ille. Peccatum autem 
meum illum non potest absorbere, Sed absorbetur in abysso iustitiȩ eius infinita, Cum sit ipse Deus 
benedictus in sȩcula. Ac sic ‘Deus maior est corde nostro’. Maior est defensor quam accusator, etiam 
in infinitum. Deus defensor, cor accusator. Quȩ proportio? Sic, Sic, etiam Sic! ‘Quis accusabit 
aduersus electos Dei?’ q. d. Nullus. Quare? Quia ‘Deus est, qui iustificat. Quis est, qui condemnet?’ 
Nullus. Quare? Quia ‘Christus Ihesus est’ (qui etiam Deus est), ‘qui mortuus est, immo qui et 
resurrexit’ etc. ‘Si ergo Deus pro nobis, quis contra nos?’ (3) On Rom. 3:27, WA 56.267.1-7, LW 
25.254: Restat igitur in peccatis nos manere oportere et in spe misericordie Dei gemere pro liberatione 
ex ipsis. Sicut Sanandus, qui nimium festinat sanari, certe potest grauius recidiuare. Paulatim ergo 
sanari oportet et aliquas imbecillitates aliquamdiu sustinere. Sufficit enim, quod peccatum displicet, 
etsi non omnino recedat. Christus enim omnia portat, si displiceant et iam non nostra, Sed ipsius sunt 
et Iustitia eius nostra vicissim. 
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beneath the mercy of God. But all this is conditioned by “Holl’s propter,” in this case a 
dummodo interim. The saints’ residual “sin” is not reckoned to their account—
“provided that” they persevere in the way of renewal while awaiting their ultimate 
liberation from sin’s enslaving power. What does this perseverance entail? Patiently 
battling against the affective remnants of one’s old “self,” ne peccatum regnet. Luther’s 
allusion to Rom. 6:12 is unmistakable: non ergo regnet peccatum, admonishes the 
Apostle, ut obediatis concupiscentiis eius. Translated into Augustine’s moral-
psychological terminology, Luther is saying that the saints remain sheltered by God’s 
non-reckoning of their “sin” so long as—and only so long as—they refuse to consent to 
its evil desires, the presence of which they are summoned to bravely endure 
(Sustineamus) till God clean takes it away.  
In short, Luther’s edgy-sounding “in ourselves we are sinners, but by God’s 
reckoning we are righteous through faith” is not inimical to an Augustinian theology 
of renovation. On the contrary, it depends upon just such a theology; and apart from 
the spiritual reality that such a theology attests—viz., hidden, fragile, embattled, but 
nonetheless real holiness—Luther’s impressive (“simul”) peccatores et Iusti simply 
breaks down. 
(2) In the next and long paragraph that follows, Luther elaborates the same 
theology of residual sin, ongoing healing by Christ’s grace, and merciful non-
imputation in terms of the Christus Samaritanus. To wit: 
It’s just like with a sick person: he believes the doctor who promises most 
certain health, and in the meantime, obeying the doctor’s order in hope of the 
promised health, he abstains from those things which are prohibited to him—
lest he impede the promised health and increase the disease—until the doctor 
fulfills what he promised. Now this sick person, is he healthy? Indeed, he is sick 
and healthy at the same time. Sick in the truth of the matter, but healthy by 
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the certain promise of the doctor, whom he believes, who already reckons him 
as healthy because he is certain that he will heal him, because he has begun to 
heal him and he has not imputed to him sickness unto death. In the same way, 
our Samaritan Christ took up the half-dead man to cure his sickness in the inn, 
and has begun to heal him, having promised most perfect health in eternal life, 
and not imputing sin i.e. concupiscences unto death, but prohibiting 
meanwhile in hope of the promised health to do or omit those things by which 
that health would be impeded and sin i.e. concupiscence increased. Now, then, 
is he perfectly righteous? No, but simul peccator et Iustus; sinner in fact, but 
righteous by the certain reckoning and promise of God, that he will liberate 
from that (ab illo, sc. peccatum), until he perfectly heals. And for this reason, 
he is perfectly healthy in hope, in reality however a sinner, but having the 
beginning of righteousness so that he always seeks it more fully, always 
knowing that he is unrighteous. Now if this sick person, loving his weakness, 
does not will to cure it all, won’t he die? Sic he who follows his concupiscentias 
in the world. Or, if someone does not seem sick in his own eyes, but healthy, 
and therefore rejects the doctor—this is the kind of person who is justified 
through his own works and is healthy.854 
 
In theological substance, Luther adds nothing new here. But the analogy is powerful. 
For Luther, sin’s sick longings and impulses in the saints are pathological, lethal, and 
absurd. To indulge them is—not just in terms of the metaphor, but quite literally—to 
succumb to one’s inveterate bent toward insanity and self-destruction. For when the 
regenerate Christian consents to his residual concupiscence, it is like a mad 
convalescent fleeing from a skillful and trustworthy physician (who has promised 
                                                        
854 WA 56.272.3-273.2: Est enim simile sicut cum ȩgroto, Qui promittenti medico certissimam 
sanitatem credit et precepto eius obediens interim in spe promissȩ sanitatis abstinet ab iis, que 
prohibita sunt ei, ne promissam sanitatem impediat et morbum augeat, donec impleat medicus, quod 
promisit. Iste enim Aegrotus nunquid sanus est? Immo ȩgrotus simul et sanus. Egrotus in rei veritate, 
Sed sanus ex certa promissione medici, cui credit, qui eum iam Velut sanum reputat, quia certus, 
quod sanabit eum, quia incepit eum sanare nec imputauit ei egritudinem ad mortem. Eodem modo 
Samaritanus noster Christus hominem semiuiuum ȩgrotum suum curandum suscȩpit in stabulum et 
incepit sanare promissa perfectissima sanitate in vitam ȩternam, et non imputans peccatum i. e. 
concupiscentias ad mortem, Sed prohibens interim in spe promissȩ sanitatis facere et omittere, quibus 
sanitas illa impediatur et peccatum i. e. concupiscentia augeatur. Nunquid ergo perfecte Iustus? Non, 
Sed simul peccator et Iustus; peccator re vera, Sed Iustus ex reputatione et promissione Dei certa, 
quod liberet ab illo, donec perfecte sanet. Ac per hoc sanus perfecte est in spe, In re autem peccator, 
Sed Initium habens Iustitiȩ, ut amplius querat semper, semper iniustum se sciens. Si nunc iste ȩgrotus 
diligens infirmitatem nolit omne curare, nonne morietur? Sic qui sequuntur concupiscentias suas in 
mundo. Aut si quis egrotus sibi non videatur, Sed sanus, ac sic medicum respuat, tale est: per opera 
sua Iustificari et sanum esse. Cf. LW 25.260. 
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complete restoration to wholeness) in order to commit suicide. No less mad is the sick 
person who thinks he is well and refuses the care of the doctor altogether. “Those who 
are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick,” taught the Lord Jesus, to 
the outrage of the Pharisees: “I came not to call the righteous, but sinners” (Mark 2:17). 
The great thrust of Luther’s long paragraph, however, is the real sanatio begun and 
progressively carried forward to its completion by Christ’s grace. The Good Samaritan 
and wise medicus has taken the semivivus into the inn and begun to heal him. His 
graced patient is by no means out of the woods: precisely in his convalescence by 
grace, he remains a sinner sick with the deadly morbus concupiscentiae. But because 
Christ really has begun to heal him, his patient really does possess the initium Iustitie.̧ 
Furthermore, Christ has promised to finish the healing he has begun; and in the 
meantime, he does not impute the affective sin-sickness that remains in his patient as 
a sickness unto death.  
Simul peccator et Iustus, indeed. But there is only one reason for the first term, 
and perhaps three for the second. The chronic disease of evil desire renders Christ’s 
patient a sinner re vera. But the same patient, at the same time, is healthy and 
righteous, because (a) Christ has begun to make him healthy and righteous; (b) Christ 
has promised to finish the job; (c) until he does so, Christ does not impute his 
patient’s remaining morbus, infirmitas, aegritudo, or “sin” as a sickness unto death, 
i.e., destruction or condemnation.855 Is there a forensic element in this picture? There 
is: for in itself, the deadly disease of evil desire, which originated in Adam’s treachery 
                                                        
855 Cf. Hamel, II/89-90. On Hamel’s reading of the Romans lectures, God declares the 
partim/partim sinner righteous for three reasons: (1) God knows that he will heal the sin-sick sinner 
completely in the end; (2) the man is a penitent who confesses his sin and humbly begs for 
righteousness; (3) God reckons Christ’s righteousness to his account.  
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and rebellion, is worthy of damnation. But to myopically focus on this theme at the 
expense of Luther’s emphatic stress on real healing through grace, and to then set the 
former over against the latter—as Grane ill-advisedly asserts—does real injustice to 
both the intricate details and the overall tenor of the passage.856 For Luther fits his non 
imputavit into a far more complex theological and spiritual vision than Grane 
recognized: so much so, that interpreting Rom. 4/Ps. 32—i.e., explicitly imputational 
and “forensic” texts—proves for Luther a vital occasion for expositing his Augustinian 
theology of sanatio through the grace of Christus medicus. 
 Thus we arrive at the folly of the “pig theologians,” and the spiritual wisdom 
and consolatory power of nupt. conc. 1.25.28. 
 
3. Nupt. conc. 1.25.28 and die Sawtheologen 
 
In the next few pages, Luther intersperses autobiographical remarks amidst highly 
charged polemic against the Bielish theology of nature, sin, grace, and good works. Its 
fierceness tells us much about Luther’s own sense of having been betrayed by a false 
(or non-catholic) theology, his anger toward hypocrisy in the Church, his pastoral 
concern for “the simple Christians” affected thereby,857 and his passionate 
                                                        
856 Grane (Modus loquendi, 77) labors hard in defense of his claim that this text and others like it 
does not express “a gradually progressing justification,” warns the reader not to be “fooled” by 
Luther’s use of sanare language, and asserts: “It is not permissible to accentuate a sentence like 
‘donec perfecte sanet’ in such a way that the sharpness of the ‘simul iustus et peccator’ is abolished.” 
Luther was speaking freely and in a metaphorical manner, and probably never imagined he’d have 
to protect his unguarded sayings from later misinterpretations. Then a few pages later (p. 80): “You 
must not be led astray by Luther’s ‘Augustinian’ way of speaking.” So Grane, whose assertions mark 
an important juncture in the scholarly misapprehension of Luther’s Augustinianism; even in the 
face of such patently sanative texts, Hermann’s “simul” possesses such axiomatic force that it 
functions as an exegetical deus ex machina to void each Lutherrede that contradicts it. And Grane 
was no mean scholar. 
857 WA 56.276.16-19, LW 25.263. 
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commitment to his program of scriptural and patristic (that is, Augustinian, plus one 
quote from Ambrose) ressourcement.858  
“The scholastic theologians”—in this case, Scotus, Ockham, and Biel all fit the 
bill—teach inadequately about sin and grace, “for they dream that the entire original 
sin (Originale totum) is taken away just like actual sin, as if they were the kind of 
things that can be clear taken away in the blink of an eye, like darkness by light.”859 
The bad grammar of Luther’s plural “as if they” (quasi sint) conveys a good 
Augustinian theology of original sin. Since its antecedent is peccatum originale, the 
reader expects quasi sit. But the plural sint evinces Luther’s operating assumption 
about the nature of original sin as a bundle of vitiated and unruly desires; and when 
paired together with the important little adjective totum, both his own theology of 
baptismal grace and his complaint vis-à-vis the late medieval alternative he had once 
held himself are greatly illumined.  
Biel (and his pupil Friar Martin in 1509/10) held that baptism took away “the 
whole original sin.” In 1516, does Luther now hold that baptism has no real effect on 
original sin at all? No, he does not. Instead, he asserts that peccatum originale totum is 
not taken away, i.e., original sin as a whole is not taken away. For the evil 
concupiscentiae of which it is comprised remain partially left over—hence the quick 
shift to the plural quasi sint quaedam amouibilia. But Luther’s totum must be held 
closely together with this, because the evil desires that remain do so only in 
                                                        
858 WA 56.273.6-8, cf. LW 25.261: Unlike the scholastic theologians, who spoke ad modum 
Aristotelis, “the ancient holy fathers Augustine and Ambrose spoke very differently, ad modum 
Scripturae.” 
859 WA 56.273.3-6: Aut ego nunquam intellexi, aut non bene satis de peccato et gratia theologi 
scolastici sunt locuti, Qui Originale totum auferri somniant sicut et actuale, quasi sint quedam 
amouibilia in ictu oculi, sicut tenebrȩ per lucem. Cf. LW 25.260-1. 
 334 
fragmentary and residual form: the grace of baptism having broken, if not yet entirely 
obliterated, original sin’s dominion in the regenerate. For Luther, baptism wreaks 
havoc on original sin, but it does not sweep out its every affective remnant in the 
regenerate in the blink of an eye. The whole of it is not taken away, but neither is the 
whole of it left over. For concupiscentiae remain in the saints after baptism. And by 
1515/16, Luther—after the manner of the “420s Augustine”—has come to speak frankly 
about evil desires in the saints as the remnants (or relics) of original sin itself. The 
conclusion follows rapidly from the premises. If concupiscence remains in the saints, 
then original sin—however debilitated, crippled, and overruled by the invasion of 
grace—remains a reality after baptism. And if “sin” is thus present, it must be dealt 
with one way or another if the sin-bearing saint is to stand in reconciled fellowship 
with the Holy One. Enter nupt. conc. 1.25.28—well almost, at any rate: 
Blessed Augustine said most clearly: “sin concupiscence is forgiven in baptism, not 
so that it no longer is, but so that it is not imputed” (peccatum concupiscentiam in 
baptismate remitti, non vt non sit, sed vt non imputetur).860 
 
The superscript in the excerpt reflects the fact that in the handwritten notes, 
concupiscentiam is added above the word peccatum. Here is what Augustine wrote: 
Concupiscence of the flesh is forgiven in baptism, not so that it no longer is, 
but so that it is no longer imputed as sin (dimitti concupiscentiam carnis in 
baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut in peccatum non inputetur).861 
 
Plainly, Luther did not quote Augustine’s text with literal accuracy. Did Luther 
perhaps cite Augustine from his capacious memory, as he would with remarkable 
accuracy in the 1521 Antilatomus, holed up in the Wartburg without benefit of a 
                                                        
860 WA 56.273.10-274.1, cf. LW 25.261. 
861 BA 23.116-8, cf. WSA I/24.46. 
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library, and in the event do so imprecisely?862 I do not know for sure. The first positive 
reference to nupt. conc. 1.25.28 that I can locate in Luther’s works is found in the 1514 
sermon “On the Conception of Blessed Mary the Virgin, and about Congenital Sin” to 
which I referred in the introduction to Part II of this book. (Notably, Luther does not 
cite it in the 1513 Dictata on Ps. 32.)863 In this sermon, Luther’s text differs from both 
our modern critical edition and the excerpt in the Rom. 4:7 scholion:  
Cum dicitur in baptismo originale peccatum dimitti, quomodo ergo tu dicis, 
quod remaneat et cum eo pugnandum esse? Respondet Divus Augustinus: 
‘Dimittitur quidem peccatum gentilitium in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut 
non imputetur.’864 
 
There may be a hint toward a solution in this sermon. The way Luther posits a serious 
theological question and then answers it with an authoritative text reflects, I think, 
the dialogical form of scholastic theology. Now, it was almost certainly in Lombard 
that Luther first encountered nupt. conc. 1.25.28, and this by the winter semester of 
1509/10 at the latest, when he rejected it out of hand. Evidently by the time he 
preached this sermon in 1514, Luther had come to reverse his position. Does this mean 
he had already undertaken his intensive study of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings? 
As I noted above, Hamel, Grane, and Leppin date Luther’s reading of vol. 8 of the 
Amerbach edition to the vicinity of 1515, and speak of a kind of “breakthrough” to an 
Augustinian sola gratia in the same year. In terms of Luther’s full digestion of 
Augustine’s theology of grace, this judgment is basically sound: and indeed it is, as I 
acknowledged above, a major premise underlying my decision to skip to the Romans 
                                                        
862 Cf. Hamel, II/1, citing Melanchthon’s preface to the second edition of Luther’s works in 1546 (CR 
6.159): Omnia Augustini monumenta et saepe legerat et optime meminerat.  
863 WA 3.171-8 (gloss plus scholia), LW 10.145-51 (scholia). 
864 WA 4.691.30-33. 
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lectures as the main focus of this second part of my study. The 1514 sermon shows it is 
at least possible that Luther had begun his readings in Augustine’s anti-Pelagian works 
one year earlier than is often assumed. Possible, but not necessary: for nupt. conc. 
1.25.28 was a text already known to Luther from the Sententiae. And in addition to the 
dialogical form of the extract’s presentation in the sermon, there are strong enough 
verbal echoes to suggest that Luther drew his not-quite citation of Augustine from 
Sent. II d. 32.  
Unlike Luther, when Peter cites nupt. conc. 1.25.28 near the end of d. 32 cp. 1 he 
does so accurately, with only the slightest variations: Dimittitur concupiscentia carnis 
in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut non imputetur in peccatum.865 However, from the 
first line of d. 32 cp. 1.1 (and in accord with his teaching in d. 30 cp. 8), Peter identifies 
original sin with concupiscence and vice versa:  
1. Quomodo originale peccatum dimittatur in baptismo, cum et post sit illa 
concupiscentia quae dicitur originale peccatum. Quoniam supra dictum est 
originale peccatum esse vitium concupiscentiae, assignatumque quomodo a 
parentibus trahatur et originale dicatur, superest investigare quomodo 
baptismo dimittatur, cum etiam post baptismum remaneat concupiscentia 
quae ante fuerat: unde videtur vel peccatum originale non esse 
concupiscentiam, vel non remitti in baptismo.866 
 
Not only the dogmatic question, but Luther’s very wording in the 1514 sermon 
approximates what Peter writes here in d. 32 cp. 1.1. Peter asks: “How is original sin 
forgiven in baptism, when also afterward there is that concupiscence which is said to 
be original sin?” Luther asks: “If it is said that original sin is forgiven in baptism, how 
then do you say that it remains and that one has to fight with it?” Peter goes on, in cp. 
1.2-3, to explain that original sin is forgiven in two ways, viz., extenuatione sui et 
                                                        
865 Sent. II d. 32 cp. 1.6 (Grott. I/513). 
866 Sent. II d. 32 cp. 1.1 (Grott. I/511). 
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solutione reatus, “by its diminishment and by the releasing of its guilt.”867 “Neither 
does it”—i.e., concupiscence/original sin—“remain after baptism ad reatum, because it 
is not imputed in peccatum.”868 This marks the first (unnoted) reference to nupt. conc. 
1.25.28 in d. 32 cp. 1, and interestingly enough this allusion follows on the heels of an 
explicit citation of sentences from the same passage that come after Augustine’s 
decisive remark on baptism and non-imputation.869 In cp. 1.4-6, Peter then defends his 
solution with numerous proofs from authority, above all Augustine, culminating in a 
catena of three lines taken from continuous sections of nupt. conc. (1.24.27, our 1.25.28, 
and 1.26.29). Read in light of the whole of d. 32 cp. 1, it is an at least plausible 
conjecture that Luther’s variations on nupt. conc. 1.25.28 in 1514/15—and thenceforth 
right up to 1546—stem from the fact that he read into it both (a) the identification of 
concupiscentia and peccatum originale, and (b) the distinction between the 
diminution of original sin’s powers and the absolution of its guilt, which Peter’s 
Augustinianism had already achieved in this very chapter. On this supposition, by 
Advent 1514 Luther has tucked away his glossed version of nupt. conc. 1.25.28—as a 
kind of pithy summary Sent. II d. 32 cp. 1 taken as a whole—in his memory, and he 
runs with it for the rest of his life.  
 I grant that this is a speculative and thus tentative historical hypothesis. But it 
does fit with the impression given the reader at this specific juncture in the scholia 
                                                        
867 Sent. II d. 32 cp. 1.3 (Grott. I/511). 
868 Sent. II d. 32 cp. 1.2 (Grott. I/511). 
869 Sent. II d. 32 cp. 1.2 (Grott. I/511): Augustinus in libro De nuptiis et concupiscentia: ‘Manet quippe, 
ut ait Augustinus, in corpore mortis huius carnalis concupiscentia, cuius vitiosis desideriis non 
obedire praecipimur; quae tamen concupiscentia quotidie minuitur in proficientibus et continentibus.’ 
Sed licet remaneat concupiscentia post baptismum, non tamen dominatur et regnat sicut ante; immo 
per gratiam baptismi mitigatur et minuitur, ut post dominari non valeat nisi quis reddat vires hosti 
eundo post concupiscentias [Ecclus. 18:30]. Nec post baptismum remanet ad reatum, quia non 
imputatur in peccatum, sed tantum poena peccati est; ante baptismum vero poena est et culpa. 
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that Luther is writing furiously—i.e., both rapidly and angrily—and in process quoting 
authorities from memory. The reference to nupt. conc. 1.25.28 under consideration 
here is the first appeal to a non-scriptural authority in the Rom. 4:7 scholia. In the 
following pages, Luther refers once to “the books of blessed Augustine”870 in general 
and then—accurately enough with respect to its content, but nonetheless 
indefinitely—to “how beautifully and richly blessed Augustine has written in many 
books” about the velle/perficere distinction, “especially book 2 against Julian.”871 The 
next extensive excerpt, to ep. 167.5, turns up seven pages farther on in the WA.872 The 
slight changes in the excerpt itself (e.g., baptismo to baptismate, dimitti to remitti, and 
shifts in word order) also point in this direction. So does the very brevity of both the 
Augustine citation and the reference to Ambrose’s de sacramentis 4.6.28 which 
immediately follows it. Finally, there is the fact that ad litteram Luther misquotes 
Ambrose too, yet despite this successfully conveys the substance of Ambrose’s 
remarks.873 Here, it would seem, are two patristic texts that had deeply impressed 
Luther by 1515. He had digested their basic substance and committed them to 
memory. In this instance, he remembered them with an imprecision that falls short of 
the rigorous standards of modern scholarship.  
Thinking along these lines, I suggest we take the old Luther’s frequent advice 
and attend to his reference to nupt. conc. 1.25.28 in terms of its res rather than its 
                                                        
870 WA 56.276.5-6, LW 25.263. 
871 WA 56.281.1-4, cf. LW 25.268. 
872 WA 56.289.1-12, LW 25.276. 
873 Luther has (WA 56.274.2): Et. b. Amb. ait: ‘Semper pecco, ideo semper communico.’ Ambrose, 
discussing the Eucharist and referring to 1 Cor. 11:26, wrote (PL 16.446): Si mortem annuntiamus, 
annuntiamus remissionem peccatorum. Si quotiescumque effunditur sanguis, in remissionem 
peccatorum funditur; debeo illum semper accipere, ut semper mihi peccata dimittantur. Qui semper 
pecco, semper debeo habere medicinam. Luther quotes Ambrose’s last sentence in an obviously 
slightly divergent form, which just as obviously conveys the substance of what Ambrose wrote. 
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verba. The question must be asked, despite the obvious variations between his text 
and Augustine’s, and apart from my proposed theory as to the provenance of those 
variations, whether Luther did in fact render its theological substance faithfully (as he 
did Ambrose’s). There are, I think, two reasons to judge in Luther’s favor in this 
regard, one quite simple and the other a tad more subtle. 
First, when the two sentences are held alongside one another, a fairly impartial 
reader will find them to be virtually identical. It seems tedious to point this out. But 
since Denifle went to such great lengths to prove Luther’s divergence from Augustine, 
and since even more sympathetic readers of Luther have been influenced (or 
intimidated) by the dark shadow of Denifle’s non-Augustinian Lutherdeutung, I do 
think this simplest point of all needs to be urged in Luther’s defense. Luther has: 
peccatum/concupiscentiam in baptismate remitti, non vt non sit, sed vt non imputetur. 
Augustine has: dimitti concupiscentiam carnis in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut in 
peccatum non inputetur. Both hold that prior to baptism into Christ, concupiscence is 
the inherited original sin that naturally binds the vitiated filii Adae in chains of death 
and damnation. Both assert that this concupiscence/sin is forgiven in baptism. Both 
hold that this happens in such a way that “it”—whether concupiscence, “sin,” or 
both—though forgiven, nonetheless remains after baptism. Luther teaches that “sin” 
remains, but is not imputed: and by “sin,” he means concupiscentia rea. Augustine 
teaches that concupiscence remains, but is not imputed as (or for, or into) “sin”: and 
in his subsequent explanation of his meaning at c. Iul. 6.17.51 in 421, Augustine clarifies 
that the mala concupiscentia still present in the baptized is indeed intrinsically rea. I 
submit that this amounts to either a distinction without a real difference, or else a 
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simple identity of theological substance. In any case, just a few lines below his not-
quite citation of nupt. conc. 1.25.28, Luther writes that grace begins to take “sin” away, 
“in order that it not be imputed henceforth for sin”—vt non Imputetur ammodo pro 
peccato, which is just a hair’s breath away from Augustine’s ut in peccatum non 
inputetur.874 
Second, whereas Denifle read all of Augustine’s later writings contra Iulianum 
in light of the Tridentine orthodoxy of the “410s Augustine”—which, to be sure, is 
reflected in nupt. conc. 1.23.25—Luther did just the reverse, and read texts from even 
the 390s in light of the “420s Augustine” whom he regarded as the real and catholic b. 
Augustinus noster. This is clear, for example, in the scholion on Rom. 6:2, where 
Luther offers a long extract from the 394/5 ex. prop. Rm. and interprets its references 
to caro, lex peccati, desiderium peccati, concupiscentiae, desideria prava, and Rom. 
6:12’s “peccatum” in the stronger anti-Julian sense that Augustine will indeed find in 
these same terms in the 420s.875 At nupt. conc. 1.25.28, Augustine writes that the 
concupiscence of the flesh remains in the regenerate after baptism. As I have argued 
thus far, Luther well knows that Augustine sometimes identifies postbaptismal 
concupiscence as “sin,” and he prefers this “420s Augustine” because he finds him the 
more helpful interpreter of the literal meaning of St. Paul in Rom. 6—8 and Gal. 5, St. 
John in 1 John 1, St. David in the Psalter, etc. This Augustine, Luther has concluded by 
1515, is in fact the orthodox and catholic Augustine. And as catholic theologians 
know—Augustine’s relation to Cyprian on the rebaptism of traditores or Thomas 
                                                        
874 WA 56.274.9-11: remissio quidem vera sit, Sed tamen non sit ablatio peccati nisi in spe i. e. 
auferenda et data gratia, que auferre incipit, vt non Imputetur ammodo pro peccato. Cf. LW 25.261. 
875 WA 56.320.11-29, LW 25.308. 
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Aquinas’ relation to Augustine on illuminationism being two cases in point—it is best 
practice to cover the nakedness of our fathers, and in ambiguous cases to offer a 
generous construction of their meaning. 
This is the practice Augustine himself engaged in (whether wittingly or 
unwittingly is hard to say) in c. Iul. 1 and 2 vis-à-vis a Greek father like John 
Chrysostom, whose theology of sin and grace is, well, less “Augustinian” than 
Augustine’s. Nearer to Luther’s time, Heiko Oberman has shown that Biel’s successor 
at Tübingen, Wendelin Steinbach, did much the same thing in order to claim 
Augustine and St. Paul—despite the excesses of their modus loquendi—for his defense 
of human initiative in salvation over against the trenchant medieval Augustinianism of 
Thomas Bradwardine and Gregory of Rimini.876 “When disputing against the enemies 
of grace and infused charity, Augustine seems to have spoken excessively (excessive) a 
great number of times”—thus the Bielish Steinbach in 1513; but no matter, for the 
incautious Augustine and the judicious Biel are really at one. In the same manner, but 
in clear the other direction in terms of dogmatic substance, by 1515/16 Luther has 
already arrived at the conclusion (as he will put in the first thesis of the 4 Sept. 1517 
Disputation against Scholastic Theology) that 
                                                        
876 Heiko Augustinus Oberman, Masters of the Reformation, 91-110. Oberman (p. 98, notes 157 and 
158) supplies three fascinating excerpts to this effect from Steinbach’s 1513 lectures on Galatians: (1) 
Et sepe numero, cum sancti errorem aliquem funditus enervare volunt aut veritatem aliquam in luce 
ponere, cui plerique contradicunt aut contradicere presumunt, quasi excessivo videntur uti sermone 
aut nonnumquam subobscuro, ne qualemcumque errandi relinquant occasionem. Ita Paulus, cum de 
fide, que est inicium omnis boni et sperandarum rerum substancia, loquitur, quasi sola sufficiat loqui 
videtur indoctis (Opera Exegetica 1 p. 134 ll. 12-17); (2) Augustinus disputando contra inimicos graciae 
et caritatis infuse sepe numero excessive locutus esse videtur, salvo nostro loquendi modo nunc solito 
de merito congrui et condigni (ibid, p. 135 ll. 2-4); (3) Quod nisi attendatur in dictis Augustini et 
Apostoli, videntur totum dare Deo, semoto libero arbitrio. Cuius contrarium uterque tenet. Sumus 
enim adiutores Dei, et unusquisque propriam mercedem accipiet secundum suum laborem, 1 Cor 3 
(ibid, 206 ll. 6-9). 
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To say that Augustine speaks excessively (excessive) against heretics is to say 
that 
Augustine lied almost everywhere.877  
 
Or, as he declares at table in 1538, 
 
Augustine writes nothing penetrating about faith, except when he writes 
against the Pelagians: they woke Augustine up and made him into a man.878  
 
The old Augustine, der Mann awoken from his dogmatic slumbers and pushing the 
logic of the argument to its farthest point against the arch-Pelagian Julian—this, for 
Luther in 1515/16 right up to his death three decades later is the “catholic Augustine” 
par excellence: “the illustrious and distinguished Doctor ecclesiae,” as he stated with 
marked admiration in 1544, “who freed countless souls from multiple errors and (after 
the Apostles) conquered so many monstrosities of the heretics.”879 Or, as Risto 
Saarinen puts it with a touch greater reserve, for Luther “the aged Augustine who 
writes against Julian is the definitive doctrinal authority.”880 
This being the case, when Luther read a text like nupt. conc. 1.25.28 in 1515, he 
read it in light of what he regarded to be the orthodox, catholic, and scriptural “420s 
Augustine.”881 Concupiscence is sin; it is forgiven in baptism; it remains 
                                                        
877 WA 1.224.7-8: 1. Dicere, quod Augustinus contra haereticos excessive loquatur, Est dicere, 
Augustinum fere ubique mentitum esse. Contra dictum commune. Cf. LW 31.9. 
878 WA Tr 4.56.3-5, #3984 (1538): Augustinus nihil acriter de fide scribit, nisi cum contra Pelagionos 
scribit: sie haben Augustinum auffgeweckt und zum manne gemacht,” cited in Gerald Bonner, 
“Augustine and Pelagianism,” AugS 24 (1993), 27-47, endnote 1. Cf. WA Tr 1.18.11-16, #51 (1531): 
Augustinus ex contentione cum Pelagianis magnus est factus et fidelis gratiae assertor. Gregorius est 
leprosus ceremoniis; statuit peccatum mortale esse, si quis emittat crepitum. Ambrosius simplex fidei 
est assertor contra fiduciam operum; si contradictores passus fuisset, forte omnes antecelleret. 
879 From the 1544 lecture on Gen. 41:1-7, WA 44.399.11-13, cf. LW 7.135. 
880 Risto Saarinen, “Desire, Consent, and Sin,” 474. Cf. Hamel, II/2; Markus Wriedt, “Via Augustini,” 
14; idem, “Produktives Mißverständnis?” 216. 
881 Later in life, Luther uses the same tactic in the reverse direction to excuse what he came to 
regard as Augustine’s weak points (e.g., on imputation), and thus ensure both his own and 
Augustine’s catholicity in one fell swoop. See, e.g., WA Tr 1.130.1-6 (#316, Summer/Fall 1532): De 
commentario Philippi in Rom. edito anno 32. dicebat: Augustinus si iam viveret, gauderet hunc librum 
legere, quanquam saepe eum perstrinxerit, sed S. Hieronymus, wenn der lebt, solt er wol dawider 
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fragmentarisch in the regenerate: but it is not imputed to their account—provided, 
that is, that the baptized do not consent to its vicious impulses. For Roman Catholics 
after Trent to cry foul at this point is anachronistic: Girolamo Seripando’s grief in 
December 1546 speaks well to this point,882 as does the tragic witness of the 
theologians of l’abbaye de Port-Royal.883 But for modern Lutherans to celebrate 
novelty instead is a failure to appreciate the formal and—by the standard of the late 
Augustine, at any rate—material catholicity of Luther’s theology of original sin, 
baptism, and grace. It is, I think, only a failure of historical imagination (or perhaps 
catholic generosity) that would preclude one from seeing—mutatis mutandis, to be 
sure—that the superior general at Trent, the district vicar in Wittenberg, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
schreyben wie ein ander parfusser munch. Ergo nisi sit singularis quaedam remissio peccatorum 
praeter illam communem, qua omnes indigemus, so ist er verlorn. (cf. LW 54.44). If only Augustine 
could have read Melanchthon on Paul, he would have rejoiced to admit his error and embraced the 
Reformation theology of justification. Not so Jerome! 
882 On Seripando, see Peter Walter, “Die bleibende Sündigkeit der Getauften in den Debatten und 
Beschlüssen des Trienter Konzils,” and Anthony N. S. Lane, Justification by Faith, 60-5. 
883 Anthony Lane (Justification by Faith, 5 n. 4) relates that Otto Herman Pesch has suggested that 
Rome rehabilitate the “radical Augustinianism (of those like Jansen and Pascal) which was 
condemned after Trent,” referring to Pesch’s essay “The Canons of the Tridentine Decree on 
Justification. To Whom Did they Apply?” in K. Lehmann, ed., Justification by Faith: Do the 
Sixteenth-Century Condemnations Still Apply? (New York: Continuum, 1997), 214 n. 76. On 
Jansenism, see Leszek Kolakowski, God owes us nothing: a brief remark on Pascal’s religion and on 
the spirit of Jansenism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). If Jean Daniélou and Henri de 
Lubac could successfully rehabilitate Gregory of Nyssa and Origen as Catholic theologians, why in 
principle could not the same be done for Jansen and Arnauld—or Luther? This seemingly simple 
question raises historical, dogmatic, and ecumenical issues of immense complexity that cannot be 
dealt with here. For a start, in addition to Lehmann’s (ed.) op. cit., see Eero Huovinen, “Doctor 
Communis? The ecumenical significance of Martin Luther’s theology,” Lutherjahrbuch 80 (2013), 13-
30; Theo M. M. A. C. Bell, “Roman Catholic Luther Research in the Twentieth Century: From 
Rejection to Rehabilitation,” OHMLT, 584-97; and Peter Manns, Vater im Glauben: Studien zur 
Theologie Martin Luthers, ed. Rolf Decot (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1988), esp. chapters 6, 7, 
9, 10, and 11. Though it must be admitted that reading Manns’ essays in 2015 at times feels like an 
exercise in nostalgia. In the ecumenical chill that has set in since the 1999 JDDJ, the mere 45 years 
since Jan Cardinal Willebrands, in his official statement to the Fifth Assembly of the Lutheran 
World Federation at Evian in 1970, acclaimed Luther “notre maître commun”—i.e., doctor 
communis, and precisely in articulo iustificationis—seem to have grown longer.  
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bishop in Hippo might all have made for rather stout Jansenists had they lived in 
seventeenth-century Paris. 
 But let us press on farther in the scholion on Rom. 4:7 to see where Luther 
takes his variant text of nupt. conc. 1.25.28. He had appealed to Augustine, Ambrose, 
and the Bible against the “Aristotelian” theology of the scholastics, who made actual 
evil or good works the locus for evaluating one’s sinfulness or righteousness, and who 
did so because of (a) their theological commitment to the complete eradication of 
original sin in baptism (or sacramental penance)884 and (b) their positive assessment 
of the integrity of human nature and its faculties after the fall.885 For reasons rather 
elementary to a spiritually-minded and theologically informed late medieval ascetic in 
hard pursuit of true humility, this deeply puzzled Friar Martin: 
On this account, foolish me could not understand how I ought to repute myself 
a sinner like others and thus prefer myself to no one, since I was contrite and 
had confessed. For then, I was thinking that all sins had been taken away and 
evacuated, even intrinsically. For if it was because of past sins, which they say 
must always be remembered (and they speak the truth, just not enough), then I 
would think that they had not been forgiven: which, nonetheless, God has 
promised have been forgiven to those who confess. Thus I battled with 
myself…886 
 
Luther’s formation in late medieval “piety-theology” as an Augustinian friar had taught 
him to strive for humility. But his Erfurt training in late medieval Scholastik had 
                                                        
884 WA 56.273.3-9: Aut ego nunquam intellexi, aut non bene satis de peccato et gratia theologi 
scolastici sunt locuti, Qui Originale totum auferri somniant sicut et actuale, quasi sint quedam 
amouibilia in ictu oculi, sicut tenebrȩ per lucem, Cum Antiqui sancti patres Aug., Ambro. multum 
aliter sint locuti ad modum Scrip., illi autem ad modum Aristot. in ȩthicorum, Qui peccata et 
Iustitiam collocauit in opera et eorum positionem et priuationem similiter. Cf. LW 25.260-1. 
885 WA 56.274.11-18, LW 25.261-2; WA 56.275.17-22, LW 25.262. 
886 WA 56.274.2-8: Et ex hoc ego stultus non potui intelligere, quomodo me peccatorem similem 
cȩteris deberem reputare et ita nemini me preferre, cum essem contritus et confessus; tunc enim 
omnia ablata putabam et euacuata, etiam intrinsece. Si enim propter preterita, que dicunt semper 
oportere recordari (et verum dicunt, Sed non satis), tunc non remissa esse cogitabam, que tamen 
Deus promisit remissa esse confitentibus. Ita mecum pugnaui… Cf. LW 25.261. 
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eliminated in principle the most powerful rationale for refusing to prefer himself to 
others. After passing through the penitential stages of contrition and confession, the 
guilt of all postbaptismal sin was forgiven afresh in priestly absolution, its eternal 
poena being commuted to the temporal pains for which satisfaction must be rendered 
either in this life or in purgatory (unless, of course, mitigated or removed through 
indulgences). As for the concupiscentia which had been kindled into the fire of mortal 
sin through consent: it went back to being the sinless “tinder” which the grace of 
baptism had rendered it prior to one’s lapse into actual sin. Luther had taught this 
doctrine himself as sententiarius at Wittenberg in 1509/10.887 Because of it, he knew 
that when he left the confessional, he left it as one who was no longer a sinner.  
At some point between 1510 and 1514/15, Luther realized he could no longer 
square this scholastic theology of sin and penance with either (a) the affective facts of 
his own monastic experience or (b) the spiritual wisdom embodied in at least some of 
the monastic theology he had been taught since his admission to the novitiate in the 
Erfurt Augustinian cloister in 1505. He needed to be humble, and to consider others 
better than himself. But after confession—a sometimes daily practice for Friar 
Martin—he knew, at the theological level, that he was no longer a sinner and 
therefore was in fact better than others who were. The suggested remedy was 
counterproductive: calling past sins to mind in order to engender humility only sent 
scrupulous young Luther into the self-obsessed spiral of despair that Staupitz was 
                                                        
887 WA 9.75-6, on Sent. II d. 32. So, e.g., 9.75.16-19: illa concupiscentia in carne est nihil aliud nisi 
inoboedientia carnis ad spiritum quae de se non est culpa, sed poena, quia si esset aliquo modo culpa 
et non dimitti in baptismo diceretur, injuria fierit baptismo et gratiae dei. Indeed, ll. 21-23, after 
baptism concupiscence non est mala nisi occasionaliter inquantum ratio contra eam sibi in pugnam 
pro poena inoboedientiae primae relictam debet certare. Thus 76.1-4: Unde dicit Apostolus, quod 
concupiscentia non nocet his qui secundum Christum vivunt, quia non est malum deleta culpa, sed 
tantum pondus et inclinatio ad malum quam sic deus esse voluit in poenam Adae. 
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laboring to pull him out of. Thus specific aspects of scholastic theology pushed Luther 
to presumption, while specific strains within monastic piety led him to despair. As I 
argued above, Staupitz’s pastoral counsel to “look to Christ” proved indisputably vital 
both for helping the afflicted Luther find spiritual consolatio and for midwifing the 
birth of Luther’s relentlessly (and joyfully) christocentric evangelical theology.888 But 
in this autobiographical confession from 1515, Luther acknowledges the Augustinian 
wisdom summed up in nupt. conc. 1.25.28 as the source of the simultaneously 
dogmatic and spiritual solution to his prior perplexity and folly: 
                                                        
888 In addition to a handful of bright flashes of Christ-centered joy in the Romans lectures (cited in 
an earlier footnote), Luther’s justly famous letter to his Augustinian confrère Georg Spenlein shows 
how deeply he had imbibed Staupitz’s theology of soteriological exchange through union with 
Christ by 8 April 1516. Note the spiritual dialectic of presumption and despair, and how Luther 
urges that the freedom and peace won through union with Christ ought to issue in Spenlein’s 
humble service of the brothers—for as a sinner, he is not better than them. This is the same 
complex of problems Luther discusses in the Rom. 4:7 scholion. WA Br 1.35.15-36.52, #11: Caeterum 
quid agat anima tua, scire cupio, utrumne tandem suam pertaesa propriam iustitiam discat in iustitia 
Christi respirare atque confidere. Fervet enim nostra aetate tentatio praesumptionis in multis, et iis 
praecipue, qui iusti et boni esse omnibus viribus student; ignorantes iustitiam Dei, quae in Christo est 
nobis effusissime et gratis donata, quaerunt in se ipsis tam diu operari bene, donec habeant fiduciam 
standi coram Deo, veluti virtutibus et meritis ornati, quod est impossibile fieri. Fuisti tu apud nos in 
hac opinione, imo errore; fui et ego, sed et nunc quoque pugno contra istum errorem, sed nondum 
expugnavi. Igitur, mi dulcis Frater, disce Christum et hunc crucifixum, disce ei cantare et de te ipso 
desperans dicere ei: tu, Domine Ihesu, es iustitia mea, ego autem sum peccatum tuum; tu assumpsisti 
meum, et dedisti mihi tuum; assumpsisti, quod non eras, et dedisti mihi, quod non eram. Cave, ne 
aliquando ad tantam puritatem aspires, ut peccator tibi videri nolis, imo esse. Christus enim non nisi 
in peccatoribus habitat. Ideo enim descendit de coelo, ubi habitabat in iustis, ut etiam habitaret in 
peccatoribus. Istam charitatem eius rumina, et videbis dulcissimam consolationem eius. Si enim 
nostris laboribus et afflictionibus ad conscientiae quietem pervenire oportet, ut quid ille mortuus est? 
Igitur non nisi in illo, per fiducialem desperationem tui et operum tuorum, pacem invenies; disces 
insuper ex ipso, ut, sicut ipse suscepit te et peccata tua fecit sua, et suam iustitiam fecit tuam. Si 
firmiter hoc credas, sicut debes (maledictus enim, qui hoc non credit), ita et tu fratres indisciplinatos 
et adhuc errantes suscipe, et patienter sustineas, atque ex eorum peccatis facias tua, et si quid boni 
habes, illorum esse sinas. Sicut docet Apostolus: suscipite invicem, sicut et Christus suscepit vos in 
honorem Dei; et iterum: hoc sentite in vobis, quod et in Christo Ihesu, qui, cum in forma Dei esset, 
exinanivit semetipsum etc. Ita et tu, si tibi melior videris, non rapinam arbitreris, ac quasi tuum solius 
sit, sed exinanias te ipsum, et obliviscere, qualis es, et esto quasi unus illorum, ut portes eos. Infelix 
enim istius iustitia, quae alios sibi comparatos veluti peiores sustinere non vult, et fugam et desertum 
meditatur, qui patientia et oratione et exemplo praesenter eis prodesse debuit; hoc est talentum 
Domini abscondere, et conservis non tradere, quod debatur. Igitur si es lilium et rosa Christi, scito, 
quoniam inter spinas conversatio tua erit; tantum vide, ne per impatientiam et temerarium iudicium 
vel occultam superbiam tu spina fias.  
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… Thus I battled with myself, not knowing that forgiveness (remissio) is true 
indeed, but that there is nevertheless no removal of sin (ablatio peccati) except 
in hope, i.e., that it is to be taken away and that grace has been given (data 
gratia), which begins to take it away so that (vt) it is not imputed henceforth 
for sin.889 
 
This is a paraphrase of the excerpt from nupt. conc. 1.25.28 cited just a few lines earlier, 
in substance adding only (a) the notion that “grace” does indeed begin to take away 
the “sin” that remains after baptism/penance, and (b) the linkage (vt!) between this 
inchoate renewal by grace on the one hand, and the non-imputation of the remaining 
“sin” pro peccato on the other. Both additions are themselves eminently Augustinian, 
and together function to explain how the Ps. 32:2/Rom. 4:8 non imputare coheres with 
the robust theology of sanative renewal which Luther has been developing thus far in 
the scholion. “Grace”—in this context, gratia sanans/iustificans—is really given, and it 
is given to the end that the “sin” that remains after baptism (or penance) really begins 
to be taken away. So long as this process is underway, the “sin” that remains is not 
imputed to the penitent’s account: with Luther’s vt implying strongly that one’s 
inchoate renewal relates to the forgiveness or non-imputation of the “sin” that 
remains as the cause to its effect. But it is, I think, better to read this as another 
instance of Luther’s consistent conviction that the penitent’s abiding in statu gratiae 
through the actual exercise of the non consentire desideriis, concupiscentiis, etc. 
constitutes the conditio sine qua non for the non-imputation of the affective sin that 
remains for the fight.  
                                                        
889 WA 56.274.8-11: Ita mecum pugnaui, Nesciens, Quod remissio quidem vera sit, Sed tamen non sit 
ablatio peccati nisi in spe i. e. auferenda et data gratia, que auferre incipit, vt non Imputetur ammodo 
pro peccato. Cf. LW 25.261. 
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Regardless, here we have Luther presenting an accurate summary of 
Augustine’s mature theology of sin, grace, renewal, forgiveness, and (implicitly) non-
consent as the solution to his dogmatic and spiritual conundrum. Against the 
temptation to despondency, he did not need to doubt the reality of the forgiveness 
bestowed upon him in the sacrament of penance: remissio quidem vera—non 
imputetur. But neither did Friar Martin have reason to boast of sinless perfection, 
finding a deep spiritual anchor for the monastic virtue of humility in the dogmatic 
redefinition of the penitent as peccator re vera on account of his residual sinful desires: 
non vt non sit. Reading the “420s Augustine” in 1515 thus gave Luther the dogmatic 
(and exegetical) equipment he needed as a monastic to continue in the path of 
deepening humility he had chosen in 1505, and to do so without losing the hope of 
true forgiveness in Christ that Staupitz was urging upon him with increasingly salutary 
effect at just about this time.  
 The following pages in the WA orbit around the explosive interaction of these 
same scholastic, monastic, and Augustinian themes. Luther had once been a Bielish 
“fool” himself (ego stultus). Now, in the first-person grammar of confession and the 
second-person grammar of mind-to-mind dogmatic combat, he attacks his erstwhile 
scholastic teachers with the zeal of a convert and the incisive substance of the contra 
Iulianum Augustine. O stulti, O Sawtheologen! Luther begins by summarizing a 
doctrine of merited justification common in its basic outline to Scotus, Ockham, and 
Biel.890 Each had taught that a sinner could merit the first grace of justification de 
congruo by doing what was within his power to do, to wit: keep the law by loving God 
                                                        
890 WA 56.274.11-14, LW 25.261. 
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above all things. In his Collectorium II d. 28, e.g., Biel paired his version of the 
distinction between “half” and “full” merit together with a second, viz., that of (a) 
keeping God’s commandments “insofar as the substance of the act is concerned” 
(quoad actus substantiam), on the one hand, and (b) keeping them “according to the 
intention of the law-giver” (ad intentionem precipientis) on the other.891 Through his 
free decision, a sinner could keep the law in the first, weaker sense by virtue of his 
own natural powers, and thus earn the half-merit which—by the generous terms of 
God’s ordered pactum—deserved de congruo the infusion of justifying grace. This 
grace, in turn, would empower the justified person to act supernaturally, keep the law 
in its deeper sense, and thus merit eternal life de condigno.892  
 Luther’s response is twofold. Its first part is rooted in the Pauline theology of 
law and grace explored by Augustine in sp. litt. (and for this reason, I think, more 
attended to in the scholarship). Luther observes that for Biel et al., grace is not 
necessary for keeping the law—quoad actus substantiam, this can be done ex 
naturalibus—but “only for the fulfillment of a new exaction imposed by God above the 
law.”893 This turns grace into a new law, nova lex, a fatal move which a theologian can 
only make if he fails to grasp the law’s true purpose in the economy of grace. To 
explain what the law can and cannot do, Luther cites Rom. 4:15 and 8:3: in the first 
place, “the law works wrath”—not grace—and in the second, “weakened through 
                                                        
891 Biel, Collectorium II d. 28 q. 1 a. 2 conc. 3 (W & H, II/539): Homo per liberum arbitrium ex suis 
naturalibus potest divina praecepta quoad actus substantiam implere, sed non ad intentionem 
praecipientis, quae est consecutio salutis nostrae. 
892 Biel, Collectorium II d. 28 q. 1 a. 2 conc. 3 and a. 3 dub. 1 (W & H, II/539-40). 
893 WA 56.274.14-18, cf. LW 25.261-2. 
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flesh” as St. Paul says it is, the law cannot be fulfilled sine gratia.894 This theology of 
law (which exacts impossibilia from vitiated human beings) and grace (which heals 
such humans and thus empowers law-keeping) is in essence the familiar 
Augustinianism of sp. litt. and other anti-Pelagian writings from the 410s. 
 In the second part of his reply, Luther advances his argument with tools 
supplied by the “420s Augustine,” intensifying the theology of sinful concupiscence 
already germinally present in sp. litt. but brought to full flower in the works against 
Julian. In general, but also specifically for Augustine and Luther, the role played in 
one’s theology by both (a) the non-imputation of “sin”/concupiscence and (b) the 
necessity of inner grace to renovate human nature vitiated by this concupiscence 
expands in proportion to the extent that concupiscence itself is regarded as sinful. 
And vice versa: for a Pelagius, a Julian, or a Biel, the relative moral neutrality of 
concupiscence in the regenerate diminishes (or eliminates) the need for either kind of 
“grace,” broadly construed. Taking up late Augustinian cudgels against die 
Sawtheologen along just these lines, Luther’s first thrust consists in a forthright appeal 
to honest experience; but this becomes the point of departure for a concise 
elaboration of his maturing monastic/experiential and Augustinian/dogmatic theology 
of residual sin, healing grace, and merciful non-imputation: 
… “the law works wrath” and “is weakened through flesh,” and it certainly 
cannot be fulfilled without grace. And they could have been admonished about 
their own most foolish sententia to be ashamed and to repent at least by their 
very own experience. Because, willy-nilly, they feel (sentiunt) base 
concupiscences in themselves. Therefore I say: Hey! Now, I beg you, get to 
work! Be men! Work, with your whole powers (Ex totis viribus vestris), so that 
these concupiscences will not be in you. Prove what you say, that it is possible 
to love God “ex totis viribus” by nature (naturaliter), without any grace. If you 
                                                        
894 WA 56.274.18-275.2, cf. LW 25.262. 
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are without concupiscences, we will believe you. But if you dwell with and in 
these concupiscences, then neither do you fulfill the law. For the Law says: “Do 
not desire evilly” (non concupisces, Exod. 20:17), but “love God” (Deum diliges, 
Deut. 6:5). But he who desires and loves (concupiscit et diligit) something else, 
is he able to love God (Deum diligere)? And this concupiscence is always in us; 
therefore, the love of God (dilectio Dei) is never in us, unless it has begun 
through grace (nisi per gratiam incepta); and the relic of concupiscence that 
still needs to be healed—because of which we do not yet “love God with a 
whole heart” [Luke 10:27]—through mercy is not imputed as sin, until the 
whole thing (totum) is taken away and until the love of God has been perfected 
(perfecta Dei dilectio) in those who believe and perseveringly knock right up to 
the end [cf. Luke 11:9-13].895 
 
Here, in polemical and dialogical form, is a compressed statement of Augustine’s 
mature theology of sin and grace. At its hearts stands both the lived experience and 
the dogmatic evaluation of concupiscentia. As we saw in the Rom. 7 scholia, Luther 
sometimes follows Augustine’s typical coupling together of Exod. 20:17 and Ecclus. 
18:30 to explain the moral-psychological logic of their theory of refusing consent to the 
evil desires that remain in the regenerate. Setting this late ancient anthropology 
against his “modern” opponents, Luther now places the 10th Commandment’s 
universal prohibition of evil desire—which, Augustine had argued in sp. litt. 4.6, St. 
Paul cites with profound intention and care at Rom. 7:7896—in sharp contrast with the 
                                                        
895 WA 56.275.1-16: ‘lex iram operatur’ Et ‘infirmatur per carnem’ et prorsus sine gratia non impleri 
potest. Et poterant stultissime suȩ huius sententiȩ moneri, pudere et penitere Vel ipsa saltem propria 
experientia. Quia, Velint nolint, sentiunt prauas in seipsis concupiscentias. Hic ergo dico: Hui! Nunc, 
queso, satagite! Estote viri! Ex totis viribus vestris facite, Vt non sint istȩ concupiscentie in vobis. 
Probate, quod dicitis, ‘ex totis viribus’ Deum diligi posse naturaliter, sine denique gratia. Si sine 
concupiscentiis estis, credimus vobis. Si autem cum et in ipsis habitatis, iam nec legem impletis. 
Quippe Lex dicit: ‘non concupisces,’ Sed ‘Deum diliges’. Sed qui aliud concupiscit et diligit, Nunquid 
Deum diligere potest? At hec concupiscentia semper in nobis est; ergo nunquam dilectio Dei in nobis 
est, Nisi per gratiam incepta, et reliquo concupiscentie adhuc sanando, quo nondum ‘diligimus Deum 
ex toto corde’, per misericordiam non imputato ad peccatum, donec totum auferatur et perfecta Dei 
dilectio donetur credentibus et perseueranter vsque in finem pulsantibus. Cf. LW 25.262. 
896 Contra Origen et al., Augustine argues that “the letter that kills” (2 Cor. 3:6) refers to Exod. 
20:17’s universal prohibition of evil desire: quod, si quis inpleuerit nullum habebit omnino peccatum. 
nam hoc ideo elegit apostolus generale quiddam, quo cuncta complexus est, tamquam haec esset uox 
legis ab omni peccato prohibentis, quod ait: non concupisces; neque enim ullum peccatum nisi 
concupiscendo comittitur. CSEL 60.158, cf. WSA I/23.146. 
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Great Commandment’s summons to wholehearted love for God (Deut. 6:5, Matt. 
22:37-8, Luke 10:27, etc.; cf. section 6 below, on Augustine’s ep. 167). Scotus and Biel 
taught that fallen humans could love God super omnia if they did what laid within 
their natural powers to do: even if they did so “with clenched teeth,” as Dieter has it.897 
But Luther insists that the very slightest holding-back of unadulterated, unrestricted, 
pure, and total love for God amounts to simply breaking the Great Commandment: 
and this, on the part of the regenerate heart. To quote Dieter once more, it is the 
“refused totality” of one’s love for God that makes a person a sinner.898 And the reason 
the regenerate fall short of this total love, is that they still—however slightly—infringe 
upon the 10th Commandment. For even if they do not “go after” their evil desires 
(Ecclus. 18:30, Gal. 5:16, 1 John 3:9), the regenerate still suffer their unwanted presence 
in their renewed but affectively divided hearts. And the infinitesimally smallest 
deflection of the regenerate person’s affective life from wholehearted love for God 
amounts per definitionem magni mandati to a total failure to keep the Great 
Commandment. Nothing less than complete and undivided love for God ex toto corde 
will do. If a person suffers (and at the same, perplexingly, possesses as his own) malae 
concupiscentiae in his heart, he breaks the command non concupisces, fails to exercise 
perfecta Dei dilectio, and therefore fails to fulfill the law.899  
Thus Luther, a little like Elijah on Mount Carmel (1 Kgs. 18), dares his 
imaginary Scotist or Bielish interlocutor to make good on his theological claim 
regarding the natural ability to love God super omnia. Prove that you have no evil 
                                                        
897 Dieter, 96. 
898 Dieter, 97. 
899 For further on both Biel and Luther on this point, see Dieter, 94-107. 
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desire at all, and I’ll believe your theology! Do what lies within your power to do, “so 
that these evil desires will not be in you”—Luther’s vt non sint istȩ concupiscentie in 
vobis mirroring in the plural Augustine’s non ut non sit at nupt. conc. 1.25.28. Once one 
accepts (on the basis of Augustine’s and Luther’s shared scriptural reasoning) the 
major premise that the slightest concupiscence in the regenerate person is law-
breaking “sin,” and then admits (on the basis of his own experience) the minor 
premise that evil desires still exist within his heart, the conclusion follows that Scotus’ 
and Biel’s theorem regarding self-elicited love for God in the unregenerate person is 
groundless, indeed, foolish and blasphemous (Rom. 9:30-10:4, Gal. 2:21, 3:1, 3:10, 5:1-6, 
Phil. 3:2-14). Together with their theorem, the superstructure of the half-merited first 
grace of justification which they built upon it tumbles to the ground. Some other 
solution is therefore needed. Rather than calling down fire from heaven, Luther 
invokes the mature theology of Augustine. Because concupiscence is always with the 
saints in this life, perfect love for God never is. But an imperfect love for God has 
begun to take root in their hearts, through the inner operations of healing grace. 
Meanwhile, through the mercy of God, the reliquus concupiscentiae is not imputed as 
sin; and this merciful non-imputation holds fast till the day when evil desire as a 
whole will be perfectly taken away, and perfect love for God will be given in its place. 
But this mercy holds fast only for those “who believe and perseveringly knock right up 
till the end”: a clear allusion to Luke 11:9-13 and with it, an entire monastic spirituality 
of yearning and begging for ever increasing supplies of grace.  
 Two final observations on this portion of the Rom. 4:7 scholion are in order 
before pressing on further. 
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(1) First, as Luther renews his attack on the “Aristotelian” theologians’ 
understanding of sin, he does so in a potentially confusing way. With nupt. conc. 
1.25.28 still setting the tone, Luther writes that all the scholastics’ monstrous errors 
resulted from the fact that they failed to grasp the quid sit of either sin or forgiveness. 
They thus limited their definition of sin to “a certain minutest motus animi, just like 
righteousness.”900 Luther promptly leaves sin aside to discuss righteousness, and in 
this context treats the scholastic—and in some cases also mystical—doctrine of the 
soul’s “synteresis,” viz., its ineradicable baseline orientation to the good, however weak 
and faint this scintilla conscientiae may prove to be in a given soul.901 This, Luther tells 
us, the scholastics also defined as a “small motion” (paruulum motum), though in this 
case toward God.902 In addition to the fact that Biel does not define synteresis as a 
motus animi,903 what is potentially confusing about this use of “motus”-language is the 
fact (as we have seen at some length) that Luther elsewhere adopts this very same 
                                                        
900 WA 56.275.17-19: Hȩc portenta omnia ex eo Venerunt, Quod peccatum, quid esset, ignorauerunt, 
nec quid remissio. Quia peccatum artauerunt vsque ad minutissimum quendam motum animi sicut et 
Iustitiam. 
901 On synderesis in scholastic theology, cf. Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 39 a. 2 q. 1; Thomas Aquinas, ST 
I q. 79 a. 12; Biel, Coll. II d. 39 (W & H, II/655-66). For the concept in Tauler and Gerson, see Steven 
E. Ozment, Homo Spiritualis: A Comparative Study of the Anthropology of Johannes Tauler, Jean 
Gerson, and Martin Luther (1509-16) in the Context of their Theological Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1969), 
15-26 and 62-3, 71. 
902 WA 56.275.19-22: Ita enim, quia Voluntas habens istam syntheresim, qua, licet infirmiter, 
‘inclinatur ad bonum’. Et huius paruulum motum in Deum (quem naturaliter potest) illi somniant 
esse actum diligendi Deum super omnia!  Cf. LW 25.262. 
903 For Biel, synteresis is an inextinguishable spark of reason and/or conscience, seated in the 
intellect. See, e.g., Collectorium II d. 39 q. 1 (W & H, II/655): Utrum synderesis, quae rationis scintilla 
dicitur, et conscientia sint in intellectu aut affectiva potentia. Ibid., a. 2 conc. 1 (W & H, II/660): 
Synderesis, quae est scintilla conscientiae, non est actus vel habitus in voluntate. Ibid., conc. 3 (W & 
H, II/661): Tertio conclusio: Synderesis, quae est aliquid intellectus, non est actus neque habitus. 
However, as a nominalistic Aristotelian Biel rejects a real division of the soul into constituent 
faculties; thus he explains (a. 1, not. 1; W & H, II/656) that, cum quaeritur, utrum synderesis et 
conscientia sint in intellectu aut voluntate, nihil aliud est quaerere quam: utrum sint actus, habitus 
vel passiones intellectivi vel affectivi. This would seem to justify, to some extent, the imprecisions in 
Luther’s account of his opponents’ doctrine of synteresis. 
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language in its technical Augustinian and “Stoic” moral-psychological sense and 
identifies sinful concupiscence as that bundle of evil motus animi, i.e., psychologically 
experienced emotions, impulses, desires, affections, etc., against which the regenerate 
person must struggle to refuse the consent of his will. This being the case, if Luther 
thinks the scholastics define “sin” as motus animi, what’s the problem?  
In this instance, it appears that the very same phrase means nearly the opposite 
of what Luther usually takes it to mean in positive presentations of his own position. 
For here, “motus” is not an essentially passive experience, but the (I think to our 
modern ears) more normal sense of motion as an active movement. More importantly, 
this is also the primary meaning of “motus” in high and late medieval interpretations 
of Aristotle: rich and intricate traditions which Dieter has superbly exposited and set 
in relation to Luther’s early thought.904 For in this passage, Luther takes the 
“scholastic” motus animi to mean an inner consensual or volitional movement or act of 
the soul, which Jacob Preus conveys well with his rather free English translation of 
Luther’s Latin text as “some very minute activity of the soul.”905 Biel, citing Thomas’ 
Summa Theologiae I/II q. 109 a. 1 in the Collectorium, can in fact speak in the same 
breath of an inner psychological act as a motus spirituale, an actus, and an actio 
intellectus et voluntatis.906 This seems to be what Luther has in mind. 
Two factors within the scholion itself argue for this interpretation. The first 
emerges from what Luther says about synteresis. The will (voluntas) has this basic 
                                                        
904 Dieter, 276-346. 
905 LW 25.262. 
906 Biel, Collectorium II d. 28 q. 1 (W & H, II/529): … ‘omnes motus corporales et spirituales 
reducuntur in primum movens simpliciter, quod est Deus, ideo natura, sive corporalis sive spiritualis, 
quantumcumque perfecta, non potest in suum actum procedere, nisi moveatur a Deo.’ Ac per hoc 
omnis actio intellectus et voluntatis ‘et cuiuscumque entis creati dependet a Deo,’ inquantum ab ipso 
habet perfectionem, per quam agit, et ‘inquantum ab ipso movetur ad agendum.’ 
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orientation to the good: weak as it may be, inclinatur ad bonum. This faint but 
inexorable inclination to the good—Tauler would call it the soul’s grunt—is the “small 
motion toward God” that Scotus and Biel “dream is the actum diligendi Deum super 
omnia.” Now, if Luther’s analysis here leaves something to be desired—just to begin, 
Biel e.g. locates synteresis in the intellect, not the will; and for Thomas, Tauler, Biel et 
al., synteresis is not an act, but the orientation that guides the soul to act rightly if the 
soul so chooses—what matters for our purposes is that he ascribes two things to his 
opponents vis-à-vis righteousness that together help to explain his puzzling remark 
about their definition of sin as an evil motus animi. First, Luther asserts that for die 
Sawtheologen the soul’s orientation to the good is anthropologically basic. Therefore, a 
contrary bent or inclination to evil, such as is set forth in an Augustinian theology of 
original sin and natura vitiata, is logically excluded from the start. This is indeed the 
stuff of Biel’s doctrine of postlapsarian natura integra. For Biel, as for Luther the 
fledgling sententiarius in 1509/10, there is no room in the system for a definition of 
“sin” as an enslaving and pathological affective motus animi luring the unregenerate 
soul irreversibly toward evil, death, and damnation: apart, that is, from the 
intervention of radical Augustinian grace, for which the only praeparatio is 
praedestinatio.907 But in the second place, Luther asserts that the good inclination 
afforded homo naturalis by virtue of his synteresis is identical to the act of loving God 
                                                        
907 praed. sanct. 10.19, BA 24.522: Inter gratiam porro et praedestinationem hoc tantum interest, quod 
praedestinatio est gratiae praeparatio, gratia vero iam ipsa donatio. Cf. WSA I/26.165. See too civ. dei 
13.14 (Bett. 532): “From [Adam’s] misuse of free will there started a chain of disasters: mankind is led 
from that original perversion, a kind of corruption at the root, right up to the disaster of the second 
death, which has no end. Only those who are set free through God’s grace escape that calamitous 
sequence.” Pereira (p. 157) speaks eloquently of the “pathology” of post-baptismal 
concupiscence/sin in Augustine’s theology: every child of Adam is “born addicted” to evil desire, 
and “one needs grace to overcome one’s self-destructive tendencies.” 
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above all things, which Scotus and Biel posit as within one’s power to achieve and 
therefore postulate as the “half-merit” requisite for earning the first grace of 
justification. This, I think, is one of the weakest points in Luther’s analysis: for how 
can the natural inclination toward the good (synteresis) be identical to the act of 
loving (actus diligendi) that one chooses to perform in accord with the inclination that 
guides him?908 But that is beside the point I am arguing for; or rather, in an odd way it 
supports it. For what counts is this: Luther’s identification of the good motus animi (or 
synteresis) with the elicited act of loving God argues that his similar claim about his 
opponents’ definition of sin as a bad motus animi should be interpreted in the same 
way, i.e., it too is a minute actus animi, an actual sin. This, of course, fits well with 
what we have seen to this point regarding Luther’s polemics against the scholastic 
reduction of “sin” to actual sinful deeds, be it earlier in the Rom. 4:7 scholion itself or 
twenty years later on in the Smalcald Articles. 
Thence we arrive at the second reason to find Luther’s use of motus animi 
language at this juncture pretty anomalous. For as he carries on the argument, the 
fulcrum point for his polemic is the contrast between (a) the kind of Augustinian 
penitential spirituality Wicks has emphasized, with its twin foci on “sin” as a heart-
deep affective disorder and “grace” as gratia sanans providing the remedy for this 
disease, and (b) a mistaken and, in Luther’s eyes, spiritually disastrous piety focused 
                                                        
908 Biel, Coll. II d. 39 q. 1 a. 2 conc. 1 (W & H, II/660-1): Synderesis, quae est scintilla conscientiae, 
non est actus vel habitus in voluntate. Probatur: Quia synderesis est aliquid necessario dirigens, 
saltem in universali, ad operationem iustam et rectam; sed nihil tale pertinet ad voluntatem (nihil 
enim, quod est in voluntate, necessario inclinat); ergo non est aliquid pertinens ad voluntatem. – 
Consequentia nota. Maior patet ex condicionibus synderesi attributis. Nam inclinat ad bonum et 
remurmurat malo, et hoc necessario, quia scintilla inesxtinguibilis; igitur non potest non inclinare ad 
bonum, et ita necessario inclinat ad bonum. Minor probatur: Quia, cum voluntas sit potentia libera 
contingenter tendens in quodlibet obiectum, etiam ultimum finem, ut patuit I dist. 1, nihil ad ipsum 
pertinens necessario inclinat ad hoc vel ad aliud obiectum. 
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primarily on actual sin. “Our theologians have deflected sin to works alone.”909 “To be 
sure, they implore God’s grace: though not rightly, but only in order that the work of 
sin (opere peccati) may be forgiven.”910 That, for Luther, is sheer folly, because the 
pathology of sin is so grave that forgiveness isolated from healing grace is not enough 
to deal with the problem at its root. Not incidentally, this makes for another point of 
contact between Luther’s opponents and Augustine’s. For neither Biel, Julian, nor 
Pelagius denied the importance of forgiveness, at least the first granting thereof in 
baptism and/or penance.911 But all alike downplayed or denied the necessity of gratia 
sanans for renewed moral and spiritual being, life, and action (to say nothing of holy 
suffering). One way or another, for pelagiani antiqui et moderni virtue could be 
attained—and thus merit accrued—without the help of healing grace, since human 
nature with its innate powers remained basically sound after Adam’s fall. Therefore, as 
Henri Strohl observed in the 1920s comparing Luther’s theology and Augustine’s vis-à-
vis their respective opponents: at bottom “the adversary is the same.”912 This being so, 
when Luther attributes to his opponents the initially surprising definition of sin as 
motus animi, the “psychological movement” in question must be understood as a 
                                                        
909 WA 56.276.6, cf. LW 25.263. 
910 WA 56.276.15-16: Et licet gratiam Dei implorent, non tamen recte, Sed tantummodo pro opere 
peccati dimittendo. Cf. LW 25.263. 
911 While they differed on whether infants were baptized propter remissionem peccatorum, 
Augustine and the Pelagians all agreed that sinners were freely forgiven in baptism. See e.g. gr. et 
pecc. or. 1.39.43 (for Pelagius); also Theodore de Bruyn, Pelagius’s Commentary on St Paul’s Epistle 
to the Romans. Translated with Introduction and Notes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 81f on Rom 
3.24ff: “Having been justified freely by his grace. Without works of the law, through baptism, 
whereby he has freely forgiven the sins of all, though they are undeserving. Through the redemption 
which is in Christ Jesus. By which he has redeemed us with his blood from death. Through sin we 
had been sold to death… For we were all condemned to death, to which [Jesus] handed himself 
over, though it was not his due, so that he might redeem us with his blood.” 
912 Henri Strohl, Luther jusq’en 1520, 181, cited in Pereira, 29 n. 11. 
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freely willed and consensual peccatum actuale, however minute, inward, and hidden 
this sinful act of the will may be in a given case.  
 (2) This leads to the second point I wish to highlight in this portion of the 
Rom. 4:7 scholion, namely, the predominance of Luther’s late medieval Augustinian 
spirituality, with its interrelated emphases on: first, unfeigned humility, which is 
evinced by confession of one’s sinfulness and the principled lack of assurance arising 
therefrom; second, incessant warfare against one’s evil desires; and consequently 
third, a desperate—if not quite despairing—longing for healing grace or “justification.” 
This present earthly life is not a life of sinless perfection, but “a life of being cured 
from sin” (Vita curationis a peccato); and the Church, following the Augustinian 
interpretation of Luke 10:25-37, is “the inn and infirmary for those who are sick and 
need to be healed.”913 Perfect sanitas and iustitia await the new heavens and new earth 
that St. Peter teaches about in 2 Pet. 3:13. Righteousness dwells there, not here, but in 
the meantime “it prepares for itself a dwelling place by healing sins.”914 What kind of 
sins? In context, Luther clearly refers to residual evil desires in the saints’ hearts, 
which gratia sanans progressively heals. Because his opponents teach only about 
external good works—and do so on the supposition that virtue is attainable by doing 
what lies within one’s natural ability to achieve—their doctrine necessarily produces 
“proud people” (superbos) who, convinced of their own righteousness, are not 
                                                        
913 WA 56.275.25-8: Igitur Ista Vita Est Vita curationis a peccato, non sine peccato finita curatione et 
adepta sanitate. Ecclesia Stabulum est et infirmaria egrotantium et sanandorum. Cf. LW 25.262-3. 
914 WA 56.275.28-276.3, cf. LW 25.263. 
 360
concerned to declare war on their evil desires.915 And this, laments Father Martin, has 
now led in the Church to a great falling away (recidiuatio) after confessions: 
For they do not know that they need to be justified (Iustificandos), but are 
confident that they have been justified (Iustificatos se esse confidunt) and thus, 
through their own security, are overthrown without any effort on the Devil’s 
part.916 
 
Students of the “reformational” Luther will, I think, quickly perceive the deep irony 
here. In 1515, the spiritual malady that Luther sees pervading the Church is not too 
little assurance, but too much of it: and that, on the false basis of one’s own 
righteousness. The real problem Luther diagnoses in the Bielish penitent is that he 
leaves the confessional presuming that he has been “justified,” blissfully unaware of 
his deep need to be continually justified further and—for this very reason—
terrifyingly susceptible to the great sin of spiritual pride. Martin Luther, fretting over 
souls being confidently assured of their justification? Yes indeed, for at this point in 
his development iustificari primarily means sanari—not forgiveness, nor non 
imputatio peccati—and to teach an absolved penitent to think that he no longer needs 
to be healed of the evil affective disease that afflicts him is nothing less than to spoon-
feed a deadly poison into his already sin-sick soul.917 
Instead, penitents ought to be taught how, through “groaning” (gemitum, cf. 
Rom. 8:23-6), to humbly seek “healing grace” (gratiam sanantem) and acknowledge 
that they are “sinners.”918 For then, rather than swelling with pride, they will 
solicitously “declare war” on their concupiscentiis, sigh endlessly to God in prayer, and 
                                                        
915 WA 56.276.6-7, 9-11, cf. LW 25.263. 
916 WA 56.276.11-14, cf. LW 25.263. 
917 On the equivalence of iustificari and sanari, see WA 56.268.9-15, LW 25.256, cited above. 
918 WA 56.276.8-9, cf. LW 25.263. 
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rightly beg God for that “grace” which not only pardons sin but heals the forgiven 
sinner’s heart.919 This “sin”-confessing penitence, explains Luther, is the way of all the 
saints (omnes sancti), “just as David prophesied in Psalm 31,” i.e., Ps. 32:6.920 In v. 5, 
David confesses his delictum and iniustitiam to God, and praises God for forgiving the 
impietatem peccati mei. In v. 6, he declares that “for this”—pro hac, i.e., the impiety of 
one’s sin—“every saint (omnis sanctus) will pray to you.” Thus Luther finds David 
prophesying in the Psalter that every saint confesses that he is a sinner. These later 
verses in the Psalm form the immediate context for the earlier vv. 1-2, which St. Paul 
cites as a proof-text for his doctrine of justification in Rom. 4:5-8. Once again, we find 
Luther urging that the context in the prophetic Psalm must inform a proper 
interpretation of the apostolic gospel.  
In 1515, Luther is also ever eager to attest the harmony of St. Paul and 
Augustine, and thus continues: “Therefore, all the saints confessed that they were 
sinners, Vt patet in libris b. Augustini.”921 In his footnote to this line in the WA, 
Johannes Ficker suggests that Augustine’s writings “in general” are to be understood. 
On the basis of my argument thus far, I propose both that a more specific reference to 
Augustine’s writings against Julian—überhaupt, to be sure—is in order, and that with 
his confessing sinner-saints Luther intends neither more nor less than what Augustine 
argued regarding the real but embattled holiness of Rom. 7-patterned sancti in these 
books against Julian.  
                                                        
919 WA 56.276.10-11, 15-6, cf. LW 25.263. 
920 WA 56.276.3-5, cf. LW 25.263. 
921 WA 56.276.5-6, cf. LW 25.263. 
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Thus far the young Luther expanding upon nupt. conc. 1.25.28 within the 
broader contours of an Augustinian theology of renewal, and putting it to work over 
against a—if not the—dominant theology and piety of his day.  
 
4. Impletio legis, gratia sanans, and Brautmystik 
 
In a rich corollarium farther on in the Rom. 4:7 scholia, Luther develops his major 
theme of healing grace amidst allusive adumbrations of his evangelical theology of 
justification, for he sets it in relation both to real law-keeping and to the monastic 
theology of Christ’s mystical union with the soul. He first rehearses the now familiar 
doctrinal and spiritual contentions against the late medieval theology and piety in 
which he was reared and trained. According to Biel, Johannes von Paltz, the Erfurt 
philosophers, and sundry other moral optimists of the period, graceless filii Adae are 
able—by virtue of their incorrupt natural powers—to keep the law according to its 
substance through a freely elicited act of the will. Indeed, they may do so not merely 
in the sense of an “external operation,” viz., an external good work or pious deed, but 
“for God’s sake and from the heart.” And if they do so, they merit de congruo the first 
grace of justification.922  
The anti-Pelagian Augustine had taught Luther to know better: “The will, if it 
were allowed, would never do what the law commands: for it is unwilling (Inuita) 
toward the good and prone toward evil.”923 That is to say, the fallen, vitiated, self-
enslaved will, unaided by God’s gift of healing grace: for Luther quickly adds that 
grace transforms the law-averse will and “makes it willing and cheerful (libentem ac 
                                                        
922 WA 56.278.25-279.16, LW 25.266. 
923 WA 56.279.17-18: Voluntas, si liceret, nunquam faceret, que lex precipit. Inuita enim est ad bonum, 
prona ad malum. Cf. LW 25.266. 
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hilarem) toward the law.”924 This marks yet another succinct statement of Augustine’s 
theology of the will’s renovation through grace: a gratia sanans so powerful in its 
renewing effects that the very same will that once shuddered in aversion to the law 
now delights in it. Following the insightful lead of Andreas Wöhle,925 I argued in 
chapter 2 that this will-renewing “joy in God’s law” comprises the inner spiritual 
marrow of Luther’s mature theology of the Spirit’s nature-renovating gift; and in 
chapter 3 we saw its centrality in Luther’s exposition of Rom. 7. I shall return to it 
below, in section 5 of this chapter. 
First, we need to attend to the unique way in which Luther develops the 
Brautmystik he inherits from Bernard and Staupitz vis-à-vis his own pressing concern 
with residual sin in God’s law-delighting saints. In the course of elaborating a doctrine 
of justification in Christ through union and exchange that is very similar to the one he 
will famously celebrate in the 1520 tractate on The Freedom of a Christian, Luther 
shifts back and forth between emphases on the “external” and “internal” goods 
bestowed upon the soul (or the Church) through union with Christ. Referring back to 
the contrast between intrinsic and extrinsic justification in the first lines of the Rom. 
4:7 scholion,926 Luther follows up his clear statement of the will’s inner renovation into 
joyful law-keeping with a claim that jars the reader because it seems to tug in the 
opposite direction: 
                                                        
924 WA 56.279.19-21: Quamdiu enim Inuita est ad legem, auersa est a lege ac ideo non implet. Ergo 
opus habet gratia, que eam faciat libentem ac hilarem ad legem. Cf. LW 25.267. 
925 Andreas H. Wöhle, Luthers Freude an Gottes Gesetz. 
926 WA 56.268.27-30: Sancti Intrinsece sunt peccatores semper, ideo extrinsece Iustificantur semper. 
Hipocritȩ autem intrinsece sunt Iusti semper, ideo extrinsece sunt peccatores semper. Cf. LW 25.257. 
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Therefore there is need for grace, which makes the will willing and cheerful 
toward the law. Therefore I rightly said that all our good is extrinsic to us (Extrinsecum 
nobis), because it is Christ.927  
 
Luther supplies 1 Cor. 1:30 as a proof-text to this effect: Christ became for us wisdom, 
righteousness, sanctification, and redemption.928 This is why Luther states that Jesus 
Christ is himself all our good. Thus while Christ is (pro) nobis, he is—as the Son of God 
in our flesh, the real living Person who is the Church’s Bridegroom—necessarily 
Extrinsecum nobis. But as soon as Luther has quoted 1 Cor. 1:30 to explain the 
“external” nature of omne bonum nostrum, he shifts swiftly back to its “internal” 
reality: “These things”—i.e., wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption—
“are in us (in nobis sunt), but only through faith and hope in Him.”929 This, I suggest, 
goes a long way in explaining the at first puzzling “therefore” that links the two 
sentences cited above. The gratia that transforms the vitiated will in its inmost 
affective being is “external” to the believer in the sense that it comes to him from 
without, ab extra. But through faith and hope in Christ, this grace does indeed enter 
into the depths of the believer’s soul. For grace—omne bonum nostrum—is Jesus 
Christ (1 Cor. 1:30), and Christ dwells in the Church through faith (Eph. 3:17): “In the 
Song of Songs, all the Church’s praise is of Christ, who dwells in her through faith.”930  
We thus arrive in decidedly Finnish territory. In discussing the same apparent 
tension between gratia ab extra and gratia in nobis in chapter 2, I pointed to an article 
                                                        
927 WA 56.279.20-24: Ergo opus habet gratia, que eam faciat libentem ac hilarem ad legem. Ideo Recte 
dixi, quod Extrinsecum nobis est omne bonum nostrum, quod est Christus. Sicut Apostolus dicit: ‘Qui 
nobis factus est a Deo Sapientia et Iustitia et sanctificatio et redemptio.’ Cf. LW 25.267. 
928 WA 56.279.23-24, LW 25.267. 
929 WA 56.279.24-25: Quȩ omnia in nobis sunt non nisi per fidem et spem in ipsum. Cf. LW 25.267. 
930 WA 56.279.25-6: omnis Laus Ecclesie in Canticis Christi est in ipsa per fidem habitantis. Cf. LW 
25.267. 
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by Eero Huovinen that illuminates this point well.931 For the moment, I wish to 
highlight the second of the two inseparable functions or roles that the indwelling 
Christ (or “grace”) plays vis-à-vis both the residual vitiation and intrinsic guilt of 
indwelling sin. In the first place, “grace” as gratia sanans heals the will and restores it 
to cheerful law-keeping. But in the second, “grace” as the indwelling Christ—the 
mystical Bridegroom of the Song—covers the poverty, emptiness, and ugliness of his 
Bride with the free gift of his righteousness. Indeed, for Luther this mystical theology 
of union with Christ and joyful exchange fleshes out the spiritual “mechanism” (if you 
will) that lies beneath the Augustinian (nupt. conc. 1.25.28) theology of sinful desire’s 
non-imputation which has dominated the Rom. 4:7 scholia to this point. Mystical 
union and forensic non-imputation, the mellifluous Bernard and the polemical 
Augustine, King Solomon’s erotic poetry and the Apostle Paul’s epistolary dogmatics, 
are thus united to form a dogmatic whole that coheres intimately with Luther’s 
penitential spirituality: 
In the Song of Songs, the Church often confesses that she is naked and is 
described as having no other desideria except for the Bridegroom, saying: 
“Draw me after You, we will run to the odor of your ointments” [1:4]. Always 
she seeks, always she desires, always she praises the Bridegroom. By this, she 
shows plainly that she herself is empty and poor within herself (intra se), and 
that her own fullness and righteousness is outside herself (extra se). For if the 
confessions of the saints are only to be understood as referring to past sins, and 
in the present they are pure, then why do they confess not only past sins, but 
also present ones? It’s because they know that sin is in them, but that for 
Christ’s sake it is covered and not imputed: so that they may declare that all 
their good is outside themselves in Christ (extra se in Christo), who 
nevertheless is in them through faith (per fidem in ipsis est).932 
                                                        
931 Eero Huovinen, “Der infusio-Gedanke als Problem der Lutherforschung.” 
932 WA 56.279.27-280.4: Sic Ecclesia in Canticis se nudam sepius confitetur et non nisi sponsi 
desideria scribitur habere, dicens: ‘trahe me post te, in odore vngentorum tuorum curremus’. Semper 
petit, Semper desiderat, Semper commendat sponsum. Quo manifeste sese vacuam et pauperem 
ostendit intra se esse, et extra se esse plenitudinem et Iustitiam suam. Si enim solum pro preteritis 
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The Bride’s plaintive cries of longing in the Song for the Bridegroom attest her own 
emptiness and poverty. For Luther, the Bride’s frank recognition of her ugliness 
supplies further scriptural proof for his advanced Augustinian doctrine of the residual 
sinfulness of the saints. Real honest sancti desire Christ’s beauty, riches, fullness, and 
righteousness all the more earnestly precisely because they know that the “sin” still 
dwelling within them makes them unrighteous, empty, poor, and misshapen. But 
propter Christum, this sin is not imputed to their account: and extra se in Christo, all 
his wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption has become their very own 
good. Yet the Christ for whose sake the saints are forensically pardoned, the Christ in 
whom the saints find their righteousness extra se, is the Christ who dwells within 
them through faith.933  
 
5. An “Augustinian” phrase, c. Iul. 2, and Luther’s covenant theology circa 1515 
 
In the strength of this excursus toward a “Finnish” mystical theology of justification 
through union and exchange, Luther now returns to his major themes of true 
                                                                                                                                                                     
peccatis intelligendȩ sunt confessiones sanctorum et in presenti esse puros Vt quid non solum 
preterita, Sed etiam prȩsentia confitentur? Nisi quod sciunt in se esse peccatum, Sed propter 
Christum tegi et non imputari, Vt omne suum bonum extra se in Christo, qui tamen per fidem in ipsis 
est, protestentur. Cf. LW 25.267. 
933 In the sequel (WA 56.280.8-9), Luther reprises this mystical theology of righteousness in Christ 
through a christological reading of Ps. 45:1-4, concluding: Nos regnum eius [viz., Christi], Sed 
pulchritudo in nobis non est nostra, Sed ipsius, Qua tegit nostram fȩditatem. A few pages prior to the 
text under consideration here, Luther develops the same theology in an exposition of Ps. 32:1-2. 
There he employs a rich christological interpretation of Ruth 3:7-9 plus Ezek. 16:8, Ps. 45, and Ps. 
63:7 (WA 56.278.1-10, cf. LW 25.265): Tegitur, inquam, per Christum in nobis habitantem, Sicut in 
figura dixit Ruth ad Boos: ‘Expande pallium tuum super famulam tuam, quia propinquus es.’ ‘Et 
leuato pallio proiecit se ad pedes eius’ i. e. anima proiicit se ad humanitatem Christi et tegitur ipsius 
Iustitia. Item Ezech. 16.: ‘Et expandi amictum meum super te et operui ignominiam tuam.’ Et psalmo 
62.: ‘Et in velamento alarum tuarum exultabo.’ Item psalmo 44.: ‘filiȩ regum in honore’ i. e. decore tuo, 
vnde honorantur a te et tu in illis. Et ‘Specie tua et pulchritudine tua intende’ etc., dimisso itaque malo 
opere et residuo peccati i. e. fomitis non imputato, donec sanetur. 
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repentance and healing grace. Once again, he is worried about spiritual laziness; only 
this time, a text Luther clearly regards as pseudo-Augustinian is part of the problem: 
Hence also many hand themselves over into sluggishness and security by virtue 
of confidence in that word, which blessed Augustine is supposed to have said: 
“A great part of righteousness, is wanting to be righteous.”934 
 
Magna pars iustitiae, velle esse iustum: the way Luther introduces the phrase suggests 
that it was something of a proverbial commonplace, a stock-in-trade maxim of 
monastic lore. As it happens, he was right to doubt its Augustinian provenance. In the 
WA apparatus, Ficker points to Augustine’s ep. 127.5; but though the gist of its sense is 
there, the phrase itself is not.935 Where then did it come from?  
In antiquity, two intriguing possibilities emerge. In the course of treating 
confession and repentance in book 2 of his Sententiae, Isidore of Seville (c. 560-633) 
writes: “Now, it is a great part of righteousness (Magna iam iustitiae pars est) for a 
man to know himself, that he is depraved, in order that he may be more humbly 
subject to divine virtue by God’s help, from whom he recognizes his own infirmity.”936 
Like his predecessors Prosper of Aquitaine and Fulgentius of Ruspe, Isidore gathered 
and organized patristic florilegia, including to be sure numerous texts from Augustine 
himself. His Sententiae served as a basic reference work for early medieval theologians 
                                                        
934 WA 56.280.10-12: Vnde et illius Verbi fiducia multi se in torporem et securitatem tradunt, Quod b. 
Aug. dixisse fertur: ‘Magna pars Iustitiȩ, Velle esse Iustum.’ Cf. LW 25.267. 
935 Augustine, ep. 127.5, PL 33.485: Iusta vero vita, cum volumus, adest, quia eam ipsam plene velle, 
iustitia est; nec plus aliquid perficienda iustitia, quam perfectam voluntatem requirit. Vide si labor 
est, ubi velle satis est. 
936 Isidore, Sententiae 2.13 (CCSL 111.120.1-3): DE CONFESSIONE PECCATORVM ET PAENITENTIA. 1. 
Ex eo unusquisque iustus esse incipit, ex quo sui accusator extiterit. Multi autem e contra semetipsos 
peccatores fatentur, et tamen semetipsos a peccato non subtrahunt. 2. Magna iam iustitiae pars est 
seipsum nosse homo quod prauus est, ut ex deo diuinae uirtuti subdatur humilius, ex quo suam 
infirmitatem agnoscit. 3. Bene se iudicat iustus in hac uita, ne iudicetur a Deo damnatione perpetua. 
Tunc autem iudicium de se quisque sumit, quando per dignam paenitentiam sua praua facta 
condemnat. 
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and, as such, was a major precursor to Peter Lombard’s more famous textbook by the 
same title.937 The broadly Augustinian and monastic ethos of penitential humility-
piety is unmistakable in Isidore’s text, which resonates deeply with Luther’s spiritual 
teaching. Isidore’s magna iustitiae pars may lie near the origins of a phrase that came 
to circulate in late medieval monasteries under Augustine’s name and eventually 
reached Luther through (say) Johannes Greffenstein, the Erfurt Augustinian novice-
master, as early as summer 1505.938 
 Farther back of Isidore’s magna pars are two instances in the letters of Seneca. 
In ep. 34 he writes: pars magna bonitatis est velle fieri bonum, “a great part of goodness 
is wanting to become good.”939 Then, in ep. 71, he likewise writes: magna pars est 
profectus velle proficere, “it is a great part of making progress to want to make 
progress.”940 Now, what is especially intriguing about these two magna pars phrases in 
Seneca is their substantial similarity (when combined together) to an adage in 
Bernard’s ep. 91 that became quite popular in subsequent medieval piety:  
Minime pro certo est bonus, qui melior esse non vult, et ubi incipis nolle fieri 
melior, ibi desinis etiam esse bonus. 
 
To be sure, that man last of all is good who does not want to be better, and at 
the point where you begin to not want to become better, there you cease even 
to be good.941  
                                                        
937 See Ulrich G. Leinsle, Introduction to Scholastic Theology, trans. Michael J. Miller (Washington: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 31-33. 
938 On Greffenstein and Luther’s novitiate, see Brecht, Road to Reformation, 57-61; Saak, 633. 
939 Seneca, epistulae morales ad Lucilium 34, par. 2, LLA 335.PH (Tuebner, O. Hense, 1938), p. 110. 
940 ep. 71, par. 35, ibid. p. 252: Instemus itaque et perseveremus. Plus, quam profligavimus, restat, sed 
magna pars est profectus velle proficere. Huius rei conscius mihi sum: volo et mente tota volo. 
941 Bernard, ep. 91, par. 3 (Bernardi Opera, ed. J. Leclerq and H. M. Rochais, 1974-77, vol. 7-8): 
Vidit Iacob in scala angelos ascendentes et descendentes: numquid stantem quempiam, sive 
sedentem? Non est stare omnino in pendulo fragilis scalae, neque in incerto huius mortalis vitae 
quidquam in eodem statu permanent. NON HABEMUS HIC MANENTEM CIVITATEM, nec futuram 
adhuc possidemus, sed inquirimus. Aut ascendas necesse est, aut descendas: si attentas stare, ruas 
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We know that Bernard’s aphorism made a deep impression on brother Martin. 
Sometime in the period 1513-16, he inscribed it on the inside of the front cover of his 
copy of the Opuscula Anselmi,942 and it factors critically in his 1516 scholion on Rom. 
12:2.943 In itself, however, this gets us nowhere with respect to explaining the 
provenance of the pseudo-Augustinian magna pars iustitiae known to Luther.  
 But the plot thickens. In a fifteenth-century sermon series attributed to the 
Czech reformer Jan Hus (c. 1369-1415), Bernard’s aphorism and the crucial line from 
Seneca’s ep. 34 appear in tandem: 
 Unde Bernhardus in quadam epistola: “Minime pro certo est bonus, qui melior 
esse  non vult; et ubi incipit nolle fieri melior, ibi desinit esse bonus.” Unde Seneca 
in  Epistolis: “Magna pars bonitatis est velle fieri bonum.”944 
 
The modern editor of this text thinks it unlikely to originate from Hus himself, though 
its author was certainly Czech and possibly a Hussite. Much of its substance appears 
to have been drawn from the Postilla studentium of Konrad Waldhauser (c. 1320/25-
1369), a leading preacher in Bohemia and a predecessor of the Hussites. Had Luther 
read either Waldhauser’s Postilla or the fifteenth-century sermons based thereupon? 
Probably not, given the strong animosity toward Hus and the Bohemians prevalent 
amongst German Catholics in the early sixteenth century for both theological (the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
necesse est. Minime pro certo est bonus, qui melior esse non vult, et ubi incipis nolle fieri melior, ibi 
desinis etiam esse bonus.  
942 WA 9.107.22-3. 
943 WA 56.441.14-21: Hoc pro profectu dicitur. Nam loquitur iis, qui iam incȩperunt esse Christiani. 
Quorum vita non est in quiescere, sed in moueri de bono in melius velut egrotus de egritudine in 
sanitatem, vt et Dominus ostendit in homine Semiuiuo in curam Samaritani suscepto. Sic Genes. 1. 
Spiritus Domini non quiescebat, Sed ‘ferebatur super aquas’. Et Deu. 32.: ‘Quasi aquila prouocans ad 
volandum pullos suos et super ipsos volitans.’ Psalmo 17.: ‘Ascendit et volauit, Volauit super pennas 
Ventorum.’ Vnde B. Bernardus: ‘vbi incipis nolle fieri melior, desinis esse bonus.’ Cf. also WA 1.649.18, 
3.46.41. 
944 Dicta de tempore magistro Iohanni Hus attributa, sermo 60 (dominica XXI post trinitatem), 
CCCM 239A pag 1284. 
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specter of heresy) and political (war) reasons. Luther himself did not begin to realize 
the affinity between Hus’ theology and his own until John Eck pinned him in a 
Bohemian corner at the Leipzig debate in summer 1519. By February 1520, Luther 
confided to Spalatin: “I have taught and held all the teachings of Johannes Huss, but 
thus far I did not know it.”945 In 1515/16, St. Paul, Augustine, Staupitz, Tauler, and 
Bernard supplied the resources that fueled Luther’s explosive theological 
development; and if Bohemian theology ever did enter his field of vision, I suspect it 
did so as the dreaded Hussite heresy and not as a potential comrade-in-arms.946 All to 
say: Luther did not acquire the pseudo-Augustinian aphorism from a Czech source. 
This, however, does not diminish the importance of the Czech sermons for our 
purpose. For what counts is this: Bernard is the premier monastic theologian, and 
Seneca nearly supplies the exact phrase as it appears in Luther, once bonitatis/bonum 
are exchanged for iustitiae/iustum. Their convergence in an obscure fifteenth-century 
Czech sermon suggests exactly the kind of widespread, commonplace, proverbial, and 
piety-theological provenance for the magna pars iustitiae, velle esse iustum that 
Luther’s way of framing its appearance in the Rom. 4:7 scholion reflects. In short: the 
saying was “in the air,” and at some point Luther heard it attributed to Augustine. 
                                                        
945 Luther to George Spalatin, 14 Feb. 1520 (#254), WA Br 2.42.22-3, LW 48.153. Luther continues (ll. 
23-9): “Johannes Staupitz has taught in the same unintentional way. In short, we are all Hussites 
without knowing it. Even Paul and Augustine are Hussites ad verbum. See the monstrous things 
into which we fall, I ask you, even without the Bohemian leader and teacher. I am so shocked that I 
do not know what to think when I see such terrible judgments of God over men, that the most 
evident evangelical truth was already publicly burned more than one hundred years ago and 
regarded as condemned. Neither is one allowed to confess this. Woe to the earth! Farewell.” 
946 We find a typical statement of Luther’s own prejudice in a 1514 sermon, where he sets the 
contemporary contrast between Catholics and Hussites in parallel to the biblical contrast between 
Jews and Samaritans. WA 4.614.22-25: Et perinde fuit ut hodie nobiscum et Bohemis in 
administratione eucharistiae non convenit. Atque ita exprobrabant eis nomen exosum 
Samaritanorum, ut nos hereticum Boemicum nuncupamus obiurgando quenquam et demonibus 
refertum. 
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 But now to the aphorism itself. Luther dislikes it if interpreted within the 
theological and penitential framework of die Sawtheologen, for thus understood it 
encourages spiritual sloth. The decisive question is this: what qualifies as “wanting 
(velle) to be righteous”? Luther says his opponents locate it in the minute self-elicited 
act (actum elicitum minutissimum)947 that I discussed in section 3 above. Here, 
Luther’s discussion is less technical and more overtly pastoral in nature. The Bielish 
theology of penance and half-merited justification is spiritually pernicious for two 
reasons. First, it summons the penitent to a once-off mustering of his spiritual efforts 
in order to make sacramental penance efficacious (facientibus quod in se est, deus non 
denegat gratiam) by keeping the law. But St. Paul and Augustine have shown that this 
is impossible, for the law works wrath (Rom. 4:15) and, weakened as it is by the flesh, it 
cannot accomplish justification (Rom. 8:3). In the second place, Sawtheologie 
encourages spiritual laziness after one has in fact done what was in his power to do 
and thus received the infusion of justifying grace. For after the momentarily 
heightened spiritual intensity involved in eliciting the inner act of loving God super 
omnia, the justified person relapses into spiritual relaxation. This, for Luther, is a 
delusional and dangerous pitfall, for it encourages fiducia and securitas at the very 
moment when the pastor ought instead to instruct the penitent to continue in the way 
of repentance and to go on humbly begging for increased supplies of healing grace. 
The pseudo-Augustinian aphorism short-circuits this laborious and lifelong 
process. For if “wanting to be iustus” is interpreted as eliciting the small act of the will 
requisite for iustificatio; and if this minimal velle is thought to be not only adequate 
                                                        
947 WA 56.280.12, cf. LW 25.267. 
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for getting into a state of grace, but itself a magna pars iustitiae; then the “justified” 
penitent, possessed as he is of a great part of righteousness, has no reason to regard 
himself a sin-sick person in need of gratia sanans for the deepened healing of his soul 
and the progressive increase of his righteousness. So Luther: 
They equate this “wanting” with the minutest elicited act: but then it relapses 
and begins nothing (nihil incipientem), and they go out from it snoring most 
securely.948 
 
That is to say: Bielish penitents elicit the act, go to confession, come out “safe”—and 
take a break, at just the moment when they ought rather to begin to seek healing, 
humility, and holiness afresh. Now, for earnest brother Martin—his head full of 
monastic wisdom about never ceasing to “begin” (ubi incipis nolle fieri melior, ibi 
desinis etiam esse bonus; proficere, hoc est semper a novo incipere)949 and his heart set 
on the pursuit of holiness—the pastor of the Church who counsels a penitent soul in 
this way does nothing less than plunge him into the spiritual destruction of security, 
sloth, and presumption. 
                                                        
948 WA 56.280.12-14: Itaque hoc Velle ponunt actum elicitum minutissimum, cȩterum mox relabentem 
et nihil incipientem, quo tamen securissime eunt stertentes. Cf. LW 25.267-8. 
949 WA 56.441.21 (on Rom. 12:2) and 486.7 (on Rom. 13:11). As noted above, at Rom. 12:2 Luther is 
quoting Bernard’s ep. 91. At Rom. 13:11, Luther has just cited a different place in Bernard to the same 
effect (Sermo 2 in Vigilia nativitatis Domini, PL 183.90), and is continuing himself in the same vein 
of humility-oriented monastic theology (ll. 1-14): De quibus B. Bernardus: ‘Qui non assidue festinat 
ad penitentiam, facto dicit se non indigere penitentia.’ Si non penitentia, ergo nec misericordia; si non 
misericordia, ergo nec salute. Quod non potest facere, nisi qui sit sine peccato sicut Deus et angeli. 
Ideo Bene Apostolus Christianis loquens exhortatur, vt surgant, cum tamen non essent Christiani, 
nisi surrexissent, Sed quia stare in via Dei, hoc est retrocedere, Et proficere, hoc est semper a nouo 
incipere; Vnde Ecclesiasticus Non dixit: Cum profȩcerit, Sed ‘cum consummauerit homo, etiam tunc 
incipiet’. Sicut Sanctus Arsenius orabat Deum quottidie: ‘Adiuua me, Domine, Vt incipiam tibi viuere.’ 
Sicut enim Apostolus de scientia dixit, Quod ‘si quis sibi videtur scire, nondum cognouit, quomodo 
oporteat eum scire’, ita de singulis Virtutibus inferendum: Qui se putat apprehendisse et incepisse, 
nescit, quomodo oporteat eum incipere. In addition to the biblical texts, note that Luther cites 
Arsenius’ saying from the Vitae Patrum: standard reading in the Augustinian cloister. On Bernard’s 
aphorism vis-à-vis Luther’s Ockhamist theory of motion, see Dieter, 311-12, 317-18. 
 373 
But abusus non tollit usum, and Luther thinks the pseudo-Augustinian 
aphorism is patient of an orthodox and spiritually wise interpretation. Indeed, when 
read properly in light of a genuinely Augustinian theology of real renewal and 
embattled holiness, the aphorism can be ratcheted up a notch further: “True it is that 
willing is righteousness, but it is not a great part but the whole righteousness (tota 
Iustitia) which one can have in this life.”950 This Velle is not, however, the stuff of Biel’s 
elicited act, but of St. Paul’s imperfectly renewed will in its Rom. 7-style struggle 
against the desires of the flesh:  
Not that [i.e., the Bielish] Velle, but what the Apostle calls for below: “To will 
(Velle) lies at hand for me, but to complete (perficere) I do not find” [Rom. 
7:18b]. For this whole life is a time of willing (volendi) righteousness, but never 
of completing (perficiendi) [righteousness]. But [completion is] in the future 
life.951 
 
Grane discusses this text at several turning points, and pits Luther and Augustine 
against one another. For Augustine, velle esse iustum refers to the grace-renewed will 
successfully resisting the residual concupiscence which holds it back from perfection. 
For Luther, it speaks of the Christian’s unconditional agreement with God’s will, on 
the basis of which he confesses he is a total sinner and takes refuge in Christ’s alien 
righteousness and God’s merciful reputatio.952 To will to be righteous is to recognize 
that one cannot fulfill the law ex viribus suis—whether or not he is aided by grace—
and therefore to long and pray for “grace,” which Grane equates with mercy, 
                                                        
950 WA 56.280.14-15: Verum est, Quod Velle esse Iustitiam, non est magna pars, immo tota Iustitia, 
que in hac vita potest haberi. Cf. LW 25.268. 
951 WA 56.280.15-18: Verum non illud Velle, Sed quod infra Apostolus vocat: ‘Velle mihi adiacet, 
perficere non Inuenio.’ Tota enim hȩc Vita est tempus volendi Iustitiam, perficiendi vero nequaquam, 
Sed futura vita. Cf. LW 25.268. 
952 Grane, Modus loquendi, 99. 
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forgiveness, and/or non-imputation.953 It is to confess one’s sin, renounce one’s 
righteousness, and trust in Christ’s instead.954 In short, for Grane’s Luther “wanting to 
be righteous” amounts to a near equivalent of the “total simul,” and as such it 
expresses a non-sanative, imputational theology of justification. 
Now, for Grane—who asserts this interpretative axiom fairly early in his 
argument—Luther’s novel reinterpretation of the traditional velle esse iustum supplies 
the key to grasping why his seemingly Augustinian exegesis of Rom. 7 is in reality of 
another kind altogether: the hands are the hands of Augustine, but the voice is Paul’s 
and Luther’s.955 To take the most important instance, when Grane sets his hand to 
explain the long excerpt from c. Iul. 3.26.62 which effectively comprises the scholion 
on Rom. 7:18, he insists we remember that Luther has basically altered the meaning of 
Augustine’s velle esse iustum. In light of Luther’s revision of the aphorism’s meaning, it 
becomes clear that his intended agreement with Augustine’s facere/perficere 
distinction and its theory of consent is only apparent; and therefore, Luther’s 
agreement with the Augustinian theology of real inchoate Heilung, for which refusing 
to volitionally “complete” the desires that one’s flesh “does” against one’s grace-
renewed will is an integral component, is only apparent too. For Luther, non 
consentire means saying Nein to one’s self and giving way to God’s judgment—i.e., just 
what Grane asserts “wanting to be righteous” means. But for Augustine, non-
consent—and by extension, velle esse iustum—means “that the already justified 
                                                        
953 Grane, Modus loquendi, 80-1. 
954 Grane, Modus loquendi, 60. 
955 Grane, Modus loquendi, 59-60. 
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person resists the inclinations which are still present even after the forgiveness of 
original sin.”956 
In fact, Luther himself intends exactly the position which Grane urges as the 
merely apparent Augustinian alternative. This is why he refers infra to Rom. 7: if you 
want to understand the aphorism, Luther is saying, you need to read Paul on velle. As 
an eager student of the “420s Augustine,” to want to be righteous—or simply to want 
righteousness—is for Luther to want to be perfectly or completely righteous, without 
remainder. This finds paradigmatic expression in St. Paul’s desire—his “wanting”—to 
bring to whole-hearted completion that delight in the law which already truly 
characterizes his renovated heart (Rom. 7:22) to the extent that it has been renovated 
into spiritus by the Spirit’s grace. But in this life, so long as Paul’s residual flesh 
remains to be reckoned with in the combat—for it “does” things (facere) against his 
holy will—his renewed will can at best “do” (facere) imperfectly the holy spiritual 
actions it longs to execute in the flawless perfection of love. Constricted in his spiritual 
affections by the contrary desires of the flesh, Paul cannot yet “complete” (perficere) 
the things he longs for and delights in, though he emphatically refuses to permit his 
flesh to bring its desires to completion either. So far Augustine—and Luther. For in 
Luther’s modus loquendi augustinianus, “wanting to be righteous” (Rom. 7:18b: velle 
adiacet mihi) names the graced possibility in the present age that ruefully 
compensates for the present impossibility of “completing the good” (Rom. 7:18c: 
perficere autem bonum, non invenio). This entire life is a time of grace-produced 
wanting to be unreservedly righteous. Only in the life to come will the saints bring 
                                                        
956 Grane, Modus loquendi, 98-99, here 99. 
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their present longings to completion in the perfections of glory. It is this Augustinian 
eschatological reserve, not some alleged indifference to real growth in holiness, that 
explains why Luther can modify the pseudo-Augustinian aphorism in what seems to 
Grane’s twentieth-century eyes an innovative direction: velle iustitiam is not just pars 
iustitiae, but tota iustitia. In fact, Luther’s insistence that velle esse iustum is—under 
the conditions of the present life—the apex and sum of Christian righteousness is of a 
piece with his broad program of Augustinian ressourcement, as exemplified above all 
in his exegesis of Rom. 7.  
The context bears this out plainly. Not coincidently, it includes the sweeping 
reference to c. Iul. 2 that I mentioned in passing above, on the heels of which Luther 
composes a rich statement of his Augustinian theology of indwelling sin, healing 
grace, and merciful non-imputation as they intersect in the spiritual experience of the 
true monastic: 
“To will (Velle) lies at hand for me, but to complete (perficere) I do not find” 
[Rom. 7:18b]. For this whole life is a time of willing (volendi) righteousness, but 
never of completing (perficiendi) [righteousness]. But [completion is] in the 
future life. Therefore, to will (Velle) is to show by all powers, pursuits, prayers, 
works, sufferings that we desire righteousness (desideremus Iustitiam), but that 
we do not yet have it perfectly. Regarding these matters, see blessed Augustine 
writing most beautifully and richly in many books, especially book 2 against 
Julian, adducing St. Ambrose, Hilary, Cyprian, Chrysostom, Basil, Nazianzus, 
Irenaeus, Reticius, Olympius. Therefore the mother of hypocrites and cause of 
hypocrisy is security itself. Thus God leaves us in this sin, in the tinder, in 
concupiscence (in peccato isto, in fomite, in concupiscentia), so that he may 
keep us in the fear of Him and humility, in order that thus we may always flee 
to his grace (gratiam): always frightened lest we should sin, i.e., always praying, 
lest He impute it to us and permit sin to rule (peccatum dominari sinat [Rom. 
6:14]). To be sure, by the very fact that we do not fear, we sin. Obviously, since 
this evil in us is sin per se, because on its account we do not fulfill the love of 
God above all things. By this alone does it become venial and is not imputed, 
that we groan for it and—lest God perhaps should damn us because of it 
(propter ipsum), lest he impute it to us—we anxiously implore his mercy 
(misericordiam) and pray that it be taken away through his grace (gratiam) and 
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thus confess that we are sinners because of it (ex ipso) and regard ourselves as 
sinners by weeping, by repenting, by grieving, by shedding tears. For when this 
fear and anxiety cease, straightaway security sets in; when security sets in, 
straightway the imputation of God in peccatum returns. For this reason: God 
has decreed (statuerit) that he wills to not impute [sin] only to the person who 
groans and fears and assiduously implores his mercy. By this most merciful 
counsel (consilio), our most godly God drives us to weariness of this life, to 
hope of the future life, to desire for his grace (desiderium gratie ̧sue)̧, to hatred 
of sin, to penitence, etc.957 
 
In the first place, contra Grane, Luther clearly does not limit velle esse iustum to 
confessing one’s sinfulness and accepting God’s judgment. “To will” in the full-bodied 
Pauline sense of the term—omnis viribus—means to evince one’s deep longing as 
homo spiritualis for the perfect righteousness he cannot yet attain, and to do so 
concretely through the central practices of monastic piety: pursuits (studiis: either 
spiritual endeavors broadly or monastic studies more narrowly), prayers, works, 
sufferings, weeping, grieving, groaning, repenting, tears, abasement, confession, 
humility, the fear of God. The influence of Luther’s spiritual Sitz im Leben upon the 
text is unmistakable: “wanting righteousness” evidently entails the kind of hard 
                                                        
957 WA 56.280.15-281.21: Verum non illud Velle, Sed quod infra Apostolus vocat: ‘Velle mihi adiacet, 
perficere non Inuenio.’ Tota enim hȩc Vita est tempus volendi Iustitiam, perficiendi vero nequaquam, 
Sed futura vita. Velle itaque est omnibus viribus, studiis, orationibus, operibus, passionibus ostendere, 
quod desideremus Iustitiam, nondum autem perfectum habeamus. De quibus Vide pulcherrime et 
locupletissime in multis libris b. Aug⌊ustinum, precipue li. 2. contra Iulianum, allegantem S. Ambro., 
Hila., Cyprian, Chrisost., Basilium, Nazianz, Hireneum, Reticium, Olimpum. Mater igitur 
hipocritarum et Causa hipocrisis est ipsa securitas. Deus enim ideo nos in peccato isto, in fomite, in 
concupiscentia derelinquit, Vt nos in timore sui et humilitate custodiat, vt sic ad eius gratiam semper 
recurramus, Semper pauidi, ne peccemus i. e. semper orantes, ne nobis imputet et peccatum dominari 
sinat. Immo eoipso peccamus non timendo, Quippe cum hoc malum in nobis per se sit peccatum, quia 
non implemus propter ipsum dilectionem Dei super omnia. Hoc solo autem fit veniale et non 
imputatur, Quod pro ipso gemimus, et ne forte Deus propter ipsum nos damnet, ne nobis imputet, 
misericordiam ipsius solliciti imploramus et auferri per gratiam eius oramus ac sic peccatores nos ex 
ipso confiteamur ac pro peccatoribus nos habeamus flendo, pȩnitendo, dolendo, lachrymando. 
Cessante enim isto timore et sollicitudine mox ponitur securitas, posita securitate mox redit 
Imputatio Dei in peccatum, eo quod statuerit Deus nulli velle non imputare nisi gementi et timenti ac 
assidue misericordiam suam imploranti. Quo consilio misericordissimo nos piissimus Deus cogit ad 
tedium huius vitȩ, ad spem futurȩ vitȩ, ad desiderium gratiȩ suȩ, ad odium peccati, ad penitentiam etc. 
Cf. LW 25.268. 
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spiritual work—and intense spiritual sufferings—which by 1515 Luther himself had 
zealously undertaken for some ten years as an observant Augustinian friar.  
 In the second, and in line with his apt if broad appeal to Augustine contra 
Iulianum, Luther sets out his dogmatics of sin and grace, holiness and mercy. The “sin” 
that God wisely leaves his saints in, is evil desire: fomes/concupiscentia. This malum is 
“obviously” peccatum per se: not because it eliminates real holiness in the saints 
altogether, but because it keeps them back from the perfect dilectio Dei super omnia 
that the law demands and that their own renewed hearts desire to fulfill. But this 
painful state of affairs is actually to the saints’ great advantage, for the ongoing 
presence of evil desire humbles them. This counteracts the most dangerous vice of all, 
spiritual pride, and keeps them in a state of fear before God. Thus forestalled from 
lapsing into laxity and securitas, the saints’ “sin” spurs them on to seek increases of 
“grace.” By this “grace,” Luther means gratia sanans: for it actually takes away (auferri) 
the sin that remains in the saints, and stops whatever bits of it God in his wisdom has 
left behind for their humiliation from gaining the upper hand (dominari, an allusion to 
Rom. 6:14). To be sure, the saints are frightened by the real and present danger of 
falling into sin; but empowered by this grace, they do not actually succumb to the evil 
affective impulses which they are forced to suffer. So long as they keep up the fight, 
groaning against sin and begging God for both gratia and misericordia—that is, for 
healing grace and pardoning mercy—God declines to impute the “sin” that thus 
remains to their account. What is intrinsically damnable sin becomes pardonable, 
veniale, by God’s mercy—but only under certain conditions. The non-imputation of 
the saints’ sinful concupiscentia is contingent upon their continuance in the way of 
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real holiness begun by God’s grace. Since their healing is real but fragile, their 
attainment of mercy is precarious and uncertain. If humble fear gives way to 
presumptuous security, God reverses his judgment of mercy and imputes what had 
once been venial sin in peccatum. Residual affective “sin,” grace-produced healing and 
renewal, merciful non-imputation contingent upon the refusal of consent to the sin 
that remains: these are the consistent Augustinian components of Luther’s theology of 
holiness circa 1515/16.  
 One final point remains to be considered. The spiritual usefulness of “sin” for 
killing pride, inducing humility, and driving the penitent to seek grace—think of St. 
David, or St. Peter—is classic Augustinian wisdom: virtus, Augustine never tired of 
lecturing Julian, infirmitate perficitur (2 Cor. 12:7-10).958 But in the last sentences of the 
above-cited paragraph, there are hints of the way Luther is restating this Augustinian 
inheritance in terms of the late medieval “covenant” or pactum theology he had read 
in Biel.959 For the conditional relationship that obtains between the sinner-saint’s 
penitence, non-consent, and “yearning for grace” on the one hand, and God’s merciful 
non-imputation on the other, is itself the result of God’s free determination. He might 
(de potentia absoluta) have decreed otherwise: but in his mercy, God has chosen not 
to impute sin when the appropriate conditions are met; and having resolved to act 
thus (de potentia ordinata), his decrees are very trustworthy (Ps. 93:5). “God has 
                                                        
958 See e.g. c. ep. Pel. 3.7.18, c. Iul. 2.4.8, 4.2.11, 4.3.28. Cf. Thomas F. Martin, O.S.A., “Paul the Patient: 
Christus Medicus and the “Stimulus Carnis” (2 Cor. 12:7): A Consideration of Augustine’s Medicinal 
Christology”; Hombert, Gloria Gratiae, 310-12. 
959 Berndt Hamm, Promissio, Pactum, Ordinatio: Freiheit und Selbstbindung Gottes in der 
scholasticschen Gnadenlehre (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1977). 
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decreed (statuerit) that he wills to not impute [sin] only to the person who groans and 
fears and assiduously implores his mercy.”960  
Against prevalent caricatures of Ockhamist covenant theology, it should be 
said that this resolution on God’s part is not arbitrary in a capricious sense: for it is the 
fruit of his wise and merciful counsel (consilium), and he is a God piissimus.961 
Furthermore, as students of the Dictata have long recognized, Luther is refashioning 
these theories in several respects. For one thing, he does not describe the condition for 
obtaining mercy in terms of a half-merit: that door, as we have seen, is firmly shut for 
Luther once he has digested the bracing Augustinian doctrine of fallen human nature 
as vitiated in all its powers. For all the flaws in his interpretation, Grane is still helpful 
in this regard: contra Gabrielem, the sinner contributes nothing to his justification 
apart from his sin; and if he does what lies in his power to do, additional sin is the only 
possible outcome. But in the present instance, the doctrinal and spiritual context for 
Luther’s nascent covenant theology is not the prima gratia of initial justification—as 
for Biel’s doctrine—but rather the question of how a graced or justified person 
remains a beneficiary of God’s mercy and grace once he has already received it. For 
Luther, such a person is in fact capable of acting in the spiritually requisite manner—
refusing to consent to residual sin, begging for increased grace in prayer, pleading for 
mercy, etc.—because gratia sanans really has begun to heal and restore his wounded 
soul. And as I argued in chapter 2, such Spirit-empowered non-consent to residual 
                                                        
960 WA 56.281.18-19: statuerit Deus nulli velle non imputare nisi gementi et timenti ac assidue 
misericordiam suam imploranti. Cf. LW 25.268. 
961 WA 56.281.19-20: Quo consilio misericordissimo nos piissimus Deus cogit ad tedium huius vitȩ, ad 
spem futurȩ vitȩ, ad desiderium gratiȩ suȩ, ad odium peccati, ad penitentiam etc. Cf. LW 25.268. At 
civ. dei 10.1.3 (Bett. 373), Augustine explains that since pietas often refers in vernacular Latin to the 
works of mercy commanded by God, “from this custom of speaking it has come about that even 
God himself is said to be pius.”  
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“sin” very much remains the conditio sine qua non for abiding in a state of grace (and 
gift) for the duration of Luther’s theological career.  
I will return to this matter in Part III below. But to head off the charge of 
synergism which I anticipate from some corners, I wish to be clear about two points. 
First, from 1515 right into the 1540s, Luther holds that the conditions which the 
renewed person must fulfill to remain in God’s grace lie outside the reach of his 
natural powers to accomplish. The believer depends entirely on renovating grace—
gratia sanans in 1515/16, donum Spiritus Sancti later on—in order to fight and conquer 
residual sin’s allurements (not to mention the world’s and the devil’s) and to hold fast 
to Jesus Christ. The Christian warrior triumphs over sin and temptation, not ex suis 
viribus but ex gratia. But grace really does empower him to triumph, renewing the 
faculties of his vitiated soul in order that he may believe, hope, and love, come what 
may. Second, the very fact that the regenerate person has received this gift of new life 
in Christ is itself the outworking in time of God’s eternal election: for against Biel et al. 
and with the old Augustine, predestination is the only preparation for grace.962 In 
1515/16, this sola gratia is meant to be a fearful reality: for in line with Augustine’s 
doctrine and the medieval consensus, no Christian—apart from a few notable 
exceptions, e.g., St. Mary or Paul—may know whether or not he is in the number of 
God’s elect. The Prädestinationsanfechtung that might result from contemplating this 
fearful reality was, of course, one of the knots that tied up Luther’s anxious soul. But in 
the lectures on Romans, he still views this uncertainty, and the fear it produces, 
largely positively, for it is a potent remedy for spiritual pride. Despite the marked 
                                                        
962 praed. sanct. 10.19. 
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Staupitzian reorientations in his own spirituality and pastoral practice, away from 
“speculation” into the hidden mystery of one’s election and toward the manifestation 
of God in Christ crucified, this fearful and humbling element in Augustine’s spiritual 
theology of predestination remains a component of the older Luther’s teaching as well. 
Once the promissio-fides correlation has given birth to reformational assurance—
according to Bayer, in early summer 1518—the gospel sets the believer free to rest in 
the grace of forgiveness and justification in Christ. But this assurance of grace through 
God’s promise in Christ, and the freedom it bestows, only holds true of the present 
moment. No believer knows whether he will persevere in true faith to the end, 
perseverance itself being a free gift of God’s grace that flows from the hidden font of 
his eternal predestination. Since present regeneration and justification may be lost, 
the godly Christian lives poised between fear and hope, and the riddle of 
predestination remains unresolved till the wayfaring pilgrim passes by grace through 
death into glory.  
For these reasons, Luther goes on in the next pages of the scholion to explain 
the deep identity of presumption and despair as twin forms of self-obsessing egoism, 
and to commend instead the “royal road” (regia via) that passes safely between those 
shoals of destruction.963  This is the path of humility—humilitas fidei—which takes 
root in the heart that fears God and hopes in his mercy at the same time.964 Luther’s 
regia via reflects an ancient monastic exegesis of Num. 20:17 and 21:22 which he 
                                                        
963 WA 56.281.22-284.8, LW 25.269-71; for regia via, WA 56.283.7. 
964 Explaining Paul’s paradox 1 Cor. 5:7—cleanse out the old leaven, because you really are 
unleavened—Luther writes (WA 56.282.9-15): Quis enim eorum intelliget ista duo simul, quod sint 
azymi et tamen expurgandum sit eis fermentum vetus? Nisi quia vnum in re vera, Sed aliud propter 
humilitatem fidei in timore, in spe et non-Imputatione Dei consistit. Fermentum habent, Sed dolent 
pro eo et gratiam Inuocant ideoque Azymi sunt reputatione Dei, qui eis fermentum non imputat, Sed 
expurgandum relinquit. Cf. LW 25.269. 
 383
probably acquired from Bernard.965 It does not disappear after the reformational 
Durchbruch: we find it, for example, in the 1532 lecture on Ps. 2:11966 and the 1544 
lecture on Gen. 38:26.967 When Luther ends his 1537 lecture on Gen. 12:20 with the 
exhortation and prayer “that in patience and hope we may work out our salvation, 
Amen,”968 his allusion to Phil. 2:12 is not adventitious. Neither is the plea with which 
the old Doctor brought his lectures on “the dear Genesis” to a close on 17 November 
1545, just a few months before his death: “Pray God for me, that He may grant me a 
good, blessed last hour.”969 This is not pious rhetoric. The gospel of free justification in 
Christ did not free Luther from the fear that he might not continue in this grace. For 
Luther, young and old, stood firmly within the medieval consensus in dogmatics and 
in piety that a great “if” hangs over the Christian life. The believer must accept this “if,” 
fear God, and humbly work out his salvation (Phil. 2:12)—trusting to be sure that 
God’s grace is at work in him, both to will and to work for his good pleasure (Phil. 
2:13). But for Luther as for Augustine, the resolution of this “if” does not ultimately lie 
in the believer’s hands, but in God’s, hidden in the mystery of predestination. 
                                                        
965 See Jean Leclercq, “La voie royale,” Supplément de la vie spirituelle 7 (1948), 338-52; Mette B. 
Bruun, “Bernard of Clairvaux and the Landscape of Salvation,” in Brian Patrick McGuire, ed., A 
Companion to Bernard of Clairvaux (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 249-78, here 269-70; G. R. Evans, Bernard of 
Clairvaux (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 30. According to Bruun, the roots of the 
monastic-exegetical regia via go back to Origen (Homilies on Numbers 12.5-6) and Cassian 
(Conferences 24.24). 
966 On David’s “Serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling,” Luther comments: Christ 
commands “that we travel upon the royal road, and that we fear and hope at the same time.” WA 
40/2.288.29-30 [A], cf. LW 12.75. 
967 WA 44.334.3-10: Utrunque enim prohibuit Deus, et desperationem et praesumptionem, 
declinationem ad sinistram et ad dextram. In dextra non est praesumendum: in sinistra non est 
desperandum. Regiae viae insistendum est, peccator non abiiciat fiduciam misericordiae: iustus non 
superbiat. ‘Bene placitum enim est Domino super timentes eum, et in eis qui sperant super 
misericordia eius’, odit superbos et praesumptuosos, et eos diligit, in quibus timor aliquid spei et 
praesumptionis retinet, non in nobis ipsis, sed in misericordia Dei. Cf. LW 7.44. See too WA 44.822.9-
14, LW 8.329-30 (on Gen. 50:19-23) from 1545, cited in chapter 2 above. 
968 WA 42.493.11-12, cf. LW 2.323. 
969 WA 44.825.11-12, cf. LW 8.333. 
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6. Virtue, Vice, and Imputation: Augustine’s Ep. 167 
 
The last Augustine citation in the scholia on Rom. 4:7 is the longest and, in a way, the 
most decisive for my argument: a paragraph from one of Augustine’s letters to Jerome 
(ep. 167 by the modern enumeration, ep. 29 by Luther’s).970 The letter concerns the 
interpretation of James 2:10: “For whoever has observed the whole law, but offends in 
one point, has become guilty of all.” Written in 415, it reflects—without actually 
discussing—the anti-Pelagian controversy in its first phase, and directly engages 
Jerome’s distinct controversy with Jovinian. To the philosophical ear, St. James’ 
teaching appears to resonate with the extreme Stoic version of the commonplace 
ancient doctrine of the unity of the virtues, i.e., the necessity of possessing all virtue to 
possess any virtue at all (qui unam uirtutem habuerit, omnes habet eique nulla est, cui 
una defuerit).971 Augustine is keen to address this philosophical doctrine critically, and 
to reshape it in light of his (by 415) well-established theory of virtue as ordered love 
and his maturing understanding of the flaws or vices that continue to mar the saints’ 
holiness even as they make real progress in this love. In his usual manner, Grane 
asserts that Luther was wrong to cite Augustine’s letter in defense of his theology; but 
he does well to associate the tenor of the passage with Luther’s Antilatomus, for the 
same scriptural texts and arguments surface there in great abundance, as does the 
same paragraph from ep. 167.972 
                                                        
970 For the text, see CSEL 44.586-609, WSA II/3.95-104. Luther excerpts material from paragraph 
4.15. 
971 This is Augustine’s own pithy summary of the Stoic doctrine, as stated at ep. 167.3.10 (CSEL 
44.596); cf. ep. 167.2.4-5, 3.10-12, 4.14.  
972 Grane, Modus loquendi, 82-3. For ep. 167 in the Antilatomus, see WA 8.89.35-90.5, LW 32.204. 
Note well that Vercruysse (“Die Stellung Augustins in Jacobus Latomus’ Auseinandersetzung mit 
Luther,” 12) refers to Latomus’ interpretation of ep. 167 as “cumbersome.”  
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The Augustine citation is nestled in the midst of the second to last corollary in 
the scholion, which canvasses the familiar themes of righteousness, residual sin, and 
mercy or non-imputation in their interrelation. Luther first reiterates his contrast 
between scriptural and philosophical definitions of iustitia. “The philosophers and 
lawyers”—I think it safe to say that here Luther lumps scholastic theologians together 
with the philosophi—“assert that it is a quality of the soul, etc.”973 By contrast, in the 
Bible righteousness “depends more on the imputation of God than on the being of the 
thing (esse rei).”974 True righteousness as scripturally defined is not to be found within 
the soul, as the fruit of infused grace transforming the qualitates animae from vice to 
virtue. Rather, righteousness depends on God’s reckoning an unrighteous person as 
righteous in his sight.  
For that person has righteousness, not who has the quality alone—indeed that 
one is a sinner altogether and unrighteous—but whom God, on account of the 
confession of his own unrighteousness and the plea for the righteousness of 
God, mercifully reputes and wills to be held righteous before him. Therefore, 
we are all born in iniquity i.e. unrighteousness, we die, but by the reckoning 
alone of the God who has mercy [Rom. 9:16], through faith in his Word, we are 
righteous.975 
 
Read out of context, Luther plays right into Grane’s hand; and Grane seizes the 
opportunity. Against the philosophical definition of righteousness as a real “quality” 
inhering in the being of the transformed soul—together with all the niceties of sins 
merely venial and works truly meritorious that follow from it—Luther sets the Pauline 
gospel of iustitia through mercy and imputation alone, passively received by faith in 
                                                        
973 WA 56.287.16-18, cf. LW 25.274. 
974 WA 56.287.18-19, cf. LW 25.274. 
975 WA 56.287.19-24: Ille enim habet Iustitiam, non qui qualitatem solam habet, immo ille peccator 
est omnino et Iniustus, Sed quem Deus propter confessionem iniustitiȩ suȩ et implorationem Iustitiȩ 
Dei misericorditer reputat et voluit Iustum apud se haberi. Ideo omnes In iniquitate i. e. Iniustitia 
nascimur, morimur, Sola autem reputatione miserentis Dei per fidem Verbi eius Iusti sumus. Cf. LW 
25.274-5. 
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the Word. For the justified person is a confessing sinner (peccator est omnino et 
Iniustus!) and all his righteousness is alien to his being and imputed to his account 
and unknown to him, except by faith. Grane concludes his comments upon the 
present text thus: “The righteousness of God, with which He makes us righteous, has 
no footing in the person himself (keinen Anhalt am Menschen selbst hat), neither in 
his works nor in his properties.” This being so, the last word goes to the simul peccator 
et iustus taken in its post-Hermann sense, which Grane suggests Luther himself 
viewed as a kind of “summary” of Rom. 1-4.976 
 But let us attend to the immediate context of Luther’s decidedly “Lutheran”-
sounding claims in this text. First, looking back and recalling Luther’s sustained 
polemics against self-righteous monastics in this scholion, we need to clarify the 
intended referent of the person whom Luther calls “a sinner altogether and 
unrighteousness.” This person is not the justified sinner, nor the appropriate subject of 
the “simul” as Luther actually held it (and to be clear, the phrase does not appear in 
this corollary in so many words; Grane imports it as a heuristic tool, in the event 
unhelpfully). Luther is once again describing the Luke 18:9-14-style contrast between 
the specious righteousness of the Pharisee and the real justification of the publican.977 
The person “who has the quality alone,” i.e., the self-righteous person who knows that 
his grace-infused soul possesses the qualitas iustitiae and therefore does not confess 
                                                        
976 Grane, Modus loquendi, 83. 
977 Saak (416-17, notes 235-6) notes in passing the prominent role of Luke 18:9-14 in sermons of the 
fourteenth-century Augustinians Albert of Padua (Pentecost X, Expositio Evangeliorum 
Dominicalium, fol. S-2ra—b) and Jordan of Quedlinburg (OP sermo 374B, fol. 90rb—90,va OP sermo 
376A, and Opus Jor sermo 256, fol. 396rb—va). In the last cited text, a sermon on Luke 18:9-14, Jordan 
writes: In hoc evangelio commendatur virtus orantionis et ostenditur quia in qua consistat summa 
totius humane perfectionis. Et introducuntur hic duo homines, unus iustus et alter peccator. Iustus, 
quia nescivit orare, fuit reprobatus; sed peccator, qui scivit orare, fuit iustificatus. Cf. Augustine, En. 
Ps. 31/2.10-12, WSA 3/15.373-5. 
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that he is a sinner, immo ille peccator est omnino et Iniustus—that kind of person 
above all is a sinner full stop. Thus the person who “has the quality alone,” and who 
presumes that his possession of this quality justifies him before God, does not have 
righteousness at all. If the self-righteous is unrighteous in the core of his rotten heart, 
who then is the truly righteous person? Precisely the heart-broken penitent whose 
character and actions Luther has already described at some length, and sketches again 
here: the true monastic, who confesses his unrighteousness, begs for God’s 
righteousness, and trusts in the Word that promises this mercy as a free gift of the 
merciful God.  
In light of this penitential monastic theology, notice the central role that 
“Holl’s propter” plays in this text. It is because of the penitent’s confession and plea 
that God grants him mercy, and the humble soul that prays in this truthful way cannot 
be a peccator omnino. Indeed, the more he humbly insists on the reality of his 
sinfulness, the more he evinces (perhaps to his own irritation) the reality of his 
renewal in holiness. Luther’s true penitent confesses that he is a sinner, trusts in God’s 
mercy, and does not presume that he has righteousness on account of the fact that a 
virtuous qualitas inheres in his soul. But the spiritual fact that he does not rely on 
possessing “a quality alone” to establish his righteousness coram deo does not mean 
that he has no righteous qualities at all. To the contrary: his humble confession of sin 
is the first and foremost proof of his regeneration out of the deceitfulness of his 
inherited flesh into the truthfulness of the renewed spiritus that is brought to life in 
Christ.  
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 In the second place, we need to look forward from Luther’s focus on original 
sin in the last sentence of the above-cited paragraph to the catena of scriptural proof-
texts for the universality and depth of human sinfulness that follows it. Luther’s omnes 
In iniquitate i.e. Iniustitia nascimur reflects the language of Ps. 5o:7 Vg. (in 
iniquitatibus conceptus sum, etc.) and the apposition of morimur with nascimur 
strongly signals St. Paul’s teaching in Rom. 5:12-21 and 1 Cor. 15:20-22. These are, of 
course, classic scriptural loci for Augustine’s theology of original sin. Within the 
excerpted paragraph itself, this again shows that for Luther the object of God’s 
merciful non-imputation in the saints is not actual, but original sin in the residual 
form it assumes as their “flesh.” On account of its unwanted operations in and as their 
flesh, the saints truly confess that they are sinners, refuse to rely on their own 
righteousness, and take refuge in the promise of God’s mercy in Christ. This is the 
force of Luther’s last sentence; and it explains why he proceeds to catalogue scriptural 
proofs in demonstration of original sin and, therefore, of the continuing sinfulness of 
regenerate saints: “Therefore, let us heap up authorities from Scripture, in which all 
are asserted to be in sins,” omnes in peccatis matching the earlier omnes In iniquitate 
i.e. Iniustitia nascimur.978 
 The catalogue of proof-texts is impressive, and anticipates similar collections in 
the 1518 Heidelberg Disputation, the 1521 Defense and Explanation of All the Articles, 
and the great Antilatomus of the same year: Gen. 8:21, Ex. 34:7, Rom. 3:20, 1 Kgs. 8:46, 
Eccl. 7:20, Job 7:20-1, 9:2, 9:15, Ps. 32:6, 143:2, 130:8, 72:14, Isa. 64:6, Jer. 30:11, 1 Tim. 1:15, 
                                                        
978 WA 56.287.25-6, cf. LW 25.275. 
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Rom. 7:19 (“etc.”), Phil. 3:13, James 3:12, 1 John 1:8, Rev. 22:11.979 In passing, Luther 
acknowledges Job 27:6 and 1 John 5:18 (cf. 3:9) as counter-texts. St. John’s qui natus est 
ex Deo, non peccat etc. is especially important for the reasons I explored above in 
chapter 2: for Luther, the flesh-bearing and thus “sinful” regenerate person does not 
consent to the impulses of his flesh, and therefore does not sin. This first Johannine 
text immediately precedes the second, Rev. 22:11, with which Luther concludes his 
catalogue. Between them both, the overall stress on sinfulness (in particular, with 
respect to our origin in vitiated Adam) gives way to a marked emphasis on the reality 
of regeneration (1 John 5:18) and the necessity of progressive justification (Rev. 22:11). 
As I have argued throughout this book, it is this dual emphasis on residual sinfulness 
and real renewal in righteousness “simul” that occupies Luther’s prodigious energies 
both spiritually and dogmatically, and this as penitent and mystic, pastor, exegete, and 
catholic reader of Augustine all in one. So it is that after citing St. John’s qui iustus est, 
Iustificetur adhuc, Luther shifts promptly to Augustine’s ep. 167 as an illuminating 
comment on his scriptural catena, three verses of which factor in the Augustinian 
excerpt itself: 
Hence blessed Augustine, Epist. 29 to blessed Jerome: “Virtue is the charity 
(Virtus est Charitas) by which that which ought to be loved, is loved (diligitur). 
This is greater in some, less in others, in others there is none at all; but the 
fullest love [or: virtue], which could no longer be increased, is in no human 
being so long as he lives here. However, as long as it is able to be increased, 
assuredly that which is less than it ought to be is from vice (ex vitio est). 
Because of this vice (Ex quo vitio), ‘there is not a righteous person on earth who 
does good and does not sin’ [Eccl. 7:20]. Because of this vice (Ex quo vitio), ‘no 
living person will be justified in God’s sight’ [Ps. 143:2]. On account of this vice 
(Propter quod vitium), ‘If we say that we do not have sin, we deceive ourselves 
and the truth is not in us’ [1 John 1:8]. On account of this vice (Propter quod 
vitium), regardless of how much we advance, it is necessary for us to say: 
                                                        
979 WA 56.287.27-288.32, LW 25.275-76. 
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‘forgive us our debts’ [Matt. 6:12], though already in baptism everything said, 
done, thought has been forgiven.” That’s Augustine.980 
 
It is indeed: Luther’s text compares quite favorably with a large portion of §4.15 as it 
stands in our best modern edition.981 To evaluate whether (and to what extent) Luther 
was right to appeal to it in support of his theology, we need first to grasp what 
Augustine himself was arguing for. In the lines that immediately precede the 
excerpted material, Augustine tells Jerome that he is about to explain what he 
embraces in his theory (notio) of virtue (§4.15).982 Then in the paragraphs that follow 
the excerpt, Augustine returns to the problem raised by Jas. 2:10 and/or the Stoic 
doctrine of virtue. His solution turns on relating his virtue theory to Rom. 13:9-10 and 
Matt. 22:37-40, i.e., the “Love Commandment” in both its Pauline and dominical 
forms: Plenitudo legis caritas est, qua deus proximusque diligitur. The “fullness” of the 
law is love. But love in its fullness, caritas plenissima for God and neighbor, is precisely 
what Augustine—in the preceding §4.15 excerpted by Luther—has just forsworn as a 
possibility in this life. For Augustine, this helps explain the meaning of Jas. 2:10 in a 
way that embraces the real element of truth in the Stoic virtue theory: anything less 
                                                        
980 WA 56.289.1-12: ‘Virtus est Charitas, qua id, quod diligendum est, diligitur. Hȩc in aliis maior, in 
aliis minor, in aliis nulla est, plenissima vero, quȩ iam non possit augeri, quamdiu hic homo viuit, est 
in nemine; quamdiu autem augeri potest, profecto illud, quod minus est quam debet, ex vitio est. Ex 
quo Vitio “non est Iustus in terra, qui faciat bonum et non peccet”. Ex quo Vitio “non Iustificabitur in 
conspectu Dei omnis viuens”. Propter quod vitium “si dixerimus, quia peccatum non habemus, 
nosmet ipsos seducimus et veritas in nobis non est”. Propter quod vitium etiam, quantumlibet 
profecerimus, necessarium est nobis dicere: “dimitte nobis debita nostra”, cum iam omnia in 
baptismo, dicta, facta, cogitata, dimissa sint.’ Hec ille. Cf. LW 25.276. 
981 CSEL 44.602. Apart from slight changes in spelling and punctuation, I count three variations: 1. 
Luther’s version of Eccl. 7:20 differs slightly from Augustine’s: the latter’s “there is not a righteous 
person on earth who will do good and will not sin” shifting to “there is not a righteous person on 
earth who does good and does not sin.” 2. In the 1 John 1:8 citation, Augustine has nos ipsos 
decipimus and Luther nosmet ipsos seducimus. 3. In the final “propter quod” which comes on the 
heels of 1 John 1:8, to Augustine’s propter quod Luther adds the clarifying propter quod vitium.  
982 CSEL 44.602: ut generaliter breuiterque complectar, quam de uirtute habeo notionem, quod ad 
recte uiuendum adtinet, uirtus est caritas, qua id, quod diligendum est, diligitur. 
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than the richest and most perfect love renders the flawed lover guilty of the whole law, 
because acting thus he sins against the total love on which all the commandments 
depend (§5.16).983 At the same time, Augustine suggests that this scripturally revised 
theory of virtue enables the theologian to avoid the most notorious implication of the 
Stoic doctrine, viz., the equality of all vices and sins. “Why then are sins not said to be 
equal? Is it perhaps because one does more against love who sins more gravely, and 
less against love who sins more lightly?” et hoc ipso admittat magis et minus, to wit, 
varying degrees or intensities of love in different persons or actions, and therefore 
diverse gradations of guilt, can be admitted with scriptural faithfulness and 
philosophical coherence. The “man of apostolic grace”—St. James—can therefore 
truthfully say that we all offend in many things (Jas. 3:2) and that failing in one point 
renders one guilty of the whole law (2:10) without contradicting the fundamental 
commitments of Augustine’s Pauline theology of sin and grace, flesh and spirit, 
present hope and future perfection in glory. The emptier (inanior) one is of love, the 
fuller (plenior) he is of iniquity, and vice versa; only in the future glory, when nothing 
more remains of the present weakness (ex infirmitate), will the saints be exceedingly 
perfect in love (§5.17).984 
                                                        
983 CSEL 44.603, cf. WSA II/3.102. 
984 CSEL 44.604: cur ergo non dicantur paria peccata? an forte quia magis facit contra caritatem, qui 
grauius peccat, minus, qui leuius, et hoc ipso admittat magis et minus, quo fit quidem omnium reus, 
sed grauius peccans uel in pluribus peccans magis reus, leuius autem uel in paucioribus peccans 
minus reus tanto maiore scilicet reatu, quanto amplius, tanto minore, quanto minus peccauerit, 
tamen, etiam si in uno offenderit, reus omnium, quia contra eam facit, in qua pendet omnia? quae si 
uera sunt, eo modo et illud absoluitur, quod ait homo etiam apostolicae gratiae: in multis enim 
offendimus omnes; offendimus enim, sed alius grauius alius leuius, quanto quisque magis minus ue 
peccauerit, tanto in peccato committendo maior quanto in diligendo deo et proximo minor et rursus 
tanto minor in peccati perpetratione quanto maior in dei et proximi dilectione, tanto itaque plenior 
iniquitatis quanto inanior caritatis et tunc perfectissimus in caritate, quando nihil restat ex 
infirmitate. Cf. WSA II/3.102-3. 
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 Augustine’s ex infirmitate at the end of §5.17 corresponds conceptually to ex 
vitio in Luther’s excerpted §4.15. Vitium can be translated either as “defect” or as “vice” 
depending on contextual considerations and, perhaps at times, the translator’s 
theological commitments. In terms of its conceptual substance in Augustine’s 
thought, this is really a case of six of the one or a half-dozen of the other, as the close 
connection between vitium and infirmitas itself suggests: after all, a basic meaning for 
virtus is simply “power,” and to lack moral strength and to suffer moral weakness is to 
be marred by vitium, vice. It is due to a lack of what is owed in a human person’s 
being, affections, and actions—a defect, weakness, wound, or vitium—that he falls 
short of the moral power and excellence of “virtue” and is therefore possessed of “vice” 
to varying degrees. In any case, in §4.15 Augustine plainly draws a contrast between 
the virtus of love, on the one hand, and its lack or imperfections ex vitio on the other. 
Whatever is lacking in the regenerate person’s love; whatever is less than the fullness 
of love which he hopes his small beginnings in the present will one day become by 
grace in glory; whatever is less than the plenitudo legis which is caritas, and therefore 
“less than what is owed” (quod minus est quam debet)—is from vice (ex vitio est). 
Augustine then reinforces his position with the four proof-texts on sin that form the 
heart of the paragraph, introducing the first two (Eccl. 7:20, Ps. 143:2) with ex quo vitio 
and the second pair (1 John 1:8, Matt. 6:12) with propter quod vitium. Real progress is 
made in the Christian life of holy love for God and neighbor. But on account of the 
“vice” (§4.15) or the “weakness” (§5.17) that remains in the saints—in St. Paul’s terms, 
their “flesh,” “law of flesh,” or “sin”—perfection in righteousness, plenitudo legis, is in 
this life unattainable.  
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Now, in §4.15 and in light of Jas. 2:10, Augustine does not shy from drawing the 
conclusion suggested by his virtue theory and intimated by his carefully chosen catena 
of proof-texts from the Bible. On account of the vitium that remains in the saints, 
there is not a righteous person on earth who does good and does not sin; no one living 
will be justified in God’s sight (this is one of the occasional forensic instances of 
iustificari that one does come across in Augustine); Christians who claim sinless 
perfection deceive themselves; and regardless of how far one has advanced in the way 
of love, he never outgrows the need to pray for daily forgiveness through the Lord’s 
Prayer. But apart from the fleeting affirmation of complete forgiveness in baptism that 
concludes the excerpted material from §4.15, in ep. 167 Augustine does not enter upon 
the question why the vitium that restricts and mars the wayfaring saint’s love—and 
thus makes him guilty of the whole law, which requires nothing less than 
wholehearted love—nevertheless does not make him guilty in God’s sight. In the 
language of the Psalm, if ex vitio no saint living will be justified before God, how then 
is the saint forgiven, accepted, or justified before God? As we now know, Augustine 
elsewhere engages this question with great interest: and it is just such texts, above all 
from the writings against Julian, that especially interest Luther in his lectures on 
Romans. 
 If we turn now to examine the role of ep. 167.4.15 in the Rom. 4:7 scholion, 
three things are readily apparent: (1) first, that Luther adopts Augustine’s theory of 
love vis-à-vis the fullness and fulfillment of the law; (2) second, that Luther bites the 
bullet and names as “sin” the lack of perfect love which Augustine usually—though 
not always—refers to as vitium, weakness, flesh, evil desire, the law of sin, etc.; and I 
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note that in §4.15, Augustine combines both usages by virtue of his citations of Eccl. 
7:20, 1 John 1:8, and Matt. 6:12; (3) third, that Luther draws once again on his “420s 
Augustine”-inspired theology of residual sin’s non-imputation to resolve the question 
begged by—but left unanswered in—Augustine’s letter to Jerome. Earlier on in this 
scholion, when Luther made his broad-brush reference to c. Iul. 2, we saw each of 
these three points on display in concert: the “tinder” of evil desire left in the 
regenerate is “sin” per se, argued Luther, “since propter ipsum we do not fulfill the love 
of God above all things”985 (#1 and #2); but to those real saints who confess that they 
are sinners ex ipso, and pray for healing grace to take away and pardoning mercy to 
overlook the tinder, concupiscence, vice, and indeed “sin” that remains in their flesh, 
God does not impute it in peccatum (#3).986 In the comments that immediately follow 
the excerpt from ep. 167, Luther exhibits the same grasp of the Augustinian theory of 
virtue as love in its relation to the law; the same intensification of the logic of this 
theory (or perhaps, as Steinmetz has it, “the more perfect embodiment of a 
tendency”987) vis-à-vis the Bielish doctrines of natura integra, self-elicited love for God 
super omnia, and half-merited justification; and the same nascent attempt to think 
through the implications of fusing together a handful of interrelated Augustinian 
                                                        
985 WA 56.281.9-11: Quippe cum hoc malum in nobis per se sit peccatum, quia non implemus propter 
ipsum dilectionem Dei super omnia. Cf. LW 25.268. 
986 WA 56.281.11-21, LW 25.268. 
987 Steinmetz, Luther and Staupitz, 15. To be clear, Steinmetz was not discussing this precise issue, 
but rather the general question of the nature of Luther’s “Augustinianism.” In his lucid discussion, 
Steinmetz distinguishes five senses of the term “Augustinian” (and “Pelagian”), the fifth being “not 
so much agreement with the teaching of Augustine and Pelagius in their original form as the 
embodiment of a theological tendency which in special cases may go beyond their original 
thinking. In one sense it is possible to say that Thomas Aquinas is more Augustinian than Luther 
on the question of merit, if the standard is fidelity to the original teaching of St. Augustine. But one 
can also hold, without taking an absurd and indefensible position, that Luther is more Augustinian 
than Thomas, if the frame of reference is the more perfect embodiment of a tendency. It all 
depends what you mean by ‘Augustinian.’”  
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inheritances (viz., his virtue theory, his eschatological reserve, his doctrine of grace, 
and his theology of non-imputation) with his own fresh reading of the Bible. The 
outcome is novel in certain real but limited respects, for at bottom Luther is 
advancing the logic already present in ep. 167 and nupt. conc. 1.25.28 etc. Here it is: 
From this it is plain to see that there is no such thing as venial sin ex substantia 
et natura sua, but neither is there merit. Because even good works, since the 
tinder and sensuality resist, do not happen with as great a concertedness and 
purity as the law requires: for they do not happen by our whole powers (ex totis 
viribus), but only by the powers of spirit, with the powers of the flesh fighting 
back (tantum ex viribus spiritus repugnantibus viribus carnis). Therefore, even 
when we work well, we sin, unless God through Christ covers this imperfection 
for us and does not impute it; thus it becomes venial through the mercy of the 
God who does not impute it, on account of faith and groaning for this 
imperfection, which is taken up in Christ.988 
 
Note well that Luther’s comments begin with the back-reference to §4.15: Ex quo patet, 
Quod etc. Employing a typical mode of scholastic argumentation, Luther aims to 
elucidate the implicit implications of an authoritative text in order to draw further 
conclusions from it. In this case, he does so by placing one set of Augustinian data in 
relation to another. If in the event Luther fails to reproduce Augustine’s doctrine 
exactly—more on this shortly—he may nonetheless achieve “the more perfect 
embodiment of a tendency” by carrying Augustine’s argument forward to a more 
robustly “Augustinian” conclusion: just as, for example, Thomas Aquinas’ 
understanding of the persons of the Holy Trinity as “subsistent relations” may be seen 
                                                        
988 WA 56.289.14-21: Ex quo patet, Quod nullum est peccatum Veniale ex substantia et natura sua, 
Sed nec meritum. Quia etiam bona opera, quia renitente fomite et sensualitate, non tanta fiunt 
intensione et puritate, quantam lex requirit, cum non ex totis viribus fiant, Sed tantum ex viribus 
spiritus repugnantibus viribus carnis. Idcirco enim bene operando peccamus, nisi Deus per Christum 
nobis hoc imperfectum tegeret et non imputaret; fit ergo Veniale per misericordiam Dei non 
imputantis, propter fidem et gemitum pro ista imperfectione in Christo suscepta. Cf. LW 25.276. 
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as a deeply “Augustinian” theology based upon the argument in trin. 5-7 and at the 
same time advancing beyond it. 
 Now to the matter at hand. On the surface, Luther’s denial of a real distinction 
between venial sins and mortal, his rejection of merit, and his claim that the 
regenerate person sins even when he does a good work—all hugely controversial 
positions from 1518 on—stand in manifest opposition to Augustine’s doctrine; for 
Augustine upheld the first two interrelated points, and at the least never affirmed the 
third in so many words. But there’s the rub: in Luther’s first sentence, he is making the 
claim that what Augustine wrote in ep. 167 about love, virtue, vice, the law, and sin 
itself leads to the evident conclusion that no sin, in its essence, nature, or definition, is 
pardonable in and of itself. For anything less than perfect love is a vicious falling short 
of the fullness of virtuous love that God requires of his humans in his law. However 
great in love a regenerate person may become by God’s grace, since in the conditions 
of this present life he cannot but fall short of the fullness of love, he therefore fails to 
fulfill the law. And to fail to fulfill the law is the essence of “sin” ex substantia et natura 
sua, regardless of how slight a deviation from the law’s perfection a given failure may 
in fact amount to. For it is not the slightness of the flaw in one’s love that renders it an 
intrinsically “venial” sin, but the nature of the relation that obtains between that flaw 
and both (a) the flawed lover’s will, i.e., does he consent to and acquiesce in the 
imperfections of his love, or does he suffer these imperfections unwillingly; and (b) 
the mercy of God in Christ, for God does not impute this “sin” in peccatum to those 
who believe and groan for help, and “Christ succors them from the fullness of his 
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purity, and covers over this imperfection of theirs.”989 For the same reasons, Luther 
rejects merit and hazards the claim that the regenerate sin when they do good works: 
and while the conclusions are novel, the reasons themselves are drawn straight from 
Augustine. The wholeheartedness, the concertedness (intensio), the unblemished 
purity of perfect love required by the law is lacking in the best of works: for the 
regenerate person’s heart is divided in its “powers” between spirit and flesh, the new 
and holy vires spiritus fighting to love in purity and the old sinful vires carnis 
vexatiously fighting back. This is Augustine’s spiritual theology of real but embattled 
holiness, complete with one of his choice proof-texts for the same (Gal. 5:17); and 
when Luther now states that the righteous “sin” even when they do good works, his 
rhetorically charged and seemingly novel claim is in fact a pointed restatement of 
Augustine’s spirit/flesh “simul.” Because of their residual flesh, ex vitio/infirmitate, the 
saints continue to fall short of the perfection of love. They therefore “sin” even when 
they do the good works of love, for they do not love ex totis viribus with as great an 
intension and purity as the law requires (and as grace will one day free them to 
accomplish in glory). “On account of this vice, regardless of how much we advance, it 
is necessary for us to say: ‘forgive us our debts’”—so Augustine; so Luther. No good 
deed is without “sin” in this precise and mutually agreed upon sense (in rei veritate 
and sometimes also in verba, not least when Augustine takes his words directly from 
the Bible). No sin is intrinsically venial: this is, I think, a justifiable conclusion to draw 
from a close reading of ep. 167, especially at those points in the argument where 
Augustine weaves his virtue theory together with Rom. 13:10 and Jas. 2:10. No good 
                                                        
989 WA 56.289.29-31: … succurrit eis Christus de plenitudine puritatis suae et tegit eorum hoc 
imperfectum. Cf. LW 25.277. 
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deed, therefore, is intrinsically meritorious. On the contrary, the saints themselves 
stand in constant need of the mercy of God in Christ; and this mercy is theirs to have, 
so long as they refuse to consent to the “sin” which—having been instructed by Ps. 
143:2, Eccl. 7:20, 1 John 1:8, and Matt. 6:12—they do not refuse to confess before God.  
Therefore, even when we work well, we sin, unless God through Christ covers 
this imperfection for us and does not impute it; thus it becomes venial through 
the mercy of the God who does not impute it, on account of faith and groaning 
for this imperfection, which is taken up in Christ.990 
 
If Luther’s conclusion marks a material advance beyond the combined force of 
Augustine’s ep. 167 and the theology of sin, grace, and mercy formulated with 
increasing clarity in the works against Julian—and I have given reasons to think that it 
does not—I submit that it is an “Augustinian” advance nonetheless.  
 
7. Conclusion to Part II—Augustinus si anno gratiae 1515/16 viveret, gauderet Lutherum 
in Romanos legere? 
 
In a Table-Talk from 1532, Luther declared that Augustine would have rejoiced to read 
Melanchthon’s recently published commentary on Romans: so great was the church 
father’s love for the truth that Master Philipp’s strong criticisms of his exegesis surely 
would not have prevailed over his joy at discovering the fullness of the truth of the 
gospel.991 By 1532, the differences between the evangelicals’ exegesis of St. Paul and 
Augustine’s had in fact grown in both number and significance: but in 1515/16, 
substantial points of divergence distinguishing Luther from Augustine are not so easy 
                                                        
990 WA 56.289.18-21: Idcirco enim bene operando peccamus, nisi Deus per Christum nobis hoc 
imperfectum tegeret et non imputaret; fit ergo Veniale per misericordiam Dei non imputantis, propter 
fidem et gemitum pro ista imperfectione in Christo suscepta. Cf. LW 25.276. 
991 WA Tr 1.130.1ff (#316, Summer/Fall 1532; cf. LW 54.44): De commentario Philippi in Rom. edito 
anno 32. dicebat: Augustinus si iam viveret, gauderet hunc librum legere, quanquam saepe eum 
perstrinxerit. 
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to discern. How might Augustine have responded to Luther’s reading of his anti-
Pelagian theology circa 1515/16? Or for that matter, how might Augustine have taken 
to Luther’s own distinctive theology, deeply indebted as it was to Augustine’s but rich 
with other influences (the Bible, Bernard, Peter Lombard, Tauler, Biel, Staupitz, 
humanism, experientia, etc.) and thus necessarily advancing beyond it? Turning 
Luther’s 1532 saying at table into a question posed to his own early theology is a 
fascinating and massively intricate thought experiment; and it probably leads whoever 
dares ask it out of the realm of historical theology and into the sphere of confessional 
dogmatics. All the same, the question is irresistible: Had Augustine lived in 1515/16, 
would he have rejoiced to read Luther’s comments on Romans? 
 I think he would have, and I shall return to this question in the conclusion of 
this book. 992 But my argument in Part II has not concerned the hypothetical question 
                                                        
992 At civ. dei 10.30 (Bett. 419), in the course of polemicizing against Apuleius, Plotinus, and 
Porphyry, Augustine pauses to credit the last-named Platonist for daring to correct their common 
master in a particular point of the doctrine of metempsychosis: “We have here a Platonist departing 
from Plato, for the better. Here we have one who saw what his master failed to see; and though he 
was a disciple of a teacher of such eminence and authority, he did not shrink from correcting his 
teacher, because he preferred the truth to the man.” I think Luther was right to believe that 
Augustine too preferred the truth to the man, and to think that in playing the Porphyry to 
Augustine’s Plato in certain points of doctrine, he was himself carrying out the theological task in a 
profoundly Augustinian way. This formed a major plank in Luther’s defense of the catholicity of the 
Reformation. See esp. On the Councils and the Church Part I, where Luther appeals to several 
Augustinian texts (as well as Bernard) to demonstrate the patristic credentials for the sola scriptura 
Prinzip. For example, after appealing to ep. 82.1.3 to Jerome (PL 33.277: solis eis Scripturarum libris 
qui iam canonici appellantur, didici hunc timorem honoremque deferre, ut nullum eorum auctorem 
scribendo aliquid errasse firmissime credam… Alios autem ita lego, ut quantalibet sanctitate 
doctrinaque praepolleant, non ideo verum putem, quia ipsi ita senserunt; sed quia mihi vel per illos 
auctores canonicos, vel probabili ratione, quod a vero non abhorreat, persuadere potuerunt.) and trin. 
3.2 (Noli meis litteris quasi Scripturis canonicis in servire, sed in illis et quod non credebas cum 
inveneris incunctanter crede, in istis autem quod certum non habebas nisi certum intellexeris noli 
firme retinere), Luther states: “St. Augustine must have felt many shortcomings in the fathers who 
preceded him, because he wants to be free, and to have all of them, including himself, subjected to 
the Holy Scriptures” (WA 50.524.12-525.6, LW 41.26). He then argues: “What should we do now? If 
we should take the churches back to the teaching and ways of the fathers and the councils, there 
stands St. Augustine to confuse us and thwart our plan because under no circumstances does he 
want reliance placed on the fathers, bishops, councils, be they as holy and learned as they can be, 
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whether Augustine would have rejoiced to read Luther, but the historical question 
whether Luther succeeded in his (as it happened, heart-gladdening) reading of 
Augustine. With ep. 167, the last Augustine citation in the scholia on Rom. 4:7, I rest 
my case that he did. In the scholia on Romans 7 and 4:7, Luther not only read 
Augustine with the highest esteem, but in the event did so with insight and skill. He 
understood Augustine’s anti-Pelagian theology well. But humanist though he was, he 
was no Patristiker in the modern sense (but neither, for that matter, was the great 
Erasmus). For one thing, he read Augustine’s works generally in light of the positions 
that the old doctor gratiae came to take in the works against Julian, which Luther 
believed to evince the real marrow of scriptural orthodoxy and thus to represent the 
“real” Augustine. But even more importantly, Luther read Augustine in order that he 
might read the Bible, pray, teach, preach, write, and pastor in the Church as a true 
theologian in his own right. In other words, like most readers of Augustine prior to 
quite recent developments in the history of thought, Luther read the great church 
father as a committed Christian and as one apprenticed to the catholic tradition of 
theology. This does mean that there are nuances, details, and developments in 
Augustine’s works which Luther—just like Fulgentius, Bernard, Peter Lombard, 
Thomas, Bradwardine, Rimini, Staupitz, Cranmer, Contarini, Peter Martyr, Calvin, 
Seripando, Davenant, Jansen, Pascal, Owen, et al.—overlooked, nuances which the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
or on himself. Instead, he directs us to the Scripture. Outside of that, so he says, all is uncertain, 
lost, and in vain” (WA 50.525.31-6, LW 41.27). Cf. the 1539 Preface to Luther’s German Writings, WA 
50.658.21-8, LW 34.285: Und folge hierin dem Exempel S. Augustin, der unter andern der erst und fast 
allein ist, der von aller Veter und Heiligen Buecher wil ungefangen allein der heiligen Schrifft 
unterworffen sein, Und daruber kam in einen harten straus mit S. Hieronymo, der jm furwarff seiner 
Vorfaren buecher, Aber daran er sich nichts keret. Und hette man solchem Exempel S. Augustini 
gefolget, der Babst were kein Antichrist worden, und were das unzeliche unzifer, gewuerm und 
geschwuerm der Buecher nicht in die Kirchen komen und die Biblia wol auff der Cantzel blieben. 
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modern patristics scholar will carefully observe and account for. But perhaps this also 
means that there are aspects of Augustine’s theology and spirituality which Luther 
(and not only Luther) grasped with a depth of insight, sympathy, regard, and affection 
that the modern researcher, as a reader detached from the object of his study, cannot 
attain. If love sometimes diminishes the perspicuity of one’s sight, detachment—not 
to mention hostility—tends rather to blind it altogether than to purify it. Regard is not 
the enemy of historical knowledge, and Augustine urges that it is essential for real 
knowledge of the truth. Rigorous and ecclesial historical theology, combining aspects 
of both kinds of scientia, will best lead holy Church into wisdom when it is 
undertaken as a work of friendship, truth, and love in the midst of the sanctorum 
communio.  
In the next and last Part III of the present work, I shall have first to set this 
positive conclusion to Part II in relation to the works of Luther’s maturity which I 
exposited in Part I, in order to assess what is new and what is old in his mature—and 
persistently Augustinian—dogmatics of holiness.  
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5. THE BIG PICTURE (1514—1546): CONTINUITIES AND 
DISCONTINUITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF  
LUTHER’S THEOLOGY OF HOLINESS 
 
 
1. Can this chapter be written? 
 
Is it advisable, or even possible, to give an account of the “big picture” of Luther’s 
theology that reckons seriously with the complexities of his development over time? 
Thomas Kaufmann has written of the “theological problem” posed by that 
scholarly convention which contrasts the young Luther and the old.993 Not unusually, 
the problem began in Luther’s own lifetime: first Roman Catholic polemicists, then 
dissenting voices from within the churches of the Reformation looked for 
inconsistencies in Luther’s positions over time in order either to discredit him or, as in 
Agricola’s case, to defend their own doctrine as authentically “Lutheran.” Kaufmann 
documents how already in the 1520s, Luther began to distance aspects of his maturing 
theology from positions he himself had held not long before, or else—to put a more 
charitable construction on Luther’s recollections—to explain his real meaning and 
intention over against his opponents’ mistaken or malign misinterpretations of his 
teaching. Since for Luther the pursuit of doctrinal truth is a life and death struggle 
between the clear Word of Jesus Christ and the obfuscating lies of the Devil for the 
soul of the Church,994 this sometimes rose ex necessitate to the level of setting forth a 
“definitive” confession that would demarcate the genuine doctrina evangelii from 
deviant traditionalist, sacramentarian, and enthusiastic alternatives. Thus, for 
                                                        
993 Thomas Kaufmann, “Der ‘alte’ und der ‘junge’ Luther als theologisches Problem,” in Luther und 
das monastische Erbe, 187-205. 
994 Heiko A. Oberman, Luther: Man between God and the Devil. 
 404 
example, the 1528 Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper against Zwingli and 
Oecolampadius: which, despite Luther’s adamant and repeated protestations of 
finality,995 he then followed up first with the Smalcald Articles in 1536/7 and then, in 
1544, the Brief Confession Concerning the Holy Sacrament. (Neither should the 1527 
Visitation Articles, the 1529 Catechisms, nor Melanchthon’s work in 1530/1 be 
overlooked in this regard.) At other times, Luther offered authoritative advice about 
which of his works ought to be read in perpetuity. His canon varied: the Catechism, de 
servo arbitrio, the 1531 Galatians, or the 1537-40 sermons on John; or perhaps none of 
his works at all, just die Bibel and Master Philipp’s surpassing Loci. At still others, 
Luther narrated his gradual progress as a theologian out of the darkness of “the Pope” 
and into the light of the gospel—most famously, in the 1545 Preface to his Latin works: 
Above all else, I beg the sincere reader, and I beg for the sake of our Lord Jesus 
Christ himself, to read those things judiciously, yes, with great commiseration. 
May he be mindful of the fact that I was once a monk and an utterly mad 
papist when I began that cause… So you will find how, in these my earlier 
writings (scriptis prioribus), I conceded much and with great humility to the 
pope, which in my later writings and in  these times (posterioribus et istis 
temporibus) I hold and execrate as the highest blasphemy and abomination. 
You will, therefore, pious reader, ascribe this error, or, as they slander, 
contradiction (antilogiam) to the time and to my inexperience. At first I was all 
alone and certainly most inept and unlearned in conducting such great 
affairs.996 
 
Thus in several genres the interpretive paradigm of the “young” versus the “old” 
Luther originates in Luther’s own “Selbsthistorisierung.” Plainly, as such it is not a 
value-neutral periodization (though one might justly question whether there ever is 
such a thing) but an aid to reading Luther’s earlier works with discrimination in light 
                                                        
995 See especially the introductory and concluding paragraphs to the Third Part, WA 26.499.15-
500.26 [B], LW 37.360-1 and WA 26.509.19-28 [B], LW 37.372. 
996 WA 54.179.22-5, 34-6-180.2, cf. LW 34.328. The WA apparatus suggests that Luther has in mind 
the 1523 de antilogiis et contradictionibus Lutheri of Johannes Fabri. 
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of what he later came to regard as sound catholic and evangelical doctrine. For the 
aged Luther engaged in identity formation via self-retrospection, “young” means 
immature, incomplete, undependable, and at times just plain wrong, while “old” 
means wise, orthodox, truthful, and trustworthy. The pastors and theologians who 
decisively shaped the processes of confessionalization in the Lutheran territories (c. 
1530—80) looked to this “old Luther” as the premier Luther, and that quite specifically 
as a teacher of Christian doctrine. For them, “Dr. Luther, of holy and blessed memory” 
was a—probably the, if Lutherans are honest—doctor ecclesiae.997 
 Kaufmann argues that this pretty much held up through the ascendancy of 
Lutheran Orthodoxy in the seventeenth century. Confessional theologians showed 
little or no interest in a disjunction between the “two Luthers,” and in general evinced 
the same strong affinities for the old doctor that characterized the initial period of 
confessionalization. Eighteenth-century pietists like Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff and 
Gottfried Arnold first stirred interest in the religious experience of the “young Luther” 
                                                        
997 Kaufmann, “Der ‘alte’ und er ‘junge’ Luther,” 188-9. Perhaps the most important example of this 
is the preface to the Solid Declaration in the 1577/80 Formula of Concord. Its first sentence reads: 
“By the Almighty’s special grace and mercy the teaching of the chief articles of our Christian 
religion (which had been hideously obscured by human teaching and regulations under the papacy) 
was, through Dr. Luther of blessed and holy memory, purified and elucidated anew on the basis of 
God’s Word. He condemned the errors, abuses, and idolatry of the papacy” (BSELK, 1304, cf. BC, 
524). Farther on: “We confess our adherence to the publicly recognized writings that have been 
regarded and used as creeds or common confessions in all the churches of the Augsburg Confession 
at all times: before the disputes arose among those who had confessed their adherence to the 
Augsburg Confession and during the time when, everywhere and in all articles of faith, they had 
remained in agreement with the pure teaching of the divine Word as Dr. Luther of blessed memory 
had explained it” (BSELK, 1308.29-10.5, BC, 526-7). Etc. Cf. A Sincere Admonition by Martin Luther to 
all Christians to Guard against Riot and Rebellion (1522), WA 8.685.4-11, LW 45.70-1: “First of all, I 
ask that men be silent about my name and call themselves not Lutherans, but Christians (nit 
lutherisch, sondern Christen). What is Luther? After all, the teaching is not mine. Neither was I 
crucified for anyone. St. Paul, in 1 Corinthians 3, would not allow the Christians to call themselves 
Pauline or Petrine, but Christian (Paulisch oder Petersch, sodernn Christen). How then could I, a 
poor stinking sack of maggots, come to have men call the children of Christ by my wretched name? 
Not so, dear friends; let us abolish all party names and call ourselves Christians, after him whose 
teaching we hold.” 
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as opposed to the right confession of the old. Then in the nineteenth century, this 
divergence between Orthodoxy and Pietism/Enlightenment (via Kant and 
Schleiermacher) evolved into two competing factions within the nascent field of 
modern Lutherforschung. The orthodox Theodosius von Harnack (1862/86) 
championed the search for “the whole Luther” and aimed to explain “the earlier 
Luther on the basis of the later.”998 But I think Köstlin’s was probably the greatest 
exposition of Luther’s theology which assumed the fundamental diachronic unity of 
his thought and focused on the “old Luther” (and the Lectures on Genesis) in the 
systematic presentation of his dogmatics. Later in that brilliant and fateful century, 
Theodosius’ renowned son Adolf (1886/90) ridiculed his father’s work and instead 
focused on what he called the “glorious episode” of 1519—23, when 
… power (Macht) was given to Luther, as to none before, to form his Ego into 
the spiritual/intellectual center-point of the nation (sein Ich zum geistigen 
Mittelpunkt der Nation zu bilden) and to summon his century into the lists 
armed with all weapons 
 
to fight in autonomous reason’s battle against tradition, authority, medievalism, etc.999 
(In addition to their plain silliness from the dogmatic standpoint, I find these 
disturbing words to read after the great darkness of 1933-45.) Karl Holl, under the 
influence of Wilhelm Dilthey’s ideas about the decisive formation of geniuses in their 
youth, carried forward the junior Harnack’s emphasis on the epoch-making genius 
and heroic individualism of the “young Luther” into the mainstream of twentieth-
century Luther scholarship. Relatedly, as James Stayer has shown, leading students of 
Holl like Emmanuel Hirsch and Erich Vogelsang were to become ardent National 
                                                        
998 Kaufmann, “Der ‘alte’ und der ‘junge’ Luther,” 190-1, citing the senior Harnack’s Luthers 
Theologie 1/12. 
999 Kaufmann, “Der ‘alte’ und der ‘junge’ Luther,” 191, citing the junior Harnack’s Lehrbuch 3/811. 
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Socialists in the 1930s who undergirded their fascist politics with the religious icon of 
the “German Saviour” which the junior Harnack (himself a liberal) and Holl (a 
vigorous opponent of the Weimar Republic, who died in 1926) had paved the way for 
in their dispassionate works of history.1000 
More recently, in a suggestive essay that echoes Köstlin’s great work, Gordon 
Rupp defends the “inner coherence and consistency” of Luther’s thought and lavishes 
effusive praise on the Genesis lectures (“one of the most impressive of [Luther’s] 
theological feats”).1001 Bernhard Lohse’s introduction to Luther’s theology proceeds 
from a similar conviction of consistency and continuity amidst traceable 
developments.1002 Other scholars, interested on historical and dogmatic grounds in the 
relatively uncharted territory of Luther’s Leben und Werk after 1530 or so, have begun 
the project of understanding the old Reformer on his own terms.1003 But this is hardly a 
trend. In his compelling biography, Volker Leppin has reasserted that the real action is 
                                                        
1000 James M. Stayer, Martin Luther, German Saviour: German Evangelical Theological Factions and 
the Interpretation of Luther, 1917—33 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2000). Cf. Heiko A. Oberman, “The Nationalist Conscription of Martin Luther,” in idem, The Impact 
of the Reformation: Essays by Heiko A. Oberman (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 69-78; Thomas 
Kaufmann and Harry Oelke, eds., Evangelische Kirschenhistoriker im “Dritten Reich” (Gütersloh, 
2002). 
1001 Gordon Rupp, “Miles Emeritus? Continuity and Discontinuity between the Young and the Old 
Luther,” in Luther: Theologian for Catholics and Protestants, ed. George Yule (Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 1985), 75-86, here 78 and 84. 
1002 Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology, 8-10. 
1003 H. G. Haile, Luther: An Experiment in Biography; Brecht, The Preservation of the Church; Mark 
U. Edwards, Jr., Luther’s Last Battles: Politics and Polemics, 1531-46 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1983); Helmar Junghans, ed., Leben und Werk Martin Luthers von 1526 bis 1546, 2 vols. (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983); Heiko A. Oberman, “Teufelsdreck: Eschatology and Scatology in 
the ‘Old’ Luther,” The Impact of the Reformation, 51-68; Graham White, Luther as Nominalist: A 
Study of the Logical Methods Used in Martin Luther’s Disputations in the Light of Their Medieval 
Background (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola, 1994); Christine Helmer, The Trinity and Martin Luther; 
Mickey L. Mattox, “Defender of the Most Holy Matriarchs”: Martin Luther’s Interpretation of the 
Women of Genesis in the Enarrationes in Genesin, 1535-45 (2003); Bielfeldt, Mattox, and Hinlicky, 
The Substance of Faith: Luther’s Doctrinal Theology for Today; John A. Maxfield, Luther’s Lectures 
on Genesis and the Formation of Evangelical Identity (Kirksville, Missouri: Truman State University 
Press, 2008). 
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in the young Luther,1004 and some of the most visible and influential Finnish studies 
gravitate to the earlier period when most of Luther’s explicit references to deification 
are to be found.1005 The festivities of 2017 will probably serve to reinforce the 
instinctive modern bent toward the young innovator, the rebel, and his (we are told) 
epoch-making cry for “freedom.” For his part, Kaufmann sensibly urges that talk of the 
“young” and the “old” Luther, if used at all, ought to be tethered to a more objective 
chronological periodization (as in Brecht’s three-volume biography: 1483—1521, 1521—
32, 1532—46). Because Luther’s thought progressed, sometimes but not always 
dramatically, over time, and because much if not all of his theology was occasioned by 
the tumultuous circumstances in which he lived and carried out his theological work, 
responsible historical research is wise to attend to the particular moment rather than 
the universal story, a text rather than der ganze Luther, the tree rather than the 
forest—or maybe just a single leaf. In process, the real “theological problem” lies in 
tracing the material shifts and developments in Luther’s theology over time, and in 
discerning the motives and occasions for the same.1006 
                                                        
1004 Volker Leppin, Martin Luther, 13. 
1005 This is unfortunate, in that it makes the Finns’ important thesis too easy for their 
unsympathetic critics to reject as vorreformatorisch. For two important examples of this weak spot 
in the Finnish project, see Tuomo Mannermaa, “Why is Luther So Fascinating? Modern Finnish 
Luther Research,” in Braaten and Jenson, eds., Union with Christ, 1-20; and Simo Peura, Mehr als ein 
Mensch? There are, certainly, major exceptions. To pick only two works by the same theologians, 
consider Mannermaa’s school-founding Der im Glauben gegenwärtige Christus, which focuses on 
the 1531 Galatians; and Peura’s essay “Christ as Favor and Gift: The Challenge of Luther’s 
Understanding of Justification” (Union with Christ, 42-69), an exposition of the 1521 Antilatomus. 
Peura’s 1989/90 essay “Die Teilhabe an Christus bei Luther” is an interesting case in point: after a 
close and useful reading of Luther’s 1535 lectures on Gen. 1-3 (which I engaged in chapter 1 above) 
Peura turns mainly to texts from the 1510s and 20s to establish his arguments regarding 
participation in Christ and theosis. This gives the impression that these themes are not so readily 
available in the works of Luther’s maturity.  
1006 Kaufmann, “Der ‘alte’ und er ‘junge’ Luther,” 193-4, 204-5. Kaufmann’s emphasis.  
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 In this, Kaufmann breathes the spirit of the age; and I have no choice but to 
draw my breath from the same air as he, uneasy as I am with our collective and I 
suspect shortsighted rebound from the confident universalism of the prior age to the 
despairing particularism and perspectivalism of the present moment. For if the 
limitations of the present which we inhabit, and the distance that separates us from 
Luther (or any other historical person or event) in the past, means that “the whole 
Luther” is inaccessible to us—and this I take as granted—the more advanced 
historicists are wrong to think that there is no Luther “there” at all, i.e., that the real 
Luther is simply beyond our ken. For though God alone knows the whole truth of our 
stories, he does know it (1 Cor. 13:12), and he makes it known piece by broken piece to 
those who receive both the humility and the courage to ask for it. The Psalter, and 
Augustine’s Confessions, might have taught us this, and kept us from both our former 
arrogance and our present despair. By analogy, I believe something similar takes place 
in good historical-theological work: however imperfectly, Luther’s story, and the story 
of Luther’s theology, may be known and told. This work is at once an intellectual and 
spiritual discipline, and it requires not only technical skill but deep regard for the 
objective reality of an actual human person who lived in a past that the historical 
theologian can enter into only indirectly at best, through the medium of the textual 
data (and gifts they are) which attest in the present the reality or truth of that past.1007 
                                                        
1007 See Prof. David Steinmetz’s forthcoming essay on “Doing History as Theologians.” Cf. John 
Webster, Word and Church: Essays in Christian Dogmatics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 1-6, 
whose reflections on theological reason in the sphere of dogmatics apply, mutatis mutandis, to 
historical theology as well. Webster argues that theology is “rational,” not in the modern post-
Kantian sense of “a critical epistemological directive” but in the ancient sense of “an obedient 
following of given nature.” Therefore: “Christian theology is not a spontaneous undertaking, but 
ordered towards a positum.” In dogmatics, the positum to which the theologian responds is the 
sheer and “devastatingly eloquent” reality of God in Jesus Christ, attested in Holy Scripture (4). So 
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Above all, the historical theologian can read these texts with sobriety, humility, and 
patience; and the closer he or she sticks to the letter, the better he is positioned to 
listen in on conversations, debates, teachings, and kerygma that once possessed spirit 
and life. 
This is hard to do well. It is much, much harder than if I were to set out (as 
many others have done before) to paint the “whole Luther” as a kind of hidden self-
portrait, either as a guarantor of true doctrine or as a genius of religious experience. 
Like the questers for the historical Jesus whom Schweitzer unsettled, that picturesque 
path has often resulted in very clever books that explain eloquently what their authors 
saw reflected back to them in the water at the bottom of the wells they sought to 
drink from. Thus Ebeling’s Luther might more accurately be subtitled Einführung in 
meinen Denken, whereas Bayer’s introduction to Martin Luthers Theologie is qualified 
by the more forthright eine Vergegenwärtigung. The whole Luther, Luther’s dramatic 
story and complex theology “wie es eigentlich gewesen” (Ranke), is as such beyond our 
grasp; and a Luther conveniently useful to the intents and purposes of the “pure 
historian” is to a real extent unavoidable. Kaufmann is therefore right to insist that in 
the historical approach to the Reformer, there is no alternative to the work of 
painstakingly “reconstructing the afflicted, fissured, notoriously overworked figure of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
far Webster, himself a rather eloquent theologian and the leading teacher of Christian dogmatics in 
the Anglican tradition today. Now, for the historical theologian, the positum is at least one step 
removed from the astonishing reality of God. For his or her object is rather a particular theologian’s 
more or less adequate attestation of the truth. If one’s object of study is well-chosen, a trustworthy 
doctor of the Church, the historical enterprise may overlap with the dogmatic. But even (or perhaps 
especially) in such cases, it is of vital importance that the historical theologian keep in mind both 
the responsibilities and the limitations of his office, and the finitude and fallibility of his object’s 
wisdom. Ps. 94:10-12, Isa. 40:6-8, Jer. 23:28-9, 1 John 4:1-6. Augustine, Thomas, Luther, and Calvin 
each knew the meaning of these verses, but many Augustinians, Thomists, Lutherans, and 
Calvinists have not. 
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a wrongly condemned heretic” from the material we have at hand and from the 
perspectives we can never quite overcome.1008 A salutary confession, that, which gives 
rise to a sobering methodology. 
But even so: if confession and truth go hand-in-hand, might it not be possible 
to go about this arduous work with hope, thankfulness, and even joy, provided that 
the historical theologian—as a servant of Jesus Christ and his Church—repents? and 
therefore, prays? The penitent historical theologian forsakes fashionable “academic” 
despair and abandons the vain modern presumption of mastery; for these, as 
Augustine, Newman, Polanyi, and Newbigin knew, are but the two possible outcomes 
for little humans who try to know big things in a divine way (Gen. 3:5). His work is just 
one modulation of holy abiding in the sanctorum communio through faith, hope, and 
love: one limited but vital form for invoking the presence of the Spirit of truth in order 
to serve in a truthful Church. The spiritual conditions for the possibility of knowing 
historical truth are not beyond the reach of confessing reason chastened and 
sanctified by grace (cf. John 3:27, Jas. 1:17). And if it must be confessed from the outset 
that “the big picture” of Luther’s (or Thomas’, or Augustine’s, etc.) life and theology 
cannot be represented with the flawless precision of a Baroque masterpiece, perhaps 
we will find that a more impressionistic portrait, precisely by refusing the pretension 
                                                        
1008 Kaufmann, “Der ‘alte’ und er ‘junge’ Luther,” 204-5. For a similar but more hopeful judgment, cf. 
Mickey Mattox, “Martin Luther’s Reception of Paul,” 107-8: “Luther should be thought of as a figure 
fully in historical motion, one who, to be sure, retained a certain Augustinian and yes, evangelical 
orientation throughout his career, but who nevertheless must be met ever and again as a man who 
remained an extraordinarily insightful and creative thinker, one who broke through to new insights 
throughout his career.” This being so, scholars must attend with patient care to “the flesh and 
blood of a man who continued ever to develop, one who remained a moving, and elusive, historical 
target.” 
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of mastery in representation, is able to attest the truth in a smaller and therefore more 
genuinely human way. 
 In this impressionistic chapter on the “big picture,” I wish to be clear from the 
start that I harbor no such pretentions of systematic mastery of and/or over Luther’s 
theology of holiness conceived as a whole. In right proportion, exercised within the 
spiritual context of repentance and hope, I am convinced of the usefulness of the 
skepticism of that historical mentalité and method which Kaufmann represents. But 
this new and in many respects welcome emphasis on the limits of our knowledge has 
limits of its own; and for both historical and dogmatic reasons it is necessary to give 
some account of how the pieces fit together into a whole. For we limit not only the 
scope, but the depth of our historical knowledge of Luther’s theology when we restrict 
our researches to only one period of his life, or one text from his pen, or one portion 
from one text.1009 It is, of course, useful to know (for example) what Luther’s theology 
was like in 1515/16, and what sources influenced his teaching during that formative 
period. This is what I have attempted to describe in Part II of this book. But if this 
knowledge is not set in relation to where Luther eventually took his early theology, it 
remains incomplete: rather like intensively studying an acorn without bothering to 
take a look at the oak it grows into. On the other hand, if we study only the “exciting” 
and controversial Luther of the 1517—25 period, or (as I did in Part I) the later and to 
many readers less inspiring works of his last decade, our inattention to the roots of the 
Reformer’s subsequent theology in both his own prior stages of development and in 
                                                        
1009 See, e.g., Thomas Reinhuber’s useful monograph, Kämpfender Glaube: Studien zu Luthers 
Bekenntnis am Ende von De servo arbitrio (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000). 
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the tradition of the Church will frustrate our knowledge of his ripening, mature, and 
last theology.  
My object in the rest of this chapter is to overcome these pitfalls by following 
Rupp’s and Lohse’s leads and attending to both the continuities and the 
discontinuities that mark the development of Luther’s theology from the 1510s to his 
death in 1546. To this end I must also, as Kaufmann rightly asserts, attend to texts 
from the middle-period in Luther’s theological career, i.e., the 1520s.1010 Of course, this 
requires that I select which texts to focus on: and such selection is itself an act of 
interpretation, which peculiarly exhibits my limitations both as a knower and as a 
sharer of historical knowledge. It would seem that try as we may, our limits just 
cannot be avoided! But I will do the best I can, and select short but rich excerpts from 
writings that are well known and generally regarded as representative of Luther’s 
theology in that decade of his life. After briefly demonstrating the fundamental 
“Augustinian” continuity of Luther’s dogmatics of sin, grace, and holiness in section 2, 
I will draw upon texts from spanning from 1518 to 1544 in section 3 in order to illumine 
the continuities and discontinuities that characterize the enduringly Augustinian 
Luther’s theology as it assumes its mature creedal shape and its relentless focus on the 
glad tidings of the gospel. This will afford us a textually sound and historically rich 
understanding of what first the maturing (in the 1520s) and then the old Luther (in the 
30s and 40s) set forth in his dogmatics of residual sin, free grace in Jesus Christ, and 
the renewing gift of the Holy Spirit as those realities intersect in the lives of saints 
sojourning toward the courts of God’s glory. 
                                                        
1010 Kaufmann, “Der ‘alte’ und er ‘junge’ Luther,” 194. 
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 As to dogmatics: if Luther is to be received in some real sense as a common 
teacher of the Church (Willebrands), it is a matter of first importance to establish 
what it is that he actually taught. Since the risen and exalted Jesus Christ, through his 
Word and Spirit, is himself the sole Teacher—capital “T”—of the Church (Deut. 18:15-
20, Matt. 15:6-7, 17:5, 23:8-12, Luke 24:25-49, John 1:14-8, 1:33, 3:29-35, 5:39-40, 8:31-2, 
14:26, 15:26, 16:13-15, 17:17, 1 Cor. 2:7-16, Col. 1:18, 1 John 2:20, 27, 4:1-6, Rev. 1:16), 
spiritual exegesis is the master of dogmatics. But in support of this magisterial and 
miraculous act of listening to the Bible, historical theology has its own role to play as a 
servant useful in all God’s house (2 Tim. 2:21). I happen to live in an age that worships 
the young and the sexy and forgets and marginalizes the old. In addition to being 
wicked, this is a way of great folly, for “gray hair is a crown of glory” (Prov. 16:31). As an 
historical reader of theologians in the tradition, I am just as interested in (say) the 
young Augustine’s Platonism as in the old Augustine’s theology of grace. But as a 
pastor and teacher in the Church, I listen to the old Augustine with a greater intension 
and a deeper regard. For he has acquired wisdom: past errors have been overcome, 
new light from the Scripture has shone forth, and Monica’s newly converted wild 
child, puffed up by the vanity of philosophy (1 Cor. 8:1-3, Col. 2:8), has grown up into a 
Vater im Glauben (Eph. 4:12-16). The same holds for the way I approach Thomas 
Aquinas or John Owen; the same for how I approach Luther. His early battles with the 
Devil, his breakthroughs into scriptural truth and evangelical freedom and joy, the 
drama of his controversy with the Papacy, the courage of his stand at Worms: these 
are all objects of great fascination to me, and of real importance for any historical 
account of Luther’s life and thought. But as a teacher of Christian doctrine in the 
 415
Church, I want to listen to the wise old pastor who has read and preached the Word of 
God, counseled souls, taught theology, and engaged in controversy with demons and 
men for some twenty or thirty years. What Rupp wrote of the Genesis lectures in 
particular is true, I think, of his writings generally in the 1530s and 40s: into them 
Luther “crammed the experience of a lifetime, and the great affirmations about the 
gospel of grace.”1011 Paying careful historical attention to how Luther gained this 
experience—and with it, sapientia experimentalis—over the course of his career is 
essential for grasping the mature positions he eventually arrived at; and it is this old 
Luther, not the young hero, who stands the best chance of sharing wisdom with the 
catholic Church. Then, all that remains is the risky task of evaluating, on the basis of 
Holy Scripture, whether what the old Doctor held and confessed as evangelical truth is 
in fact true. But more on this in the conclusion to this book. 
 To begin, let us compare two sermons, one from 1514, the other from 1546. 
  
2. The Basic “Augustinian” Continuity  
 
(1) In part II, I had occasion to refer briefly to Luther’s 1514 sermon “On the Feast of 
Blessed Mary the Virgin, and about Congenital Sin.” From what I can gather, it marks 
the first time Luther excerpts nupt. conc. 1.25.28 with approbation. In it, the thirty-one 
year old preacher and theologian also incorporates two further direct references to 
Divus/b. Augustinus, which I will pass over here,1012 as well as vital Augustinian 
exegesis and doctrine that will occupy our attention shortly. In 1527, when Stephen 
Roth prepared Luther’s Festpostille, he incorporated a long excerpt from this early 
                                                        
1011 Rupp, “Miles Emeritus,” 84.  
1012 WA 4.692.15-17 and ll. 24-5. 
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treatment of the doctrine of original sin, baptism, and grace into the 8 Dec. sermon 
“Am tage der Empfengknus Marie der mutter Gottes.”1013 Roth entitled this excerpt, 
which he translated into German, “Von der Erbsünde” (pp. 282ff), and that does 
capture the central issue at stake in this fairly typical late medieval homily on the 
Feast of St. Mary’s Conception (typical apart from Thomists, that is).1014 In the original 
sermon of 8 Dec. 1514, Luther quite logically devotes his first two paragraphs to the 
question quid sit peccatum originale.1015 Formally, his thesis suggests the more 
optimistic theory of Anselm, Scotus, and Ockham; materially, however, it resonates 
with the mature Augustine and Peter Lombard. Perhaps, then, it reflects the 
mediating position held by Thomas and Biel: and if it does, it would seem Luther got 
the shape of his doctrine from the latter (Coll. 2 d. 30 q. 2), though he has now infused 
it with the Augustinian substance he has recently become acquainted with through his 
readings in the Amerbach Opera vol. 8.1016 Thus Luther first states that “by the 
consensus of all the doctors, original sin is the lack of original righteousness (carentia 
                                                        
1013 WA 17/2.280-89, on Luke 11:27-8. 
1014 See Heiko Oberman, Harvest, chapter 9: “Mariology,” 281-322. On p. 285, Oberman explains that 
in the aftermath of the disputed Council of Basel (1439), the Dominicans vociferously opposed its 
decision in favor of Scotus’ and Ockham’s (rather than Thomas’) Marian speculations and indeed 
“used such strong language that they did not refrain from calling it the synagogue of Satan, whose 
diabolic first-born was the definition of the Immaculate Conception.” Oberman cites I. de 
Turrecremata’s Tractatus de veritate conceptionis p. xiii c 18, ed. B. Spina et (De) Cataro OP 
(Romae, 1547), 276-7, as cited in Meinolf Mückshoff, “Die Mariologische Prädestination im Denken 
der franziskanischen Theologie,” Franziskanische Studien 39 (1957), 457. In passing, I note the 
curiosity that leading Roman Catholic polemicists against the Reformation often saddle Scotus and 
Ockham with a great deal of responsibility for the late medieval disintegrations in intellectual and 
social life that paved the way for, and then fully matured within, the deleterious theology, 
ecclesiology, and social, economic, and political culture of sixteenth-century Protestantism en 
route to Modernity. It is ironic, I think, that Luther held the opinion finally dogmatized in 1854, 
and that (say) Brad Gregory evinces at once such little gratitude for John Duns Scotus’ decisive 
contribution to the development of that dogma and such little regard for the awkwardness posed 
by the fact of the Angelic Doctor’s opposition to the same. Cf. Acts 17:11, ST 1 q. 1 a. 8 ad. 2. 
1015 WA 4.690.3-4: Primo notandum erit, quid sit peccatum originale, ut intelligere queamus, quomodo 
diva virgo ab illo sit praeservata. 
1016 Cf. Heiko A. Oberman, Harvest, 122-3. 
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originalis iustitiae) by which we have been punished through the first sin of Adam in 
paradise.”1017 But our young Prediger then fleshes out his “consensus” position in the 
bracing terms of Augustine and Peter.  
Adam was created just and holy by God, without any propensity 
(propensionem) toward evil, pride, anger, or libido, being ordered rather toward the 
good alone, to chastity, gentleness, charity, and humility. Then, it was as easy for him 
to preserve naturaliter all the virtues he had received in his creation as it is for us to 
see, hear, drink, eat, walk, touch, and speak now. Had Adam stood fast, he would have 
done all possible good works with pleasure and ease (voluptate et facilitate), free of all 
the labor, temptation, danger, sin, and difficulty we now experience. And he and Eve 
would have reproduced children of a like holy nature as themselves: original 
righteousness would have been the natural inheritance of the filii Adae. For in the 
unfallen sexual act, husband and wife would not have experienced an evil inclination 
toward one another (non sentiebant malam inclinationem adinvicem), such as all 
people now feel; and thus the God-ordained natural process for the propagation of the 
human race would have been free from the contagion of sin.1018 
 This is all preparatory for Luther’s discussion of the holy and spiritual 
conception of Jesus Christ by the Spirit in Mary the Virgin’s womb, and for his 
intricate speculations as to Mary’s own conception. But first, Luther sets forth what 
Oberman calls the “strict Augustinian” doctrine of the first sin and the ensuing 
vitiation of human nature by original or (as in this sermon’s title) “congenital” sin. 
When Adam ate from the forbidden Tree, “immediately that original righteousness 
                                                        
1017 WA 4.690.4-6. 
1018 WA 4.690.6-23. 
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perished and was corrupted.”1019 Instead, all manner of evil desires (omnia mala 
desyderia) began to sprout up and grow (pullulare et succrescere) in just the opposite 
direction of Adam’s lost purity and holiness, viz., “toward pride, libido, 
concupiscentiam carnis, etc.” Now Adam had flesh “infected” by sin; and all the 
children generated from his fallen flesh are born with the same sin-sick flesh.1020 Citing 
Gen. 6:5 and 8:21 and Matt. 15:19 and 12:34, Luther defines this congenital sin-disease 
in terms of an affective propensity toward evil (ad malum propensus). All sins come 
forth “from the evil inclination of our heart” (ex mala inclinatione cordis nostri), and 
“it is from the abundance of the heart (ex abundantia cordis) that the mouth 
speaks.”1021 In short, original sin is nothing but “that malice and propensity for evil 
(propensio mali), which all people experience in themselves both toward pride and 
toward the anger and libido that is born in them.”1022 
 Thus far the robust Augustinian doctrine of original sin, as to both its 
definition as an evil affective infection corrupting the fallen human heart and its 
natural propagation through the fallen sexual act. In the next two paragraphs, Luther 
turns to present the good news of the remedy for the fallen sons and daughters of 
Adam; and atonement through Christ’s cross, the healing grace of the Good 
Samaritan, and nupt. conc. 1.25.28 stand at the center of this gospel. Here is the 
relevant portion of the sermon: 
3. Now it has been established that no one will be saved unless he becomes 
pure from this sin. Therefore, God has given commandments by which he 
                                                        
1019 WA 4.690.24-5. 
1020 WA 4.690.25-9. 
1021 WA 4.691.1-8. 
1022 WA 4.691.8-10: Patet ergo, quod peccatum originale non sit aliud nisi tota illa malitia et propensio 
mali, quam sentiunt omnes homines in seipsis tam ad superbiam quam iram libidinemque natam. 
 419
prohibits this sin, and he wills that we should be righteous again, just as Adam 
was before sin. Now, since we are not able to do them, he therefore handed 
over Christ to die for us [cf. Rom. 8:32], in order to set us free from this original 
sin and all the sins that come forth from it through Christ’s blood [cf. Rev. 1:5, 
Gal. 5:1, also Zech. 9:11, Matt. 26:28, Rom. 3:25, Eph. 1:7, Col. 1:20, Heb. 2:14-15, 
9:12, 10:19, 13:20, 1 Pet. 1:18-19, 1 John 1:7, etc.]. To that end, he teaches us to 
believe in him and to pray for the grace (gratia) by which such sin is purged. 
Just as he says in the last chapter of Mark: “He who believes and is baptized” 
(16:16). For when we are baptized and believe, we receive grace (gratiam), 
which fights against the evil propensity (propensionem) in us and takes the 
birth-sin by storm. Then good and upright desires (desyderia) toward 
submission and chastity, toward gentleness, begin; and good works come 
about. Thus it is written in John 15[:5]: “I am the vine, you are the branches 
etc.” And to this end he has given the Creed and the Lord’s Prayer, so that we 
may be exercised daily in faith and prayer, always praying for his grace 
(gratiam) against the birth-sin. For as long as we live, we are not without the 
birth-sin, evil desires (desyderia) always remain in us, which incite us toward 
sins, against which we must fight. Just as Peter teaches, saying at 1 Pet. 2[:11]: 
“Beloved, I adjure you etc.” Thus it [sc. grace] must always be exercised and 
prayed for, even unto death: then indeed the whole flesh is put to death. 
 
4. Since it is said that original sin is forgiven in baptism, how then do you say 
that it remains and that one has to fight with it? The divine Augustine 
responds: “The birth-sin is indeed forgiven in baptism, not so that it longer is, 
but so that it is not imputed.” Just as that Samaritan in Luke chapter 10[:33-5], 
when he poured oil and wine into the wounds of the half-dead man, he didn’t 
heal him immediately, but set him in the inn.  So through baptism all sins are 
taken away, but in this way, that God does not impute: but not, then, that they 
no longer exist, rather they are going to be healed and they have begun to be 
healed. But in death, absolutely all sins will be healed. Therefore, as often as 
you feel that you are being moved toward impatience, pride, libido and other 
evils, so often you must know that you are feeling the fatal wounds of the 
birth-guilt, which the devil inflicted in Adam’s flesh (whence your own flesh 
was propagated); and right away you must consider how you ought to resist 
and pray the Lord Jesus, so that this sin will not prevail over you, but will be 
conquered through his own grace (gratiam). Thus Paul says, Gal 5[:17]: “The 
flesh lusts against the spirit etc.” Rom. 13[:14]: “And make no provision for the 
flesh, in its desires (desideriis).” For he who thus fights with his own vices 
(vitiis)—to such a one, not only is it not imputed by God, however much he 
lives in it, but he will even merit the crown [cf. 1 Cor. 9:24-7, 2 Tim. 4:8, Rev. 
2:10], and he will be set free from them [cf. Rom. 7:24, 8:21]. But they who do 
not fight, but consent (consentiunt) to them, they return completely into the 
birth-sin and become such as they were before baptism.1023 
                                                        
1023 WA 4.691.12-692.12: 3. Nunc statutum est, ut nemo salvetur, nisi fiat purus ab isto peccato. Ideo 
Deus praecepta dedit, quibus peccatum hoc prohibet et vult, ut simus rursum iusti, sicut Adam fuit 
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This will, I hope, sound familiar, for its substance is virtually identical to the 
“Augustinian” theology of sin, mercy, grace, and holiness that I exposited in Part II on 
the basis of Luther’s Romans lectures. And not just the substance! The same words 
and phrases, the familiar verses from St. Paul, Christus Samaritanus with his healing 
oil and wine, and last but not least, the excerpt from nupt. conc. 1.25.28: one would be 
hard pressed to differentiate between the presentation of these doctrines in this festal 
sermon from Dec. 1514 and that of the lectures on Rom. 4:7 in late 1515 and 7:17 in early 
1516.1024 I offer here a brief recapitulation.  
The original, birth, or congenital “sin” inherited from Adam is a bundle of 
wicked desires or vices, an irresistible propensity in the unregenerate person toward 
                                                                                                                                                                     
ante peccatum. Quare quia non possumus facere, ideo tradidit Christum pro nobis morti, ut per 
sanguinem suum nos ab isto originali peccato et omnibus inde provenientibus liberaret. Idcirco docet 
nos in eum credere et pro gratia invocare, qua tale peccatum purgatur. Sicut dicit Marci ultimo: ‘Qui 
crediderit et baptizatus fuerit’. Nam cum baptisamur et credimus, gratiam accipimus, quae contra 
malam propensionem pugnat in nobis et expugnat peccatum natalitium. Tunc incipiunt bona et 
honesta desyderia ad submissionem et castitatem, ad mansuetudinem, et fiunt bona opera. Sic 
scriptum est Ioannis 15: ‘Ego sum vitis, vos palmites etc.’ Et ad hoc dedit symbolum fidei et orationem 
dominicam, ut nos cottidie exerceremur in fide et oratione, semper invocantes eius gratiam contra 
peccatum natalitium. Nam quamdiu vivimus, non sumus sine peccato gentilitio, semper in nobis mala 
desyderia manent, quae nos ad peccata sollicitant, contra quae nos pugnare oportet. Sicut docet 
Petrus dicens 1. Pe. 2: ‘Charissimi, obsecro vos etc.’ Ideo semper exercendum et orandum est, usque ad 
mortem: tunc enim mortificatur tota caro. 4. Cum dicitur in baptismo originale peccatum dimitti, 
quomodo ergo tu dicis, quod remaneat et cum eo pugnandum esse? Respondet Divus Augustinus: 
‘Dimittitur quidem peccatum gentilitium in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut non imputetur’. Sicut 
Samaritanus ille apud Lucam c. decimo, quando infudit oleum et vinum in vulnera semivivi, non 
statim eum sanavit, sed in stabulum eum posuit. Ita per baptismum omnia peccata tolluntur, sic 
tamen, quod Deus non imputat: sed non ideo non sunt, immo sananda sunt et coepta sanari. Verum 
in morte sanantur absolute omnia. Ideo quoties sentis te moveri ad impatientiam, superbiam, 
libidinem et alia mala, toties scire debes, quod sentias mortifera vulnera natalitiae culpae, quae in 
carne Adae, unde tua propagata, diabolus inflixit, et mox cogitare, quomodo resistas et ores 
Dominum Ihesum, ut hoc peccatum non praevaleat tibi, sed per gratiam suam vincatur. Sic Paulus ait 
Gal. 5: ‘Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum etc.’ Rho. 13. ‘Et carnis curam non foeceritis in desideriis’. 
Qui enim sic cum vitiis suis pugnat, huic non solum non imputatur a Deo, quantumlibet in ipso vivat, 
sed etiam coronam merebitur, et ab eis liberabitur. Qui vero non pugnant, sed consentiunt eis, ipsi 
redeunt omnino in peccatum gentilitium et fiunt, quales erant ante baptismum.  
1024 See esp. WA 56.272.3-273.2, LW 25.260 (on Rom. 4:7), WA 56.351.11-22, LW 25.340 (on Rom. 
7:17). 
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evil, “flesh.” God in his law forbids this root sin, and all the actual sins that proceed 
therefrom; he summons Adam’s children to become pure and righteous just as Adam 
had been before the disaster of his rebellion. But because of the vitiation of human 
nature in Adam, no one can keep God’s law by his own resources. No one can purify 
his own heart. Seeing that we could not lift a finger to save ourselves, God in his great 
love and mercy handed over Christ to die for us (cf. Eph. 2:1-5, Rom. 5:6-11, 8:32). 
Through his blood, we are set free from all sin, original and actual: in this instance, 
Luther seems to have the guilt and curse of sin especially in mind, for his language 
evokes the nexus of atonement/redemption through Christ’s cross and the freedom of 
the blood-washed redeemed in texts like Rev. 1:5, Rom. 3:24-28, Gal. 2:15—5:1, etc. The 
gift of redemption in Christ is received through faith and baptism; and in addition to 
being set free from the bondage of guilt (cf. Col. 2:14), the baptized receive the “grace” 
that fights against their inherited evil desires and indeed takes them by storm. Here, 
“gratia” means gratia sanans: the gift of union with Christ (John 15:5), the Samaritan 
who heals the sin-wounds of the man left for dead beside the road through the 
bestowal of those good and upright desyderia which renovate the heart itself and begin 
to reverse its inveterate bent toward evil. Now, the Christian, as 1 Pet. 2:11 and Rom. 
13:14 make clear, has a role to play in this ongoing healing process. Once the grace of 
regeneration has brought the dead to life, the reborn person must—and may—fight 
against the deadly desires that vexatiously remain as his “flesh” right up to the point of 
death. The main way of carrying on the fight against one’s residual flesh is by begging 
for increased supplies of healing grace; enlivened, renovated, and empowered by this 
grace, he is able as “spirit” to refuse consent to the vicious desires that constitute his 
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“flesh” (Gal. 5:17). Whenever he feels himself being moved (moveri) by evil desire, he 
must redouble his efforts, fight back, and pray. So long as he keeps up this holy war 
against his own old self, God in his free mercy declines to count against him the sinful 
desires that remain within him: thus Luther’s constant interpretation and use of nupt. 
conc. 1.25.28 from 1514 on. If, however, the Christian consents (consentire) to the 
desires he still experiences or feels (sentire) in his flesh—then, the erstwhile believer 
becomes one with his flesh, returns completely to his birth-sin, forfeits God’s gifts of 
mercy and healing grace in Christ, and becomes just as he was before his baptism.  
In sum: atonement through Christ’s blood; healing grace to renovate the 
deepest affections of the heart; the merciful non-imputation of the affective “sin” that 
remains after baptism; the contingent nature of this mercy, which depends upon the 
condition that the graced person refuses to consent to the residual sin that makes this 
mercy needful;—these are the characteristic elements of Luther’s Augustinian 
theology of holiness c. 1514—16.  
(2) Now let us turn to the last sermon Luther ever preached in Wittenberg. On 
17 Jan. 1546, Luther was sixty-two years old: a little over thirty-one years had passed 
since he had preached de peccato gentilitio on the feast of St. Mary’s conception in late 
1514. In the interim, Luder had become Luther; the Church in Europe had bitterly 
divided over the teaching of this “drunken German,” as Pope Leo X is reputed to have 
called him; the Reformer had made his stand at Worms, and Leo had excommunicated 
him as an obstinate heretic; all manner of theological breakthroughs, writings, 
conflicts, etc. had taken place; the peasants had revolted and the princes had 
slaughtered them; brother Martin had married sister Katharina as a work of corporal 
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mercy, grown to love her deeply, and had six children, two of whom had died; first his 
spiritual father, Staupitz, and then Hans Luder had died too; Luther had broken with 
Karlstadt, Erasmus, Oecolampadius, Zwingli, Agricola, and Bucer; Leo, Adrian VI, and 
Clement VII had come and gone, and Paul III sat in St. Peter’s chair; the emaciated 
monk had grown into the fat doctor; the long-anticipated general council, which 
Luther had called for in 1520, had just gotten under way at Trent in Dec. 1545; und so 
weiter. In short, almost everything had changed about Luther’s life, and not a little 
had changed in his theology too. Nonetheless, as his swansong in the Stadtkirche 
shows, the baseline content of Luther’s dogmatics of sin, grace, and holiness had 
remained virtually the same.  
 The epistle reading for the day (the second Sunday after Epiphany) is Rom. 
12:3ff, but Luther will eventually focus on v. 6 and the analogia fidei. First, he 
summarizes Rom. 1—15 in short order. It is St. Paul’s custom to teach the great chief 
articles of Christian doctrine first, that is, “about the law, sin, faith, how one is to 
become righteous before God and live eternally.”1025 This teaching concerns faith in 
Christ, viz. how “we are redeemed through the blood and death of the Son of God,”1026 
and it occupies the Apostle in Rom. 1—11. Then Paul turns, in Rom. 12—15, to instruct 
“the good tree” brought about through this faith regarding the good fruits and works it 
ought to bring forth (Matt. 7:17).1027 He does this because he does not want us to be 
                                                        
1025 WA 51.123.8-10 [A], cf. LW 51.372. 
1026 WA 51.124.8 [A], cf. LW 51.372. 
1027 WA 51.124.1-3 [A], cf. LW 51.372. 
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falsi Christiani, but real and true believers in Christ.1028 Since God’s Son has redeemed 
us by his blood, 
… we ought to consider that we should live in a godly way, as those who do not 
belong in this transitory life, but in heavenly life [cf. 2 Cor. 4:17-18, Phil. 3:20]. 
After faith [cf. Gal. 3:23-5], we should not become the world, as he says a little 
before: “Be renewed in the sense of your mind” (Rom. 12:2). “Amongst 
yourselves” (cf. Phil. 2:5), that is, who are Christians.1029 
 
Take to heart God’s great and free mercies in Christ crucified (Rom. 12:1), and 
Renovamini sensu mentis (Rom. 12:2). This is the right order to be observed in the 
pursuit of true gospel holiness, as opposed to the cultivation of merely moral virtue. 
But St. Paul, and the dying Luther as his expositor, is keen to urge the imperativeness 
of this renewal as it is concretely evidenced in good works. These Paul describes in 
great detail from Rom. 12:3 forward, first with respect to the corporate life of the 
baptismal Church (Rom. 12:3-21), then in regards to the Christians’ relation to the 
magistrate (Rom. 13). Finally, he admonishes the strong in faith to bear with the weak 
(Rom. 14—15:7). These, proclaims Luther, are the works of real Christians: that is, the 
good fruits brought forth by those who are being renewed in the depths of their souls, 
since Jesus Christ has enriched them (2 Cor. 8:9) and transferred them from the dark 
kingdom of the devil and of this world into his own kingdom or Church (Col. 1:13-
14).1030 
 But for Luther the incorrigible Augustinian, those whom the Father has 
adopted and redeemed by his Son and begun to renew by his Spirit, in short those 
                                                        
1028 WA 51.124.4-6 [A], cf. LW 51.372. 
1029 WA 51.124.8-11 [A]: Cum redempti per sanguinem, mortem filii Dei, cogitandum, ut pie vivamus ut 
hi, qui nicht gehoren in dis vergenglich leben, sed in coelestem vitam. Non post fidem fiamus Welt, ut 
paulo ante inquit: ‘Renovamini sensu mentis’. ‘Unter euch’ scilicet, qui sunt Christiani. Cf. LW 51.372. 
1030 WA 51.124.10-125.1 [A], LW 51.372. 
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who nicht gehoren in dis vergenglich leben, sed in coelestem vitam, are still flesh-
bearing pilgrims in exile from their true home, and they are incessantly tempted by 
the devil, the world, and their own sinful desires to re-naturalize here below. (As a 
rule, reports of Luther’s “this-worldliness” have been greatly exaggerated1031 and, I 
suspect relatedly, the profoundly evangelisch Bonhoeffer has been much 
                                                        
1031 For example, Vítor Westhelle chides Philipp Jakob Spener’s appeals to Luther’s theology in his 
Pia Desideria: “…it certainly misses Luther’s worldliness.” See his essay “Luther’s Theologia Crucis,” 
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Spirituality,” in Timothy J. Wengert, ed., Harvesting Martin Luther’s Reflections on Theology, Ethics, 
and the Church (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 240-60, here 258. Though this is a step in the right 
direction, I am not convinced that Hendrix’s useful exposition does full justice to the starkly 
otherworldly orientation of Luther’s Genesis “Saints” in particular. For in the 1530s and 40s, even as 
he ubiquitously stresses the obedience of that faith which works through love in ecclesia, 
oeconomia, politia—the Dreiständelehre—the old Luther very much continues to reflect the “stark 
orientation toward the otherworldly” that Berndt Hamm calls the “dominant mentality” of late 
medieval Europe (The Reformation of Faith, 17). See e.g. the description of St. Abraham’s obedient, 
detached, married, monastic, and exilic existence in the 1537 lecture on Gen. 12:1, WA 42.441.15-19, 
35-442.7, LW 2.252-3: Monachi hanc magnam laudem putant, quod relinquant omnia, cum tamen 
plus inveniant in monasteriis, quam in domo parentum reliquerunt, Sed quem mihi cum hoc Monacho 
Abraha conferes, qui deserit patriam, cognationem, fundos paternos, domum et omnia, et simpliciter 
sequitur in exilium vocantem Deum? … Quid igitur inquies, nonne David rex erat, et Dominus terrae, 
quae Abrahae semini promissa fuit? Denique ipse Abraham, etsi exul fuit, tamen fuit in re lauta, et 
habuit maximas opes: vera quidem haec sunt, et tamen fuerunt exules, quia habuerunt haec, ac si non 
haberent. Sicut Epistola ad Hebraeos testatur: ‘utentes mundo tanquam non utentes’ [1 Cor. 7:31]. Ad 
hunc modum omnibus temporibus in mundo vivunt, occupantur quidem Oeconomicis et civilibus 
studiis, gubernant Respublicas et familias aedificant, colunt agros, exercent mercaturam, aut 
manuarias operas, et tamen agnoscunt se cum patribus esse exules et hospites: utuntur enim mundo 
tanquam diversorio, ex quo emigrandum brevi sit, non apponunt cor ad huius vitae negocia, sed 
tanquam sinistra manu corporalia curant, dextram levant sursum ad aeternam patriam: ac si quando 
accidit, ut turbetur aliquid, vel in Republica vel Oeconomia, nihil aut parum moventur. Satis enim est 
eis, utcunque in hoc diversorio tractentur, quod norunt aeternas mansiones a filio Dei paratas.” Note 
Luther’s references to Ps. 39:12, 1 Cor. 7:31, Heb. 11, and John 14:1. In his 1537 sermon on John 14:1-4, 
the Reformer’s “otherworldliness” is again on full display. See WA 45.483-88, LW 24.25-31, e.g. WA 
45.484.36-485.6, cf. LW 24.27: “If you have nothing here (hie), you will surely receive richly there 
(dort). For God still has such a great store that he can give every one of you a hundred dwellings for 
one. Therefore retain your courage, and do not hesitate to surrender what the world can take away 
from you. The dwellings of life are far more spacious than the dwelling of death. Even if they throw 
you in a dungeon or prison here (hie), or drive you away, do not let it bother you. These are houses 
that belong to the world; but you look upon another home, a home which you have to look forward 
to which you will receive and possess there (dort).” 
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misunderstood.1032) The reborn of God, the redeemed in Christ, have eternal life now 
by faith (John 1:12-13, 3:3-8, 13-18, 36, 5:24-5, Rom. 3:21—6:23). They experience the 
advance of this new life through the Spirit’s operations described in Rom. 8, and they 
do the good works of love set forth in Rom. 12—15. But even so, in this life they never 
surpass the angefochtene holiness of the flesh-fighting, law-loving saint confessed so 
frankly by St. Paul in Rom. 7. At sixty-two, the irascible and corpulent Doctor, weary 
of countless battles and eager to depart and be with Christ (Phil. 1:21-3), knew this 
better than ever before. To describe this vision of Christian life and holiness one last 
time for his difficult, unruly, and largely impenitent flock in Wittenberg, Luther 
turned again to the Augustinian theology he had set out in the same pulpit three 
decades earlier: 
After baptism, much from the old Adam remains. As has often been said, sin 
was completely forgiven in baptism, but they are not yet completely pure 
(peccatum in baptismo prorsus remissum, sed nondum sind gantz rein). As in 
the parable about the Samaritan, who carried the man wounded by the robbers 
into the inn. For he did not do this in such a way, that he healed him at once, 
but he bound up his wounds, pouring (infundens) etc. The man who fell among 
the robbers had received two injuries. Everything that he had, they took from 
him, they robbed him, they wounded him, so that he was half-dead and had to 
have died if the Samaritan had not come. Adam has fallen among murderers 
and has propagated sin into us all: but Christ the Samaritan has come, who 
binds us up and carries us into the Church and heals us. Thus we are under the 
Physician’s care, for sin indeed has been forgiven, but it has not yet been 
purged out, neither are we pure (peccatum quidem gar remissum, sed nondum 
expurgatum nec rein). If the Spirit does not rule a man, he becomes rotten 
again. But he must purify the wounds daily. So this life, in this world, is a 
hospital. Sin indeed is forgiven, but not yet healed (peccatum quidem 
remissum, sed nondum heil).1033 
                                                        
1032 See Charles Marsh’s disappointing biography Strange Glory: A Life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (New 
York: Alfred A. Kopf, 2014). For a helpful corrective: Philip G. Ziegler, “Dietrich Bonhoeffer: 
Theologian of the Word of God,” in Keith L. Johnson and Timothy Larsen, eds., Bonhoeffer, Christ 
and Culture (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2013), 17-38. 
1033 WA 51.125.1-14 [A], cf. LW 51.373-: Post baptismum remanet multum de veteri Adam. Saepe dictum 
peccatum in baptismo prorsus remissum, sed nondum sind gantz rein. Ut in parabola de Samaritano, 
qui portavit vulneratum a Latronibus in hospitium. Nam in so nicht an, das er in flugs heil machet, 
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Here Luther sallies forth into his exposition of Rom. 12:6 and the way “the devil’s 
bride, reason, the lovely whore, comes in and wants to be wise,” cooks up conceited 
schwermerey, and draws people away from the true faith into heresy (in this 
paragraph, that of the south German and Swiss Reformed in mysteriis; later in the 
sermon, Rome).1034 The problem with heresy is that it is not an obvious sin like 
fornication: “Other gross sins are seen, but no one is able to judge reason.”1035 So it is 
useful to explain how to fight against the subtle sin of heresy (which is born of 
tinkering with God’s Word, in order to make it fit with what one takes to be 
reasonable or pious apart from the revelation of that Word) by analogy to how one 
fights against “the sin of sexual lust, which everybody understands.”1036 Therefore, the 
experienced Pfarrer fleshes out the logic of postbaptismal evil desire, graced non-
consent, and forgiveness one last time for the Wittenbergers in familiar Augustinian 
terms: 
An objection arises: I am a Christian nevertheless? Well stated. Take heed, take 
heed to yourself. Sin has not yet been purely healed, purged out (nondum 
peccatum pure sanatum, expurgatum). As I say to a young man, to a girl: That 
you would not feel the sickness of your father and mother (fuelest patris, 
matris kranckeit)—that is impossible. If you follow lust, you will become a 
whoremonger, a fornicator. There the Gospel admonishes you: “Don’t do it! 
Don’t follow your concupiscentiae!” [Ecclus. 18:30]. Sin indeed has been 
forgiven and purged, now see to it that you remain in grace (modo ut maneas in 
gratia). In this way the leftover misfortune in the flesh has been forgiven, but 
                                                                                                                                                                     
sed verband im seine wunden infundens &c.. Is, qui inciderat in latrones, hat ij schaden empfangen. 
Alles, was er hat, haben sie im genomen, Spoliarunt, vulnerarunt, das er halb tod war, hette muessen 
sterben, nisi Samaritanus venisset. Adam ist unter die Morder gefallen et in nos omnes propagavit 
peccatum, nisi venisset Christus Samaritanus, qui verband und tregt uns in Ecclesiam, heilet an uns. 
Sic sumus sub Medico, peccatum quidem gar remissum, sed nondum expurgatum nec rein. Si spiritus 
non regieret hominem, wuerde er wider faul. Sed mus die wunden teglich reinigen. Sic vita haec in hac 
terra ist ein Spital, peccatum quidem remissum, sed nondum heil. 
1034 WA 51.125.14-126.10 [A], cf. LW 51.373-4. 
1035 WA 126.10 [A], cf. LW 51.374 
1036 WA 127.5-6 [A], cf. LW 51.374 
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not yet purely swept out. Rather the filthy relics are to be purged, like that man 
who fell among the robbers. I speak about sexual lust, a gross evil which all 
people feel (sentiunt). If a believer does not follow God’s admonition, to stand 
against the Devil who tempts him [1 Pet. 5:8-9], sin has not been forgiven for 
him (ei non est peccatum remissum).1037 
 
Again, what’s true of sexual sin holds for that “more hideous harlotry” which is 
idolatry: and how the prophets raged against “der Abgotterey… der schonen hur”!1038 
 But that is the stuff of Reformation polemics; let us attend to the mature 
Augustinian theology of sin, grace, and holiness still being preached by the oldest 
Luther. Much from, though not all of, the old Adam remains in the Christian saint 
after baptism: and these base reliquiae are rightly called “sin.” This residual sin is a 
deadly affective disease, and its malignant operations, suffered by the patient soul in 
the form of evil desires, feelings, and impulses, cannot be entirely done away with in 
this life. For the wounds of the holy soul are not yet wholly healed. But even though 
the saint is not yet fully healed of the cancer of sin, all his sins, including the remnants 
of Adam’s sin that still infect him, have been completely forgiven in baptism. For 
Christus Samaritanus has taken him up and brought him into the Church; and in this 
hospital Christus Medicus has begun to heal his wounded soul. So long as Christ’s 
redeemed patient continues in his care, all is well, and the hope of full healing is well 
founded. His sins, and the bits of Adam’s sin still in him, have been blotted out, and 
what remains will be healed in time, for the Spirit binds up and purifies his wounds 
                                                        
1037 WA 126.14.-127.5 [A]: Obiectio: Tamen sum Christianus? Bene. Sihe dich fuer fuer dir selbs. 
Nondum peccatum pure sanatum, expurgatum, ut dico ad iuvenem, puellam: Das du nicht fuelest 
patris, matris kranckeit, hoc est impossibile. Si sequeris lust, fies hurer, scortator. Ibi Euangelium 
monet: thue es nicht, folge nicht concupiscentiae. Peccatum quidem est remissum et purgatum, modo 
ut maneas in gratia. Sic das ubrig ungluck in carne condonatum, sed nondum rein ausgefeget, sed 
reliquae sordes sunt purgandae, ut is, qui incidit in latrones. Ut loquor de libidine, crasso malo, quod 
omnes homines sentiunt. Si credens non sequitur Dei admonitionem, wider zustehen dem Teuffel, qui 
tentat, ei non est peccatum remissum. Cf. LW 51.374. 
1038 WA 127.5.-128.3 [A], cf. LW 51.374-5. 
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daily. But the patient, for all his suffering, is not merely a passive recipient of Christ’s 
(and the Spirit’s) gracious ministrations in the Church. He must see to it that he 
remains in Christ’s grace; and, healed and empowered by Christ’s grace and Spirit, he 
does in fact abide in Christ by refusing to consent to the residual sinful desires he 
inherited from Adam. True, he cannot help but “feel” the persistent effects of his 
congenital disease. But the Gospel—not the law!—admonishes him to refuse to follow 
his feelings, with the promise that if he resists them God’s grace in Christ covers the 
“sin” that necessitates this resistance, and the threat that if he gives way to his evil and 
pathological desires the forgiveness he once enjoyed will vanish. Luther’s allusion to 
Ecclus. 18:30, a central text (as we saw in Part II) in Augustine’s explication of his 
theory of consent but by 1546 no longer part of Luther’s canon, is especially striking in 
this connection: as I argued in chapter 2, for the mature Luther non-consent is (from 
the human perspective, not sub specie praedestinationis aeternae) the absolute 
conditio sine qua non for abiding in a state of grace and gift. Maneas in gratia! Thue es 
nicht! Folge nicht concupiscentiae! So far the old and dying doctor iustificationis 
gratuitae, brimming with imperatives which he believed both could be kept by Christ’s 
grace and Spirit and had to be kept in order to continue in that grace. 
Set alongside one another, the two sermons vividly demonstrate the basic 
continuity that marks Luther’s “Augustinian” dogmatics of sin, grace, and holiness 
from 1514—16 to his death in 1546. Residual sin from Adam; grace in Christ the 
Samaritan; healing in the Church by the Spirit, ordered toward increasing purity of 
heart; the utter needfulness of refusing consent to the evil affective pathology that still 
infects and affects Christ’s convalescent saints; the merciful gift of forgiveness/non-
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imputation, the main object of which is this evil desire in the saints; the contingency 
of this mercy upon the refusal of consent to sinful desire (or else upon its renewal in 
repentance): these are the characteristic, fundamental, and consistent components of 
Augustine’s theology of sin, grace, and sanctification in the 420s, and of Luther’s from 
1514 to 1546.  
Now let us see about some of the noteworthy developments in that stretch of 
time, bearing in mind that the shifts which take place in Luther’s theology occur 
within the context of this core and enduring Augustinian doctrine.  
 
3. Continuities and Discontinuities: Luther’s creedal and evangelical Augustinianism 
 
My goal in this section and the next is to render systematisch an account of how the 
embryonic dogmatics of holiness examined in Part II relates in continuity-and-
discontinuity to the mature dogmatics set forth in Part I. Of course, my selection of 
the word “embryonic” signals my interest in the gradual development of Luther’s 
theology over time. But here, I am not in the hunt for the dates, causes, circumstances, 
and effects of breakthroughs, let alone “the” Durchbruch or Wende to “Reformation 
theology.” (One index of just how hard that distinguished project is, is the realization 
that if Luther’s supposed turn from Augustine’s gratia sanans to the Reformer’s 
promissio gratiae is the standard for determining who does and does not count as an 
evangelical theologian, Luther in 1546 himself fairs rather poorly.) Rather, I hope 
simply to offer an historically sensitive dogmatic description of select points where the 
maturing and mature Luther’s theology either upholds, advances, or departs from 
positions held in 1514—16. For two reasons, I join “continuity-and-discontinuity” with 
dashes and an “and.” There is, first, the fundamental “Augustinian” continuity 
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established above in section 2. This ought to inform, and moderate, asseverations of 
Luther’s novelty; it urges us to look for the ways his fresh exegetical and spiritual 
insights cohere with the traditions he inherited, traditions which profoundly and 
permanently shaped his theology. In the second place, it is one my basic operating 
assumptions that the real discontinuities apparent in the thought of some major 
thinkers in the tradition (e.g., Plato, Augustine, Thomas, Luther, Barth) are thrown 
into the greatest relief when set in relation to the continuities that persist amidst, and 
in some sense enable, the often more perceptible shifts, modifications, or 
developments in one’s thought. This is true even of the great and dramatic reversals 
that sometimes take place, for example of Luther against Biel or Barth against 
Schleiermacher. For the old teacher continues to shape the renegade pupil precisely as 
the latter rebels against the former. I am looking for discontinuities-in-continuity, for 
nova in vetere and for vetera in novo.  
 
3.1. From sin, grace, and mercy (c. 1514—16) to sin, gift, and grace (1521—46) 
 
To begin, let us consider the terms that oriented my study of Luther’s mature 
dogmatics in Part I: residual indwelling sin (peccatum/caro), the grace of free 
forgiveness and justification in Christ (gratia), and the gift of new life and progressive 
renewal in holiness by the Spirit (donum). Rolf Schäfer has argued that Luther’s use of 
“gratia” as a quasi-technical term for the wrath-removing favor and pardon of God in 
Christ, and “donum” for the nature-renewing power of Christ present within the 
believer by the Spirit, dates to the Antilatomus of June 1521. He was probably 
convinced of the usefulness of this distinction by Melanchthon, who had borrowed it 
from Erasmus’ 1516 Novum Instrumentum. In the winter 1515/16 lecture on Rom. 5:15 
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(gratia Dei et donum in gratia, etc.), which Luther wrote prior to receiving his copy of 
Erasmus’ work later on in 1516, he identifies “grace” and “gift” as equivalent terms used 
to name the one ipsa iustitia gratis donata per Christum;1039 and as recently as the 
lectures on Galatians published in 1519, after Luther became familiar with Erasmus’ 
distinction, he had argued against it.1040 But Master Philipp’s writings (and personal 
conversation?) in 1520/1 seem to have won Luther over to it. Grace and gift, in their 
proper distinction and inseparable interrelation, factor prominently in the 
Antilatomus,1041 and when the Galatians lectures were republished in 1523, Luther 
deleted his earlier critical remarks.1042 As I trust chapter 2 has demonstrated, Luther 
                                                        
1039 WA 56.318.12-32: Gratiam et donum, quasi differant, Apostolus copulat, Sed hoc ideo facit, Vt 
formam futuri, quam dixit, clare ostendat, Scil. quia licet ex Deo Iustificemur et gratiam accipiamus, 
Eam tamen gratiam non merito nostro accipimus, Sed est donum, Quod Christo dedit pater 
hominibus dare, secundum illud Eph. 4.: ‘ascendens in altum captiuam duxit captiuitatem, dedit dona 
hominibus.’ Hȩc ergo dona sunt gratiȩ Dei, quȩ a patre accepit per meritum et gratiam suam 
personalem, vt daret nobis, Vt Act. 2.: ‘Accepta promissione spiritus sancti a patre effudit hoc donum, 
quod videtis.’ Sensus ergo: ‘Gratia Dei’ (qua nos Iustificat, immo que est in Christo sicut in principio, 
Vt peccatum hominis in Adam) ‘et donum’, sc. quod diffundit Christus a patre in suos credentes. 
Quod donum ‘in gratia vnius hominis’ i. e. merito et gratia personali, qua Deo placuit, Vt donum illud 
daret nobis. Illud ‘in gratia vnius’ de personali gratia Christi intelligitur, respondenter ad peccatum 
proprium et personale Adȩ, ‘donum’ autem ipsa Iustitia nobis donata. Sic et peccatum originis (si 
liceret dicere) donum est in peccato vnius hominis Adȩ. ‘Gratia Dei’ autem et ‘donum’ idem sunt sc. 
ipsa Iustitia gratis donata per Christum. Et addit eam Gratiam, quia et amicis donari consueuerunt. 
Sed hoc donum etiam inimicis ex misericordia donatum est, Quia non fuerunt digni hoc dono nisi 
misericordia et gratia Dei digni facti ac reputati. Cf. LW 25.306. 
1040 On Gal. 3:7, WA 2.511.11-21, LW 27.252: Dicit enim, spiritum tributum et virtutes factas ex auditu 
fidei, et hoc probat, quia sic Abrahae fides est reputata ad iusticiam. Ergo ne fidem reputari ad 
iusticiam est spiritum accipere? Aut ergo nihil facit, aut accipere spiritum et reputari ad iusticiam 
idem erit. Quod et verum est, et ideo refertur, ne divina reputatio extra deum nihil esse putetur, ut 
sunt, quibus verbum Apostoli ‘gratia’ magis favorem quam donum significari putatur. Nam favente et 
reputante deo vere accipitur spiritus, donum et gratia. Alioquin ab aeterno gratia fuit et intra deum 
manet, si tantummodo favorem significat, eo quo in hominibus modo favor est. Deus enim sicut 
diligit reipsa, non verbo tantum, ita et favet re praesente, non tantum verbo. 
1041 See esp. WA 8.105.36—108.18, LW 32.26-30, e.g. WA 8.107.13-16 (LW 32.229): Iustus et fidelis 
absque dubio habet gratiam et donum: gratiam, quae eum totum gratificet, ut persona prorsus 
accepta sit, et nullus irae locus in eo sit amplius, donum vero, quod eum sanet a peccato et tota 
corruptione sua animi et corporis. 
1042 Rolf Schäfer, “Melanchthon’s Interpretation of Romans 5.15: His Departure from the 
Augustinian Concept of Grace Compared to Luther’s,” in Timothy J. Wengert and M. Patrick 
Graham, eds., Philip Melanchthon (1497—1560) and the Commentary (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1997), 79-104, here esp. 82-5, 95-104. 
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runs with the distinction-in-relation of gratia et donum, Gnade und Gabe for the rest of 
his life. Once these terms are cemented in his mind as a kind of shorthand for 
describing the trinitarian work of redemption (which seems to be the case already in 
1521) “grace” and “gift” take on a life of their own, rarely tethered to their original 
provenance in Rom. 5:15 but always charged with the creedal gospel of God’s free gifts 
of forgiveness in Christ and new life in the Spirit. 
Luther’s famous “Preface to Romans” in the 1522 Septembertestament is one of 
the instances where both the roots of the distinction in Erasmus’ and Melanchthon’s 
exegesis of Rom. 5:15 and Luther’s own mature dogmatics are on full display: 
Between grace and gift (Gnade vnd gabe) there is this difference: grace really 
means God’s graciousness or favor (hulde odder gunst), which he bears in 
himself toward us, out of which he was pleased to pour Christ and the Spirit 
with his gifts (seynen gaben) into us. This becomes clear from the fifth chapter, 
for there he says gnad vnd gabe ynn Christo etc. (Rom. 5:15). Though now the 
gifts and the Spirit (die gaben vnd der geyst) increase in us every day, they are 
not yet perfect, since evil lusts and sin still remain in us which struggle against 
the spirit, as he says in [Rom.] 7 and Gal. 5, and as the feud between the 
woman’s seed and the serpent’s seed is foretold in Gen. 3[:15]. Even so, grace 
(gnade) does so much that we are reckoned wholly and fully justified before 
God, since his grace is not divided and parceled out, as are the gifts (die gaben). 
Rather, he takes us wholly and indeed into favor (ynn die hulde), for the sake of 
Christ our intercessor and mediator; and for that reason, the gifts (die gaben) 
have begun in us.1043 
 
Gnade, hulde, and gunst refer to God’s kind favor toward sinners in and for the sake of 
his Son Jesus Christ, the Mediator. Gabe means Christ, the Holy Spirit, and his gifts, 
                                                        
1043 WA DB 7.8.10-22: Gnade vnd gabe sind des vnterscheyds, das gnade eygentlich heyst, Gottis hulde 
odder gunst, die er zu vns tregt bey sich selbs, aus wilcher er geneygt wirt, Christum, den geyst mit 
seynen gaben ynn vns zu gissen, wie das aus dem funfften Capitel klar wirt, da er spricht, gnad vnd 
gabe ynn Christo etce. Ob nu wol die gaben vnd der geyst ynn vns teglich zu nehmen vnd noch nicht 
volkomen sind, das also noch bose luste vnd sund ynn vns vberbleyben, wilche wider den geyst 
streytten, wie er sagt am .7. Gala. 5 vnd wie Gen̄. 3. versprochen ist der hadder zwisschen des weybs 
samen vnd der schlangen samen, So thut doch die gnade so viel, das wyr gantz vnd fur voll rechtfertig 
fur Gott gerechnet werden, denn seyne gnade teylet vnd stucket sich nicht, wie die gaben thun, 
sondern nympt vns gantz vnd gar auff ynn die hulde, vmb Christus vnsers fursprechers vnd mittelers 
willen, vnd vmb das ynn vns die gaben angefangen sind. Cf. LW 35.369-70. 
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poured (gissen) into the heart by the Father in order to renovate it into the new 
“spirit” who struggles against the old flesh and its desires.1044 The gifts have not yet 
been perfected in the saints, owing to their residual sinfulness; St. Paul’s battle against 
his old self, described in Rom. 7 and Gal. 5, attests this well. But seeing as the 
outpoured (or “infused”) gifts originate in the gracious kindness of God, the remaining 
flaws in the saints’ renewal do not hinder them from being taken entirely into his 
favor. For God’s grace is so strong that the really but imperfectly holy are already 
reckoned as wholly and fully justified in his sight for the sake of Jesus Christ, their 
Serpent-Crusher, Mediator, and Intercessor. Thus far Luther’s theology of residual sin, 
grace and justification in Christ, and daily increasing renewal in holiness by the 
Spirit’s outpoured gifts c. 1522, replete with the rich creedal and evangelical substance 
and stated in the same dogmatic shorthand which will crop up so plentifully in the 
1530s and 40s. Held alongside the dogmatics of sin, grace, and gift set forth in the 
Smalcald Articles or On the Councils and the Church, the thirty-eight year old 
Reformer’s pronouncements on the same loci appear to be virtually indistinguishable.  
 How does this mature dogmatics, blossoming in 1521/22 and bearing rich fruit 
in the later years, relate to the younger professor’s exegetical ruminations (and 
Augustinian appropriations) in 1514—16? I think Schäfer is right to locate a 
terminological shift in the vicinity of early 1521. But that does not, in itself, 
                                                        
1044 Luther’s oft-cited paean to the divine work of a true lively faith follows just three paragraphs 
later on in the Preface, WA DB 7.10.6-15: Aber glawb ist eyn gotlich werck ynn vns, das vns wandelt 
vnd new gepirt aus Gott, Johan. 1. vnd todtet den allten Adam, macht vns gantz ander menschen von 
hertz, mut, synn, vnd allen krefften, vnd bringet den heyligen geyst mit sich, O es ist eyn lebendig, 
schefftig, thettig, mechtig ding vmb den glawben, das vnmuglich ist, das er nicht on vnterlas solt gutts 
wircken, Er fraget auch nicht, ob gutte werck zu thun sind, sondern ehe man fragt, hat er sie than, vnd 
ist ymer ym thun, Wer aber nicht solch werck thut der ist eyn glawbloser mensch, tappet vnd sihet 
vmb sich nach dem glawben vnd gutten wercken, vnd weys widder was glawb odder gutte werck sind, 
vnd wesscht vnd schwetzt doch viel wort von glawben vnd gutten wercken. Cf. LW 35.370. 
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demonstrate a shift in doctrinal substance. It may be that in early summer 1521, Luther 
first recognized just how useful Melanchthon’s Erasmian verba could be for describing 
the dogmatic res he had already held and taught for some time. This is not at all to 
downplay the significance of Melanchthon—or Erasmus—for the formation of 
Luther’s maturing theology in the early 1520s: as an Anglican, I don’t have a dog in 
that old Lutheran fight. Terminological precision and clarity is a great boon for all 
intellectual work, and especially for the Church’s dogmatics, and I think Melanchthon 
helped Luther in this regard. But it was Dr. Luther who helped Master Philipp arrive at 
a profound grasp of the res magna evangelii, not the other way around. His deepest 
convictions regarding the sin-sickness inherited from Adam, the gifts of forgiveness, 
regeneration, and healing that are in Christ, and the merciful non-reckoning of 
residual sin that God grants for Christ’s sake had assumed their mature shape and 
substance by 1516: Augustine, St. David, Paul, John, and Staupitz, probably in that 
order of importance, had led Luther to them a few years before the prodigious “Greek” 
assumed his professorship in Wittenberg in fall 1518. 
On several occasions in Part II, I suggested that the young Luther’s 
Augustinian dogmatics of sin, grace, and holiness anticipates in embryonic fashion 
what we find full-grown in the works of his maturity. Prior to the terminological input 
of Melanchthon, Luther generally stuck closer to the Augustinian litterae in describing 
how “sin,” gratia sanans, non-consent, and non-imputation relate to one another in 
the Christian life. After that input, Luther still holds essentially the same theological 
judgments, but now in part uses different theological words and concepts to describe 
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them.1045 In part only, I say, for two reasons: first, because Luther’s language about 
“sin” does not really advance beyond what he wrote in 1515/16; second, since right up 
to 1546, the oldest Luther can still preach the gospel using the same Augustinian 
words, scripture verses, and images that he had adopted ex ipso Augustino half a 
lifetime before. But let us attend now to the developments. 
First, in general Augustine’s renovating “grace” evolves into the mature 
Luther’s renovating “gift.” But as it does so, the reality of vitiated nature’s spiritual 
regeneration in the saints, and of their ongoing renovation, restoration, healing, 
sanctification, or “justification” (Gerechtmachung) by Christ and the Spirit, remains 
unaltered in its substance despite the shift in the terms Luther uses to describe this 
great gift. For the Lutheran donum Spiritus is really the old Augustinian gratia sanans 
passing under another name. This is why it is highly misleading to speak, as Schäfer 
does, of Luther’s (or Melanchthon’s, for that matter) “departure from the Augustinian 
concept of grace.”1046 For, on the one hand, Luther invests his Melanchthonian 
concept of the Spirit’s sanctifying “donum” with the same dogmatic content that the 
earlier “Augustinian” gratia infusa et sanans had possessed; and on the other hand, 
Augustine himself uses the word “gift” to describe the Spirit’s gracious bestowal of 
renovating spiritual delight in the soul: delectatio non litterae, sed spiritus donum 
est.1047 (Furthermore, it will be remembered that the scriptural language of the Spirit 
as God’s “gift” plays a decisive role in Augustine’s trinitarian pneumatology: see, e.g., 
                                                        
1045 On words, concepts, and judgments, see David S. Yeago, “The New Testament and Nicene 
Dogma: A Contribution to the Recovery of Theological Exegesis,” Pro Ecclesia 3 (1994): 152-64. 
1046 This is his subtitle: “Melanchthon’s Interpretation of Romans 5.15: His Departure from the 
Augustinian Concept of Grace Compared to Luther’s.” 
1047 sp. litt. 15.26, CSEL 60.180.22-181.4, WSA I/23.161. See above, chapter 2 section 2.2.1. 
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trin. 5.12—17, 6.11, 15.29, 33—6.) In 1520, Luther is still defending gratia infusa in public 
disputation.1048 In May 1521, commenting on Ps. 68:24 in the Wartburg, he defines “die 
gnade” as “der glauben in unß, die… nit auß uns noch von uns, ßondern von got uns 
geben ist.”1049 In the next month’s Antilatomus, “grace” and “gift” are distinguished in 
the Melanchthonian manner for the first time. But Luther continues to speak of the 
“gift” being “infused” into the soul (Donum etiam infusum est),1050 and he ascribes to it 
the same healing, renovating, and sin-fighting operations that infused “grace” had 
once performed. Moreover, the old Luther sometimes uses “grace” in the earlier 
manner if it suits his purpose as exegete or preacher.1051 It is not, then, altogether 
helpful to first enumerate instances of gratia/Gnade in works after 1521 (or 1530, in 
Lowell Green’s case) which have to do with the abolition of God’s wrath through his 
mercy and Christ’s blood, and then contrast them to the spiritual transformation that 
the same term names in the earlier period. For from 1514 to 1546, Luther consistently 
                                                        
1048 WA 6.85-98; e.g., 85.7, 20-1: 2. Fides acquisita sine infusa nihil est, infusa sine acquisita est 
omnia… 11. Fides… infusa est spiritus vitae. 12. Etiam sola fides infusa satis est ad iustificationem 
impii. 
1049 From “Der lxvij Psalm von dem Ostertag, Hymelfart, unnd Pfingstag,” WA 8.28.20-22. Luther is 
commenting on Ps. 68:28, “O gott gepeutt deyner krafft, o gott bekrefftige das du ynn unß gewirckt 
hast.” Here are ll. 17-25: Bißher ist beschrieben alß was Christus gethan hat durch sich und seyn 
Apostelln. Nu hinfurt bit er, das alßo bestehen mug und erhalten werde, wie es anfangenn ist, davor 
auch alle Apostell, ßonderlich Paulus, sorgfeltig geweßen sind. Und die krafft ist die gnade odder der 
glawben in unß, die heysset gottis krafft, darumb das sie nit auß uns noch von uns, ßondern von got 
uns geben ist, da durch wir krefftig seyn zu allem guttem, widder allis boeße, drumb spricht er ‘wilche 
du yn uns wirckist’, das ist, durch wilche krafft du ynn und durch uns wirckist, die selbe ist Christus 
krafft und doch vom vatter gepotten wirt. Cf. WA 8.34.13-15 on v. 34: ßo thut alßo: gebt yhm die 
krafft, bekennet, das nit ewer werck, ßondern seyne gnade euch krefftig, gerecht und selig mache. I am 
thankful to Schäfer for pointing me in the direction of these texts (“Melanchthon’s Interpretation of 
Romans 5.15,” p. 98, n. 97). 
1050 Antilatomus, WA 8.107.22, LW 32.229. 
1051 See, e.g., the 29 Sept./6 Oct. 1537 sermon on John 1:17. In it, Luther develops a law/“grace” 
contrast much in keeping with Augustine’s sp. litt. The law reveals sin, but doesn’t have the power 
to save us from it or rid us of it; it is a mirror in which we may perceive the hard truth that we lack 
righteousness and life. This is salutary, for it impels us to cry: “Oh come, Lord Jesus Christ, and help 
us and give us grace (gnad), so that we may be able to do what the law demands from us.” WA 
46.661.22-38, cf. LW 22.143-4. 
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upholds his hard-earned Augustinian doctrine of affective “sin” in the saints, and his 
no less Augustinian doctrine of the progressive renewal of their sinful affections by 
inner healing “grace.” But after 1521, “donum” is the word he more typically uses to 
describe the free gift of this renewal through the Spirit’s operations in the heart. The 
shift from one Augustinian (and broadly scholastic) verbum to another in order the 
better to describe the Spirit’s gift of growth in holiness does not in fact signal any 
material alteration on Luther’s part in his understanding of the dogmatic and spiritual 
res which either term can ably attest.1052 
How does the mature Luther’s “gratia” relate to his earlier theology? Once 
again, I think that a deep substantial continuity obtains beneath the surface-level 
(though not superficial) shift in words. Of course, as I just discussed, “grace” often 
refers to gratia sanans for the young Luther and for the old Augustine; and what the 
young Augustinian Luther often named as God’s mercy, forgiveness, and/or non-
imputation, the older Luther often calls “gratia” or “Gnade.” But two points need to be 
made in this regard. First, and quite evidently, the mature Luther continues to speak 
the older Augustinian (and Staupitzian) language of misericordia, remissio, and non-
imputatio/reputatio. Second, and less well-known, Augustine by no means limits 
himself to one way of talking about “grace.” To the contrary, in the works against 
Pelagius and Julian c. 411/12—30, “gratia” consistently unfolds as a rich and threefold 
gift comprising forgiveness, spiritual renewal, and bodily resurrection that reaches in 
its effects from sacramental initiation in baptism to the final glory of the Last Day.1053 
                                                        
1052 Hence Calvin’s duplex gratia, or Owen’s retrieval of habitual sanctifying “grace.” 
1053 For example: (1) Pecc. mer. 2.27.44, CSEL 60.115, WSA I/23.106: adtendere ac meminisse debemus 
tantummodo peccatorum omnium plenam perfectamque remissionem baptismo fieri, hominis uero 
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The heart’s inner renovation through infused charity is central to this theology of 
grace and justification, to be sure: but it forms one part of it, not the whole.1054 Failing 
to recognize this point is a major vice in much of both Augustine and Reformation 
                                                                                                                                                                     
ipsius qualitatem non totam continuo commutari, sed spiritales primitias in bene proficientibus de die 
in diem nouitate crescent commutare in se quod carnaliter uetus est, donec totum ita renouetur, ut 
animalis etiam infirmitas corporis ad firmitatem spiritalem incorruptionemque perueniat. (2) sp. litt. 
33.59, CSEL 60.218, WSA I/23.183 (on Ps. 103:3-4): qui propitius fit omnibus iniquitatibus tuis: hoc 
agitur in baptismatis sacramento. qui sanat omnes languores tuos: hoc agitur in hac uita fidelis 
hominis… qui languores uetustatis, si perseuerante intentione proficimus, de die in diem crescente 
nouitate sanantur ex fide, quae per dilectionem operatur. qui redimit de corruptione uitam tuam: hoc 
fit in ultima resurrectione mortuorum. qui coronat te in miseratione et misericordia: hoc fit in iudicio. 
(3) gr. et pecc. or. 2.39.44, CSEL 42.202, WSA I/23, 442: donec omne uitium, cui consentiendo 
peccatur, regeneratione nouissima consumatur, id est ipsius etiam renouatione carnis, quae in eius 
resurrectione futura promittitur, ubi non solum nulla peccata faciamus, sed nec habeamus ulla 
desideria uitiosa, quibus consentiendo peccemus, ad quam beatam perfectionem huius quod nunc 
datur sancti lauacri gratia peruenitur. qua enim regeneratione spiritus modo fit, ut peccata omnia 
praeterita remittantur, eius merito fiet etiam regeneratio carnis in aeternam uitam, qua in ipsa carne 
incorruptibiliter resurgente peccatorum omnium incitamenta sanentur. sed ea salus adhuc in spe 
facta est, non tenetur in re neque per praesentiam possidetur, sed expectatur per patientiam. (4) nupt. 
conc. 1.25.28, NBA I/18.60, WSA I/24.46: dimitti concupiscentiam carnis in baptismo, non ut non sit, 
sed ut in peccatum non imputatur. Quamvis autem reatu suo iam soluto manet tamen, donec sanetur 
omnis infirmitas nostra proficiente renovatione interioris hominis de die in diem, cum exterior 
induerit incorruptionem. (5) nupt. conc.  I.33.38-34.39, NBA I/18.74, WSA I/24.51f: eodem lavacro 
regenerationis et verbo sanctificationis omnia prorsus mala hominum regeneratorum mundentur 
atque sanentur, non solum peccata quae omnia nunc remittuntur in baptismo, sed etiam quae 
posterius humana ignorantia vel infirmitate contrahuntur, non ut baptisma quotiens peccatur, 
totiens repetatur, sed quia ipso quod semel datur fit, ut non solum antea, verum etiam postea 
quorumlibet peccatorum venia fidelibus impetretur… [34, 39] non solum omnia peccata, sed omnia 
prorsus hominum mala christiani lavacri sanctitate tolluntur, quo mundat Ecclesiam suam Christus, 
ut exhibeat eam sibi non in isto saeculo, sed in futuro, non habentem maculam aut rugam aut aliquid 
eius modi. (6) c. Iul. 2.4.9, NBA I/18.526, WSA I/24, 312: Dei gratia nos regenerante non imputandum, 
Dei gratia iuvante frenandum, Dei gratia remunerante sanandum. (7) c. Iul. 6.13.40, NBA I/18.912-14, 
WSA I/24.501: Nunc etiam perfecte innovat hominem, quantum attinet ad liberationem ab omnibus 
omnino peccatis, non quantum ad liberationem ab omnibus malis… Sed ad illam, quoque 
perfectionem quae speratur, eodem Baptismate, quod hic accipitur, pervenitur. (8) c. Iul. 6.14.44, NBA 
I/18.920, WSA I/24, 505: Absit ut ego inanem dicerem gratiam lavacri illius, in quo renatus sum ex 
aqua et spiritum, qua liberatus sum a reatu omnium peccatorum, vel quae nascendo traxeram, vel 
quae male vivendo contraxeram: qua liberor ut sciam ne intrem in tentationem, a concupiscentia mea 
abstractus et illectus, atque ut exaudiar dicens cum consortibus meis: Dimitte nobis debita nostra; 
qua liberabor, ut spero, in aeternam. Cf. c. Iul. op. imp. 2.71, 2.84, 2.97, 2.217, 6.11, 6.15, 6.29, 6.31, 6.41. 
1054 One finds passing references to Augustine’s triplex gratia in: “Notes Complémentaires. 36. 
L’importance du baptême,” in Œuvres de Saint Augustin 23. Premières Polémiques contre Julien, eds. 
F.-J. Thonnard, E. Bleuzen, and A.C. de Veer (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1974), 798-800; Vittorino 
Grossi, “Baptismus,” in Cornelius Mayer, ed., Augustinus-Lexicon vol. 1 (Basel: Schwabe, 1986-1994), 
583-591, here 590f; Agostino Trapè, Saint Augustine: Man, Pastor, Mystic, trans. Matthew J. 
O’Connell (New York: Catholic Book Publishing Co., 1986), 206f; Hombert, Gloria Gratiae, 164, 265f; 
William Harmless, S.J., “Baptism,” in ATTA, 84-91, here 90; Mathijs Lamberigts, “Competing 
Christologies: Julian and Augustine on Jesus Christ,” AugS 36:1 (2005), 159-194, here 176. 
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scholarship, and it handicaps those few intrepid souls who try to grasp the nature of 
the Reformers’ project of Augustinian ressourcement. In, for example, one of Timothy 
Wengert’s learned articles, he cites a 1545 introduction to Augustine’s life and theology 
by Melanchthon to this effect: 
… [Augustine] everywhere called the Churches back to the true doctrine of the 
Prophets and the Apostles, showed how horribly Pelagius erred by denying the 
sin of the origin, demonstrated the distinction between the law and the Gospel, 
taught that sins are forgiven freely because of God’s Son, not because of our 
worthiness, and affirmed that the Gospel is the ministry of the Spirit, and that 
the Holy Spirit is received by faith…1055 
 
—then gently chides his hero’s “glowing (Lutheranized) review of the divine 
Augustine,” which forced him to explain “what might seem to be flaws in the good 
bishop’s work.”1056 On the next page, Wengert notes Melanchthon’s admission that 
Augustine “often states that human beings are justified through grace (iustificari 
homines per gratiam), when the Holy Spirit is given who enkindles love in our 
hearts.”1057 This is part of the picture for evangelical theology, but not the whole; 
accordingly, Melanchthon shores up Augustine’s sanative theology of justification 
through infused charity (favored by Johannes Brenz and Andreas Osiander) with a 
concise statement of the genuine Lutheran forensic doctrine. In process, Philipp 
asserts that  
… elsewhere, Augustine distinctly and openly affirmed that remission of sins is 
received by faith and that we are pronounced righteous because of the 
                                                        
1055 From Philipp’s preface to an edition of Augustine’s sp. litt. published by Joseph Klug in 1545. CR 
5.805: Sed tunc adversus Pelagii venena excitatus est divinitus Augustinus, qui Ecclesias passim ad 
veram doctrinam Prophetarum et Apostolorum revocavit, ostendit, horribiliter errare Pelagium 
negantem peccatum originis, monstravit discrimen legis et Evangelii, docuit, remitti peccata gratis 
propter filium dei, non propter dignitatem nostrum, adfirmat, Evangelium esse ministerium spiritus, 
ac fide accipi spiritum sanctum. I have revised Wengert’s translation slightly. 
1056 Timothy J. Wengert, “Philip Melanchthon and Augustine of Hippo,” LQ 22 (2008): 249-67, here 
259. 
1057 CR 5.806. 
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Mediator. And by this faith, minds which in acknowledging God’s wrath are 
terrified of and flee God should be consoled. For there are many extant 
statements of his that inculcate this view without any ambiguity.1058 
 
Melanchthon might say this, Wengert wryly observes, but he does so without 
specifying “where the elsewhere in Augustine might be.”1059 In fact, the historical 
Augustine never said anything quite that Lutheran; and Wengert therefore proceeds 
to meditate on the peculiar Wittenberg manner of traditioning Augustine in light of 
the gospel.1060 
 Here, I think, is a prime case of an unavoidable misreading of a Reformer that a 
prior misreading of Augustine has set up. For Melanchthon was actually right, partly. 
If Augustine does not hold a doctrine of declarative righteousness—and 
Melanchthon’s suggestion to the contrary is surely an unhistorical Lutheranization—
the good bishop does indeed frequently inculcate his doctrine of undeserved 
forgiveness, freely granted for the sake of Jesus Christ and his blood, bestowed upon 
faith in baptism by the Spirit,1061 and flowing from the font of God’s free mercy and 
election. It is the first part, enduring in its effects,1062 of his theology of threefold 
baptismal grace. In addition to the texts exposited in Part II and cited in footnote 1053 
just above, I would like to draw attention here to a luminous paragraph in the 421 
                                                        
1058 CR 5.807. 
1059 Wengert, “Philip Melanchthon and Augustine of Hippo,” 260. 
1060 Wengert, “Philip Melanchthon and Augustine of Hippo,” 261-3. 
1061 Note, for example, the role of Rom. 5:1 at the head of Augustine’s summary of his theology of 
threefold grace at c. Iul. op. imp. 6.8, CSEL 85/2.306, WSA I/25.615f: Nunc ergo nostra iustitia est, ut 
iustificati per fidem pacem habeamus ad deum, contra carnis vero concupiscentiam nos 
oppugnantem per ipsius dei auxilium repugnante spiritu dimicemus. Non est ergo huius vitae iustitia 
vitium non habere, sed vitia non eis consentiendo minuere eisque resistendo temperanter et iuste et 
pie vivere, nullum autem cui resistamus habere vitium posterioris est vitae, quae bene gestae 
praesentis est praemium, sanatione nostrae, non… alienae separatione naturae. 
1062 On the enduring Kraft of baptismal forgiveness, see Ekkard Sauser, “Baptismus—Baptismus 
cottidianus—und Sündenvergebung in der Theologie des heiligen Augustinus,” in H. auf der Maur, 
ed., Zeichen des Glaubens. Studien zu Taufe und Firmung. Festschrift B. Fischer (Zürich, 1972), 83-94. 
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“handbook” in doctrine and piety which Augustine wrote for Laurentius. In ench. 
10.33, the old bishop is instructing his junior pupil in the saving work of Jesus Christ. 
The human race, by nature children of wrath and bound by a just damnation, stand in 
need of a Mediator or Reconciler to rescue them from God’s wrath—his just 
judgment—against their sins. Jesus Christ, the Mediator, placates this wrath by the 
oblation of his unique sacrifice on the cross. Thus, in St. Paul’s words taken up here by 
Augustine, we who once were enemies have been reconciled to God by the death of 
his Son (Rom. 5:10): and having been reconciled by his blood, we will also be saved 
from God’s wrath through him (Rom. 5:9).1063 This bloody theology of redemption by 
Christ’s death is the objective salvation-historical sine qua non for the first part of 
Augustine’s threefold grace: the removal of condemnation by the forgiveness of 
sins.1064  
Augustine immediately follows up this summary of his theology of 
reconciliation with a complex and rich sentence that unites the salvation of sinners 
from God’s wrath through the Mediator (viz., grace’s first part) with their adoption by 
the Spirit as God’s children (in effect, its second):  
                                                        
1063 ench. 10.33, BA 9.164-66: Tenebatur itaque justa damnatione genus humanum, et omnes erant irae 
filii… in hac ira cum essent homines per originale peccatum, tanto gravius et perniciosius, quanto 
majora vel plura insuper addiderant, necessarius erat mediator, hoc est reconciliator, qui hanc iram 
sacrificii singularis, cujus umbrae omnia sacrificia Legis et Prophetarum, oblatione placaret. Unde 
dicit Apostolus: Si enim, cum inimici essemus, reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem Filii ejus, multo 
magis reconciliati nunc in sanguine ejus salvi erimus ab ira per ipsum. 
1064 See J. Rivière, “Notes Complémentaires. 27. Économie de la Rédemption,” BA 9 (1947), 370: for 
Augustine, “toute l’économie de la Rédemption se déroule essentiellement dans l’ordre objecif. Ce 
n’est pas de convertir le pécheur qu’il s’agit… mais de lui obtenir au préalable, en fléchissant la 
justice divine irritée contre lui, la possibilité de son pardon, et c’est à quoi tend essentiellement la 
médiation du Fils de Dieu. Rien, d’ailleurs, n’est plus ferme dans la doctrine d’Augustin que cette 
valeur du sacrifice de la croix.” Cf. c. Iul. op. imp. II.172, CSEL 85/1.291, WSA I/25.239f, on Rom 5.9: 
de reconciliatione agebat, quam tu quoque per mediatorem Christum ex inimicitiis quas cum deo 
habuimus, factam esse concedis.  
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Therefore: that we are reconciled to God through the Mediator and receive the 
Holy Spirit, that from enemies we may be made sons—for as many as are led 
by the Spirit of God are sons of God [Rom. 8:14]—this is the grace (gratia) of 
God through Jesus Christ our Lord [Rom. 7:25].1065  
 
Only the very first part of this sentence relates directly to what Augustine has been 
treating in the previous section, but he characteristically moves quickly from the work 
of the Son on the cross to its effects in the redeemed, namely, that through the 
Mediator, by the reception of his Spirit, the filii irae become filii dei. Reconciliation to 
God by Jesus’ wrath-placating blood, and—thereby—the transformation of the 
children of wrath into the children of God by the Spirit: this, says Augustine, is the 
grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom. 7:25). In short, Wengert is wrong to 
smile at what he assumes to be Melanchthon’s patristic naiveté. But more to my 
present purpose: Augustine knew well indeed the gospel of redemption and free 
forgiveness through Christ’s shed blood which the mature Luther sometimes 
encapsulates in the word “gratia.” And as an astute reader of the Bible, it came as 
naturally to him to describe this forgiveness-through-redemption as the gift of God’s 
“grace” as it would for his better-known pupil in the 1520s—40s.  
 In sum: sin, “grace,” and mercy in 1515/16 become sin, gift, and grace from 1521 
on. The first term (with its near associates concupiscence, flesh, desire, etc.) remains 
unaltered in form and content over the course of Luther’s career after his 
“Augustinian” turn in 1514/15. Healing grace becomes renovating “gift” in June 1521, 
retaining its Augustinian substance under another name. Forgiveness or non-
imputation through God’s mercy in Christ, while often spoken of in the old terms, is 
                                                        
1065 Ench. 10.33, BA 9.166: Quod ergo per mediatorem reconciliamus Deo, et accipimus Spiritum 
sanctum, ut ex inimicis efficiamur filii : Quotquot enim Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii sunt Dei : haec est 
gratia Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum. 
 444
frequently designated by the quasi-technical term “grace.” Right up to 1546, these are 
the dogmatic and spiritual realities which together form an inseparable threefold cord 
that cannot be broken in this life without falling away from God’s grace in Christ. This, 
I think, argues for profound substantial continuity in Luther’s theology of sin, grace, 
and holiness even after the important terminological shift in June 1521, and it fits well 
with the striking Augustinian parallels between the early and the late sermons which I 
exposited above in section 2. 
 I turn now to suggest points of greater substantial discontinuity and 
development in Luther’s theology over the course of his career. In the main, they have 
to do not with his theology of renewal in holiness through the Spirit’s donum—which 
remains virtually unaltered to his death—but rather with his deepening scriptural 
understanding of the gratia that is in Christ, that is to say, of the grace, forgiveness, 
and/or “righteousness” which the Father freely lavishes (for Christ’s sake) upon those 
whom the Spirit is making new. At the outset, I again emphasize the impressionistic 
character of my theses in this regard. Without departing from solid footing in actual 
texts grasped in their historical context, I do intend to paint with a bigger brush for 
the remainder of this chapter.  
 
3.2. The joyful gospel of Christ’s victory for us 
 
One of the main reasons Luther’s mature theology remains so compelling for the 
Church today is its relentless focus on the good news of Jesus Christ, the Son of David, 
and his complete triumph over all the enemies of his people, chiefly sin, death, the 
devil, and hell. In the next two subsections 3.3-4, I will flesh this out further with 
respect to the great themes of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness and the 
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promise/faith nexus. For the time being, we need to tarry with the gospel itself and, 
therefore, with the irrepressible joy it enkindles in the depths of the believing heart 
and in the work of the verus theologus. This evangelical joy is, I think, a real 
Charakteristikum of the Reformer’s mature theology. When Luther, commenting on 
Gal. 1:4 in 1531/5, declares that St. Paul “sounds forth nothing besides Christ” (Nihil 
aliud sonat quam Christum),1066 it is hard not to think that he is speaking more than a 
little autobiographically. Likewise on Gal. 1:1: 
Paul burns so ardently here that he isn’t able to wait till he comes to the issue 
itself, but immediately in the very title of his letter he erupts and says what he 
has in his heart. For in this letter, he wants to speak about the righteousness of 
faith, and to defend it and to overthrow the law and the righteousness of 
works. He is full of these thoughts, and his mouth speaks out of this marvelous 
and inexhaustible abundance of the most excellent wisdom and of the thought 
of Christ in the heart [Matt. 12:34]. This flame, this huge burning of the heart, 
cannot be hidden, neither can it let him be silent [Jer. 20:9]. Therefore he says: 
‘And through God the Father, who raised him from the dead’ (Gal. 1:1)…1067 
 
St. Paul’s—and Luther’s—resolute and glad obsession with Jesus Christ and his gospel 
springs forth from the very nature of that gospel as the proclamation of Christ’s 
decisive triumph. On the next page of the Galaterbrief, Luther explains: 
 Thus straightaway, at the first word, the whole matter which he intends in this 
letter 
erupts for Paul. For he has to do with the resurrection of Christ, who rose again 
for our righteousness, Rom. 4[:25]. His victory, therefore, is the victory over the 
law, sin, our flesh, the world, death, hell, and all evils, and he has given this his 
victory to us. To be sure, these tyrants and enemies of ours accuse and terrify 
us. Nevertheless, they are not able to drive us into despair and condemn us. 
For Christ, having been raised from the dead, is the Victor over them, and he is 
our righteousness. Therefore thanks be to God, who has given us the victory 
through our Lord Jesus Christ (1 Cor. 15:57), Amen.1068 
 
                                                        
1066 WA 40/1.82.31-2 [B], cf. LW 26.32. 
1067 WA 40/1.64.14-21 [B], cf. LW 26.21. 
1068 WA 40/1.65.10-18 [B], cf. LW 26.21-2. 
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So Luther on Paul in 1531/5, in just the first pages of that most joyful book which 
helped John Bunyan to begin to trust in “grace abounding to the chief of sinners.” The 
question is: did the young Luther c. 1514—16 have this joy in Christ the Victor?  
 There are hints of it. In a remarkable 1514 sermon on “The Foundation of 
Theology,” Luther speaks of Christ’s substitutionary penal death in a manner hard to 
distinguish from that of his later years. Christ did and suffered nothing for himself, 
but for us, indeed for me; and when I cling to him through faith, “so great is the grace 
given to me” that his obedience, passion, righteousness, and works become my very 
own.1069 In 1515/16, a number of texts in the Romans lectures evince the great exchange 
between Christ and the sinner, the co-relativity of the promise and faith, and the 
imputation of iustitia Christi aliena.1070 And in April 1516, there is Luther’s rightly 
                                                        
1069 WA 4.652.3-20: Sic enim Christus dicit: ‘Ego sum ostium: qui per me ingressus fuerit, pascua 
inveniet’. Item: ‘Ego sum via, veritas et vita’. Item: ‘Et nemo venit ad me, nisi pater traxerit eum’, und 
das geschihet per verbi praedicationem. Und das gehet alßo zcu, Das hertz sall hangen In Christo, 
desperemus de nostris, trosten uns allein des, quia satisfecit pro peccatis nostris, quia passio sua et 
poena, sanguinis effusio et mors, das gildt mir, Ehr ist sunst ein her des hymmels, allein das ehr sein 
ehre tregtt, ut vitaremus omnia nostra. Voluntatem dedit, voluntatem reddamus. Sic esse oportet. ‘Jha 
wo findt man den meister?’ Christus est magister, ipse vitam habet et perdit, gibtt das leben vor den 
todtt, perdit etiam famam, iustitiam und alßo vill schoner wergke, ut esset in eo virtutum thesaurus, 
omnia reliquit, ut amaret patrem, iussus est trucidari ut scelestus homo, wie ein boßer bube. Unde 
dixit: ‘Vide, pater, haec omnia facta, ut quanto te amore prosequar videas’. Item omnia perdit, etiam 
matrem, klebt und hengkt gar bloß in patris voluntate. Ille voluntatem Dei nobis reddidit, qui et solus 
servavit. Nuh hatt ers fur sich nichtt gethan, sed pro nobis. Ergo cum in Christo haereo, sua 
oboedientia, passio, iustitia opera mea sunt per fidem. Et tanta est mihi data gratia, ut per fidem 
omnes Christi actiones mihi propriae sint. 
1070 For iustitia aliena in 1515, see, e.g., (1) the scholion on Rom. 1:1, WA 56.158.10-14, LW 25.136: Deus 
enim nos non per domesticam, Sed per extraneam Iustitiam et sapientiam vult saluare, Non que 
veniat et nascatur ex nobis, Sed que aliunde veniat in nos, Non que in terra nostra oritur, Sed que de 
celo venit. Igitur omnino Externa et aliena Iustitia oportet erudiri. (2) On Rom. 2:15, WA 56.204.15-
28, LW 25.188: Cor enim credentis in Christum, si reprehenderit eum et accusauerit eum contra eum 
testificans de malo opere, Mox auertit se et ad Christum conuertit dicitque: Hic autem satisfecit, hic 
Iustus est, hic mea defensio, hic pro me mortuus est, hic suam iustitiam meam fȩcit et meum 
peccatum suum fȩcit. Quod si peccatum meum suum fecit, iam ego illud non habeo et sum liber. Si 
autem Iustitiam suam meam fecit, iam Iustus ego sum eadem Iustitia, qua ille. Peccatum autem 
meum illum non potest absorbere, Sed absorbetur in abysso iustitiȩ eius infinita, Cum sit ipse Deus 
benedictus in sȩcula. Ac sic ‘Deus maior est corde nostro’. Maior est defensor quam accusator, etiam 
in infinitum. Deus defensor, cor accusator. Quȩ proportio? Sic, Sic, etiam Sic! ‘Quis accusabit 
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cherished letter to his Augustinian confrère, Georg Spenlein: “Learn Christ and him 
crucified [1 Cor. 2:2]… Beware of aspiring to so great a purity that you do not wish to 
be looked upon as a sinner, or to be one; for Christ dwells only in sinners.”1071 In short, 
the substance of the gospel of Jesus Christ as Luther himself would later come to 
confess and preach it is in place by 1514. And I would suggest that any Protestant 
Augustinian who wishes to deny this needs first to think carefully about whether he or 
she can do so while maintaining the catholicity of his confession with any real 
historical seriousness. For if Luther is not preaching the gospel in 1514—16, then 
Augustine never did at all.1072 
That said, when such powerful adumbrations of Luther’s mature evangelical 
teaching as these come to the fore in mid 1510s, my impression is that they do so as 
                                                                                                                                                                     
aduersus electos Dei?’ q. d. Nullus. Quare? Quia ‘Deus est, qui iustificat. Quis est, qui condemnet?’ 
Nullus. Quare? Quia ‘Christus Ihesus est’ (qui etiam Deus est), ‘qui mortuus est, immo qui et 
resurrexit’ etc. ‘Si ergo Deus pro nobis, quis contra nos?’ (3) On Rom. 3:27, WA 56.267.1-7, LW 
25.254: Restat igitur in peccatis nos manere oportere et in spe misericordie Dei gemere pro liberatione 
ex ipsis. Sicut Sanandus, qui nimium festinat sanari, certe potest grauius recidiuare. Paulatim ergo 
sanari oportet et aliquas imbecillitates aliquamdiu sustinere. Sufficit enim, quod peccatum displicet, 
etsi non omnino recedat. Christus enim omnia portat, si displiceant et iam non nostra, Sed ipsius sunt 
et Iustitia eius nostra vicissim. 
1071 WA Br 1.35.15-36, #11 (8 April 1516): Caeterum quid agat anima tua, scire cupio, utrumne tandem 
suam pertaesa propriam iustitiam discat in iustitia Christi respirare atque confidere. Fervet enim 
nostra aetate tentatio praesumptionis in multis, et iis praecipue, qui iusti et boni esse omnibus viribus 
student; ignorantes iustitiam Dei, quae in Christo est nobis effusissime et gratis donata, quaerunt in 
se ipsis tam diu operari bene, donec habeant fiduciam standi coram Deo, veluti virtutibus et meritis 
ornati, quod est impossibile fieri. Fuisti tu apud nos in hac opinione, imo errore; fui et ego, sed et nunc 
quoque pugno contra istum errorem, sed nondum expugnavi. Igitur, mi dulcis Frater, disce Christum 
et hunc crucifixum, disce ei cantare et de te ipso desperans dicere ei: tu, Domine Ihesu, es iustitia 
mea, ego autem sum peccatum tuum; tu assumpsisti meum, et dedisti mihi tuum; assumpsisti, quod 
non eras, et dedisti mihi, quod non eram. Cave, ne aliquando ad tantam puritatem aspires, ut 
peccator tibi videri nolis, imo esse. Christus enim non nisi in peccatoribus habitat. Ideo enim 
descendit de coelo, ubi habitabat in iustis, ut etiam habitaret in peccatoribus. Istam charitatem eius 
rumina, et videbis dulcissimam consolationem eius. Si enim nostris laboribus et afflictionibus ad 
conscientiae quietem pervenire oportet, ut quid ille mortuus est? Igitur non nisi in illo, per fiducialem 
desperationem tui et operum tuorum, pacem invenies; disces insuper ex ipso, ut, sicut ipse suscepit te 
et peccata tua fecit sua, et suam iustitiam fecit tuam. 
1072 A bitter pill which John Maxfield, Luther’s Lectures on Genesis, 74-7, 115, 139-40, appears willing 
to swallow. 
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pretty isolated beams of sunlight momentarily breaking through a dark and ominous 
sky.1073 In hindsight, the evangelical theologian (I refer to conviction, not 
denomination) can switch the metaphor slightly and see these shafts of light as the 
dawning of the sun of righteousness (Mal. 4:2). But brooding brother Martin, 
convinced as he was that fiducia was a sign of spiritual presumption and that 
insecurity was conducive to humility, did not enjoy the luxury of this hindsight. In this 
early monastic period, already firmly “Augustinian” but not yet fully “evangelical,” the 
overall tenor of Luther’s writings is one of penitential sorrow; and his driving concern 
seems to be less “How can I find a gracious God?” as “How can I live faithfully as a 
humble monk, and teach others to do the same?” Luther of course knew, believed, and 
taught that Jesus Christ, the Son of God and David, had won the victory for us by his 
incarnation, death, resurrection, and ascension.1074 But then, so did all major patristic 
and medieval theologians: and lecturing on Gen. 28:12 in 1542, e.g., Luther would still 
single out not just Augustine and Ambrose but Bernard and Bonaventure too as 
especially praiseworthy for their glad delight in the incarnation of God’s Son.1075 
                                                        
1073 Bayer (Promissio, 140-2) acknowledges these texts to some extent but in the end argues them 
away, the better to fit his thesis of a Wende in summer 1518. I prefer to let the texts stand, and to 
posit instead an inconsistency in Luther’s theology as it develops (rather like a Christian saint) in 
fits and starts.  
1074 See esp. the 1515 scholion on Rom. 1:3-4, e.g., WA 56.168.33-169.3: Igitur Epilogemus. Euangelium 
est de filio suo facto ex semine Dauid, manifestato nunc filio Dei in potestate omnium per spiritum. 
sanctum datum ex resurrectione mortuorum, Ihesu Christo domino nostro. Ecce sic habes, Quod 
Euangelium est sermo de Christo filio Dei primum humiliato et postea glorificato per spiritum 
sanctum. Cf. LW 25.148. 
1075 WA 43.580.38-581.4, 11-13: haec est illa ingens et inenerrabilis dignitas humani generis, quam 
nemo potest eloqui, quod Deus hac miranda coniunctione copulavit sibi humanam naturam. 
Ambrosius et inprimis Bernardus admodum delectantur hoc loco prae omnibus dulcissimo, et opere 
isto incarnationis, et quidem recte et pie. Nam talis delectatio erit gaudium supra omne gaudium, et 
beatitudo aeterna, cum illic vere intuebimur nostram carnem per omnia similem nobis, et in summo 
pariter et infimo loco. Haec enim omnia fecit pro nobis, descendit ad inferos, et adscendit ad coelos… 
Bernardus valde dilexit incarnationem Christi, item Bonaventura, quos duos maxime laudo propter 
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Furthermore, by 1515/16 Luther clearly believed that the victory of Christ, and its spoils 
in righteousness, was given freely to faith: as did Augustine and arguably a few other 
fathers like the author of the Epistle to Diognetus, Polycarp, Irenaeus, Hilary, Marius 
Victorinus, Ambrosiaster, Ambrose, Prosper, Leo, and Fulgentius,1076 together with at 
least some medieval catholics (not least Bernard, and some luminaries in the 
remarkable succession of teachers in the O.E.S.A. unearthed by Müller, Stakemeier, 
Zumkeller, Trapp, Oberman, and Saak). But as I argued in Part II, in 1515/16 Luther 
does not yet consistently hold that the believer is free to trust that he possesses the gift 
of Christ’s victorious righteousness by faith. On the contrary: if the devout monk 
thinks he is righteous, that is a surefire proof that he isn’t. Whereas during the 1518—
20 period, Luther begins to teach that apart from this assured resting of the heart in 
Christ, there is no real faith at all. On this point, farther in section 3.4. 
 For my present purposes, I want to relay—with minimal comment—a handful 
of texts from Luther’s middle and late career which illustrate the joyful gospel of 
Christ’s victory with admirable clarity. (1) In the first place, a classic “Finnish” excerpt 
from the 1520 Freedom of the Christian: 
… faith bodily unites (copulat) the soul with Christ as a bride with the 
bridegroom. By this mystery (as the Apostle teaches) Christ and the soul are 
made one flesh (Eph. 5:29-32, Gen. 2:24). For if they are one flesh, and there is a 
true marriage between them—indeed, by far the most perfect of all is 
consummated, since human marriages are but tenuous figures of this single 
                                                                                                                                                                     
illum articulum, de quo tam libenter et praeclare cogitant, et magna laetitia et pietate in se ipsis 
exercent. Cf. LW 5.220-1. 
1076 For overviews, see Robert Eno, “Some Patristic Views on the Relationship of Faith and Works in 
Justification,” Recherches augustiniennes 19 (1984): 3-27; D. H. Williams, “Justification by Faith: a 
Patristic Doctrine,” JEH 57/4 (Oct. 2006): 649-67. For narrower studies: C. P. Bammel, “Justification 
by Faith in Augustine and Origen,” JEH 47/2 (April 1996), 223-35; J. Warren Smith, “Justification 
and Merit before the Pelagian Controversy: The Case of Ambrose of Milan,” Pro Ecclesia 16/2 
(2007): 195-217; D. H. Williams, “Hilary of Poitiers and Justification by Faith according to the Gospel 
of Matthew,” Pro Ecclesia 16/4 (2007): 445-61. 
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true marriage—it follows that everything they have, both good and evil, 
becomes common. So that whatever Christ has, the believing soul is able to 
presume and glory about these things as if they were his own; and whatever 
belongs to the soul, these Christ arrogates to himself as if they were his own. 
Now let us compare these things, and we will see incomparable things. Christ 
is full of grace, life, and salvation. The soul is full of sins, death, and damnation. 
Now let faith come between, and it will happen that sins, death, and hell are 
Christ’s, but grace, life, and salvation are the soul’s. Indeed, it is necessary that 
he, if he is the bridegroom, accept the things which the spouse has and, at the 
same time, impart to the spouse the things which are his own. For if he gives 
her his own body and his own self, how will he not give her all his own things? 
[cf. Rom. 8:32] And if he receives the body of the bride, how will he not receive 
all the bride’s things? 
 
Now this brings forth a most sweet spectacle, not only of communion but of a 
saving war and of victory and salvation and redemption. For since Christ is God 
and Man in the same person, which neither sinned, died, nor was damned, 
neither is he able to sin, die, or be damned, and his righteousness, life, and 
salvation is unconquerable, eternal, omnipotent; since, I say, such a person 
made the sins, death, and hell of his bride common to himself, indeed proper 
to himself, on account of faith’s wedding-ring, and in these matters he does not 
act otherwise than if they were his very own and if he himself had sinned, 
laboring, dying, and descending to hell in order to conquer them all; and sin, 
death, and hell were not able to swallow him up; these were necessarily 
swallowed up in him in an amazing duel (stupendo duello). For his very 
righteousness is greater than all sins, his own life is more powerful than all 
death, his own salvation is more invincible than all hell. Thus the believing 
soul, through the pledge of its faith in Christ her bridegroom, becomes free 
from all sins, secure from death and safe from hell, since the eternal 
righteousness, life, and salvation of Christ her bridegroom have been given her. 
Thus he presents to himself a glorious bride without spot or wrinkle, cleansing 
her by the washing of water in the word of life [Eph. 5:25-27], that is through 
faith in the word of life, righteousness, and salvation. Thus he weds her to 
himself in faith, in mercy and in compassion, in righteousness and judgment, 
as Hos. 2 [:19-20] says. 
 
Who, therefore, sufficiently esteems these royal nuptials? Who comprehends 
the riches of the glory of this grace [Eph. 1:6-7, 12, 14, 2:7]? Here this rich and 
pious bridegroom, Christ, considers this poor little woman, this ungodly harlot, 
redeems her from all her evils and adorns her with all his good things. Now 
indeed it is impossible that her sins should destroy her, since they have been 
set upon Christ [Isa. 53:6] and swallowed up in him, and she has the very 
righteousness in Christ her bridegroom of which she may presume as her very 
own, and against all her sins, against death and hell she is able with confidence 
(cum fidutia) to set this righteousness and say: “If I myself have sinned, and my 
Christ in whom I believe has not sinned, all his things are mine and all my 
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things are his,” as in the Song of Solomon: “My beloved is mine, and I am his” 
(2:16). This is what Paul says, 1 Cor. 15[:57]: “Thanks be to God, who has given 
us the victory through Jesus Christ our Lord.” Victory, that is, over sin and 
death, just as he also says there: “sin is the sting of death, but the power of sin 
is the law” (15:56).1077 
 
All the telling marks of Luther’s mature theology of Christ’s victory and the believing 
soul’s participation therein are present in this great Reformation tract: the orthodox 
doctrine of the two natures united in Christ’s person; his marvelous duel with sin, 
death, the devil, and hell, and his unequivocal triumph over the same, which triumph 
is possible precisely because of the character of his person as the invincible God-Man 
(Luy); the believer’s mystical union with Christ through faith (the Finns); the 
exchange of all the sinner’s propria with Christ’s (and vice versa) in faith’s marriage; 
the joy and freedom of the sinner saved thus and clothed with Christ and his divine 
righteousness, life, and salvation; the Augustinian boasting, not in one’s self but in 
Christ and in gloria suae gratiae (Hombert); St. Paul’s shout of victory at 1 Cor. 15:56-7, 
the climax of his “sprawling masterpiece on the resurrection” (as N.T. Wright styles 1 
Cor. 15). Looking back, we see the ripening seeds of Luther’s theology of the gospel in 
the 1516 letter to Spenlein now fully flowered into Reformation theology; looking 
ahead, we have here the lineaments of the gospel that Luther will preach, teach, 
confess, and struggle to believe right up to the end of his life. 
 (2) In the second place, a passage from the 1537—40 Saturday sermons on St. 
John’s Gospel which Luther preached during Pfarrer Bugenhagen’s errand to 
Denmark. The whole series is an exercise in the kind of patristic/homiletical and 
scholastic/technical christology that Yeago and Luy have illumined in their researches. 
                                                        
1077 WA 7.54.31-55.36, cf. LW 31:351-2. 
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In order to prime his readers for the rich feast of scriptural exegesis, patristic 
orthodoxy, scholastic precision, and Reformation soteriology which is to follow, 
Luther ranges freely through John 1:1-18 and 29-34 in the first sermon, of 7 July 1537. I 
pick up here near the end: 
In sum, in the first place we must have such a Savior who can deliver us from 
the power of the god of this world, of the Devil, likewise from sin and death, 
that is: he must be the true, eternal GOD, through whom all who believe in 
him become righteous and blessed. For if he is not more and higher than 
Moses, Elijah, Isaiah, John the Baptist, etc., then he is not our Redeemer. But if 
he, as the Son of God, shed his blood for us to redeem us and purify us from 
sin, and we believe it, and rub it in the Devil’s nose when he terrifies and 
plagues us because of sin, then the Devil is defeated quickly; he has to go away 
and leave us in peace. For the fishhook, that is: the divinity of CHRIST, was so 
hidden under the earthworm, under his humanity (which the Devil gobbled up 
in his throat when Christ died and was buried) that it tore open the Devil’s 
belly, so that he couldn’t keep him down with justice, but had to give him up 
again. And thereby he ate death, which is our highest consolation: for just as 
little as he was able to keep Christ in death, so little can he also keep us in it, 
who believe in Christ. 
 
On the other hand, we must have a Savior who is also our Brother, of our flesh 
and blood, who became like us in all things sin only except [Heb. 4:15]; and 
that, we sing, confess, and say also in our Children’s Creed: “I believe in Jesus 
Christ, the one only Son of God the Almighty Father, who was conceived by the 
Holy Spirit,” not by Joseph, “born of Mary,” a true, natural Man, “who suffered, 
was crucified, died, on the third day rose from the dead, ascended into Heaven, 
is sitting at God’s right hand,” in the same power and glory with the Father. 
That, therefore, I may say with a joyful heart: “I believe in Jesus Christ, GOD’S 
only Son, who sits at his right hand and intercedes for me [Rom. 8:34, Heb. 1:3-
4, 8:1-2, 9:11-28, 10:11-14, 1 John 2:1-2], he who is even my flesh and blood, Ja, he 
is my brother! For us men and for our salvation he has come from heaven, 
become Man, and died for our sins.” Therefore John too has begun his Gospel 
with the eternal divinity of Christ, saying: “In the beginning was the Word” 
(1:1), and “this same Word,” he says later on, “has become flesh” (1:14)… So now 
this article, that Christ is true natural God and Man, is our Rock [Matt. 16:16-18, 
1 Cor. 10:4], and our salvation and blessedness is established upon it. On this 
we were baptized; on this we live and die.1078 
 
                                                        
1078 WA 46.556.25-557.16, 31-3, cf. LW 22.24-5. 
 453
Here, I think, three or four currents flow together into a remarkable whole: first, a 
doctrinal defense, in the face of alarming Anabaptist aberrations, of the orthodox duae 
naturae in una persona christology; second, a rhetorically charged proclamation of 
redemption through the blood of Jesus Christ, the worm-enfleshed Fishhook, which I 
suspect Gregory of Nyssa would have recognized as his own; third, an insistence that 
the gospel of redemption and creedal orthodoxy are mutually interdependent and 
inseparable; fourth, an earthy, rambunctious sense of Devil-defying joy, since the 
believer shares by faith in the invincible triumph of the Savior who tore open the 
Devil’s belly and sits at the Father’s right hand interceding for us in our own flesh and 
blood. “Come sin and death, Devil and hell, do what you will! for Jesus Christ, true 
God and Man, my Brother, has defeated you one and all: and by faith, his victory is 
mine!” That is the joyful battle cry to which the mature Luther’s creedal, kerygmatic, 
and exuberant theology of gospel grace gives rise. Gottes Sohn uns gegeben wird, der 
siegsmann und uberwinder des Teufels—therefore, rejoice, fight, triumph, be free.1079  
                                                        
1079 Cf. parallel texts from the same sermon series at WA 46.677-84, LW 22.162-170 (3 Nov. 1537, on 
John 1:29) and WA 47.78-85, LW 22.353-61 (19 June 1538, on John 3:16), e.g., WA 47.79.40—80.28: 
Kan ich aber alhier gleuben und diese artznej annemen, das Gott uns seinen Sohn gibt und nicht der 
gemeinen Sohnen einen als Abraham, Jsaac und David, derer Sohne ehr sonst viel hat, sondern seinen 
eingebornen Sohn, So ist gewiss, dieweil ein solcher Sohn uns gegeben wird, das er eine neue 
Widergeburt anrichte, das er ein siegsmann und uberwinder des Teufels sej. Den das ist die ursache, 
das Gottes Sohn weith, weith grosser ist dan der tod und stercker den die Sunde, der Teuffel, und uns 
freundlicher ist, und wir mehr gnade gottes den Zorn durch in haben, oder, was sonst mehr sein mag. 
So du dich nun druber verwunderst, wie ein mensch aus des Teuffels in Gottes reich moge gebracht 
werden, So ist das noch grosser verwunderns werth, das Gott uns seinen Sohn gegeben hat. Do du nun 
das gleubest, so wird das ander verwundern wohl auffhoren. Den wen wir den Sohn Gottes haben, der 
fur uns stehet wider den Tod und sich widder den Teuffel leget, so sei dan der Teuffel so boese, als ehr 
wolle, ist der Sohn gottes fur mich gestorben, so fresse mich der tod hin und verschlinge mich, ehr soll 
mich wohl widergeben, und ich will fur ihme wohl bleiben. Christus ist gestorben und hatt der Tod den 
Sohn Gottes verschlungen, aber der tod hatt an ihme einen angel geschlungen, das er ihnen hat 
mussen widergeben, den es wahr unmuglich, das ehr im tode bleiben soltte. Den die person ist gott, 
und do Gott und Mensch in einer person, unzertrennet, in des todes und Teuffels bauch gefharen ist, 
so hatt der todt ein bisslein an ime gessen das ihme den Bauch zureist. Das ist auch Gottes des vaters 
rath von ewigkeit gewesen, das ehr also den tod verschlingen und des Teuffels reich zerstoren woltte 
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 (3) Third and last, a fascinating paragraph from Luther’s 1545 lecture on Gen. 
48:15-16 which Peter Manns would hail as patristisch-reformatorischer Theologie.1080 
Luther observes that as St. Jacob blesses Joseph’s sons, he invokes each of the persons 
of the Holy Trinity distinctly: First, “the GOD before whom my fathers Abraham and 
Isaac walked,” that is the Father; second, “the GOD who has led me all my life long to 
this day,” viz., the Holy Spirit; third, “the ANGEL who has redeemed me from all evil,” 
that is the Son of God, who conversed familiarly with the patriarchs, wrestled with 
Jacob at the Jabbok, and “was to be sent by God into the world, to announce to us 
liberation from death, the forgiveness of sins, and the kingdom of heaven.” But as the 
risen Jesus juxtaposes the word “name” in the singular with the three personal names 
Father, Son, and Spirit at Matt. 28:19, so here Jacob skillfully pairs his rather more 
subtle indications of the three divine persons with the singular subjunctive verb “let 
him bless” (Benedicat). Since the three persons share in the one common work of 
blessing, an operation proper to the divine nature alone, both the utter unity of their 
divinity and the reality of their personal distinctions are equally attested.1081 This 
                                                                                                                                                                     
und dem Teuffel ein kleine pillen geben, die ehr mitt lust fressen soltt, aber darmit in seinem bauche 
und in der welt ein solch gerumpel anrichten. Nun will der herr sagen: Lieber Nicodeme, du sihest 
recht ein Mirackel, das Gott einen solchen grossen, theuern schatz an unser Widergeburtt wendet. 
Den ist es nicht ein wunderwerck, das ich des menschen Sohn und Gottes Sohn bin, in einer person, 
und in den todt dahin gegeben, das ich dem Teuffel und tode in rachen fhare? Aber ich werde nicht 
drinnen bleiben und nicht allein wider heraus fharen, sondern ime auch den bauch zerreissen, den die 
gifft ist zu starck, das der tod mus dran sterben. 
1080 Peter Manns, “Zum Gespräch zwischen Martin Luther und der katholischen Theologie. 
Begegnung zwischen patristisch-monastischer und reformatorischer Theologie an der Scholastik 
vorbei,” in Vater im Glauben, cp. 11. 
1081 WA 44.698.23-699.6: Sicut hic Angelum vocat eodem modo, quo supra post luctam dixit: ‘Vidi 
Dominum facie ad faciem’. Nam hic Angelus Dominus ille, sive filius Dei est, quem vidit Iacob, et qui 
mittendus erat a Deo in mundum, ut annunciaret nobis liberationem a morte, remissionem 
peccatorum et regnum coelorum. Et hic Angelus noster Goel seu vindex est, qui iustissimo iure nos 
adserit, et vindicat a potestate Diaboli, qui obnoxius est legi, propterea quod occidit filium Dei, 
iamque lex et mors et Sathan coguntur obmutescere, ac victas manus porrigere victori et triumphanti 
Christo Diligenter igitur observandum est, quod loquitur Iacob de Christo filio, qui solus est Angelus, 
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trinitarian exegetical logic is broadly “Pro-Nicene,” to use a useful if malleable 
scholarly convention,1082 though it is likely that Luther acquired his grasp of this logic 
(as opposed to this exegesis) through Lombard and Biel. But vis-à-vis its role in 
interpreting Gen. 48:15-16, we can specify at least a step further than this.  
The inspiration for Luther’s identification of “the Angel/Messenger of the Lord” 
with the Son of God was probably Hilary of Poitiers, an excellent theologian in 
Luther’s estimation,1083 who himself inherited and carried forward this ancient 
exegetical tradition (trin. 4.23—42). Hilary’s friend Athanasius was of the same mind: 
and he cites and interprets Gen. 48:15-16 much in Luther’s manner. “In saying, ‘He 
delivered me from all evil,’ Jacob showed that it was no created angel, but the Word of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
seu missus, natus homo in tempore ex virgine Maria, non pater, non Spiritus sanctus. Diserte enim 
discernit tres personas, et tamen addit: Benedicat pueris istis. Istud benedicere clare tribuit soli Deo. 
Non dicit benedicant, pluraliter, nec repetit, sed coniungit in uno opere benedicendi tres personas, 
Deum patrem, Deum pastorem et Angelum. Sunt igitur hi tres unus Deus et unus benedictor. Idem 
opus facit Angelus, quod pastor, et Deus patrum. Ita hunc articulum Trinitatis probe cognitum 
habuerunt patres, quem nos hodie docemus. Et Iacob in eadem et perfectissima fide et verbo incedit 
super omnes coelos. Non ego, inquit, sed Deus per os meumbenedicit pueris istis, Deus patrum, Deus 
pastor et Angelus ille trinus et unus benedicit. Intellexit igitur Iacob, quod filius incarnandus et 
mittendus sit in mundum, quod sit crucifigendus et resuscitandus. Etsi non tam clare haec 
pronunciat, sicut hodie docetur, tamen satis significanter dicit, et alii quoque, qui crediderunt hunc 
articulum, non obscure intellexerunt. Cf. LW 8.163-4. 
1082 See Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
1083 On Gen. 1:1, WA 42.4.26 [Dr], LW 1.4: Hilarius et Augustinus, quasi duo maxima Ecclesiae 
Lumina. That Luther is set to criticize Hilary and Augustine’s theory of the instantaneous creation 
of the world does not take away from his regard for them both. Cf. WA 42.17.8 [Dr], LW 1.21-2: 
optimus vir Hilarius, ll. 31-2: Huiusmodi cogitationibus boni Patres Augustinus et Hilarius quoque se 
oblectarunt. At Gen. 1:20, WA 42.37.41-38.14 [Dr], LW 1.50-1, it is clear that in some respects Luther 
reads Hilary in light of Augustine’s (trin. 6.11-12) critical reception of Hilary’s theology: Ad hunc 
modum D. Hilarius distinguit aliis attributis. Aeternitas est in Patre, species in imagine, usus in 
munere. Dicit Spiritum sanctum esse donum in usu, quod dat usum rerum, ne pereant, et gubernat 
res ac conservat. Sic dicunt: Pater est mens, Filius intellectus, Spiritus sanctus voluntas. Non quod 
Pater sit sine intellectu, aut Filius sine voluntate, sed sunt attributa, hoc est, dicta, quae distincta non 
tribuuntur singulis personis sed diversis, non, quod Pater sit sine sapientia, sed quod nobis ista ita 
pingimus ad retinendum et explicandum articulum Trinitatis. Ergo, quando textus dicit: ‘Et vidit 
Deus, quod esset valde bonum’, significat ipsam conservationem, quia creatura non posset stare, nisi 
Spiritus sanctus diligeret eam, et ista complacentia Dei in suo opere conservaret opus. Neque enim 
Deus ita creavit res, ut creatas deserat, sed amat eas et approbat. Igitur simul est: agitat, movet, et 
conservat singula pro suo modo. Hoc existimavi brevibus attingendum. Dignae enim sunt cognitu 
tam piae cogitationes eorum, qui nos praecesserunt in eodem stadio, in quo nos currimus. 
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God, whom he joined to the Father in his prayer; through him, God delivers whomever 
he wills” (c. Arianos 3.12). Against the grain of my argument for Luther’s indebtedness 
to Augustine in other loci, in this respect it would seem that he actually opposes his 
great mentor head-on: for in his trin. 2—3, a text well-known to the Reformer, 
Augustine severely chastened the received optimism regarding the exegete’s ability to 
parse out which of the divine persons manifests himself in a given OT theophany. 
Here, then, is evidence of the free and eclectic manner in which Luther appropriates 
trinitarian and exegetical insights from the tradition, contra Augustinum if that is 
where the text leads him.  
Regardless of its provenance, what counts for my present purposes is the old 
Doctor’s preferred interpretation of the Malach Adonai as the pre-incarnate Son of 
God.1084 For it sets the stage for a staggering celebration of Jesus Christ’s triumph over 
death, sin, the law (in its accusing function), and the Devil. He is Jacob’s “Redeemer” 
(לֵאֹגּ), as in the “kinsman-redeemer” or “avenger” who possesses the legal right either 
to liberate/redeem an enslaved person or a lost inheritance (Lev. 25:25-6, 48-9, Ruth 
2:20, 3:9, 12, 4:1, 3, 6, 8, 14) or to bring vengeance upon a manslayer (Num. 35:12, 19, 
Deut. 19:6, Josh. 20:3). Luther, aware of both senses of the word in the Hebrew, cites 
Deut. 19:6 and Job 19:25—“I know that my לֵאֹגּ lives!”—to explain its rich meaning in 
Jacob’s prophecy. Jesus Christ is not only a “ransom” (הָדָפּ). Though he is that (Hos. 
13:14), Christ is more: as the invincible Son of God in our flesh, innocent, sinless, and 
                                                        
1084 Cf. Luther’s 29 Sept. 1544 sermon on Rev. 12:7-12, WA 49.578.33-9 [Dr], LW 58.179: Denn er hat 
sich auch den heiligen Vetern erzeigt und sehen lassen als einen Engel, sonderlich Abraham und 
Jacob, und daher hin und wider auch den namen des Engels Gottes furet, Nemlich darumb, das er von 
Gott gesand, aber doch ein solcher Engel, der da Gott gleich ist, das ist: HERR aller Creaturn und selbs 
Schepffer. Solcher ist der andern keiner, welche daher Engel heissen, das sie gleich wie wir Menschen 
von Gott geschaffen sind aus nichts. 
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holy, he possesses the ius redimendi and therefore redeems condemned sinners with 
full justice as our avenger (vindex), liberator, and kinsman (propinquus).1085 For Luther, 
in the deep mystery of Christ’s triumph over the Devil and Death through his atoning 
suffering and death for sin on the cross—a major NT theme: cf. John 12:31, Col. 2:13-15, 
Heb. 2:14-17, Rev. 5:5-6—the two prophetic shades of לֵאֹגּ’s meaning in the OT converge 
as they are fulfilled in the promised redemptor: 
Christ the Lord became our הָדָפּ and לֵאֹגּ. For he not only redeemed us, but 
claimed us for himself by right (iure sibi nos asseruit), so that the Devil and hell 
were forced by strict justice (stricto iure) to release him, since they had killed 
the innocent Son of God. Therefore the Law got burned, Death shit itself, the 
Devil, hell, sin have gone too far (Lex hat sich verbrant, Mors hat sich 
beschissen, Diabolus, infernus, peccatum haben sich vergriffen)! There, all of 
them became guilty and debtors to God, to this Son Jesus Christ, who now 
possesses the right (ius) against his enemies. For what reason, O Law, have you 
crucified the Son of God? Why have you killed the innocent, O Devil, death, 
hell? “We have a law,” they say, “and according to the law he ought to die, sine 
he has made himself the Son of God” (John 19:7). Well then, take a good look at 
him rising from the dead and triumphing over you, saying, “I am the Son of 
God: I am an invincible person (invicta persona).” What now Satan? What law, 
what death, what hell? “Death is swallowed up in victory, etc.” (1 Cor. 15:54-7). 
“I have lost,” they all shriek; together they acknowledge that they have been 
conquered with the highest and full right and most justly (summo et pleno iure 
ac iustissime victos esse). And after his resurrection, Christ commanded that 
these things be announced to the whole world, and the Gospel preached to 
everyone. “Come!” he says, “believe in Me, be baptized. I will give you my own 
victory. You will not be condemned, but even when you die you will live in my 
name. You will never die, because I am the resurrection and the life; he who 
believes in Me, even if he dies, lives” (John 11:25-26). This One, therefore, is our 
לֵאֹגּ, whom Jacob calls the Angel in this passage. “He is the Angel or redemptor 
who was able to redeem me with all right (omni iure potuit me redimere) and to 
keep me safe from all evils of conscience, of the law, sin, death, brother Esau, 
etc., and all the troubles with which I have been afflicted in my life.”1086 
 
In short, Jesus Christ, invincible God in innocent humanity, pulverized the Devil and 
scared the shit out of Death. But he did so with full regard paid to the claims of justice 
                                                        
1085 WA 44.697.17-23, cf. LW 8.162.  
1086 WA 44.697.23-698.6, cf. LW 8.162-3. 
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that stood against hell-condemned sinners—a judgment manifested by the law in its 
usus elenchus—for he the innocent God-Man suffered its sanctions for them in their 
place (cf. Isa. 53:4-6, 8, 10-12, Matt. 20:28, Rom. 3:24-6, 8:3, 2 Cor. 5:14, 19-21, Gal. 1:4, 
2:21, 3:13, 4:4-5, Col. 2:14, 1 Tim. 2:5-6, Heb. 9:15, 26-8, 10:10-4, 1 Pet. 2:24, 3:18, 1 John 2:2, 
4:10, Rev. 1:5). Having satisfied the law’s just claims against sinners by his undeserved 
death, Jesus took just vengeance upon the Devil and Death when he rose from the 
grave and crushed them beneath his nail-pierced feet. For his payment of the הָדָפּ by 
his blood on the cross invested him with legal authority to act as our לֵאֹגּ in his 
resurrection, and to claim us for himself by right rather than by an act of sheer power 
(cf. Augustine’s trin. 13). Being a majestic and invicta persona, the risen Jesus gives his 
hard-fought victory personally and freely to all who trust in him: ego dono tibi 
victoriam meam. In scriptural rather than scatological terms, the promise of eternal 
and invincible life in Christ by faith in John 11:25-6 gives rise to the glad shout of 
triumph at 1 Cor. 15:54-7, upon which cognate NT texts the dying old Doctor’s 
ebullient Death- and Devil-mocking romp in this lecture on Gen. 48:15-16 is in effect 
an extended paraphrase.  
 This is the joyful gospel of Christ’s victory for us as the mature Luther preached 
and exposited it. 
 
3.3. Not Just Forgiveness: The Imputation of Christ’s Righteousness 
 
In this section we have to do with the inner content of the grace of forgiveness-and-
righteousness given freely to faith by, through, in, and for the sake of Jesus Christ. My 
object here is not to exposit Luther’s mature doctrine of the iustitia Christi (or Dei, or 
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fidei) passiva, aliena, externa, Christiana, imputata, etc. in any real depth,1087 only to 
make a few simple observations about how the “free gift of righteousness” (Rom. 5:17) 
in Christ c. 1520—46 relates to the earlier teaching on mercy, forgiveness and non-
imputation set forth in 1515/16 after the manner of the “420s Augustine.” In so doing, I 
am simultaneously highlighting one of the major differences that distinguishes the 
mature Augustine’s theology of grace-qua-forgiveness in Christ from the mature 
Luther’s theology of grace as forgiveness-and-righteousness in Christ.  
The gist is this: in general, it can be said that in 1515/16 the young Luther 
follows the old Augustine closely in stressing the reality and the gratuity of God’s 
mercy in Christ, manifest in the forgiveness of actual sins and the non-imputation of 
residual sinful desire. The mature Luther teaches this too, but in addition he 
maintains that in the justification of the ungodly the “positive” imputation of Christ’s 
righteousness is given to faith together with the “negative” non-imputation of sin. In 
more concrete terms: Augustine and the young Luther generally hold that the guilt of 
the forgiven and/or “justified” person is removed as far from him as the east is from 
the west. The mature Luther agrees, but adds that on top of this the forgiven person 
stands before God clothed in Jesus Christ’s very own righteousness; and for this 
reason, the justified believer, united with Christ by faith, is just as righteous coram deo 
as the Righteous One himself (Isa. 53:11, Acts 3:14, 1 John 2:1).  
I stress my qualifying adverbs on generality for two reasons. First, as I noted 
above, Augustine himself on rare occasions does speak of the imputation of Christ’s 
                                                        
1087 On this point, see chapter 2 above.  
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righteousness, mainly vis-à-vis baptized children,1088 and in 1514—16 the young Luther 
is already elaborating freely on iustitia imputata without Augustine’s specific 
restriction of it to infant baptism.1089 Second, the mature Luther often speaks simply of 
forgiveness or non-imputation in the “Augustinian” manner of his youth, without any 
hint of the Reformation iustitia Christi imputata. From what I can gather, and as one 
might expect, the lion’s share of such occurrences are to be found in passages that 
concern the “Augustinian simul” of renewed spiritus and old flesh/“sin” in the 
regenerate person.1090 Still, the thesis of an advance from mere forgiveness/non-
                                                        
1088 c. Iul. op. imp. 1.57, CSEL 85/1.55 (cf. WSA I/25.85): … sic imputari generatis parvulis iniustitiam 
primi hominis ad subeundum supplicium, quemadmodum imputatur parvulis regeneratis iustitia 
secundi hominis ad obtinendum regnum caelorum; c. Iul. op. imp. 3.148, CSEL 85/1.454 (cf. WSA 
I/25.350): Si autem parvuli propter iustitiam secundi hominis, qui regenerationis est auctor, 
deputantur iusti, cur non propter peccatum primi hominis, qui generationis est auctor, deputantur 
iniusti? Also: c. Iul. op. imp. 3.49, 6.22-3. 
1089 See the texts from 1514—16 cited in full at the start of section 3.2 above: WA 4.652.3-20, WA 
56.158.10-14, WA 56.204.15-28, WA 56.267.1-7, WA Br 1.35.15-36. 
1090 See, e.g., the 1531/5 lectures on Gal. 5:16-17. (1) On Gal. 5:16, WA 40/2.79.22-80.15 [Dr] (cf. LW 
27.64): Deberemus quidem implere legem et impletione eius iustificari, sed peccatum obstat. 
Praescribit et praecipit quidem lex, ut ‘Deum ex toto corde etc. et proximum ut nos ipsos diligamus’, 
sed ideo non sequitur: Hoc scriptum est, ergo fit, Lex praecipit dilectionem, ergo diligimus. Non dabis 
aliquem in terris, qui ita diligat Deum et proximum, ut lex requirit. In futura autem vita, ubi plane 
mundati ab omnibus vitiis et peccatis et puri ut sol erimus, perfecte diligemus et perfecta dilectione 
iusti erimus. In illa vero vita impedit puritatem illam caro, in qua, donec vivimus, haeret adhuc 
peccatum. Hinc tam potens est amor nostri viciosus, ut longe superet amorem Dei et proximi. Interim 
tamen, ut et in hac vita iusti simus, habemus ‘Propiciatorium’ et Thronum gratiae Christum, in quem 
credentes, peccatum nobis non imputatur. Est igitur fides iusticia nostra in hac vita. In futura autem, 
ubi perpurgati et prorsus liberi erimus ab omnibus peccatis et concupiscentiis, non amplius opus 
habebimus fide et spe. (2) On Gal. 5:17, WA 40/2.92.31-93.14 [Dr] (cf. LW 27.73-4): Sancti enim non 
nituntur sua iusticia, sed cum Davide canunt: ‘Ne intres in iudicium cum servo tuo, quia non 
iustificatur in conspectu tuo omnis vivens’, Item: ‘Si iniquitates observas, Domine, Domine, quis 
sustinebit?’ Intuentur igitur Christum, Propiciatorem suum, qui vitam dedit pro peccatis ipsorum. 
Deinde si quid est reliquum peccati in carne, noverunt hoc non imputari, sed per remissionem 
condonari sibi. Interim tamen Spiritu pugnant contra Carnem, non quod omnino eius 
concupiscentiam non sentiant, sed quod eam non perficiant. (3) On Gal. 5:17, WA 40/2.94.28-95.25 
[Dr] (cf. LW 27.75-6): Istam luctam Carnis cum Spiritu habuerunt et senserunt omnes Sancti, 
Eandem et nos experimur. Qui consulit conscientiam suam, modo non sit Hypocrita, certo inveniet 
ita geri rem in seipso, ut Paulus hic describit, scilicet, quod Caro concupiscat adversus Spiritum. 
Unusquisque igitur Sanctus sentit et fatetur Carnem suam resistere Spiritui et ista duo ita sibi 
invicem adversari in seipso, ut, quae velit, etiamsi maxime hic laboret et sudet, tamen non possit ea 
facere. Itaque Caro obstat, quo minus praecepta Dei servemus, quo minus diligamus proximos ut 
nosipsos, multominus ut diligamus Deum ex toto corde etc. Ideo impossibile est nos legis operibus 
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imputation in Augustine and the younger Luther to the non-imputation of sin plus the 
additional imputation of Christ’s righteousness in full-grown Reformation theology is 
more than defensible.1091 I realize that for some critics, this interpretation of the 
mature Luther draws perilously near to the orthodox doctrine of free justification in 
the later evangelical Confessions, both Lutheran and Reformed.1092 But this cannot be 
                                                                                                                                                                     
iustificari. Voluntas bona quidem adest, quam oportet adesse (est enim Spiritus ipse rebellans Carni), 
quae libenter vellet facere bonum, implere legem, diligere Deum et proximum etc., Caro autem non 
obsequitur isti voluntati, sed resistit ei. Sed Deus non imputat hoc peccatum, est enim propicius 
propter Christum. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod debeas peccatum extenuare aut contemnere, quia 
Deus illud non imputat. Non imputat quidem, Sed quibus et propter quid? Non duris et securis, sed 
poenitentiam agentibus et fide apprehendentibus Christum Propiciatorem, propter quem ut 
remittuntur eis omnia peccata, ita et reliquiae peccati eis non imputantur. Illi non extenuant 
peccatum, sed amplificant, quia norunt illud nulla satisfactione, operibus et iusticia elui posse, 
praeterquam per mortem Christi, non tamen propter magnitudinem eius desperant, sed certo 
statuunt illud ignosci sibi propter Christum. (4) On Gal. 5:17, WA 40/2.96.17-97.16 [Dr] (cf. LW 
27.76-7): Ex his etiam intelligi potest, qui veri Sancti sint. Sunt autem non trunci et lapides, ut 
Sophistae et Monachi somniant, qui prorsus nulla re afficiantur aut nunquam concupiscentiam 
carnis sentiant, sed, ut Paulus ait, ‘caro ipsorum concupiscit adversus Spiritum.’ Ideo peccatum 
habent et peccare possunt. Et Psalm. 32. testatur, Sanctos confiteri iniusticiam suam et orare pro 
remissione impietatis peccati sui, cum inquit: ‘Dixi, confitebor adversum me iniusticiam meam 
Domino, Et tu remisisti impietatem peccati mei. Pro hac orabit ad te omnis Sanctus’ etc. Deinde orat 
tota Ecclesia, quae certe sancta est, Remitti sibi peccata et credit Remissionem peccatorum, Et 
Psalmo 143. orat David: ‘Ne intres, Domine, in iudicium cum servo tuo, quia non iustificatur in 
conspectu tuo omnis vivens’, Et Psalm. 130.: ‘Si iniquitates observas, Domine, Domine, quis 
sustinebit? Apud te propriciatio est’ etc. Sic loquuntur et orant maximi Sancti, David, Paulus etc. Ergo 
idem loquuntur et orant eodem spiritu omnes sancti. Sophistae Scripturas non legunt, aut si etiam 
legunt, tamen obducto ob oculos velo legunt, ideo, ut de nulla prorsus re, ita neque de peccato neque 
de sanctitate recte iudicare possunt. 
1091 In his article “Was There a ‘Reformation Doctrine of Justification’?” HTR 103/2 (2010): 205-36, my 
friend David C. Fink argues that forgiveness and imputation are roughly synonymous in the “first 
wave” of evangelical confessions in the 1520s and 30s, and that this earlier usage then evolves into 
the two-part formula remissio peccatorum et imputatio iustitiae Christi in the “second wave” of 
confessions in the 1560s and 70s. I think Fink has put his finger on an important imprecision in the 
first few decades of the Reformation. That said, to me it seems that however imprecisely stated in 
verba, the dogmatic res signified by the two-part formula is already in place in the mature Luther’s 
theology of “grace” as forgiveness and righteousness in Christ. 
1092 See, for example: (1) The 1559 Confessio Gallica, written by Calvin with Beza and Viret’s help, art. 
18: “We believe that all our righteousness rests upon the remission of our sins, in which is also our 
only felicity, as David says (Ps. 32:1-2). We therefore reject all other means by which we could 
justify ourselves before God, and without presuming any virtue or merit, we hold simply to the 
obedience of Jesus Christ, which is imputed to us (nous nous tenons simplement à l’obéissance de 
Jésus-Christ, laquelle nous est allouée) as much to cover all our faults as to make us find grace and 
favor before God.” Schaff, 3.369-70, alt. (2) The 1561 Confessio Belgica, the witness of the martyr 
Guido de Brès, art. 23: “We believe that our blessedness consists in the remission of our sins for 
Jesus Christ’s sake, and that therein is contained our righteousness before God, as David and Saint 
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helped! For on my reading of the texts, the old Doctor would have it no other way: 
even if, as I think the Finns have rightly argued, he might have hoped for a stronger 
emphasis on union with Christ in the tradition that bears his name, such as one finds 
amongst notable French, Dutch, and English Reformed theologians of his century and 
the next.1093 
 Since I have already exposited the “grace” of Christ’s righteousness fully in Part 
I, and indeed again at some length in section 3.2 of this chapter, I will be brief here. 
The free and merciful bestowal of the full and complete iustitia dei—“die 
Gerechtigkeit, die vor Gott gilt,” Rom. 3:21—upon justly condemned sinners is the just 
reward of Christ’s obedient suffering and death in our place on the cross, and the 
spoils of his triumph; and the risen Jesus gives it freely to whoever believes his gospel. 
I think Oberman was right to argue that Luther broke ranks with scholastic theologies 
of justification at just this point: the law-crushed sinner’s empty-handed reception of 
Christ’s righteousness as his own by faith, and the identification of this freely given 
iustitia Christi with the righteousness that God requires at the sinner’s hands in order 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Paul teach us, declaring the blessedness of that man, to whom God counts righteousness apart from 
works (à qui Dieu alloue justice sans oeuvres, Ps. 32:1, Rom. 4:6). And the same Apostle says that we 
are justified freely or by grace, through the redemption which is in Jesus Christ (Rom. 3:24-5). And 
this is why we always hold fast to this foundation, giving all glory to God, humbling ourselves, and 
recognizing ourselves such as we are, without presuming to trust in anything in ourselves or our 
merits, and relying and resting upon the sole obedience of Christ crucified, which is ours when we 
believe in him (nous nous appuyons et reposons en la seule obéissance de Christ crucifié; laquelle est 
nôtre, quand nous croyons en lui).” Schaff, 409, ECRC, 100. (3) The 1577 FC, Ep. 3, thesis 2: “We 
believe, teach, and confess that our righteousness before God consists in this, that the Lord forgives 
us our sins out of sheer grace (Dominus nobis peccata remittit ex mera gratia), without any respect 
at all to our forgoing, current, or consequent works, dignity, or merit. For he gives and imputes to 
us the righteousness of Christ’s obedience (Ille enim donat atque imputat nobis iustitiam 
oboedientiae Christi). Because of this righteousness, we are received by God into grace and 
accounted righteous.” BSELK 1237.11-16, cf. BC 495. 
1093 But cf. David Yeago, “A Lutheran Contribution to Spiritual Theology: The Doctrine of the 
Mystical Union,” Lutheran Forum 18/4 (Advent, 1984): 18-22; Martti Vaahtoranta, “Unio und 
Rechtfertigung bei Johann Gerhard,” in Matti Repo and Rainar Vinke, eds., Gott und Mensch in der 
nachreformatorischen Theologie (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola, 1996), 200-45. 
 463 
to escape eternal condemnation in hell, meant that full justification came at the 
beginning of the Christian pilgrimage, not the end; and for this reason above all, the 
heart of the sinful but Christ-trusting viator had been set free to enjoy peace with God 
in Christ now (as St. John and Paul are especially given to say, John 3:14-18, 5:24, 6:54, 
10:27-30, 11:25-6, 1 John 2:1-2, 3:1-2, Rom. 5:1-11, 8:1, 8:31-39, Gal. 5:1, Eph. 2:4-8, Col. 1:12-
14, 2:13-15, 1 Thess. 1:4-10, 5:9-10, 2 Tim. 1:8-10).1094  
In the 1520—46 period, Luther proclaims, exposits, and defends this doctrine of 
the iustitia fidei using all the various and vivacious scriptural terms and images I 
examined closely in Part I. For it stands at the heart of his mature theology of “grace” 
(gratia/Gnade). At times, as we saw above, “imputation” as a legal mechanism and 
metaphor set in foro divino is very much front and center; our sin is reckoned to Christ 
crucified, and Christ’s obedience is reckoned to faith as righteousness (2 Cor. 5:21). In 
other places, the believer’s union with Christ and his invincible righteousness, and the 
great exchange that follows upon this union, takes the lead. In many works, not least 
the great Galaterbrief, forensic imputation and union with Christ stand side by side. 
For complex reasons that cannot detain us here, not least the Osiandrian controversy 
and its one-sided settlement,1095 many later Luther scholars and theologians have felt 
compelled to pick between either unio-texts inspired by the likes of Gal. 2:20 and 3:26-
8 or imputatio-texts rooted in Gal. 3:6-25 and 3:29—4:7. But perhaps modern 
perplexities over this phenomenon have more to do with a lack of scriptural depth and 
catholic breadth on our part than with an imagined inconsistency in Luther’s 
                                                        
1094 Heiko Oberman, “‘Iustitia Christi’ and ‘Iustitia Dei’: Luther and the Scholastic Doctrines of 
Justification,” HTR 59/1 (Jan. 1966): 1-26. 
1095 Timothy J. Wengert, Defending Faith: Lutheran Responses to Andreas Osiander’s Doctrine of 
Justification, 1551—1559 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012). 
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theology. Might not the simple fact that such texts are so intricately interwoven in the 
thread of St. Paul’s argument have urged upon us the goodness to be had in holding 
the two motifs together in their apostolic richness and unity? I think the mature 
Luther tried his hand at just this, and in the event did rather well: 
Therefore: the Christ who is grasped by faith and dwells in the heart is the 
Christian righteousness on account of which God counts us righteous and gives 
us eternal life.1096 
 
These three are joined together: faith, Christ, acceptance or imputation. For 
faith grasps hold of Christ and has him present and encloses him as a ring 
encloses the gem; and whoever is found having this faith in the Christ who is 
grasped in the heart, God reckons that person righteous.1097  
 
In my judgment, such efforts to hold together St. John’s “patristic” doctrine of saving 
unio cum Christo with St. Paul’s “Reformation” emphasis on saving iustitia in Christo 
per fidem sine operibus mark one point where the late medieval Augustinian pupil 
surpasses his ancient master as an exegetical theologian. But regardless of one’s 
dogmatic evaluation of the shift, I think it is beyond dispute that with his doctrine of 
the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, the mature Luther takes a step past the old 
Augustine’s doctrine of the non-imputation of sin: this, amidst their deep agreement 
that forgiveness/non-imputation is God’s free gift through and for the sake of his 
incarnate Son and his shed blood. 
 
3.4. Promissio evangelii in Evae semine omnibus credentibus 
 
                                                        
1096 On Gal. 2:16, WA 40/1.229.28-30 [Dr]: Ergo fide apprehensus et in corde habitans Christus est 
iustitia Christiana propter quam Deus nos reputat iustos et donat vitam aeternam. Cf. LW 26.130. 
1097 On Gal. 2:16, WA 40/1.233.16-19 [Dr]: ista tria, Fides, Christus, Acceptio vel Reputatio, coniuncta 
sunt. Fides enim apprehendit Christum et habet eum praesentem includitque eum ut annulus 
gemmam, Et qui fuerit inventus cum tali fide apprehensi Christi in corde, illum reputat Deus iustum. 
Cf. LW 26.132. 
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In his 1971 monograph Promissio: Geschichte der reformatorischen Wende in Luthers 
Theologie, Oswald Bayer argues forcefully that Luther’s Augustinian theology of sin 
and grace was already in place by the 1515/16 Romans lectures, but that this did not 
make Luther a Reformation theologian.1098 Neither did the Disputation against 
Scholastic Theology (4 Sept. 1517), the Ablaßthesen (31 Oct. 1517), or the Heidelberg 
Disputation (26 April 1518, with its celebrated theologia crucis) mark a real, decisive, 
and “reformational” departure from the broad spectrum of acceptable theological 
opinion within medieval Catholicism. The theology of these writings represents a 
rock-ribbed mystical Augustinianism (think Gregory of Rimini with a twist of John 
Tauler—or John Staupitz) which, if not ever really popular, at least held its rightful 
place at the table. 
The “turn” to Reformation theology came in early summer 1518, when Luther 
broke through to his prodigiously biblical theology of God’s saving promise (cf. Gen. 
3:15, 12:1-3, 15:1-6, 17:1-14, 18:10, 21:1, 22:18, 26:1-5, 28:13-15, 49:8-12, Exod. 2:23-5, 3:17, 6:1-
8, 12:25, 32:13, Num. 10:29, 14:17, Deut. 1:11, 9:3, 11:25, 26:18, Josh. 1:3, 21:43-5, 23:5, 10, 14-
15, 2 Sam. 7:21, 28, Neh. 9:8, Ps. 77:8, 105:9, 42, 106:24, 108:7, 119:38, 41, 50, 58, 76, 82, 
116, 123, 133, 140, 148, 154, Jer. 29:10, 32:42, 33:14, Luke 1:72, 24:49, Acts 1:4, 2:33, 39, 7:17, 
13:23, 32, 26:6, Rom. 1:2, 4:13-14, 16, 20-21, 9:4, 8-9, 15:8 2 Cor. 1:20, 7:1, Gal. 3:14, 16-22, 
29, 4:23, 28, Eph. 1:13, 2:12, 3:6, 2 Tim. 1:1, Tit. 1:2, Heb. 4:1, 6:12-17, 7:6, 8:6, 9:15, 10:23, 
36, 11:9-13, 17, 33, 39, 12:26, Jas. 1:12, 2:5, 2 Pet. 1:4, 3:9, 13, 1 John 2:25). The first text that 
clearly manifests the reformational doctrine of justification by faith in the promise of 
grace is an (at least before Bayer) obscure set of disputation theses c. May/June 1518, 
                                                        
1098 Bayer, Promissio, 140. 
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Pro veritate inquirenda et timoratis conscientiis consolandis conclusiones.1099 Here are 
the crucial theses: 
8. The forgiveness of fault (Remissio culpe) does not depend upon the 
contrition of the sinners, nor upon the office or power of the priest. 
9. Rather, it depends on faith, which is in the word of Christ saying: “Whatever 
you loose, etc.” (Matt. 16:19).  
10. For it is true that it is not the sacrament of faith, but faith in the sacrament 
(i.e., not because it takes place, but because it is believed) that justifies. 
11. Christ does not want the salvation of men to consist in the hand or the 
choice of a man, 
12. but as it is written: “he bears up all things by the word of his power” (Heb. 
1:3), and: “purifying their hearts by faith” (Acts 15:9). 
13. They err even to the point of infidelity who assert that the forgiveness of 
fault is uncertain because of the uncertainty of contrition. 
14. No matter how uncertain either the priest or the sinner may be about 
contrition,   absolution is valid if he believes that he has been absolved. 
15. It is therefore certain that sins are forgiven if you believe they are forgiven, 
because the promise of Christ the Savior is certain (certa est Christi salvatoris 
promissio). 
16. A man absolved through the keys ought rather to die and deny every 
creature than to doubt about his own absolution. 
17. By doubting whether his absolution is pleasing to God, at the same time he 
doubts whether Christ was truthful when he said: “Whatever, etc.” (Matt. 
16:19). 
18. By building forgiveness on top of contrition, they build on sand, i.e., they 
build faith in God on top of the work of man. 
19. Not believing the absolution until contrition is certain is injurious to the 
sacrament and the engine of despair. 
20. Indeed: to want to build confidence of conscience (fiduciam conscientie) on 
top of contrition in this way is to set up God for a liar and oneself as truthful. 
21. Such people presume upon their own works and powers most desperately, 
not upon the mercy and word of Christ. 
22. Indeed: they want to strengthen the word and faith themselves, rather than 
being strengthened by the word and faith. 
23. Priests are not the authors of forgiveness, but ministers of the word to the 
end of faith in forgiveness (ministratores verbi in fidem remissionis). 
24. The power of the keys works a strong and infallible work by the word and 
commandment of God, except in the event that you are a deceiver. 
25. The priest has a sufficient and manifest sign of contrition, if he perceives 
that the sinner asks for and believes the absolution. 
                                                        
1099 WA 1.629-33. On which see Bayer, Promissio, 166-7, 172, 182-202; Brecht, Road to Reformation, 
235-6. On the Augustinian and medieval backcloth to thesis 10, see Jarod Wicks, S.J., “FIDES 
SACRAMENTI—FIDES SPECIALIS: Luther’s Development in 1518,” in idem, Luther’s Reform, 117-47. 
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26. Indeed: it is better by far to inquire of him whether he believes that he is 
absolved than whether he grieves worthily. 
27. Take care, then, that the priest does not probe for contrition alone, so that 
a man believes that he must be absolved because of it. 
28. Rather, for him that saying of Christ must be insisted on: “Courage, son! 
Your sins are forgiven you” (Matt. 9:2), instead of inquiring about his 
worthiness. 
29. It follows that that word of Christ: “whose sins you forgive, etc.” (John 
20:23) are to be understood not about penalties, but about fault. 
 
33. For nothing justifies except faith only in Christ (Nihil enim iustificat, nisi 
sola fides Christi), for which faith the ministry of the word through the priest is 
necessary. 
34. Without this faith, contrition over sins is the operation of despair and 
offends God rather than reconciling him. 
 
48. Not one human being knows how often he sins mortally, even in good 
works because of empty boasting (propter vanam gloriam). 
49. Only those things should be confessed, which either to himself or to others 
are certain to be mortal, i.e., grave sins (crimina). 
50. Despairing over the rest, let him cast himself with confidence into the abyss 
of the mercy of God, who faithfully promises (cum fiducia in abyssum 
misericordie dei fideliter promittentis). 
 
The sum of it all (Summa summarum): The righteous lives not by works nor by 
the law, but by faith. Rom. 1[:17].1100 
                                                        
1100 WA 1.631.3-632.8, 15-18, 633.5-12: 8 Remissio culpe non innititur contritioni peccatoris, nec officio 
aut potestati sacerdotis, 9 Innititur potius fidei, que est in verbum Christi dicentis: Quodcunque 
solveris &c. 10 Verum est enim, quod non sacramentum fidei, sed fides sacramenti (id est, non quia fit, 
sed quia creditur) iustificat. 11 Non voluit Christus, in manu vel arbitrio hominis consistere salutem 
hominum, 12 Sed sicut scriptum est: portans omnia verbo virtutis sue, et: fide purificans corda eorum. 
13 Usque ad infidelitatem errant, qui remissionem culpe incertam asserunt propter incertitudinem 
contritionis. 14 Quantumlibet incertus sit tam sacerdos quam peccator de contritione, rata est 
absolutio, si credit sese absolutum. 15 Certum est ergo, remissa esse peccata si credis remissa, quia 
certa est Christi salvatoris promissio. 16 Absolutus per clavem potius debet mori et omnem creaturam 
negare quam de sua absolutione dubitare. 17 Dubitans, absolutionem suam deo gratam esse, dubitat 
simul, Christum fuisse veracem dicendo: Quodcunque &c. 18 Super contritionem edificantes 
remissionem super arenam, id est super opus hominis, fidem dei edificant. 19 Iniuria est sacramenti et 
desperationis machina, non credere absolutionem, donec certa sit contritio. 20 Immo sic velle 
fiduciam conscientie edificare super contritionem est deum mendacem, se veracem constituere. 21 
Tales non de misericordia et verbo Christi, sed de suis operibus et viribus perditissime presumunt. 22 
Immo perversissime volunt verbum et fidem firmare ipsi, et non potius firmari verbo et fide. 23 
Sacerdotes non sunt authores remissionis, sed ministratores verbi in fidem remissionis. 24 Potestas 
Clavium operatur verbo et mandato dei firmum et infallibile opus, nisi sis dolosus. 25 Evidentia 
contritionis signa satis habet sacerdos, si peccatorem sentit petere et credere absolutionem. 26 Immo 
longe magis exquirendum est ab eo, an credat sese absolvi quam an digne doleat. 27 Cavendum 
quoque sacerdoti, ne adeo exploret solam contritionem, ut homo credat propter ipsam sese 
absolvendum. 28 Illud Christi potius est inculcandum ei ‘confide, fili, remittuntur tibi peccata tua’, 
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To begin at the end: Luther’s concluding “the sum of it all” is no innocent peroration, 
but a pointed jab at the Summa summarum which his bitter opponent, Sylvester 
Prierias Mazzolini, had first published in 1514. The “Sylvestrina,” as it was called, was 
one of the most popular sixteenth-century manuals for confessors, and belonged to 
what Thomas Tentler calls “an identifiable genre” stemming from the work of the mid 
thirteenth-century canon lawyer, Raymond of Peñaforte. These “summas for 
confessors” aimed to assist priests in evaluating the gravity of a penitent’s sins and the 
depth of his contrition in order to make a sound judgment about whether to absolve 
him and, if so, about the appropriate penance to assign him.1101 The doctrine of 
absolution which Luther sketches in Pro veritate constitutes a Reformation broadside 
against this entire genre, against Prierias’ thorough and best-selling Summa, and 
indeed—as Cajetan insightfully recognized at Augsburg in fall 1518—against central 
aspects of the medieval sacramental system itself et eo ipso, the Roman Catholic 
                                                                                                                                                                     
quam dignitas eius exquirenda. 29 Consequens est, quod verbum illud Christi ‘quorum remiseritis 
peccata &c.’ non de penis, sed culpa intelligitur… 33 Nihil enim iustificat, nisi sola fides Christi, ad 
quam necessaria est verbi per sacerdotem ministratio. 34 Sine qua fide contritio peccatorum est 
desperationis operatio et plus deum offendens quam reconcilians… 48 Nullus hominum novit, quoties 
peccet mortaliter, etiam in bonis operibus propter vanam gloriam. 49 Ea tantum debet confiteri, que 
vel sibi vel aliis certa sunt esse mortalia, id est crimina, 50 De reliquis desperando seipsum cum 
fiducia in abyssum misericordie dei fideliter promittentis proiicere. Summa summarum: Iustus non ex 
operibus neque ex lege, sed ex fide vivet. Ro. 1. 
1101 Thomas N. Tentler, Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1977), 31-9. Tentler observes (241-3, 271-3) that most confessional 
manuals were decidedly less rigorous in their contritionism than was Luther’s primary scholastic 
teacher, Gabriel Biel; for most—including Prierias—the Scotist doctrine of the adequacy of attrition 
(on the conviction that the sacrament transformed it into contrition) sufficed. For Biel’s doctrine, 
see Oberman, Harvest, 146-60, who concludes thus: “The strictness of Biel’s contritionism 
necessarily would enhance scrupulousness and despair. Biel is aware of this problem and would 
have liked in view of this to accept Scotus’ parum attritus solution. But Biel’s doctrine of the facere 
quod in se est and a high estimate of the natural capacities and dignity of man forced him to reject 
this solution.”  
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Church.1102 For Luther, by mid 1518 an ardent theologus promissionis gratiae, the power 
of absolution no longer resides in the sacramental authority of the priest. Neither does 
its efficacy depend upon the purity of a contrite heart. Rather, absolution rests 
exclusively on Christ the Savior’s sure promise of forgiveness (theses 1, 2, 4-6, 8, 9, 13, 
15, 18, 23, 28, 29), justification (10, 33), and salvation (6, 7, 11, 15), a promise efficaciously 
conveyed in the verbum externum of absolution and received as a free gift by faith. 
Trust in God’s promise of grace in Christ overcomes penitential uncertainty and 
despair, and issues in assurance of heart, peace, joy, thankfulness, and courage. For 
Christ’s clear and certain word steels the penitent per fidem promissionis to rip his 
eyes off his insufficiently contrite no less than his abundantly sinful self, and to stake 
everything instead on the infinite abyss of God’s mercy manifest and graspable in the 
                                                        
1102 The new evangelical Promissiotheologie surfaced prominently as the Grunddifferenz between 
Luther and Cajetan at the Diet of Augsburg, 12-14 Oct. 1518. In the course of their impromptu 
debate, the German Augustinian defended his controversial doctrine of assurance through faith in 
the promise of forgiveness. When admonished by the formidable Italian Thomist to recant, Luther 
confessed: “I do not want to become a heretic by contradicting the conviction through which I 
became a Christian; I would sooner die, be burned, chased out, cursed etc.”—as he reported to 
Karlstadt, 14 Oct. 1518 (#100), WA Br 1.217.59-63: … wenn ich dies einig Wort spräche: ‘revoco’, das ist: 
“Jch widerrufe.” Aber ich will nicht zu einem Ketzer werden mit dem Widerspruch der Meinung, durch 
welchen ich bin zu einem Christen worden; ehe will ich sterben, verbrannt, vertrieben und 
vermaledeiet werden etc. Luther had explained his non sacramentum, sed fides sacramenti iustificat 
doctrine earlier on in the letter, WA Br 1.215.12-22: Aber am allermeisten ist über diesen zweien 
Artikeln gefochten worden: Zum ersten, daß ich gesagt hab, daß der Ablaß nicht sei der Schatz des 
Verdiensts unsers lieben Herrn und Seligmachers Christi. Zum andern, daß ein Mensch, das zu dem 
allerhochwürdigsten Sacrament gehen will, gläuben müsse etc. Dagegen der Legat gesetzt hat die 
Extra vagans in Sexto Decretalium, die sich anhebt: Unigenitus. Darauf er sich feste verließ und 
gänzlich vermaß, als wäre ich dadurch überwunden; wollt mich derhalb zu einem Widerspruch 
dringen. Er zog für sich an die gemeine Opinion und Wahn der Scholasticorum oder Schullehrer von 
der Kraft und Wirkung der Sacrament und von der Ungewißheit deß, der das hochwürdig Sacrament 
empfähet. In retrospect, Cajetan replied in lapidary fashion: “This is to set up a new Church.” See 
Cajetan’s tractate “Utrum ad fructuosam absolutionem in sacramento poenitentiae exigatur fides, 
qua poenitens credat certissime se esse absolutum a Deo,” which he prepared ahead of his meeting 
with Luther by 26 Sept. 1518, but then edited afterwards in light of their arguments: “The sacrament 
of penance exists sine certa fide effectus in suscipiente. Hoc [viz., Luther’s assertion to the contrary] 
enim est novam Ecclesiam construere.” In his collected Opuscula (Lyon, 1575), 111a.7-8, as cited by 
Bayer, Promissio, 183 n. 135. 
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promise. In short: the penitent sinner is righteous by faith in Jesus Christ, and 
therefore lives in the freedom and courage of the gospel. 
I think Bayer is right to urge that this biblical theology of promise and faith is 
the consequence of the Ablaßstreit rather than its cause.1103 But in itself, this does not 
prove that Reformation theology did not exist prior to the disputation Pro veritate. For 
all such claims depend upon one’s prior dogmatic account of what counts as 
Reformation theology, and are therefore inadjudicable on purely textual or historical 
grounds.1104 That said, it is beyond question that the controversy engulfing Europe in 
1518 was the causa occasionalis for the subject matter and argument of this 
disputation. Starting with thesis 1, Luther begins to attack the natural preference for 
remissio poenae over remissio culpae that stands at the center of all concupiscent 
desire for indulgences. One can be saved well enough without the former so long as he 
has the latter (thesis 6). And regardless: when there is forgiveness of guilt, “there is no 
penalty even in penalty, but joy in tribulations [cf. Rom. 5:3, Jas. 1:2-3]” (thesis 5)1105—a 
sturdy plank in Luther’s mystical theology of sanctification through the cross, to 
which I will return below. Now, in the famed Ablaßthesen of 31 Oct. 1517, Luther had 
                                                        
1103 Bayer, Promissio, 164. 
1104 Cf. Bernhard Lohse (Martin Luther’s Theology, 88) on the circularity involved in scholarly 
searches for the Durchbruch to Reformation: “In the debate over the breakthrough one cannot 
avoid the impression that the definition given the content of this discovery is at times a personal 
confessio of the given researcher.” 
1105 WA 1.630.5-631.2: 1 Inter duas ecclesiasticas illas remissiones pene et culpe longe precellit remissio 
culpe. 2 Remissio culpe quietat cor et maximam omnium penarum, scilicet conscientiam peccati, 
tollit. 3 Remissio pene quandoque auget conscientiam malam, quandoque peiorem nutrit 
presumptionem. 4 Remissio culpe reconciliat hominem deo, remissio pene reconciliat hominem 
homini, id est ecclesie. 5 Remissa culpa et conscientia, nulla pena est in pena, sed gaudium in 
tribulationibus. 6 Sine remissione pene potest homo salvus fieri, sed nequaquam sine remissione 
culpe. 7 Magis prodest ad salutem, si absolutus a culpa omittat redemptionem penarum. 
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(in good taulerisch fashion, as Leppin has shown1106) already denounced indulgences 
for taking away from the faithful the most powerful means of sanctifying grace 
available to them, to wit: penal, purgatorial suffering. Eight months into the public 
controversy, Luther is singing the same tune in regards to the hidden blessing of the 
holy cross, as indeed he will for the rest of his life. But now in June 1518, his theology 
begins to resound with the new evangelical song of the promise and, therefore, with 
the assurance which the believer may enjoy by faith. If extra-sacramental indulgences 
were pernicious prior to the advent of the new theology because they robbed 
Christians of the holy cross—alongside which, for Luther if not perhaps for his 
princes, the loss of the Germans’ hard-earned Gulden was nothing—by summer 1518 
the sacrament of penance in its medieval form has itself become baleful. For its 
“Babylonian captivity” has buried the promise of free absolution in Jesus Christ under 
intolerable burdens and veiled it beneath impenetrable distractions. Instead of 
directing sin-heavy souls to the promise of grace, and lifting up hearts through faith in 
this gospel, penance as the Reformer’s arch-nemesis Prierias (et al.) taught it fixed 
crushed hearts upon false objects of hope: the adequacy of the penitent’s contrition, 
the intricacy of his confession, the authority of the priest, the sufficiency of 
satisfactions. In Luther’s judgment—long-since preformed in his heart and mind by 
the crucicentric piety-theology of Augustine, Bernard, and Staupitz, but now rendered 
powerfully lucid through his deepened grasp of St. Paul’s doctrine of blessing, 
righteousness, and life by promise and faith (Rom. 4, 9:6-16, Gal. 3:6—4:7, 21-31)—this 
is a lie; and therefore, to pastor souls ad modum Sylvestri is to “make them trust in a 
                                                        
1106 Volker Leppin, “‘Omnem vitam fidelium penitentiam esse voluit.’” 
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lie” (as Jeremiah once said of Hananiah and Shemaiah’s false prophecies, 28:15, 29:31), 
to their destruction. “The sum of it all,” then, is that handbooks on penance like 
Prierias’ Sylvestrina are worse than a waste of time. But—certa est Christi salvatoris 
promissio! And if the crushed heart takes hold of the promise of absolution by faith, he 
has the reality of salvation which Christ bestows upon him through this very word. 
The Summa summarum is not Sylvester’s but St. Paul’s, Rom. 1:17. The righteous shall 
live, not by the purity of their contrition, the fullness of their confession, or the 
impressiveness of their penitential satisfactions, but by faith: faith which relies, not on 
the power of the priest, but on the promise of the forgiveness of sins in Jesus Christ. 
(And to be sure, good priests are faithful ministers of Christ and his Word: theses 23 
and 33, cf. Eph. 3:7, Col. 1:25.) So far Luther in early summer 1518, the newly minted 
Worttheologe.  
Pace Bayer, I have made no secret of my preference for Oberman and Leppin’s 
step-wise approach to Luther’s development in the 1513—20 period. In the course of 
those years, Luther experienced a series of piecemeal but interrelated breakthroughs, 
rather than one decisive (or even apocalyptic!) turn to Reformation. And as I have 
argued in this book, the “Augustinian” breakthrough that Luther experienced c. 1514—
16 was far more important, and in the event far more enduring, than Bayer recognizes 
or allows for. These reservations aside, I find his case for the initial emergence of 
Luther’s mature Promissio- or Worttheologie in the vicinity of summer 1518 
compelling. Bayer goes on to trace how the new promise theology grew in clarity and 
in the extent of its application to other loci over the next two years, culminating in the 
great Reformation treatises of fall 1520: The Babylonian Captivity of the Church in 
 473
October, and in November The Freedom of a Christian. This, I think, is also sound. So 
too is Bayer’s contention for the lasting centrality of the promise in the Reformer’s 
doctrine of justification from 152o to this death. As Asendorf has underscored, Luther’s 
irreducibly salvation-historical promise theology, deeply rooted in the Protevangelium 
and the promises to the patriarchs that build upon it, first surfaces in a fall 1519 
sermon on Gen. 9:91107 but then snowballs into “the organizing principle of Luther’s 
middle and late theology” in the 1520s and 30s. The theology of the Promise of the 
Seed finds its “monumental expression” in the Genesisvorlesung 1535—45, the 
sprawling volumes of which comprise the old Doctor’s last and perhaps greatest 
exposition of this impressive and vital scriptural motif.1108  
                                                        
1107 WA 9.348.8-349.5: Ecce ego statuam pactum. Observa in scripturis vocabula: fedus, pactum, 
promissio, Testamentum, Arcus federis, signum federis, Testimonium, calix novi et eterni Testamenti. 
His enim omnibus significantur divinarum rerum certa quedam Testimonia. Adam audivit verbum 
‘Ecce factus est Adam sicut unus ex nobis’. Ex quo verbo futurum intelligebat Adam, Et si obscure, ut 
aliquis sibi in carne similis, tamen deus tolleret iugum, quod ipse sibi suo peccato intulit. Desperasset 
Adam statim primo intuitu peccati, nisi verbo isto revocatus. Tegendum erat peccatum, Ideo deus 
ipse, id quod amoris erat, pellibus texit eos. Addens cum serpenti loquitur ‘ipse conteret caput tuum’. 
Incendens postea holocaustum Noe signum habuit dei faventis et propicii: Arcam, qua salvatus est, 
Deinde arcum in nubibus, Item quod odoratus est dominus odorem suavitatis, Ca. 8. In fine Abraham 
fuit promissio ‘Et in semine tuo benedicentur omnes gentes’. Signum habuit additum et Sacramentum 
Circumcissionem Ro. 4. ‘Signaculum [Iusticie fidei’ &c.] Isaac idem signum habuit, quod precet 
eandem promissionem, Iacob quoque promissionem patrum suorum habuit, Quod in semine 
Abraham et Isaac dominus esset Benedicturus universe terre, Sed signa diversa. Primum signum erat 
scala quam viderat in somnis Gene. 28. Et locum Bethel, idest Domus dei. Secundum signum erat 
Visio dei, quando luctabatur cum angelo, A quo Accepit benedictionem, Gene. 32. Filiis Iacob Dixit 
Iacob pater ‘non aufferetur sceptrum de Iuda’, Gene. 49. Simul involvens rem et signum, Moses 
redempturus Israhelem habet versionem colubris ex virga, Sanguinem ex aqua, Lepram in manu 
munda. Filii Israhel faventis dei signum habent Columnam nubis et columnam ignis. Gedeon vellus 
habet iam exiccatum, mox rore imbutum. Postea filii Israel Signum habuerunt faventis dei Arcam 
federis auream, propiciatorium, idest asserem aureum, quem tenebant duo Cherub mutuo sese 
respicientes, quo loci creditus est praesidere dominus, Exodi 37. Item librum legis. David atque eius 
Seculi homines habuit Ephoth lineum, quod applicabatur, Deinde habuit Israel Duodecim lapides in 
pectore Sacerdotis resplendentes, Salomon templum domini et Nebulam in illo 3. reg. 8. Christiani 
verbum Euangelii, Baptismum, ευχαριστιαν. Quibus si vis adde promissionem et divine doctrine 
meditationem. Matrimonium, unctio, Confirmatio non sunt sacramentalia signa, quae non habent 
annexam promissionem. Ordo figmentum est. Cf. Bayer, Promissio, 161-3. 
1108 Asendorf, Lectura in Biblia, 19-20, 26, 52-67. 
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The promise of grace in Jesus Christ, the Serpent-Crusher, true God and Man 
in one Person, nailed to the tree and risen from the dead; the right distinction of the 
gospel as this promise from the law of works; free justification by faith alone; 
assurance of salvation;—these are co-extensive doctrines which together lie at the 
heart of Reformation theology and piety. No account of Luther’s theology which fails 
to attend to them can hope to do him any real justice, and it is to Bayer’s great credit 
that his work has brought the theology of the promise from the margins into the 
center of the field. However, in addition to the historical reservations I noted above, 
Bayer’s Lutherdeutung stands in need of significant dogmatic corrections; and I believe 
the argument of this book has positioned us to see these weak points rather clearly, 
and to shore them up. In the introduction to chapter 2, I critiqued Bayer’s tendency 
toward an “abstract” theology of justification by promise and faith, i.e., one that might 
well stand or fall without the scandalous particularity of the flesh and blood of the 
Seed promised to Eve, Abraham, Jacob, and David of old, the Son of God and Mary, 
the Lord Jesus Christ, with his bitter sufferings, atoning death, and glorious 
resurrection. For Luther, this is The Promise, and apart from it there is neither a 
gospel to preach nor a truthful evangelical theology to expound. “Every promise of 
God includes Christ: for if it is separated from this Mediator, God is not dealing with 
us at all.”1109 But I will not reengage that contest here. Instead, I aim to point out four 
additional respects in which Bayer’s good account of Luther’s Worttheologie needs to 
be adjusted in light of the Reformer’s Augustinian—and “mystical”—theology of sin, 
grace, and holiness. 
                                                        
1109 On Gen. 15:6, WA 42.567.23-4, LW 3.26: omnis promissio Dei includit Christum, si enim absque 
hoc mediatore sit, Deus nihil nobiscum agit. 
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(1) First, Bayer tends to assume a stark contrast between the Augustinian 
Luther and Luther the Reformation theologian. “Promissio” names the break between 
the former and the latter and, therefore, the advance beyond the Catholic law/grace 
distinction (and its doctrine of justification by faith working through love) to the 
Reformation law/gospel distinction (and justification sole fide). But this is incomplete. 
On the one hand, Augustine himself had his own biblical theology of the promise. To 
give just one example: at c. dei 16.43, Augustine first (a) explains that the promise 
(promissio) of universal blessing made to Abraham at Gen. 12:3 “was to be fulfilled by 
Christ’s coming in the flesh, and not by keeping the old law, but by faith in the gospel 
(euangelii fides),” then (b) observes in Moses’ death outside the promised land a 
symbol of the law’s salvific impotence, but in Joshua’s victorious conquest a 
prefiguring of the promised salvation in the true Joshua, Jesus Christ.1110 So it proves 
too much to exaggerate the difference between Augustine’s law/grace contrast and the 
mature Luther’s distinction between the accusing law and God’s saving promise,1111 for 
Augustine can show himself to be a pretty sound Lutheran, that is to say a careful 
reader of Genesis and St. Paul, on just this point.1112 On the other hand, Bayer’s 
Augustine/Luther contrast fails to account for Luther’s abiding Augustinianism. As I 
                                                        
1110 CCSL 48.549, Bett. 709. 
1111 Philip Cary, “The Lutheran Codicil: From Augustine’s Grace to Luther’s Gospel,” Logia 20/4 
(Reformation 2011): 5-9. 
1112 Cf. Luther on Gal. 3:19, WA 40/1.486.17-28 [Dr], cf. LW 26.313: Evangelium lux est quae illuminat 
et vivificat corda; ostendit enim, quae sit Gratia et misericordia Dei, quae sit remissio peccatorum, 
benedictio, iustitia, vita et salus aeterna et quo modo ista consequi debeamus. Hoc modo discernentes 
legem ab Evangelio utrique tribuimus suum proprium usum et officium. De hoc Legis et Evangelii 
discrimine nihil invenis in libris Monachorum, Canonistarum, Theologorum Recentium et Veterum. 
Augustinus aliqua ex parte illud tenuit ac ostendit. Hieronymus et similes prorsus ignorarunt. 
Summa, mirum de illo fuit multis saeculis silentium in omnibus Scholis et Templis. Quae res adduxit 
conscientias in maximum discrimen. Nisi enim diserte discernatur Evangelium a Lege, non potest 
salva retineri doctrina Christiana. Cognita autem ista distinctione cognoscitur vera ratio iustificandi. 
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argued above, Luther never in fact abandons the law-“grace” contrast. He merely shifts 
his preferred terminology from gratia sanans to donum Spiritus. The faith that receives 
the promise of “grace” in Jesus Christ is quite alone in the office of justification, and 
utterly passive/receptive. But the same faith which grasps Christ in the promise for 
justification cries out for increased supplies of the Holy Spirit’s sanctifying gift, and 
this to the end of a real and robust—if inchoate and imperfect—renewal of life 
evidenced in concrete ex corde law-keeping.1113 In short, Augustine’s sp. litt. is very 
much alive in Luther’s mature theology of holiness; by the Spirit and faith, the 
Lutheran disciple does real works of love (Gal. 5:5-6). To be sure, these works 
contribute nothing to justification forensically construed—that great matter is entirely 
and exclusively wrapped up in Christ crucified (Gal. 2:21)—but they very much do 
indicate the inchoate beginnings of the real law-fulfillment which one day will come 
to its completion in eschatological glory. 
(2) With these remarks, I have already stumbled upon my second point: when 
grasped within the parameters of Luther’s doctrine of grace in Christ and renewal by 
the Spirit’s gift, the “promise” of the gospel is far richer in its content than Bayer 
realizes. Without question, there is for Luther (as for any Augustinian theologian) a 
real priority to the free gift of mercy and forgiveness in Christ: “grace.” Once an 
appropriately bleak account of fallen humanity’s helplessness due to original sin is in 
place, and with it a muscular doctrine of predestination as the only hope of salvation, 
this must needs be so: John 3:3-8, 6:63, Rom. 3:24, 8:29-30, 9:16, 11:5-6, Eph. 1:3-14, 2:1-8, 
                                                        
1113 On Gen. 15:6, WA 42.566.35-6, 567.1-2, LW 3.25: “We know indeed that faith is never alone (fides 
nunquam est sola) but brings with it love and other manifold gifts.” Again: the faith that alone 
justifies “brings with it a chorus of the most beautiful virtues (chorum pulcherrimarum virtutum), 
and is never alone (neque unquam sola est).”  
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2 Tim. 1:9, 1 John 4:19, etc. We love God because he first loved us; and it is precisely the 
Lord God’s merciful and lavish gift of forgiveness and righteousness in Christ 
crucified—in Luther’s mature terms, “grace”—which astonishes a son of Adam’s heart, 
puts away its servile fear, and evokes filial love for such a God as this, who did not 
spare his own Son but gave him up for us all. So Luther on Gen. 15:6: 
… for he who believes in God, and is sure that he shows favor toward us (certus 
est, quod faveat nobis)—if indeed he even gave his Son, and with the Son the 
hope of eternal life, how could this man not love God with his whole heart? 
how could he not stand in awe of him? how could he not endeavor to declare 
the gratefulness of his heart for such great benefits? how could he not prove 
obedience to God by bearing up under adversities?1114 
 
God’s grace in Christ comes first, to be sure, but it is itself ordered to the evocation of 
responsive faith, trust, fear, hope, and love in the forgiven heart renewed by the 
Spirit’s gift; and on top of this, being neither a semi-Pelagian, a Philippist, a French 
Jesuit, or an Arminian, for Luther that lively faith which alone grasps hold of God’s 
grace in Christ is itself the effect—not the cause—of the Spirit’s renovating gift in the 
deepness of an incredulous and self-obsessed heart (Eph. 2:8). In the Reformer’s 
mature dogmatics of grace and holiness, it is simply impossible to have the one 
without the other.  
Prima facie, therefore, one might expect to find the same thing when Luther 
casts this same doctrine in the biblical language of God’s promise; and so we do. In the 
Reformer’s promise theology, too, “grace” enjoys a certain ascendancy over “gift”: 
partly, I suspect, owing to the pastoral and polemical context in which he lived and 
                                                        
1114 On Gen. 15:6, WA 42.566.36-40: Qui enim in Deum credit, et certus est, quod faveat nobis. 
Siquidem et filium dedit, et cum filio spem aeternae vitae, quomodo hic non amaret ex toto corde 
Deum? quomodo eum non revereretur? quomodo non studeret declarare pro tantis beneficiis gratum 
animum? quomodo non probaret Deo obedientiam in adversis perferendis? Cf. LW 3.25. 
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worked, but partly also because key promissio texts in the Bible focus on the grace of 
forgiveness through the shed blood of Jesus. Thus, for example, the words of the Lord 
at the institution of his Holy Supper, which Luther reads in terms of the promises of a 
new covenant scattered amongst the prophets: “This cup is the New Testament in my 
blood, which is poured out for you for the forgiveness of sins” (Matt. 26:28). Primarily, 
then, the Eucharist is about forgiveness through Christ’s blood—“grace”—for that is 
what Christ promises to give his Church in and through it. So Luther in the Large 
Catechism (1529): “‘This is my body and blood, given for you and poured out for the 
forgiveness of sins.’ That is to say, in brief, that we go to the sacrament because there 
we receive a great treasure, through and in which we obtain the forgiveness of sins.”1115 
Likewise: “Ja, the whole gospel and the article of the Creed, ‘I believe one holy 
Christian Church, forgiveness of sins,’ etc. are included and set forth for us through 
the word in this Sacrament.”1116 Chiefly, then, Christ promises forgiveness in the 
Supper, and the necessary spiritual correlate of every promise is faith: “Because Christ 
offers and promises (verheisset) forgiveness of sins, it can be received no other way 
than by faith.”1117 Since through the bread and wine the risen Jesus Christ gives to his 
people his body broken and his blood shed for the forgiveness of sins, the principal 
(though for Luther not the exclusive1118) gift to be had in the Supper by faith is the 
“grace” bestowed through Christ’s word of promise.  
                                                        
1115 LC, On the Sacrament of the Altar (Part 5), BSELK, 1138.15-18, cf. BC, 469. 
1116 Ibid, BSELK, 1140.27-30, cf. BC, 470. 
1117 Ibid, BSELK, 1142.11-12, cf. BC, 470. 
1118 Ibid, BSELK, 1138.23—1140.5, cf. BC, 469: “Therefore, [the Eucharist] is appropriately called a food 
of the soul, for it nourishes and strengthens the new man (den neuen Menschen). For through 
baptism we are born again in the first place. However, nonetheless, the old hide (as it is said) 
remains in a man’s flesh and blood. There are so many hindrances and attacks (anfechtung) of the 
devil and the world that we often grow weary and faint and at times even stumble. Therefore the 
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 This being so, still it would be a mistake to reduce the content of the promise 
to the “grace” of forgiveness and righteousness that is in Christ, for in Luther’s 
theology the promise also includes the gift of new life through the Spirit. The promise 
of new life comes through more clearly, for example, in Luther’s baptismal catechesis 
than in his teaching on the Supper—I gather for basic scriptural reasons. For if in the 
Supper the Church proclaims her dear Lord’s atoning death for sin till he comes (1 Cor 
11:26), baptism promises and gives not only forgiveness, but death and new life in 
Christ: holiness. In baptism, the sin, isolation, sorrow, and death that characterize my 
old “self” are put to death and buried with Christ, and the Spirit gives the gift of new 
birth into the holy and glad communion of Christ’s risen body (John 3:3-8, Acts 2:38-9, 
Rom. 6:3-11, 1 Cor. 6:11, 12:12-3, Gal. 3:27-8, Col. 2:11-12, Tit. 3:5). Again, the Large 
Catechism: “In baptism every Christian has enough to learn and exercise his whole life 
long. For he can always keep himself busy with firmly believing what it promises 
(zusagt) and brings: victory over the Devil and Death, forgiveness of sins, God’s grace 
(gnade), the whole Christ and Holy Spirit with his gifts (gaben).”1119 In the terms of this 
study, baptism is the sacrament of both gnade and gabe, grace and gift. For together 
with the forgiveness of sins in Jesus Christ, baptism promises a share in den gantzen 
Christum, that is, in the Church (totus Christus, caput et membra: a classic 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Lord’s Supper is given as a daily food and sustenance so that our faith may be refreshed and 
strengthened and that it may not fall back in the struggle but become evermore stronger and 
stronger. For the new life ought so to be done, that it continually develops and progresses (denn das 
neue Leben sol also gethan sein, das es stets zuneme und fortfare). But it must suffer so much against 
it. For the devil is a furious enemy; when he sees that we resist him and attack the old man, and 
when he cannot rout us by force, he sneaks and skulks about on every side, trying all kinds of 
tricks, and does not stop until he has finally worn us out so that we either renounce our faith or 
lose heart and become indifferent or impatient. For times like these, when our heart feels too sorely 
pressed, this comfort of the Lord’s Supper is given to bring us new strength and refreshment (neue 
Krafft und Labsal hole).” 
1119 LC, On the Sacrament of Baptism (Part 4), BSELK, 1120.24-8, cf. BC, 461. 
 480
Augustinian tag) vivified by the Holy Spirit and filled with his sanctifying gifts. It is 
well-known, of course, that for Luther lifelong repentance is the right use and proper 
signification of baptism: 
These two parts, being sunk under the water and coming out of it again, point 
to the power and work of baptism, which is nothing else than the slaying of the 
old Adam and the resurrection of the new man, both of which must continue 
in us our whole life long. Thus a Christian life is nothing else than a daily 
baptism (eine tegliche Tauffe), begun once and continuing for ever. For we 
must keep at it without ceasing, always sweeping out (ausfege) whatever is of 
the old Adam, so that whatever belongs to the new may come forth. What then 
is the old man? It is what is born in us from Adam, irascible, spiteful, envious, 
unchaste, greedy, lazy, proud, ja unbelieving, beset with all vices and by nature 
he has nothing good in him. Now, when we enter into Christ’s Kingdom, such 
things must daily decrease so that the longer we live the more gentle, patient, 
and meek we become, and the more we break away from unbelief, greed, 
hatred, envy, and pride. This is the right use of baptism among Christians, 
signified through water-baptizing.1120 
 
But perhaps less well-known is the fact that for Luther this baptismal gift of new life 
and continual growth in holiness is not an awkward appendix to the gospel, but a 
chief part of God’s saving promise. For in the promulgation of his gospel by preaching, 
water, bread, and wine, God promises to lavish not a single but a twofold blessing 
upon those who believe what they hear, are drenched in it head to toe, and eat and 
drink it with glad and thankful hearts. Grace and gift, forgiveness and new creation, 
free justification and real holiness of life: this one great evangelical reality is what the 
Father promises to grant, in and for the sake of his Son and by the operation of his 
Spirit, to every poor beggar who per fidem promissionis bets the farm on this gospel. 
 (3) In the third place, we need to adjust Bayer’s interpretation of the kind of 
assurance which the promise of grace in Jesus Christ creates in the believing heart. In 
chapter 2.1.4, on the 1538 addendum to SA III.3, I introduced Luther’s eminently 
                                                        
1120 Ibid, BSELK, 1128.7-21, cf. BC, 465. 
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traditional conviction that regeneration is amissible; and on that occasion, I noted 
Berndt Hamm’s incorrect conflation of Luther’s doctrine in this regard with that of the 
Reformed. In his influential essay on the Reformation doctrine of justification, Hamm 
urges that for the Reformers, “salvation means the unconditional and thus final 
acceptance of the godless, an acceptance that cannot be reversed.” Following Bayer 
(and back of him, Hennig), Hamm asserts that this conception of unconditional and 
irreversible salvation first emerged publically at Augsburg in Oct. 1518. Cajetan 
accused Luther of wrongly mingling the objective and subjective aspects of assurance: 
for the cardinal, the reality of sacramental grace in the Church is sure enough, but a 
given person’s share in that grace is uncertain or, at best, conjectural. For his part,  
… Luther and the other reformers after him made a connection between the 
objective validity of the actions of Christ, of the New Testament and its 
promise, and the advent of his promise in the shape of faith’s subjective 
certainty in the man who receives it. This connection is possible only in light of 
unconditionality.1121 
 
The proper end of salvation’s objective reality in the promise (effectually conveyed in 
Word and Sacrament) is to summon, create, and sustain subjective assurance of this 
salvation within the heart, which takes hold of it in the promise by faith. Note well, 
objective salvation by grace and subjective assurance by faith can only be linked 
together inseparably if the grace given in the promise is strictly unconditional. It is 
precisely the conditionality of Bielish pactum-theology that drove Luther to the brink 
of despair: “facientibus quod in se est,” etc. The Reformation doctrine of justification 
puts away fear and anxiousness because it first puts away every condition for achieving 
salvation, replacing merit through law by the free grace of the gospel: 
                                                        
1121 Berndt Hamm, “What was the Reformation Doctrine of Justification?” in The Reformation of 
Faith, 200-1. 
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Only because the question of whether the person receiving grace is worthy or 
unworthy becomes irrelevant, only because the sinner’s gaze no longer remains 
fixed on himself with his imperfect repentance and his inability to love, only 
because this subjective uncertainty is no longer necessary and the sinner’s 
attention is diverted away from his own potential for works and towards Jesus 
Christ as the sole grounds of salvation, does the subjective certainty of 
salvation become possible: man is unconditionally accepted by God for 
salvation although he is a sinner, indeed as a sinner. Unconditional certainty, 
to the Reformers, is thus the outcome of unconditional grace.1122 
 
For the great scholar of late medieval Frömmigkeitstheologie, the experience of 
unconditional certainty separates evangelical piety from its Catholic precursors by a 
wide gulf. As of 1518, the new promise theology has rendered “the whole typical late 
medieval yearning for security and the certainty of grace and salvation” obsolete, 
assured peace with God being an integral part of justifying faith in the promise; and 
“this certainty of being safe in Christ is the source of all that [the Reformers] call the 
peace, calm, joy, and consolation of a Christian life.”1123 
Bayer, of course, emphasizes the promise—faith/assurance nexus in a similar 
manner, for on his reading assurance born of the promise is what distinguishes Pro 
veritate as the first reformational text in Luther’s Werke. In absolution and in the 
Eucharist, the promise is spoken anew in order to preserve the believer’s union with 
the promising God; but it is in baptism that this unbreakable relation is actually 
established, on the basis of “the once-for-all-time nature of the promise.”1124 Hence in 
Bayer’s 1989 Thesen zur Rechtfertigungslehre, we find the same stress on 
unconditionality and finality highlighted in Hamm’s account:  
 
                                                        
1122 Ibid, 201. 
1123 Ibid, 201. 
1124 Bayer, Martin Luther’s Theology, 57. 
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7. The gospel is the pure—that is, unconditional—word of forgiveness to the 
sinner: “you are set free!” 
8. Nothing more is needed for salvation, “for where there is forgiveness of sin, 
there is life and salvation” (Small Catechism): salvation is to be understood as 
final and total communion with God.1125 
 
But is the promise of the gospel quite as unconditional for the mature Luther as 
modern Lutherans like Bayer and Hamm have grown accustomed to think of it?  
 It all depends on the nature and scope of the unconditionality, and thus the 
precise kind of assurance, which one posits. In his 1542 lecture on Gen. 32:3-5, Luther 
contrasts the “conditional promises of the law” (conditionales promissiones legis) with 
the “simple promise of grace” (simplex promissio gratiae). In his office as the law’s 
chosen promulgator, Moses is an “if” man: if you do this, you will live; if you do not do 
it, you will die. In the law, the promised blessing of righteousness and life is 
contingent upon the condition of one’s law-keeping (Lev. 18:15, Deut. 27:26; cf. Gen. 
2:16-17). But the ancient patriarchs enjoyed the simple promise of grace, righteousness, 
and life in the Serpent-Crusher sine conditione—as does the semen Abrahae, that is the 
evangelical Church in all ages (Rom. 4:13-16, Gal. 3:6—4:7). For in the gospel of his 
crucified Son, God promises free mercy to sinners who deserve nothing but 
punishment, and freely gives this grace to those who take him at his word.1126 In this 
                                                        
1125 Oswald Bayer, “Theses on the Doctrine of Justification,” LQ 22 (2008): 72-5, here 73. From a 1989 
conference. 
1126 WA 44.71.21-38, 72.5-12: Iudaeorum nugae, quas Lyra hoc loco videtur secutus, inanes sunt et 
frivolae. Dicunt enim Iacob trepidasse, propterea quod diutius cum idolatra Laban moratus esset, et 
aliquam labem ab eo contraxisset. Item quod cogitarit Iacob promissiones esse conditionales, quae 
requirant debitum erga Deum officium. Sed neutiquam sic sentiendum est de patribus. Quanquam 
vera est distinctio, duplices esse promissiones, conditionales et simplices sine conditione: ut legis 
promissio est conditionalis: Gratiae promissio est simplex. Quando merces promittitur laboranti, 
conditio est, quae requirit operam et officium pactum, quod si non sequitur, merces non solvitur. Sed 
tales promissiones missas faciamus, quando est cum Deo agendum in conscientia. Mox enim 
confundemur: Si quidem ne uno quidem momento in officio sumus. Ideo falsa et pessima glosa est 
Lyrae, quam sumpsit a Iudaeis: qui nugantur Iacob non potuisse statuere, promissionem gratiae esse 
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sense, for Luther the promise is indeed unconditional. For nothing is demanded on 
the part of the ungodly sinner: nothing, that is, but his sins, for his spiritual 
bankruptcy is the one asset he brings to the bargain. The riches of God’s grace are 
given freely in Christ, through the redemption wrought by his shed blood (the 
princely sum paid at the cross being itself the outworking in time of the Father’s 
merciful resolve to set his chosen people free from sin and death). By means of the 
preached Word and sacraments, these riches are bestowed freely and effectually in the 
promise itself. Poor beggar that he is, the repenting and believing sinner receives the 
free gift of these riches by faith alone, that is, quite apart from any regard to the 
spiritual capital he might have built up ex hypothesi by doing works of the law. For 
lively faith is nothing but an empty-handed heart grasping hold of Christ crucified in 
the promise and refusing to let him go. Since the unconditional promise of grace 
overcomes the conditional promises of the law, the believer enjoys assured peace with 
God (Rom. 5:1, Eph. 3:12, Heb. 10:22). So long as he abides in Christ by faith—“his 
whole life,” like St. Jacob’s, “absorbed in this promise”1127—the most fulsome praise 
that Bayer and Hamm could possibly lavish upon the certitudo salutis does indeed 
(save for one literally crucial exception: farther on this in a moment) hold water. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
simplicem et absque conditione: et fuisse conscientiam eius pavidam, propterea quod Idolatria soceri 
se contaminasset. Sed haec non recte dicuntur de sancto Patriarcha Iacob. Haud dubie enim fugit et 
detestatus est idolatriam, quantum potuit fieri… Promissio autem gratiae haec est, quando dicit Deus: 
Tu nihil fecisti, nihil es meritus. Sed hoc tibi faciam, et donabo ex sola misericordia. Tales 
promissiones sunt gratuitae, et his similes fuerunt Patriarcharum Abrahae, Isaac, Iacob 
promissiones. Sicut supra recitatae sunt. ‘Adorabunt te filii matris tuae’, item ‘vino et oleo stabilivi te’, 
ibi nulla conditio accedit: Si feceris hoc, eris benedictus. Sed habes hanc promissionem et 
benedictionem gratuito. Moses quidem plenus est promissionum legalium: sed Patriarchae simplices 
et gratuitas habent. Cf. LW 6.96-7. 
1127 On Gen. 48:21, WA 44.719.13-4: omnis vita eius in hac promissione absorpta est: Deus promisit se 
fore mihi propicium, adeo ut ex me nascendus est Messias. Cf. LW 8.191. 
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 So long as! For as I argued in Parts I and II, Luther consistently teaches that the 
believer may fall away from grace (and forfeit the gift of the Spirit) if he consents to 
the sinful desires that remain in his flesh. There is therefore an abiding conditionality 
to Luther’s theology after all; and to say the least, this considerably complicates his 
doctrine of assurance. To take first his position on assurance: Bayer and Hamm—and 
Cajetan—are right to argue that Luther’s fiducia promissionis signals a breaking-point 
with mainstream medieval Catholic doctrine and piety. But for Luther, the assurance 
of faith is a provisional reality limited in its scope to the present moment: one of the 
many respects in which his teaching is more medieval than it is modern. The 
evangelical believer knows for a certainty that he has been baptized, preached to, 
absolved, and communicated. Furthermore, he knows that in the present moment, by 
faith, he receives the promise through these means. Even if, for a season, he enjoys no 
experiential certainty of this grace, he clings to the sure promise lodged in verba 
externa and lets their sheer reality and givenness be certainty enough for him for long 
as the darkness may last. Ego baptizatus sum! So then, even the afflicted soul has a 
kind of assurance, not to be sure in himself but rather in the Word he grasps by an act 
of heroic hope. In time of trial and in time of peace, if the believer grasps the promise 
in faith, he is therefore free to rest in Christ with a quiet and confident heart—for the 
time being. Trusting in the Word, he sees (with the eyes of faith) that he has been 
justified and that he has peace with God. But what he cannot see is whether he will 
trust God’s promise this afternoon, or tomorrow, or in the hour of death. That 
depends on whether he continues to abide in Christ, persevering to the end in order to 
be saved (Matt. 10:22); and David’s and Peter’s great falls stand as an everlasting 
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rebuke against souls who nurse the presumption that they will certainly stand fast (cf. 
1 Cor. 10:12). In short: by faith in the promise, the believer enjoys (to quote a woman 
whose heart could see) the blessed assurance that Jesus is mine in the present. But he 
has no guarantee that his present sense of assurance is a certain foretaste of glory 
divine. His present salvation is real enough, but it is not final.  
 Now, behind this principled lack of final assurance (that is, assurance of 
perseverance) lies the complex and dynamic interplay of three interrelated loci: first, 
the Augustinian doctrine of predestination, which Luther adopts c. 1514/15 and never 
abandons despite his grave Prädestinationsanfechtungen and, in the 1530s and 40s, his 
pastoral counsel not to think too much about it; second, Luther’s deeply Augustinian 
doctrine of sin, grace, and holiness, the main object of this book; third, the Lutheran 
doctrine of present assurance through faith in the promise. Perhaps, in the long run, 
at least one of these factors has to give way before the others. Reformed theologians 
like Calvin, Hooker, and Owen pick up the first and the second but then modify the 
third, broadening the scope of assurance to include each link in the catena aurea from 
predestination to glory (Rom. 8:30) and thus, arguably, altering it in kind. For their 
part, Erasmians, Philippists, et al. who abandon absolute predestination willy-nilly 
attenuate sin, enfeeble grace, and misplace holiness in opera hominis by the same 
stroke; which means that they too alter the nature of assurance, anchoring it too 
confidently in the believer’s free decision to cooperate with grace and thus enervating 
that grace (and sapping the strength of assurance) in just the way Luther lamented 
near the end of de servo arbitrio.1128 Since Luther’s hard-to-categorize position charts a 
                                                        
1128 WA 18.783.3-39, Packer, 313-14. Farther on this point in the conclusion below. 
 487
middle way between these alternative stances, describing the exact nature of the 
conditionality which he envisions in the Christian life proves a difficult task. If 
considered in light of God’s eternal predestination, the elect believer’s continuance in 
grace is not conditional at all; or if it is, God has promised to give, by the operation of 
his Spirit, the very conditions which he requires for the believer to remain in his grace, 
viz., repentance and faith to the bitter end. In this regard, eternal salvation is every bit 
as unconditional for Luther as it is for Calvin—or Augustine. But Luther agrees with 
Augustine (and with all medieval Augustinians) that with few exceptions, it has 
seemed wise to the Lord to hide from the elect the fixed fact of their election, the 
better to keep them in a spiritual posture of right fear of God, humility, obedience, 
and dependence. In this regard, he is in spiritual practice closer to Erasmus than he 
might care to admit. For from the limited vantage point of the viator in lumine gratiae 
nondum gloriae, the great matter of his own salvation—dependent as he knows it 
really is on God’s election according to free grace (Rom. 9:16, 11:5-6)—appears to be a 
profoundly conditional matter. As I put it above, for Luther a great “if” hangs over the 
Christian life: if the believer perseveres to the end in faith and repentance, he will be 
saved. “If you live according to the flesh, you will die: but if, by the Spirit, you put to 
death the deeds of the body, you will live” (Rom. 8:13). In this life, the gift-empowered 
refusal of consent to residual sin is utterly necessary to remain in Christ’s grace, and 
unconditional certainty is not on the table. 
 (4) The fourth and last point of correction to Bayer’s promissio-thesis is an 
intimate spiritual corollary of the third. For Bayer, the mystical theologia crucis 
encapsulated in the April 1518 Heidelberg Disputation is part and parcel of what the 
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new theology of promise and faith emerging in May/June 1518 overcomes.1129 I am 
convinced that Luther’s promise theology deeply refashions the mystical theology of 
sanctification through the cross. But it does not do away with it. Instead, it gives rise 
to what Berndt Hamm calls an “evangelical mysticism.”1130 And for the old Luther—
above all as hagiographic lecturer on the Genesis saints—at the heart of the darkest 
possible mystical experience of the holy cross is the withdrawal of any felt sense of 
God’s grace, kindness, favor, love. To suffer thus is to share in Christ’s desolation on 
the cross (Ps. 22:1-2). In the traditional monastic terms which the old Luther 
continued to utilize, this is the suspensio gratiae.1131 In the more novel language of the 
Reformer’s Worttheologie, the same experience is described as the total eclipse of the 
promise in the midst of demonic accusation and attack—or even divine, in the case of 
the greatest saints. For in the highest Anfechtungen, of the order holy Jacob endured 
that long dark night at the River Jabbok, it is none other than Jesus Christ himself, the 
Promised Seed, who rises up in battle against his saint, revokes all former assurances 
of his blessing, and assaults him with the threat of certain damnation.1132 In that 
instance, by definition, subjective assurance of salvation is gone. But in spite of it all, 
the Promise stands fast; and though its sweetness can no longer be tasted in the heart, 
                                                        
1129 Bayer, Promissio, 12, 38, 59-62, 67, 72-3, 85, 166, 173, 181, 191, 195, 235-6, 285, 299-301, etc. 
1130 Berndt Hamm, “Wie mystisch war der Glaube Luthers?,” in Berndt Hamm and Volker Leppin, 
eds., Gottes Nähe unmittelbar erfahren: Mystik im Mittelalter und bei Martin Luther (Tübingen: 
Mohr-Siebeck, 2007), 237-87, here 237 et passim. On p. 262, note 77, Hamm observes that Bayer’s 
worttheologische interpretation of Luther’s theology (as opposed to zur-Mühlen’s in Nos extra nos) 
precludes the very possibility of an evangelical Mystik. 
1131 See chapter 2.2.3 above, where I discussed the appearance of this monastic-theological phrase in 
the lecture on Gen. 8:1 (WA 42.335ff, LW 2.103-6) and in Luther’s marginal notes on Tauler’s 
sermons, WA 9.99.29 (suspensio gratiae et spiritus) and 101.3-4 (derelictione a deo per suspensionem 
gratiae). 
1132 WA 44.96.39-40: Nostra vero sententia haec est, quod luctator sit Dominus gloriae, Deus ipse, sive 
filius Dei incarnandus, qui apparuit et locutus est patribus. Cf. LW 6.130. 
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by virtue of the Spirit’s ineffable gemitus (Rom. 8:26) its rock-solid truth can still be 
trusted, and the Lord’s deliverance hoped for (Isa. 50:10). And because of Luther’s 
Augustinian doctrine of gift-empowered non-consent as the spiritual condition for 
abiding in Christ’s grace, the severely afflicted saint not only can but must cling to the 
promise. For God will not forsake a believer unless the believer forsakes God first. But 
forsake God the saint may indeed do, frail and sinful as he is by virtue of his flesh. And 
does not everything in his experience argue that God has already forsaken him? that, 
in St. Asaph’s words, the steadfast love of the Lord has forever ceased, and his 
promises come to end for all time (Ps. 77:8)? For as long as the hour of darkness 
endures, the afflicted saint hangs suspended between eternal death and eternal life: or 
rather, he is in process of being plunged into the abyss of death and hell, with just a 
slender thread of faith precariously tethering him to the kingdom of grace and life. 
Everything hinges (in conspectu credentis, non dei miserentis) on whether he will give 
up and cut the thread and fall to his destruction, or else defiantly refuse to let go of 
God in his promise of grace, clinging to God’s promised steadfastness in Christ even in 
the face of his own wrathful opposition to this promise and indeed, to the saint 
himself. So the mystical Worttheologe, lecturing on Gen. 32 in 1542: 
This passage is regarded by all as among the most obscure in the whole Old 
Testament. Nor is this strange, since it deals with that sublime temptation (de 
sublimi illa tentatione) in which the Patriarch Jacob had to fight not with flesh 
and blood or with the Devil, but against God himself. But that is a horrible 
battle, when God himself battles and in a hostile fashion sets himself against 
his opponent as though on the point of taking away life. He who wants to stand 
and conquer in this struggle must certainly be a holy man and true Christian.1133 
                                                        
1133 WA 44.93.2-8: Hic locus ab omnibus habetur inter obscurissimos totius veteris Testamenti. Neque 
id mirum est: quia agit de sublimi illa tentatione, qua dimicandum est Patriarchae Iacob non cum 
carne et sanguine, aut cum Diabolo: sed adversus Deum ipsum. Ea vero horribilis pugna est: Quando 
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… moreover, the temptation to despair (tentatio desperationis), which usually 
accompanies this experience, increases the pain and confusion of the flesh, 
when the afflicted soul complains that it is deserted and cast off by God. This is 
the ultimate and heaviest temptation to unbelief and despair, with which the 
greatest of the saints (summi ex sanctis) are usually exercised. And he who is 
able to stand and endure there, he comes through to the perfect knowledge of 
the divine will [Rom. 12:2], so that he is able to say with Jacob: “I have seen the 
Lord,” etc. (Gen. 32:30). “I didn’t think that our Lord God meant so well with 
me.”1134 
 
In 1515/16, Luther would have counseled a soul suffering thus to resign himself to 
damnation, the better to facilitate the purgative work of infused grace.1135 This, of 
course, is the spiritual wisdom of John Tauler and the Theologia Deutsch, and I think 
Leppin is quite right to insist that Tauler’s influence on Luther is far more important—
and more abiding—than many have recognized.1136 Long after the advent of the new 
promise theology, the indisputably evangelical Luther continues to describe the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Deus ipse pugnat, et adversatur hostiliter pugnando tanquam vitam erepturus. In hac lucta qui volet 
consistere et vincere, eum sane oportebit esse sanctum virum et vere Christianum. Cf. LW 6.125. 
1134 WA 44.97.25-31: Auget autem dolorem et trepidationem carnis tentatio desperationis, quae solet 
concurrere, quando animus adflictus. queritur se desertum et abiectum a Deo. Haec est ultima et 
gravissima tentatio diffidentiae et desperationis, qua solent exerceri summi ex sanctis. Et qui ibi 
potest consistere et perdurare, pervenit ad perfectam cognitionem voluntatis divinae, ut possit dicere 
cum Iacob: ‘vidi Dominum’ etc. Jch meinet nicht, das unser Herr Gott so gut mit mir meinet. Cf. LW 
6.131. 
1135 See esp. the scholia on (1) Rom. 5:3, WA 56.303.10-17, LW 25.290, (2) Rom. 8:28, WA 56.388.3-28, 
LW 25.378, and (3) Rom. 9:3, WA 56.390.23—394.2, LW 25.380-4. Cf. Peura, Mehr als ein Mensch?, 
159-61. 
1136 Volker Leppin, “Transformationen spätmittelalterlicher Mystik bei Luther,” in Gottes Nähe, 165-
86, esp. 171-8; idem, “Tauler, Johannes (ca. 1300-1361),” TRE, vol. 32, pp. 745-48, here 747. This, pace 
Henrik Otto, Vor- und frühreformatorische Tauler-Rezeption. Annotationen in Drucken des späten 
15. und frühen 16. Jahrhunderts (Gütersloher, 2003), 213-14, who argues well that Tauler influenced 
Luther profoundly in the early period, but then concludes that this influence was merely 
temporary. Cf. the lecture on Gen. 41:1-7, WA 44.397.9-20, LW 7.133: Ista exempla diligenter 
observanda sunt et inculcanda mentibus piorum, carnales enim contemnunt, nec perspiciunt 
penetralia virtutum, quae scribuntur et proponuntur Ecclesiae in consolationem, ut discamus 
adflictiones nostras certissimum argumentum et pignus esse, quod simus filii Dei. Extat vox Tauleri, 
quanquam non loquitur in terminis scripturae sanctae, sed alieno et peregrino sermone utitur: 
Magnum damnum sciat homo se fecisse, qui non expectat opus Domini, videlicet, quando vult eum 
crucifigere, mortificare et redigere veterem hominem in nihilum, quod non fit nisi passione et cruce, 
ibi enim sustines opus Domini, qui format te, hobelt dich, und haut die groben eßt ab, et quidquid est 
impedimenti ad aedificationem aeternam, praecidit securi, serra, dolabra. Sicut inquit David Psalmo 
37.: ‘Subditus esto Deo, et formare ei.’ 
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mystical experience of damnation in the old taulerisch terms; and he does so because 
he fully expects holy Christians (summi ex sanctis) to suffer this ineffable agony as a 
crucial component of their sanctification by Christ’s cross. The experience itself is 
unaltered from a phenomenological standpoint, and the spiritual end of the 
experience is the same as well: Lutheran saints, too, pass through the hellish 
purgatorial suffering of the cross en route to holiness and glory. But the Promise has 
turned Tauler’s old wisdom on its head. In the midst of hell, the saint of God, that is 
“the man of faith who has the promise,”1137 is no longer to resign himself to perdition 
even in the event that God in his majesty so wills it. Just the reverse in fact. The 
Seelsorger trained in Luther’s evangelical Mystik (and, with Mattox and Maxfield, we 
must ever recall that the spiritual formation of skilled pastors is the old Doctor’s main 
object in his lectures1138) advises the soul in his care to cling to the divine promise in 
faith with such a tenacity and adamance that he might even be forced to hold the Lord 
God himself to his word. In scholastic terms, the suffering saint is to reject deus in 
potentia absoluta sua in favor of deus in potentia ordinata sua, that is, Jesus Christ and 
him crucified as he is present, given, and graspable in Word and sacrament.1139 In 
                                                        
1137 WA 44.101.39, LW 6.136. 
1138 WA 44.98.29-35: Haec diligenter agitanda sunt propter eos, qui aliquando futuri sunt pastores 
Ecclesiarum. Semper enim erunt aliqui, qui pacientur hasce tentationes, ut eorum voce erigi et 
confirmari possint: in hunc modum, confide, fili, crede te baptisatum esse, pastum et cibatum coena 
Domini, absolutum impositis manibus, non meis, sed Dei, qui dixit ad te: Remitto tibi peccata, 
promitto vitam aeternam. Hoc si firma fide appraehenderint, evanescent tentationes et blasphemiae 
spiritus. Cf. LW 6.132; Mattox, Defender, 257; Maxfield, 15-18. 
1139 See above all the 1539 lecture on Gen. 19:14, WA 43.71.7—73.23, LW 3.274-77, esp. WA 43.72.37—
73.10: Ego legi tales libros cum magno studio, et vos quoque hortor, ut legatis: sed cum iudicio, nec 
nulla causa est, cur ego haec sic urgeam et inculcem, ut in ordinatam Dei potentiam et ministeria Dei 
intueamini: nolumus enim agere cum Deo nudo, ‘cuius viae sunt impervestigabiles, et abscondita 
iuditia’, Romanos undecimo. Ordinatam potentiam, hoc est, filium incarnatum amplectemur, ‘in quo 
reconditi sunt omnes thesauri divinitatis’. Ad puerum illum positum in gremio matris mariae, ad 
victimam illam pendentem in cruce nos conferemus, Ibi vere contemplabimur Deum, ibi in ipsum cor 
Dei introspiciemus, quod sit misericors, quod nolit mortem peccatoris: sed ut convertatur et vivat. Ex 
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scriptural terms, even as the Lord Almighty himself seeks to put him to death (cf. 
Exod. 4:24), an evangelical mystic like Jacob must defiantly and resolutely refuse to let 
go of God in his promise, until he blesses him (Gen. 32:26): 
I shall cling to the Word of God and be content with it. There I shall die: there I 
shall live. There is sufficiently abundant protection in the promise of God not 
only against the devil, the flesh, and the world but also against this sublime 
temptation. For if God were to send an angel to say: “Do not believe these 
promises!” I would reject him, saying: “Depart from me, Satan, etc.” Or, if God 
himself appeared to me in his majesty and said: “You are not worthy of my 
grace; I will change my counsel and I will not keep my promise to you,” there I 
would not give him ground, but it would have to be fought out bitterly against 
God himself. It is as Job says: “Even if he kills me, nevertheless, I will hope in 
him” (Job 13:15). If he should cast me off into the depths of hell and place me in 
the midst of devils, nevertheless, I believe that I am going to be saved: because 
I have been baptized, I have been absolved, I have received the pledge of my 
salvation, the body and blood of the Lord in the Supper. Therefore I want to 
see and hear nothing else, but I shall live and die in this faith, whether God, or 
an angel, or the devil says the contrary.1140 
 
This is to draw near to the gates of hell and to emerge the victor, grace-wounded and 
limping as you go. For in the narthex of eternal damnation, when the only certainty is 
sheer terror and the only unconditional truth the justice of the saint’s condemnation, 
the excruciating lack of assurance and the invincible strength of the Promise go hand-
in-hand—for the sanctification of the saint, and to the great glory of God.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
hac speculatione seu contemplatione nascitur vera pax, et verum gaudium cordis. Itaque Paulus dicit: 
‘Nihil iudico me scire praeter Christum’ etc. Huic speculationi cum fructu vacamus. 
1140 WA 44.97.37—98.9: Ego verbum Dei retinebo, et eo ero contentus. Ibi moriar: Ibi vivam. Abunde 
satis est praesidii in promissione Dei non solum contra Diabolum, carnem et mundum: sed etiam 
contra illam sublimem tentationem. Si enim mitteret Deus angelum, qui diceret: Non credas 
promissionibus his, reiicerem eum: discede a me, Sathana etc. Aut si Deus ipse appareret in sua 
maiestate, et diceret: Non es dignus mea gratia, mutabo consilium et non servabo tibi promissum. Ibi 
non esset mihi cedendum, sed adversus Deum ipsum pugnandum acerrime. Sicut inquit Hiob: 
‘Etiamsi occiderit me, tamen in eo sperabo’. Si abiecerit me in profundum inferni, et posuerit me in 
medio Diabolorum: tamen credo me salvatum iri: quia sum baptisatus, sum absolutus, accepi pignus 
salutis meae, corpus et sanguinem Domini in coena. Nihil igitur aliud videre, nec audire volo. Sed 
vivam et moriar in hac fide, sive Deus, sive angelus, seu Diabolus contrarium dicat. Cf. LW 6.131. 
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If the young Luther, with Tauler’s famed nun and not a few other early modern 
catholics,1141 saw the very apex of sanctity in the mystical confession, “Let him slay me”; 
and if modern Lutherans have tended to disregard sanctity and mysticism alike, saying 
simply “I will hope in him” on the basis of a one-sided theology of the Word; in the 
mature Luther’s spiritual theology, the greatest of the saints count the whole world as 
loss, stake everything on the Promise, endure the purifying cross, dare God to keep his 
word, and therefore cry out with Job in the patient, hopeful, holy suffering of faith: 
“Even if he kills me, nevertheless, I will hope in him.” Such is the Reformer’s theologia 
mystica promissionis, fidei et crucis, and it is most assuredly a theology of holiness.1142 
Did not the Lord give Jacob a new name in the struggle? Renewal in holiness is the 
object of all God’s marvelous dealings with his saints: “But now I give to you a name 
that accords with what I have done with you, just as I have magnified you (cf. Ps. 4:4 
Vg.), not as a son of the flesh, but as I have led, governed, afflicted, purged, and 
                                                        
1141 Otto, Vor- und frühreformatorische Tauler-Rezeption, 11o-14. On p. 113, Otto notes three texts 
from 1518 wherein Luther cites Tauler (and alludes to the story from Predigt 13) to prove his lack of 
novelty: in his Resolutiones, WA 1.586.16-19; the Asteriscii against Eck, WA 1.298.29ff; and the Ad 
dialogum Silv. Prieratis de potet. papae responsio, WA 1.674.33-7, to wit: … quidam e tua secta, 
doctissimus Doctor Iohannes Taulerus, ait, si coelum coram te apertum esset, adhuc intrare non 
deberes, nisi primum voluntatem dei super introitu consuleres, ut etiam in gloria non quae tua sunt 
quaeras. Sed hanc sententiam verissimam et theologicissimam absit ut probet Scholastica Theologia. 
1142 For promissio—fides—crux, see the 1544 lecture on Gen. 37:18-20, where Luther states that in the 
stories of the fathers the promise and their faith in the promise should be observed, “and 
afterwards also their cross. For these three are the principales loci in the legends of the saints.” WA 
44.272, LW 6.364. In the 1539 lecture on Gen. 22:1-2, Luther summarizes the Christian life in these 
three terms: “If there are some who want to follow allegory, Moriah was the word of God and faith 
in the word. For these two are correlatives: there can be no faith or worship of God where there is 
no word, and wherever the word is, there it is necessary that there are some people who believe. 
Where, therefore, these two are, there follows a third, namely the cross and mortification. These 
three make up the Christian life.” WA 43.208.19-22, cf. LW 4.101. Since it names the virtue exercised 
under the cross, the spiritual greatness of patience must never be underestimated, WA 44.300.41—
301.2, cf. LW 6.402: “Let patience (Pacientia), says James (1:4), have the perfect work. For he who is 
patient (paciens) does not sin: ‘he who is mortified, has been set free from sin,’ Rom. 6[:7]. He who 
is patient (Patiens) in faith in Christ is truly a saint. There, nothing of sin remains [cf. 1 Pet. 4:1]. For 
whatever he suffers (patitur) is sheer and purest righteousness.” On the cross in the Genesis 
lectures, see Forsberg, Das Abrahambild, 91-8. 
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sanctified you by many vexations, in order that I might make you a new man and a 
new creature (novum hominem et novam creaturam); and now I give to you a new 
name, not of the flesh but of the spirit.”1143 This is the old Luther’s mystical theology of 
real and indeed heroic holiness, and it is Promissiotheologie to the core. 
 
3.5 The Trinitarian Deepening of Luther’s Theology 
 
In the last place, a brief word on the maturation of the young Luther’s Augustinian 
theology sin and grace (Part II) into the mature Reformer’s trinitarian dogmatics of 
holiness (chapter 2). The student of Luther’s theology who steps back from this or that 
tree to survey the whole forest of his works cannot help but notice the rising profile of 
the catholic doctrine of the Holy Trinity. In part, this is because the younger Luther 
could simply assume its truthfulness: a luxury he could no longer afford after the 
emergence of anti-trinitarianism in the 1530s amongst the likes of Christian Entfelder, 
Michel Servetus, and John Campanus.1144 Hence the vigorous assertions of the 
Church’s creedal doctrine (and doctrinal theology) that flow steadily from his pen in 
the 1530s and 40s. For example: the Three Symbols or Creeds of the Christian Faith 
(1538), expositing the Apostles’ Creed, the Athanasian, and the Te Deum; On the 
Councils and the Church (1539), which articulates a scripturally-ruled and historically 
informed evangelical conciliarism in its first two parts and then culminates in the 
                                                        
1143 On Gen. 35:9-10, WA 44.192.13-17, cf. LW 6.259. 
1144 Cf. WA Tr 1.99.18-21, LW 54.32 (#237, from April 1532): “When an exceedingly virulent book was 
published in 1532 contra trinitatem, Luther said: ‘These people don’t think about the fact that other 
people too have suffered temptations about this article: ja, but it doesn’t lighten the sting to set my 
thought over against the Word of God and the Holy Spirit.” Presumably, Luther and his guests were 
discussing the Dialogi de Trinitate which Servetus published that year. See Brecht, Preservation of 
the Church, 133-4; for the “Radical Triadologies” of Entfelder, Servetus, Campanus, Claude of Savoy, 
and Schwenckfeld, see George Huntston Williams, The Radical Reformation, 3rd ed. (Kirksville, MO: 
Truman State University Press, 1992), 459-76. 
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third with the trinitarian, grace-and-gift ecclesiology I set forth above in chapter 2.3; 
the Promotionsdisputationen of Erasmus Alberus (1543), Georg Major and Johannes 
Faber (1544), and Petrus Hegemon (1545), advanced exercises in scholastic 
trinitarianism; exegetical works like the Lectures on Genesis (1535—45) and the 
Treatise on the Last Words of David (1543), in which Luther champions patristic 
trinitarian exegesis of the Old Testament along the lines I sketched above in section 
3.2.1145 In short, the old Luther increasingly devoted his attention and skill to 
preaching, expositing, and defending the catholic obiectum fidei or fides quae summed 
up in the ancient confessions of the Church.   
 But this is not what I have in mind to underscore here. For the trinitarian 
deepening of Luther’s theology was not just a matter of a topical shift due to the 
external provocations of false doctrine. The deepening ran much deeper than that, and 
it is therefore much harder to document or demonstrate. But a full account of the 
development of Luther’s theology of holiness requires that I set my hand to it 
nonetheless, unavoidably impressionistic as my observations here must needs be. We 
have no reason to suspect that there was ever a time in Luther’s life when he did not 
hold the Church’s received doctrine of the Trinity. (To be sure, the Devil attacked this 
chief article along with all the others: but Luther fought back against the vanity of his 
fallen, finite reasonings by the Word of God and prayer, as does every verus theologus 
ecclesiae.) In a life marked by extraordinary upheaval, his creedal faith in the Trinity—
and in the person, natures, and work of Jesus Christ—is a fixed and stable datum, and 
                                                        
1145 On the last point, see esp. Christine Helmer, “Luther’s Trinitarian Hermeneutic and the Old 
Testament,” Modern Theology 18/1 (Jan. 2002): 49-73; Mickey L. Mattox, “From Faith to the Text and 
Back Again: Martin Luther on the Trinity in the Old Testament,” Pro Ecclesia 15/3 (Summer 2006): 
281-303. 
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as such a reliable gauge of the Reformer’s abiding catholicity (as Aulén, Piepkorn, 
Pelikan, Mannermaa, Yeago, et al. have argued1146). I think there is, however, a 
discernible shift from a more formal (not merely formal: more) commitment to 
catholic dogma in the earlier stages of Luther’s career to the materially trinitarian 
dogmatics of grace and gift that pervades and invigorates his mature Reformation 
theology. In other words, the more evangelical and scriptural Luther’s gospel became, 
the more deeply catholic his theology grew. As Helmer has cogently argued in her 
book, this gradual development from a more formal to a profoundly material 
trinitarian commitment was not a matter of abandoning vain theological attempts to 
peek into the inner being, life, and glory of the so-called “immanent Trinity” in favor 
of an exclusive focus on the redemptive-historical manifestation (sub contrario!) of the 
“economic Trinity.” Nor was it quite a matter of leaving off scholastic speculations 
about God for a more patristic, exegetical, and kerygmatic theology of Father, Son, 
and Spirit. The old professor clearly delighted in thinking about the eternity, majesty, 
infinity, and joy of the Holy Trinity in se; and certainly by the time of the Romans 
lectures, the young doctor in biblia was well on his way toward the articulation of a 
scripturally rich theology of the Trinity’s mighty deeds of salvation ad extra pro nobis. 
But as Luther continued along the path which Dr. Staupitz had set for him in 1512, the 
trinitarian substance of the gospel itself, that is the Father’s promise of free grace in 
his Son and new life by his Spirit, increasingly impressed itself upon his mind.  
                                                        
1146 In addition to works cited earlier in this book, see Gustaf Aulén, Reformation and Catholicity, 
trans. Eric H. Wahlstrom (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1961); Jaroslav Pelikan, Obedient Rebels: 
Catholic Substance and Protestant Principle in Luther’s Reformation (New York: Harper & Row, 
1964. 
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 We see this in the great summaries of his teaching which Luther supplied for 
posterity in the late 1520s and 30s: in addition to the third part of On the Councils and 
the Church, the third part of the Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper (1528) and, in 
terms of their impact on the ground in the real life of the Church, above all the two 
Catechisms (1529) come to mind. In the Confession, for example, amidst a 
workmanlike, matter-of-fact summary of the Church’s faith that follows the outline of 
the Apostles’ Creed—and in process, highlights loci in doctrine and piety where, in 
Luther’s judgment, Roman Catholic teaching subverts the Creed, e.g., “I therefore 
condemn both new and old Pelagians, who do not want to let original sin be sin, 
rather it must be a weakness or lack,”1147 likewise the theory and praxis of monastic life 
as salvifically meritorious since “to seek a way of blessedness there, that’s the devil’s 
doctrine and faith, 1 Tim. 4[:1-5] etc.”1148—amidst, I say, this more formal and 
straightforward elaboration of the heads of creedal doctrine, Luther suddenly erupts 
into a doxological surge of robust trinitarian faith that is simultaneously an 
impassioned proclamation of God’s free gift of nothing less than himself to us poor 
sinners in the gospel:   
These are the three persons and one God, who has given himself to us all 
wholly and completely (der sich uns allen selbs gantz und gar gegeben hat), with 
all that he is and has. The Father gives himself to us (Der Vater gibt sich uns), 
with heaven and earth and all the creatures, that they may serve us and be 
useful. But this gift has become obscured and useless through Adam’s fall. 
Therefore the Son himself subsequently gave himself to us (hat darnach der son 
sich selbs auch uns gegeben) and has given all his work, sufferings, wisdom, and 
righteousness and reconciled us to the Father, so that we, living and 
righteousness once again, might also know and have the Father with his gifts. 
But since this grace would useful to no one if it remained so profoundly hidden 
and could not come to us, the Holy Spirit comes and gives himself to us also 
                                                        
1147 WA 26.503.25-6 [Dr], cf. LW 37.363. 
1148 WA 26.504.28-9 [Dr], cf. LW 37.364. 
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wholly and completely (kompt der heilige geist und gibt sich auch uns gantz und 
gar). He teaches us Christ’s saving deed, shows us how to understand it, helps 
us receive and preserve it, to use it to our advantage and to impart it to others, 
to increase and extend it. He does this both inwardly and outwardly: inwardly 
through the faith and other spiritual gifts, but outwardly through the Gospel, 
through baptism, and the sacrament of the altar, through which as through 
three means or ways he comes to us and inculcates the sufferings of Christ in 
us and brings blessedness for our use.1149 
 
But arguably the trinitarian deepening of Luther’s gospel (and so his evangelical 
theology) is even more apparent in texts that are not immediately concerned with the 
exposition of the Church’s creedal doctrine. In my mind, the Disputations against the 
Antinomians (1537—40) are especially worthy of mention in this regard. If those 
passages which feature the mature creedal theology of grace in Christ and renewal by 
the Spirit’s gift were cut, Jefferson-style (cf. Jer. 36:23), from the disputations, little 
would be left over. Precisely because their subject matter is not the Holy Trinity but 
the nature of the law, its right use, its role in justification, its proper distinction from 
the gospel, and so forth, the depth of Luther’s mature grasp of the doctrines of 
creation, of Adam and Eve’s rebellion with its horrible effects, and of the Father’s 
utterly gracious (and in the promise, publically declared) resolve to redeem fallen 
humans from sin and death through the grace of his Son and to restore them to life, 
holiness, freedom, and joy by the gift of his Spirit is on full display gegen die 
Antinomer. 
 With this, I come to the end of my argument. I hope that it has furnished an 
accurate (if admittedly impressionistic) account of how the Reformer carried forward 
the insights he gleaned from the “420s Augustine” into the works of his maturity, even 
as he clarified, developed, and deepened this basically traditional vision into a robustly 
                                                        
1149 WA 26.505.38—506.12 [Dr], cf. LW 37.366. 
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trinitarian, joyfully evangelical, and persistently mystical dogmatics of sin in Adam, 
grace and righteousness in Jesus Christ, and renewal into real holiness of life by the 
Spirit.   
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CONCLUSION 
SUMMARY REMARKS, PROSPECTS FOR THE CHURCHES, AND ONE 
DOGMATIC CORRECTION 
 
 
Two co-extensive arguments lie at the heart of this book.  
First, I have argued that in his mature dogmatics Martin Luther sets forth a 
vigorous doctrine of progressive renewal in holiness by the “gift” of the Holy Spirit. 
This he sets in careful relation both to the persistent “sinfulness” of the saints and to 
the “grace” of free forgiveness and righteousness in Jesus Christ. Together, these three 
realities—grace, gift, and “sin”—are the components that comprise Luther’s rarely 
grasped “simul.” Far from proving his principled indifference to sanctification, rightly 
understood the simul peccator et iustus presents a pithy summary of the Reformer’s 
creedal, mystical, and “Augustinian” theology of embattled holiness advancing 
mirabiliter within the impregnable stronghold of God’s promise of forgiveness, life, 
and salvation in Jesus Christ. Indeed, in point of the facts I have urged in this book, it 
would seem that the “simul” has occupied too central a place and too high a profile in 
twentieth-century accounts of Luther’s theology. The regenerate suffer the ongoing 
presence of residual sinful desires in and as their “flesh,” to be sure, and in this sense 
the greatest of the saints confess they are poor sinners. But by virtue of the Spirit’s 
renewing gift, holy Lutheran (!) believers in Christ refuse to consent to the evil desires 
which tantalize, vex, and grieve them all at once. That is, they refuse to stop repenting, 
cling by steadfast faith to God’s Word in law and gospel, and shut up their ears to the 
devices of the devil. They put the bits of old Adam’s affections persisting within them 
to death, beg for increased supplies of the Spirit’s life-giving power, triumph over sin 
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amidst great weakness by the Spirit’s strength not theirs, and thus continue in the 
path of baptismal discipleship that leads through their appointed share in the holy 
cross to the glory of Christ’s resurrection. So long as they keep up the fight, God 
ignores the imperfections that mar their real renewal for the sake of the blood and 
righteousness of his incarnate Son. For “sinful” as the heart-rent saints in part remain, 
this perfect righteousness is theirs by faith in the gospel. Infinite as the Son of God 
himself, this divine and victorious righteousness utterly abolishes the debt of original 
and past actual sins, swallows up the affective sinfulness that remains in the saints, 
and presents them pure and blameless before the Father, as innocent as Christ 
himself, their Head and Husband—provided they continue to repent and believe. For 
Spirit-given non-consent to evil desire, manifest in the deep repentance of faith, hope, 
and love, is the spiritual lynchpin that holds together the three parts of the “simul.” If 
the battle for non-consent is lost, and a saint succumbs to his flesh as did David with 
Bathsheba, then faith and the Spirit depart and grace and gift are forfeited. In that 
tragic case, the erstwhile saint becomes one with his flesh, falls out of righteousness 
and life in Christ back into death and damnation in Adam, and is found to be peccator 
totaliter, totus caro, nihil nisi caro, etc.—no longer a iustus saint at all. “He who does 
not abstain from sin, but persists in his former evil nature, must have a different 
Christ, that of the Antinomians; the real Christ is not there, even if all the angels 
would cry, ‘Christ! Christ!’ He must be damned with this, his new Christ.”1150  
Second, I have argued that this theology of sin, grace, and real renewal in 
holiness is deeply “Augustinian.” Despite the genuine novelty of his Reformation 
                                                        
1150 On the Councils and the Church, WA 50.599.35-600.2, cf. LW 41.114. 
 502
theology in certain vital respects, the dogmatics of holiness which Luther learned from 
the “420s Augustine” in the mid 1510s stayed with him for the rest of his life: and this, 
not as a relic of his medieval past awkwardly patched together with his novel 
Worttheologie, but as the substance and core of his catholic and evangelical theology 
of sin in Adam, grace and righteousness in Christ, and new life by the Spirit. 
I thank you for the patience and kindness you have shown me by getting this 
far in my book. Perhaps you have found the argument thought-provoking, useful, and 
even compelling. But if you haven’t, I suppose there isn’t much I could add here to 
convince you. A little like the fighter pilot God in his wise counsel decreed I shall 
never become, I’ve done my best to bring this P-51 Mustang back to base with all nine 
yards left behind in German-occupied territory. In short, my ammo is spent. All that 
remains is the debriefing, and thus the occasion to share insights gained from this 
long sortie for use in future contests. These I limit to two areas: first, the implications 
of my research for the unity of the divided Churches; second, one point where, in the 
course of writing this book, I’ve come to think that Luther’s dogmatics stand in need 
of a correction in light of the doctrines of grace set forth in the Word of God for the 
infinite consolation of fleshly, frail, tank-empty, bullet-ridden, battle-scarred little 
saints like me.  
To be quite clear, I am now shifting gears from the (one hopes) more or less 
objective historical-theological research of the scholar to the (one also hopes) grace-
astonished, scripturally-ruled, historically-rooted, deeply committed, glad, hopeful, 
and perhaps even wise work of the church theologian. If that’s not your cup of tea, I 
assure you I take no offense if you stop reading right here! For the real object of my 
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argument in this book is academic and historical. I trust that in good faith my more 
critical readers will not “Bulverize” the forgoing four-hundred or so pages of historical 
research too severely in light of the honest dogmatic theology which follows.1151 I 
realize that in setting my hand to speak of what is in fact true, I leave myself open to 
attack from those quarters that have become too clever for old fashioned things like 
being, goodness, beauty, and truth—perhaps, I fear, even to mere dismissal as “a 
theologian.” But this is a risk I am willing to take. For I am a Christian, and a pastor 
too, and I confess I love the Church of God too much to leave the results of my 
historical research sitting on the shelf. I have done my best—others, surely, can do 
better—to describe Luther’s theology as it developed in the first half of the sixteenth 
century. Now, the time has come to harvest the fruit of this research for the benefit of 
Church and theology in the twenty-first. I certainly hope that other, more capable 
church theologians than myself will indulge my lack of expertise in their field, and 
find further areas of application than the two I have chosen. And for their part, 
perhaps my pure historian friends will “bear with me in a little foolishness” (2 Cor. 
11:1). 
                                                        
1151 See C. S. Lewis, “‘Bulverism’: Or, the Foundation of 20th Century Thought,” in God in the Dock: 
Essays on Theology and Ethics, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970), 271-7, esp. 273: 
“… you must show that a man is wrong before you start explaining why he is wrong. The modern 
method is to assume without discussion that he is wrong and then distract his attention from this 
(the only real issue) by busily explaining how he became so silly. In the course of the last fifteen 
years I have found this vice so common that I have had to invent a name for it. I call it Bulverism. 
Some day I am doing to write the biography of its imaginary inventor, Ezekiel Bulver, whose 
destiny was determined at the age of five when he heard his mother say to his father—who had 
been maintaining that two sides of a triangle were together greater than the third—‘Oh you say 
that because you are a man.’ ‘At that moment,’ E. Bulver assures us, ‘there flashed across my mind 
the great truth that refutation is no necessary part of argument. Assume that your opponent is 
wrong, and then explain his error, and the world will be at your feet. Attempt to prove that he is 
wrong or (worse still) try to find out whether he is wrong or right, and the national dynamism of 
our age will thrust you to the wall.’ That is how Bulver became one of the makers of the Twentieth 
Century.” 
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Reformation Catholicity – Or, Calling All Evangelical Augustinians 
Holy Church is that free Jerusalem which is above, our once-barren mother; apart 
from her society, no slave-born, orphaned son or daughter of Adam may call upon 
God as his Father (Isa. 54:1, Gal. 4:26). In her womb we are reborn by the imperishable 
seed of God’s Word, and at her breasts we are nourished through the sacraments of 
the gospel (1 Pet. 1:23-5, Isa. 66:10-11). Above, in her eschatological fullness, she is built 
as a city that is bound firmly together, for in truth there is but one body and one 
Spirit, one Lord, faith, and baptism, one God and Father of all (Ps. 122:3, Eph. 4:4-6). 
But here below, the feuding tribes of Israel must find their way up to her (Ps. 122:4). 
The safest route up this craggy ascent is the way of the One who came down for her, 
who set his face to go to the City of David and shed his blood to ransom and purify her 
children: the sons and daughters of the promise, born not of the flesh but of the Spirit, 
freely adopted by the Father in love (Eph. 4:8-10, Luke 9:51, Eph. 5:26-7, Gal. 4:21-31, 
Eph. 1:4-5). The nearer our fractious tribes come to this nail-pierced Man, who is the 
eternal Son of God, the nearer we draw to one another. For he is the King of 
righteousness and peace, and is himself our peace by his blood, that through him we 
may all have access in one Spirit to the Father (Isa. 9:6, Heb. 7:2, Eph. 2:13-18). Did not 
the prophet Micah speak of these things long ago? 
“But you, O Bethlehem Ephrathah, who are too little to be among the clans of 
Judah, from you shall come forth for Me one who is to be Ruler in Israel, whose 
origin is from of old, from ancient days.” Therefore he shall give them up until 
the time when she who is in labor has given birth; then the rest of his brothers 
shall return to the people of Israel. And he shall stand and shepherd his flock in 
the strength of the LORD, in the majesty of the name of the LORD his God. 
And they shall dwell secure, for now he shall be great to the ends of the earth. 
And he shall be their peace (Mic. 5:2-5, cf. Matt. 2:6, John 10:11-18). 
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For in this good Shepherd “all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell, and through 
him to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by 
the blood of his cross” (Col. 1:19). And yet—the tribes are divided! One follows Paul’s 
strong grace and free justification, another Apollos’ impressive erudition, another 
Cephas’ rock-solid ecclesiology (1 Cor. 1:12). I thank God that I wasn’t baptized into the 
name of Paul, or Luther, or Augustine; and I endeavor here to preach the gospel with 
all the weakness and folly that it calls for as the verbum crucis (1 Cor. 1:13-25). Still, it 
may be that Augustine and Luther—to say nothing of Peter and Paul—may have some 
insight into this crucified King of righteousness and peace; and having listened to 
them for some time as they listened to the Bible, here I take my own stand on the 
Word of God, and hazard to speak a few words to the divided and languishing tribes of 
the Lord as they sojourn toward the City of Peace. 
 To begin with my own tribe, the Anglicans. We are known, with some justice, 
for being Augustinians at the prayer-desk and Pelagians in the pulpit; and perhaps 
part of the reason for this pitiful reputation is the fact that since the Oxford 
Movement we have billed ourselves as a people of Prayer Books, liturgies, laws of 
ecclesiastical polity, and “the patristic consensus,” but not of the Reformation 
confessions. In fact, apart from the adjustment that I will suggest in a moment, the 
doctrines of sin and grace set forth in Articles 9—18 (of the little-studied Thirty-Nine) 
is in substance identical to the evangelical Augustinianism of Luther’s mature 
dogmatics. In particular Article 9, “Of Original or Birth-sin,” is redolent of the “420s 
Augustine” as Luther came to understand him in the mid 1510s: 
Original Sin standeth not in the following of Adam, (as the Pelagians do vainly 
talk;) but it is the fault and corruption of the Nature of every man, that 
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naturally is ingendered of the offspring of Adam; whereby man is very far gone 
from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that 
the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit; and therefore in every person 
born into this world, it deserveth God’s wrath and damnation. And this 
infection of nature doth remain, yea in them that are regenerated; whereby the 
lust of the flesh, called in the Greek, Φρόνημα σαρκός, which some do expound 
the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire, of the flesh, 
is not subject to the Law of God. And although there is no condemnation for 
them that believe and are baptized, yet the Apostle doth confess, that 
concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin (peccati tamen in sese 
rationem habere concupiscentiam fatetur Apostolus). 
 
Whether Thomas Cranmer, who drafted the first edition of the Articles in Edward’s 
reign, learned this doctrine from his readings in continental Lutheran and Reformed 
theology or directly from his own extensive Augustine research I do not venture to 
say. But in light of the present study, it ought to be clear that in this Article the 
reformed Church of England confesses a Simullehre that is virtually indistinguishable 
from Luther’s as I have exposited it in this book. (The same goes for Article 15, “Of 
Christ alone without Sin,” which appeals to 1 John 1:8—a classic Augustinian proof-
text: “… but all we the rest, although baptized, and born again in Christ, yet offend in 
many things; and if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not 
in us.”) Finally published in haste in 1553, just prior to his demise and only after his 
longsuffering efforts to convene a general evangelical council to draft an agreed 
Reformation confession had failed, Cranmer wrote this article with full knowledge of 
Trent’s 1546 decree on original sin. The general tenor of the article’s content, the 
appeal to Rom. 8:1, the affirmation that concupiscence has the ratio peccati as well as 
the pointed jab that St. Paul—unlike Trent!—doth not hesitate to confess that 
concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin, all reflect the church-political 
 507
context of the early 1550s.1152 Without ambiguity, the English confession takes its stand 
against Trent and with the European Reformers: that is to say, with the “420s 
Augustine” and against the “410s.” The original or birth-sin inherited from Adam is an 
evil corruption and infection of human nature which, of itself, has the character of a 
“fault” and the nature of “sin”—to this point, in the sixteenth century, all were agreed. 
But next comes the parting of the ways: for the Anglicans confess that this vicious 
“corruption,” “infection,” “flesh,” “lust,” “concupiscence,” and “sin” remains in the 
regenerate. Yet despite the ongoing presence of what the Apostle confesses to be 
intrinsically sinful, by faith in Christ and baptism there is no longer any condemnation 
for them. That is not a bad summary of the argument of this book regarding the 
mature Luther’s personal theology. The sobering reality of postbaptismal “sin,” real 
but partial regeneration (“gift”), the removal of condemnation through faith and 
baptism into Christ (“grace”): these are the components of the great Reformer’s 
“Augustinian simul.” But beyond Luther, this doctrine of “sin,” renewal, and 
                                                        
1152 Session 5 (17 June 1546), the Decree on Original Sin §5: “If anyone says that the guilt (reatum) of 
original sin is not remitted through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ which is conferred in 
baptism, or even asserts that the whole of that which pertains to the true and proper definition of 
sin is not taken away (non tolli totum id, quod veram et propriam peccati rationem habet), but says 
that it is only shaved off or not imputed (tantum radi aut non imputari): let him be anathema. For 
God hates nothing in the reborn, because there is nothing of condemnation [Rom. 8:1a Vg.] for 
those who are truly buried together with Christ through baptism into death [Rom. 6:4], who do not 
walk according to the flesh [Rom. 8:1b Vg.] but, putting off the old man and putting on the new 
who is created according to God [cf. Eph. 4:24], are made innocent, immaculate, pure, blameless 
and beloved children of God, heirs indeed of God and coheirs of Christ [Rom. 8:17], so that nothing 
at all might delay their entrance into heaven. The holy synod confesses and senses that in the 
baptized, concupiscence or the tinder (fomitem) remains; which, since it is left for the struggle, is 
not able to harm those who do not consent (consentientibus) and manfully fight back against it 
through the grace of Christ Jesus. In fact, he who competes legitimately will be crowned [2 Tim. 
2:5]. This concupiscence (concupiscentiam), which the Apostle sometimes calls sin (peccatum), the 
holy synod declares the church catholic has never understood to be called sin because it is truly 
and properly sin in the reborn (vere et proprie in renatis peccatum sit), but because it is from sin 
and it inclines to sin (ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat). If anyone however holds the contrary: 
a. s.” DEC II/667, my translation.  
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forgiveness is the shared conviction of the evangelical Churches, Lutheran, Reformed, 
and Anglican, as set forth in their public confessions; and the fact that this common 
teaching originates in and is elaborated along the lines of the “420s Augustine” argues 
strongly in favor of the catholicity of these Reformation confessions. 
John Davenant (1572-1641), a moderating voice at the Synod of Dordt (1618/9) 
and later bishop of Salisbury, knew this well. Near the start of his 1631 Disputatio de 
justitia habituali et actuali, this generous and keen Reformed theologian took up the 
aspersions of Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621, in his de iustificatione 2.1) to the effect that, 
owing to the doctrine of the persistence of original sin qua sin after baptism, “Calvin, 
with the Lutherans, allows that there does not exist any inherent righteousness” in the 
regenerate at all.1153 In fact, the bishop protested, “We all, no less than the Romanists 
themselves, teach that inherent righteousness, and that grace of sanctification which 
is the root of new life, is infused into the justified.”1154 To justify his “we all,” Davenant 
supplies concise but apt excerpts from a sampling of evangelical theologians: Luther, 
Calvin, Martin Bucer (1491-1551), Melanchthon, Peter Martyr (1499-1562), Martin 
Chemnitz (1522-86), and William Whittaker (1548-95). The Luther quote is taken from 
the spring 1523 lectures on Jude, and is pretty accurate—as is Davenant’s summary of 
Luther’s theology: 
Luther, (tom. 5 in Epist. Judae, near the end,) says: We have received the Holy 
Spirit through faith, and we have been purified; but notwithstanding, as long as 
we live here, that corrupt mass of flesh and blood adheres to us. Here he plainly 
                                                        
1153 John Davenant, A Treatise on Justification or the “Disputatio de Justitia Habituali et Actuali,” 
trans. Josiah Allport in 2 vols. (London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co., 1844), vol. 1 p. 4. 
1154 Davenant, Justification, 1.3. 
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confesses both a certain purification or internal renovation, and the remains of 
sin still cleaving to us.1155 
 
Davenant is clear: the Reformers, including Luther himself, agree with Rome 
regarding the reality of inner renovation and purity through the Spirit. Rather, the 
question in dispute between them is whether the “remains of sin” still cleave to the 
purified saints and if so, how they can stand righteous before God despite them.1156 
Davenant argues an emphatic Yes to the first question; and in reply to the second, he 
consequently urges the necessity of imputed righteousness as the formal cause of 
justification. Inherent renewal is real enough, though insufficient to that great end. 
But where our righteousness fails, Christ’s is enough. In the course of defending what 
he regarded as the common Reformation theology of residual sin, renewal in holiness, 
and justification by faith, Davenant turns repeatedly (and with a display of erudition 
befitting a one-time Lady Margaret’s Professor of Divinity at Cambridge) to the “420s 
Augustine.” In, for example, a chapter that begins by citing Trent’s decree on original 
sin and its appeal to Rom. 8:1, Davenant turns to one of Thomas Stapleton’s (1535-98) 
arguments in favor of the sinlessness of the saints. In 1 Cor. 3:16, St. Paul teaches that 
the Church is the temple of God, filled with his Spirit; but in the Lord’s temple, all 
                                                        
1155 Davenant, Justification, 1.6-7, original emphasis. On Jude 23, WA 14.90.25-9 [B] (cf. LW 30.215): 
Wyr haben wol den heyligen geyst empfangen durch den glauben und sind reyn worden, aber so lang 
wyr hie leben, henget uns noch der alte sack, unser fleysch und blut ymmer an, das lesset seynen 
mutwillen nicht. Das ist der ‘befleckte rock’, den wyr sollen ablegen und ymer auszyhen, so lang wyr 
leben. 
1156 Davenant, Justification, 1.15: having established that the Reformers uphold real inherent 
righteousness, “we must enquire in the second place—Whether this inherent righteousness which 
we have conceded to be in the regenerate, is so perfect, as wholly to exclude original sin, and leave 
nothing in the righteous man which may retain the character and true nature of sin? Upon this 
single point depend almost all those other questions which have been subjects of controversy 
concerning justification, and the perfection or merit of works. If therefore we can prove our point 
in this, we shall obtain a bloodless and easy victory in all the rest.”  
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things are clean and pure; therefore, no sin remains in the regenerate. In his reply, 
Davenant appeals to c. Iul. 6.14.42 and 6.15.48: 
Answer:—In the perfected and finished temple of God, no sin remains; and we 
shall be such temples of God when we come to the state of glory; whilst 
however we are in this militant state we are truly esteemed and called temples 
of God, but not yet completely built, not yet carried to the height of perfection: 
It is, then, by no means wonderful, that some rubbish and dust should be 
found in these temples, which are as it were in an uninterrupted course of 
building. We therefore answer Stapleton, as Augustine once did Julian: Let no 
one be so foolish as to suppose, that every baptized person is therefore perfect, 
because it is said—The temple of God is holy, which temple ye are;—We are the 
temple of the living God; and other things of this sort. For this name is given now, 
even while it is being built. Here our members, which are upon earth, are being 
mortified:—there is however in us something to mortify, so that sin should not 
reign in our mortal body, &c. And concerning this evil which cleaves to the 
justified, he thus speaks in the same chapter: How could it be, that such and so 
great an evil should not, by the mere fact of its being in us, hold us in death, and 
drag us into final death, if its chain were not broken by that remission of all our 
sins which takes place in baptism? Let the Papists show us, why they deny that 
evil to have the formal nature of sin, which would condemn only by the mere 
act of its inherence, unless its guilt were removed by gratuitous remission.1157 
 
Farther on, busy now with Martin Becanus (1563-1624), Davenant effectively cites c. 
Iul. 2.4.8 without fanfare much as Luther had done while exegeting Rom. 7:18 in 1516, 
then rounds off this surreptitious citation with an express appeal to the older 
Augustine’s doctrine of threefold baptismal grace: 
The Jesuit therefore sadly errors in this, that he thinks baptismal grace 
produces its entire effect at once, whereas it frees us immediately from the guilt 
of sin, but by a gradual process from its pollution. We do not deny then that 
the effect of grace is a full and entire purgation from sin; but we teach with 
Augustine, that we arrive at this hoped for perfection by the same baptism 
which is here received. We enjoy not immediately this perfect cleansing, but at 
length we shall attain to it by the benefit and efficacy of Divine grace, operating 
continually in us.1158 
                                                        
1157 Davenant, Justification, 1.33, original emphasis. For c. Iul. 6.14.42, see NBA I/18.916, PL 44.846, 
WSA I/24.503; for 6.15.48, NBA I/926, PL 44.850, WSA I/24.507. 
1158 Davenant, Justification, 1.41, original emphasis; cf. 1.75. In the first marginal gloss on Rom. 7:18 
(WA 56.70.22-3), Luther writes: Deus in Christo regenerat hominem generatum sanatque vitiatum a 
reatu statim, ab infirmitate paulatim. This is an exact quote of c. Iul. 2.4.8 (NBA I/18.524, PL 
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Such appeals to Augustine pepper the following chapters in defense of the doctrines 
wrapped up with postbaptismal residual sin, which Davenant sums up nicely at the 
head of chapter 9: “Baptism frees the person from the guilt of all sins; but it does not 
immediately free the nature from the operation, or indwelling of original sin.” He then 
adds: “This is the uniform position of Augustine, who teaches that concupiscence is 
original sin causing death in the unbaptized; but that it remains in the baptized, 
though its guilt is put away.”1159 Davenant devotes the whole of chapter 13 to proving 
that this is in fact Augustine’s “uniform position,” first allowing for ambiguity in 
Augustine vis-à-vis the sinfulness of concupiscence in the baptized—“Hence arises the 
contest between us and the Romanists concerning the two-fold opinion of 
Augustine”1160—in order then to argue that the “420s Augustine” is the real and 
orthodox doctor of the Church and, eo ipso, that the evangelicals are the real and 
orthodox Catholics. Its crowning argument is the hotly-disputed excerpt from nupt. 
conc. 1.25.28, taken from c. Iul. bk. 6 and interpreted—in the familiar “Lutheran” 
manner—in light of the gains made circa 420/1: 
What is truly and in its own nature sin, may nevertheless not be imputed for 
sin to the person engrafted into Christ. But as often as this is the case (which 
we affirm to be so in all the regenerate) sin, remaining in them, is deserving of 
punishment (habet condignitatem ad poenam) by its own innate depravity; 
because it is an evil contrary to the Divine law; but it is not adjudged to 
punishment (non habet deputationem ad poenam), owing to Divine 
compassion; because it has been remitted and pardoned in baptism. Now let us 
hear what Augustine himself thinks: Contra Julian lib. 6 cap. 6, he says—
                                                                                                                                                                     
44.679): God in Christ regenerat hominem generatum, sanatque vitiatum, a reatu statim, ab 
infirmitate paulatim. 
1159 Davenant, Justification, 1.56. Original emphasis. 
1160 Davenant, Justification, 1.84. 
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Concupiscence is put away in baptism, not as regards existence, but so as not to 
be imputed for sin; for although its guilt is now discharged, yet itself remains.1161  
 
Davenant’s numeration differs from ours: the reference is to c. Iul. 6.17.51, a text I 
examined at some length above in chapter 3.2.1.1. There I argued that Luther’s 
interpretation of c. Iul. 2.5.12 in the Rom. 7:17 scholion reflects the very kind of “420s 
Augustine”-style explanation of nupt. conc. 1.25.28 which the old Augustine himself, 
having been pushed by Julian toward greater clarity of thought and expression, offered 
not just in the huge c. Iul. op. imp. but already in c. Iul. 6.17.51.1162 Had Rudolf Hermann 
read Davenant, I think he would have found his theology of sin, grace, and renewal 
every bit as “grave”—and as eerily Augustinian—as he found the young Luther’s. For 
the Saxon and the Englishman hold the same doctrine, having drawn it from the same 
African well. 
 The question is: does anyone still hold it today? Taking a sober look at the 
Anglican Communion, one has to admit that the evangelical Augustinianism of 
Luther, Cranmer, and Davenant has seen better days. But in the past century, three 
presbyters whom many do not readily think of as specifically “Anglican” theologians 
have held and taught it indeed: John Stott (1921-2011), J. I. Packer (1926—), and John 
Webster (1955—).1163 These distinguished ecclesial theologians have exerted immense 
                                                        
1161 Davenant, Justification, 1.97. Original emphasis. 
1162 WA 56.351.10-7: Ex ista pulchra authoritate patet, Quomodo Concupiscentia sit ipsa infirmitas 
nostra ad bonum, que in se quidem rea est, Sed tamen reos nos non facit nisi consentientes et 
operantes. Ex quo tamen mirabile sequitur, Quod rei sumus et non rei. Quia Infirmitas illa nos ipsi 
sumus, Ergo ipsa rea et nos rei sumus, donec cesset et sanetur. Sed non sumus rei, dum non operamur 
secundum eam, Dei misericordia non imputante reatum infirmitatis, Sed reatum consentientis 
infirmitati voluntatis. Cf. LW 25.340. 
1163 John R. W. Stott, The Cross of Christ (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity, 2006); J. I. Packer, 
Knowing God (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity, 1993); idem, “The Evangelical Identity Problem – An 
Analysis,” (Oxford: Latimer House, 1978); idem, “A Kind of Noah’s Ark? The Anglican Commitment 
to Comprehensiveness” (Oxford: Latimer House, 1981); idem, The Thirty-Nine Articles: Their Place 
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influence on the global evangelical Church. In the judgment of the Archbishop of 
Kenya, Dr. Eliud Wabukala, the rise of a confessing movement within twenty-first-
century Anglicanism is due in large part to the impact of Stott’s and Packer’s works 
upon the African and Asian episcopate. Wabukala clearly delights to point out that 
since the doctrines of sin and grace in the Articles represent a revived Augustinianism, 
and since Augustine fought against Pelagius, his own advocacy for their authority in 
the Church means that today an African is once again taking the British to school.1164 
This is most welcomed. In addition to the doctrinal leadership Wabukala exercises 
within the Fellowship of Confessing Anglicans, Ashley Null’s scholarly retrieval of 
Thomas Cranmer as a “Protestant Augustinian” theologian holds out real promise for a 
better grasp of the theology of the English Reformers in the wider context of the 
European Reformation.1165 The same goes for Torrance Kirby and Corneliu Simuţ’s 
cogent interpretations of Richard Hooker, Keble’s would-be sixteenth-century 
Tractarian, as a Reformed theologian.1166 Still, I am afraid the prospects for an 
historically responsible and scripturally rich Augustinian revival amongst us Anglicans 
are grim: the revisionist historiography of the Oxford Movement has done its work; 
probably in reaction to Anglo-Catholic moralism, the Luther who has been celebrated 
in some pockets (namely Zahl and his circle) is the “radical” Luther of Hermann, Joest, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and Use Today (Oxford: Latimer House, 1984); John Webster, Holiness (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2003); idem, The Grace of Truth (Farmington Hills, Mich.: Oil Lamp Books, 2011).  
1164 The Most Revd. Dr. Eliud Wabukala, “The Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion: The Church and Its 
Mission,” available at: http://ridleyinstitute.com/wabukala-gafcon. Accessed 30 July 2015. 
1165 Ashley Null, Thomas Cranmer’s Doctrine of Repentance: Renewing the Power to Love (New York: 
Oxford, 2000).  
1166 W. J. Torrance Kirby, “Richard Hooker as an Apologist of the Magisterial Reformation in 
England,” in Arthur Stephen McGrade, ed., Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian 
Community (Tempe, Az.: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1997), 219-33; idem, Richard 
Hooker, Reformer and Platonist (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2013); Corneliu C. Simuţ, The Doctrine of 
Salvation in the Sermons of Richard Hooker (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005). 
 514
and Forde whom I have argued never in fact existed; and the New Perspective on 
Paul—with its mainly unwitting revival of the rather old perspective of Origen, 
Jerome, and Erasmus as well as its less-than-dexterous dismissal of Augustine and 
Luther as exegetical theologians—occupies more ground by the day.1167 In short, there 
is work to be done: the history of English the0logy in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries needs to be retold from the ground up; the confession and character of 
“Anglicanism” fundamentally reconceived in light of that retelling; the holy scriptures 
diligently heard, read, marked, learned, and inwardly digested; above all, the gospel 
recovered, cherished, preached, and believed. In addition, I think we owe our friends 
in the Lutheran as well as the other Reformed Churches a hearty apology for having 
told stories about them and about ourselves that are false, all in order to celebrate the 
superiority of our polity, and all the while obscuring the glory of the gospel of free 
grace for sinners in Jesus Christ which Cranmer, Hooker, Davenant et al. gladly 
confessed along with their fellow German, Swiss, French, Dutch, and Scottish 
evangelicals.1168 
 What about the Lutherans? I confess I am very curious to see how my siblings 
in the Churches of the Augsburg Confession will receive the argument of this book. In 
theory, those pastors and theologians committed to seeking the catholicity of the 
Confessions, to receiving Luther as one doctor within the great Church, and to 
walking in truth, generosity, and love with the rest of that Church, ought to welcome 
it. For I have shown the profound continuity that obtains between Luther’s 
                                                        
1167 But cf. Stephen Westerholm, Justification Reconsidered: Rethinking a Pauline Theme (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013). 
1168 Farther on this point in my article, “Where Anglicanism came from, and How Luther’s Theology 
might do something about it,” Lutheran Forum 47/2 (Summer 2013): 42-51. 
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Reformation theology and the wisest and most scriptural of all Augustines, the only 
really universal doctor of the Church in the west. Moving forward from 1546, it should 
be much easier to fit together this “Augustinian” Luther with the theologies of 
Chemnitz, Gerhard, and others, there no longer being any need to sort out how the 
“radical” Luther’s theology of justification was tamed and muted by his ecclesial heirs. 
Looking beyond Augsburg, if this kind of Lutheran finds my argument about Luther’s 
theology compelling, I think he will need to give up whatever inflated claims of 
distinctiveness he may still boast of vis-à-vis the Reformed. Calvin & Co. are quite 
skilled at distinguishing law and gospel; the Anglicans (!) preach free justification 
through the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness; and Dr. Luther proves himself 
to be no mean theologian of regeneration and new holy life in Christ by the Spirit, an 
evangelical and Augustinian doctor sanctitatis. As for Rome—more in its place below. 
Now there are Lutherans, and then there are Lutherans. The gnostic 
antinomianism that holds the field in the liberal/old-line Lutheran churches of the 
west is only superficially akin to Agricola’s opposition to the preaching of the law, for 
as Luther allowed (albeit in the form of back-handed compliments) at least he still 
preached the gospel of redemption and forgiveness through Jesus Christ and him 
crucified.1169 I suspect that such Lutherans as these will not regard my argument very 
highly, being enemies of the cross of Christ, but perhaps it will make them think twice 
about calling themselves by Luther’s name. I have more hope for “radical Lutherans” 
who have learned their theology from Forde: for amongst them, there seems to be a 
real regard for the Confessions (large swathes of them, at any rate), a deep admiration 
                                                        
1169 David S. Yeago, “Gnosticism, Antinomianism, and Reformation Theology: Reflections on the 
Costs of a Construal,” Pro Ecclesia 2/1 (1993): 37-49. 
 516
for Luther, and a sincere desire to become theologii crucis. If this book compels any 
such to rethink their assumptions about Reformation theology, go back to re-read 
Luther, and above all to search the Scriptures to see whether these things are so, I will 
be deeply gratified. Due in large part, I gather, to Elert and Joest’s pervasive influence, 
pretty much the same applies to those “confessional” Lutherans who at times seem to 
regard dismissiveness toward both the doctrine and the reality of holiness as a 
distinguishing mark of true piety. To all such “radical” Lutherans, whether of the more 
edgy or the more stodgy variety, I put the question (with all brotherly affection): if you 
will not heed the prophets and the apostles urging that “God has not called us for 
impurity, but in holiness” (1 Thess. 4:7), will you lend an ear to your great Reformer as 
he summons you to repent and believe, teach, and confess the fullness of the blessing 
of righteous and life, forgiveness and holiness, pardon and purity, which God promises 
us in the gospel?  
 Finally, as to the ecumenical Lutherans and the great Church of Rome, that 
massive Manasseh amongst all the other smaller tribes of Israel. It’s fascinating to read 
the 1999 Joint Declaration and to see in it the “two Augustines” vying with one 
another. In section 4.4 on “The Justified as Sinner,” the Lutherans first affirm Joest’s 
“totus iustus/totus peccator simul” in a way my argument puts in question, but then 
pull back from it by virtue of a sound emphasis on Paul’s indwelling “sin” and Luther’s 
peccatum regnans/regnatum distinction, the latter drawn from the Antilatomus and 
rooted in the “420s Augustine” (§29). For their part, the Catholics cite Rom. 8:1 (and in 
the footnote, Trent) to the effect that the grace of Christ in baptism takes away all that 
is properly sin, “an inclination (concupiscence) that comes from sin and presses 
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toward sin” being all that is left behind—the “410s Augustine” (§30). The same stances 
are reiterated in §B of the Annex. In the agreed statement that precedes these separate 
qualifying paragraphs, the Lutherans and Catholics together confess (§28): 
… that in baptism the Holy Spirit unites one with Christ, justifies, and truly 
renews the person. But the justified must all through life constantly look to 
God’s unconditional justifying grace. They also are continually exposed to the 
power of sin still pressing its attacks (cf. Rom. 6:12-14) and are not exempt from 
a lifelong struggle against contradiction to God within the selfish desires of the 
old Adam (see Gal. 5:16; Rom. 7:7-10). The justified also must ask God daily for 
forgiveness, as in the Lord’s Prayer (Mt. 6:12; 1 Jn. 1:9), are ever again called to 
conversion and penance, and are ever again granted forgiveness. 
 
This remarkable paragraph could have been written by Augustine at any stage in the 
long Pelagian controversy, and by Luther at any point in his career from 1514 on. That 
speaks to its strength, but also to its weakness. The presenting issue remains the old 
question about the status of evil desire in the baptized. In the agreed paragraph, the 
two parties employ the scriptural language of “sin” to describe it, and cite the expected 
proof-texts. But there then follows the parting of the “two Augustines,” with the 
Lutherans still confessing that what Paul calls “sin” is sin indeed in their paragraph, 
the Catholics in theirs still upholding that what “the Apostle sometimes calls sin … the 
Church Catholic has never understood to be called sin because it is truly and properly 
sin in the reborn but because it is from sin and it inclines to sin.”1170 Well, which is it?  
Evangelical Augustinian that I am, I confess it greatly troubles me to hear one 
of the tribes of Israel—even a big and old one—teach that what the Apostle calls x, 
does not really mean x, because that tribe has never understood it to meant x. Is it 
possible to teach in this manner and, at the same time, declare with David in the 
presence of the true and living God: “My heart stands in awe of your words” (Ps. 
                                                        
1170 Trent, Session 5 (17 June 1546), the Decree on Original Sin §5, DEC II/667, my translation.  
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119:161)? If we stand in awe of Paul’s, that is to say God the Holy Spirit’s x, in our 
church doctrine should we not confess this same x? and should we not do so with the 
simplicity and joy of a child hearing the voice of his dear Father? Is this not the best 
way for us to heed Paul’s admonition to the Church (in the person of Timothy) to 
“follow the pattern of the sound words that you have heard from me” (2 Tim. 1:13)? In 
the agreed paragraph §28, Paul’s scandal-provoking but sound little word “sin” is used, 
and surely at this the heart of every Christian who “trembles” at God’s Word (Isa. 66:2) 
rejoices. But what are we to make of the Catholics’ claim that the power of sin which 
still presses its attacks, the inner contradiction to God, the selfish desires of the old 
Adam—evils on account of which the justified must ask for daily forgiveness in prayer, 
and struggle against all their lives—are not “sin in an authentic sense” (§30)? Is this 
the way to follow Paul’s sound words? This all makes for a truly apostolic “perplexity,” 
to be sure (Gal. 4:20). 
Perhaps if the Lutherans, convinced by my argument in this book, were to 
retreat from their simul totaliter, refocus their right insistence on the enduring 
sinfulness of the saints upon evil desire, and rejoice a little more boldly in the gospel 
gift of renewal in holiness, the Catholics would not be so hesitant about St. Paul’s (and 
John’s) little word “sin.” But in that event, I believe Davenant is right to urge that the 
imputation of Christ’s righteousness must be looked to as the formal cause of the 
justification of the renewed but still sinful saints before God (Ps. 130:3-4, 143:1-2). Is 
this not what the JD itself gestures toward—however tentatively—in its confession 
that “righteousness will be reckoned to all who, like Abraham, trust in God’s promise” 
(§10), that “justification becomes ours through Christ Jesus, ‘whom God put forward as 
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a sacrifice of atonement by his blood, effective through faith’ (Rom. 3:25; see 3:21-28)” 
(§10), that “justification … means that Christ himself is our righteousness” (§15), and 
that “through Christ alone we are justified, when we receive this salvation in faith” 
(§16)? I hope so—indeed, I rejoice at the mere prospect! For then, with the Lutherans 
confessing the Church’s doctrine of holiness and the Catholics her doctrines of sin, 
grace, and righteousness, a consensus in “the basic truths” of the gospel has indeed 
been reached (§14). All that will remain is to begin preaching this gospel, and sorting 
out and applying its unique role as “an indispensable criterion that constantly serves 
to orient all the teaching and practice of our churches to Christ” (§18)—no small task, 
and a task by no means limited to the Church of Rome, as all gospel-loving Anglicans 
will be the first to confess. But if this is the case, as I hope it is, I think the Catholics 
will need to explain to the rest of us just exactly how these “new insights” into the 
nature of justification, won by listening together to the Bible (§8), fit with the 
somewhat different yet (we are told) infallible dogma of the Council of Trent. For if 
Trent was right to teach that 
… the one single formal cause [of justification] is the righteousness of God 
(unica causa formalis est iustitia dei): not that by which he himself is righteous, 
but that by which he makes us righteous and endowed with which we are 
renewed (renovamur) in the spirit of our mind, and are not merely reputed 
righteous (reputamur) but are truly named and are righteous, each one of us 
receiving individually his own righteousness according to the measure which 
the Holy Spirit apportions to each one as he wills, and in view of each one’s 
dispositions and co-operation … 1171 
 
                                                        
1171 Trent, Session 6 (13 Jan. 1547), the Decree on Justification §7, DEC II/673, my translation. 
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then it is hard not to conclude that Christopher Malloy is also right to call the 
catholicity of the JD into question.1172 But if my argument in this book about the 
“Augustinian” Luther and the “Lutheran” Augustine is historically sound—and if the 
great church father remains a serviceable touchstone for discerning the faithfulness of 
Church doctrine—then it is Malloy’s theology (and Trent’s decree) which suffers the 
deficit in catholicity. For in light of my research, the JD comes off rather well: it is 
deeply “Augustinian” and catholic in its teaching just because it is surprisingly 
Lutheran. 
Once, Paul was able to bring St. Peter back to the gospel of free righteousness 
in Christ by faith (Gal. 2:11-21). This is as it should be. For as it is written in the great 
Psalm of Christ’s resurrection and ascension, “Benjamin, the least of them,” is the tribe 
that takes the lead in the apostolic train (Ps. 68:27a; cf. v. 18 & Eph. 4:8-10). Peter, 
John, and the rest of the Galileans—these mighty men of the Word are, one supposes, 
“the princes of Zebulun, the princes of Naphtali” (v. 27c). But it is Paul, and Paul alone, 
who descends from the tribe of Benjamin (Phil. 3:5). And this same Paul was “the least 
of the apostles” (1 Cor. 15:9), and not only so, but also “the very least of all saints” (Eph. 
3:8). For he was the chief of sinners (1 Tim. 1:15): a man set free by the great grace of 
God in Jesus Christ, and by that grace alone; a man stripped bare of the slightest 
pretension to a iustitia propria of which he might boast; a man who would never 
dream of presenting his threadbare, grace-given works (Eph. 2:8-10) before the throne 
                                                        
1172 Christopher J. Malloy, Engrafted into Christ: A Critique of the Joint Declaration (New York: Peter 
Lang, 2005). 
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of God to collect eternal life as if it were the just reward of his labors.1173 Is it not right 
for this humbled Benjamin, the least of the apostles and for that very reason the 
greatest of them all, to take the place afforded him by the Spirit of prophecy and to 
assume the primacy amongst the Churches? If Malloy still wants to put Campeggio, 
Catharinus, de Soto, Vitriarius, and Lainez in the lead, we cannot stop him. But as for 
us poor separated brethren, who pray the Psalter in our ecclesial communities, we 
prefer to listen to St. Paul with his gospel as he teaches the one great Church ex 
cathedra, that is to say, ex scriptura: for example, in the letter to the Romans. Based on 
the JD and its confession that Christ alone, with his atoning blood, is our 
righteousness, and that this righteousness is reckoned to those who believe God’s 
gracious promise, I dare say there are at least some in the Church of Rome who have 
learned to sing this Psalm too. For this, I give thanks to the God of all grace, who has 
preserved a remnant for himself in every generation (Rom. 11:1-6). 
Truth be told, the churches which (by God’s great grace) will remain faithful to 
the Lord Jesus in the midst of the barbaric, proud ruins of western civilization face 
great perils in the times to come. Has not the hour come for evangelical Augustinians 
                                                        
1173 So the Franciscan Ludovicus Vitriarius: “Let the justified man be presented before the tribunal of 
God, and God will question him and say: ‘What do you ask for?’ And the man replies: ‘I ask for 
eternal life.’ ‘Why?’ replies God. The man: ‘Because you are bound to give it to me.’ God: ‘By what 
law?’ The man: ‘Yours, because in your law it says: For you will repay to each one according to his 
work [Ps. 62:12].’” Concilium Tridentinum: Diarorum, Actorum, Epistularum, Tractatuum Nova 
Collectio, ed. Societas Goerrisiana (Freiburg: Herder, 1901-76), 5:569, as cited in Lane, Justification 
by Faith in Catholic—Protestant Dialogue, 63, note 70. My translation. Cf. the Augustinian 
Girolamo Seripando: in the regenerate evil desire “is left over, so that a man will always think about 
what sort of person he is in and of himself, and what sort he is by God’s grace through Jesus Christ. 
Of himself, he is prone to every evil. Unless this proneness remained in man, he would think that 
he is righteousness of himself and in himself. But the grace of God regards that evil as not reckoned 
to damnation because of Christ; and to be sure, by the same grace it comes about that it does not 
reign through consent, neither is it able to use the members as weapons for iniquity. And certainly, 
unless this weakness were to remain in a man, Christ’s grace would be meaningless.” CT 12:552f, 
cited in Peter Walter, “Die bleibende Sündigkeit der Getauften in den Debatten und Beschlüssen 
des Trienter Konzils,” 281. 
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in all the tribes to put our past quarrels behind us and prepare to confess together the 
truth of the gospel?  
 
The Preservation of the Saints 
 
Throughout this book, I have argued that Luther taught that regeneration and 
justification are amissible and provisional: grace and gift may be forfeited if the 
believer consents to the residual sinful desires of his flesh. Being an Augustinian in 
regards to the doctrine of predestination, Luther believed that the elect would 
ultimately persevere in repentance and faith to the end. Deep as they may fall into sin, 
God will raise them up again and restore them as he restored the humbled David. But 
the elect are not certain of their election, and that lack of assurance is spiritually 
useful to them. For it keeps them from becoming smug, from lazily resting in the 
grace already received instead of pressing forward in perpetual repentance, faith, 
dependence, humility, and prayer. Since present grace is no guarantee of future 
perseverance to glory, the godly take heed lest they fall (1 Cor. 10:12) and work out 
their salvation with fear and trembling (Phil. 2:12), being zealous to make their calling 
and election sure (2 Pet. 1:10): for it is not he who believes for a moment, but the one 
who perseveres to the end, who will be saved (Matt. 10:20).  
In affliction, the believer clings to Christ crucified present for him in Word and 
sacrament. He is free to defy the Devil, assured through faith in the gospel that 
Christ’s death is his redemption and that through the blood of this Mediator he has a 
gracious Father in heaven. But this present assurance of justification is just that: 
assurance in the present. Tomorrow I may grievously fall; and if I do, the game is up … 
unless, in his free mercy, God grants the free gift of renewal in the repentance and 
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faith I squandered. But that is precisely what I cannot count on. There is no blank 
check to sin with impunity. If I have grace today, I must endeavor to persevere in it. 
For if I lose it, it may not be given to me again. He might not have admitted it, but had 
he lived to read it the old Luther would have substantially (though not entirely) 
agreed with the doctrine set forth in chapters 12 and 13 of Trent’s decree on 
justification:  
Chapter 12. Rash presumption about predestination must be avoided … No one, 
so long as he remains in this present life, ought so to presume about the 
hidden mystery of divine predestination as to hold for certain that he is 
unquestionably of the number of the predestined, as if it were true that one 
justified is either no longer capable of sin or, if he sins, may promise himself 
sure repentance. For, apart from a special revelation, it is impossible to know 
whom God has chosen for himself. 
 
Chapter 13. On the gift of perseverance. Similarly, concerning the gift of 
perseverance it is written: He who endures to the end will be saved (and indeed, 
the gift can have no other source save him who has the power to uphold one 
who stands so that he may continue, and to restore him who falls). Even 
though all should place an unshaken hope in God’s help and rest in it, let no 
one promise himself with absolute certainty any definite outcome. For, unless 
they themselves neglect his grace, as God has begun the good work, so he will 
bring it to completion, bringing about both the will and the performance. 
Nevertheless, let those who think themselves to stand take heed lest they fall, 
and work out their own salvation with fear and trembling, in labors, watchings, 
almsdeeds, prayers and offerings, in fastings and chastity. For, knowing that 
they are reborn to the hope of glory, and not yet to glory itself, they ought to 
tremble about the struggle with the flesh, with the world, with the devil, which 
still remains and in which they cannot be victors unless, with the grace of God, 
they do what the Apostle says: We are debtors, not to the flesh, to live according 
to the flesh, for if you live according to the flesh you will die; but if by the Spirit 
you put to death the deeds of the body, you will live.1174 
 
Considered from the human vantage point, the perseverance of a saint depends upon 
his Spirit-empowered refusal of consent to residual sin (Rom. 8:13). The believer does 
well to place unshaken hope in God’s help, and to rest in it—but he can’t be certain of 
                                                        
1174 Trent, Session 6 (13 Jan. 1547), the Decree on Justification §12-13, DEC II/676. 
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the outcome. Luther might have quibbled a little about the ascetic means of abiding in 
grace elaborated by the Tridentine fathers. But upon the necessity of that abiding in 
order to continue in grace until the end, and the real and present danger that the 
believer will fail to do this and thus fall out of life in Christ back into death in Adam, 
he agreed with them entirely.  
 Now that said, on the vexed point of assurance vis-à-vis the Christian’s election 
the matter is less straightforward. From what I can gather, Luther handled this 
question in the same pastoral, occasional, or “artful” way that he handled the 
distinction of law and gospel. The gospel must be kept as far away from the 
impenitent adulterer as heaven from hell. Only the crushing hammer of the law is fit 
for him. But once that hammer has done its bitter work, a wise pastor like Nathan 
speaks sheer words of grace: “The LORD has put away your sin; you will not die” (2 
Sam. 12:13). For Pfarrer Luther, the promise of grace is not a fixed principle in a system, 
but a spiritual reality to be preached boldly, applied wisely, and trusted tenaciously in 
tentatione: “for the divine promises and consolations are not absolute, but relative, 
and universally and most certainly presuppose our temptation … For God does not 
buoy up or strengthen men unless they are engulfed in sorrow, at the point of death, 
or in despair.”1175 Apart from that trial, the gospel is just a language game—or worse, 
an intellectual justification for forgiveness and “freedom” without the cost (and the 
gift!) of discipleship. I want to suggest that Luther approached the doctrine of 
predestination in a similar manner. Dogmatically, he was a rigorous Augustinian both 
as to the substance of the doctrine itself and as to the separation of the gift of 
                                                        
1175 On Gen. 46:2-4, WA 44.636.38-637.1, 638.24-5, cf. LW 8.78, 80. 
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forgiveness and regeneration on the one hand from the gift of perseverance on the 
other. Pastorally, he often enough—far more often than is typically allowed for—
followed Augustine (and medieval Catholicism generally) in upholding the propriety 
and usefulness of the disciple’s suspension between fear and hope. I think that in the 
specific pastoral context of needing to face down theological antinomianism and 
popular licentiousness-cum-Lutheranism in the 1530s and 40s, the old Doctor 
emphasized this side of the doctrine more and more. But there were other ways of 
handling it, tailored to other situations in the spiritual lives of the real souls Luther 
cared for. And in these diverse contexts, variations on the question of assurance come 
into view. 
 For one, consider his 1523 sermon on 2 Pet. 1:10, a locus classicus on election 
and assurance. Luther’s interpretation is uncomplicated: by doing good works, 
believers steadily grow in their assurance of God’s call and election. “Although the call 
and the election (der berueff und die erwelung) is strong enough in itself, yet it is not 
strong and firm enough for you, since you are not yet certain (gewis) that it pertains to 
you. Therefore Peter wants us to confirm this call and election for ourselves with good 
works.”1176 For the more faith is exercised in good works, the stronger it grows, “until it 
becomes sure (gewis) of the call and election and can lack nothing.”1177 This is St. 
Peter’s patient route to a proper sense of assurance, and “here bounds are fixed with 
regard to how one should handle foreknowledge.”1178 Peter’s wisdom stands in stark 
contrast to all inquisitive, rash speculation into the mystery of predestination by those 
                                                        
1176 WA 14.22.25-8 [B], cf. LW 30.158. 
1177 WA 14.23.6-9 [B], cf. LW 30.159. 
1178 WA 14.23.10-11 [B], cf. LW 30.159. 
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who lack the spiritual maturity needed to handle it rightly. “Flippant spirits” rush in, 
attack the matter “from the top,” and try to reason out whether they are elected “in 
order that they may be sure (gewis) of where they stand.”1179 But that’s a surefire way to 
fall and break your neck, not to find true assurance. “Get away from this quick—it’s 
not the handhold (der gryff) you need to grasp it!”1180 Rather, 
If you want to become sure (gewis), then you must come through the way 
which St. Peter suggests here … If your faith is well exercised and applied, then 
at last you will become sure of the matter (zu letzt der sach gewis), so that you 
will not fail, as now it follows further: “For if you do this, you will not fall” [2 
Pet. 1:10b]. That is: you will stand fast, you will neither stumble nor sin, but 
rather you will go forth rightly and vigorously, and everything will fall out 
well.1181   
 
Thus in the course of exegeting 2 Pet. 1:10, Luther teaches a steady maturation into the 
assurance of election commensurate with the saint’s growth in faith and holiness. If 
the animated denial of this kind of assurance is the preferred pastoral method for 
dealing with lazy or impenitent souls, the “Petrine” path to certainty via progress in 
sanctification is very much a live option for sincere believers exercising the gift of faith 
within (for lack of a better word) the “normal” conditions of everyday discipleship. 
 But the experiential crucible in which Luther’s pastoral theology of assurance 
developed was anything but “normal”—to wit: the acute Prädestinationsanfechtungen 
that tormented him in the 1510s. In the 1542 lecture on Gen. 26:9, the old Reformer was 
still offering the remedy his wise Beichtvater had given him some three decades 
before:  
                                                        
1179 WA 14.23.11-14 [B], cf. LW 30.159. 
1180 WA 14.23.14-15 [B], cf. LW 30.159. 
1181 WA 14.23.15-19 [B], cf. LW 30.159. 
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Staupitz used to console me with these words: “Why do you torture yourself 
with these speculations? Look at the wounds of Christ and the blood shed for 
you. From these predestination will shine.”1182 
 
In short: if predestination frightens you, then stop thinking about it, and look by faith 
to Christ crucified instead. “Kill the other thoughts and the ways of reason or the flesh, 
for God detests them. That one thing do: receive the Son, so that Christ is welcome in 
your heart in his birth, miracles, and cross. For there is the book of life in which you 
have been written.”1183 In particular, the Christian afflicted with the terror of a fixed 
damnation must take refuge in the objectivity of the external Word and sacraments: 
For God did not come down from heaven to make you uncertain (incertum) 
about predestination, to teach you to despise the Sacraments, absolution, and 
the rest of the divine ordinances. Indeed, he instituted them to make you 
completely certain (certissimum) and to remove this disease of doubt from 
your soul, in order that you might not only believe with the heart but also see 
with your physical eyes and touch with your hands. Why then do you reject 
these and complain that you do not know whether you have been predestined? 
You have the Gospel, you have been baptized, you have absolution, you are a 
Christian, and nevertheless you doubt and say that you do not know whether 
you believe or not, whether you hold as true what is preached about Christ in 
word and Sacraments … He has given his Son in the flesh and death, and he has 
instituted the Sacraments in order that you may know that he does not want to 
be deceitful, but truthful. Nor does he confirm this with spiritual proofs; he 
confirms it with tangible proofs. For I see water, I see bread and wine, I see the 
minister. All this is bodily, and in these physical forms he reveals himself. If 
you must deal with men, you may be in doubt as to the extent to which you 
may believe a person and as to how others may be disposed toward you; but 
concerning God you must maintain with assurance and without any doubt 
(certo et indubitanter) that he is well disposed toward you on account of Christ 
and that you have been redeemed and sanctified through the precious blood of 
the Son of God. And in this way you will be sure (certus) of your 
predestination, since all the curious and dangerous questions about GOD’S 
secret counsels have been removed—questions to which Satan tries to drive 
us.1184 
 
                                                        
1182 WA 43.461.11-13, LW 5.47. 
1183 WA 43.459.35-8, cf. LW 5.45. 
1184 WA 43.460.4-13, 462.17-27, cf. LW 5.45-6, 49. 
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Faith’s turn “outward” from the sinful intricacies of one’s “self” to the gracious truth of 
the Gospel, which is also a turn “downward” from rationalistic or mystical ascent (and 
its vain attempts to grasp the hidden decree of election) to the One who came down 
low for us, and makes himself graspable in Word and sacrament, is always the order of 
the day. This “outward” and “downward” turn, this resolute focus on Jesus Christ in 
the preached gospel and sacraments, is the center of that steady growth in faith and 
holiness which brings with it an assurance of its own. But for Luther, this Staupitzian 
christocentrism is especially needful in the darkness of afflictions in regards to 
predestination itself. When the accuser’s dread attacks rise to this peak, and he fires 
the deadly shaft of threatened eternal reprobation into the Christian’s heart—then the 
believer fights back, refuses to play the devil’s predestinarian game, stakes his eternal 
salvation upon the promise of redemption in Christ given to him in preaching, 
baptism, Eucharist, and absolution, and lets this “one little Word” be assurance 
enough for him.  
Tellingly, however, even in this exceedingly seelsorgerlicher excursus on 
affliction and predestination, Luther still admits the provisional nature of assurance:  
God says to you: “Behold, you have my Son. Listen to him, and receive him. If 
you do this, you are already sure (certus) about your faith and salvation.” “But I 
do not know,” you will say, “whether I will remain in the faith? (an maneam in 
fide?)” At all events, accept the present promise and predestination 
(praesentem promissionem et praedestinationem), and do not inquire curiously 
about the secret counsels of God. If you believe in God revealed, and you 
receive his word, gradually he will reveal even the hidden God.1185 
 
To be sure, I believe the gospel now—but the haunting questions remain: will I 
continue in the faith to the end? have I been chosen in love from before the 
                                                        
1185 WA 43.460.23-7, cf. LW 5.46. 
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beginning? In this kind of affliction, the final answer to such questions is to refuse 
them, clinging quite alone to that predestination which is “present” together with the 
promise itself. I suspect that tried souls who read this book will agree with the old 
Luther, and with me, that Dr. Staupitz was a wise and good pastor indeed. 
 Thus far I’ve sketched three distinct “pastoral”-theological stances on the 
question at hand: fear, not assurance, must be preached to the impenitent and 
indolent; whereas to disciples, the incentive of steadily deepening assurance as a 
concomitant to real growth in holiness is to be set forth; but to afflicted souls, the wise 
pastor banishes the question of predestination altogether, and sets nothing but Christ 
in the gospel before their eyes. There is one final pastoral situation, and with it a 
fourth nuance on election and assurance, to consider before I suggest my dogmatic 
correction; and I have reserved it for this last place, because it approaches the 
Reformed doctrine I intend to defend here. In a word, the Sitz im Leben is the 
exhausting, bewildering, and intensely discouraging situation described not just in 
Rom. 7, but from the baptismal catechesis of Rom. 6 through the battle with one’s 
fleshly “self” in that moral-psychological laboratory to the “sufferings” and “groanings” 
and fierce opposition catalogued in Rom. 8.1186 In his 1522 Preface to Romans, Luther 
explains that when the Christian has not only read these chapters, but begun to 
experience the realities they attest, then at last he is ready to think soberly about the 
great matters St. Paul sets forth in Rom. 9—11. 
You had better follow the order of this epistle. Worry first about Christ and the 
gospel, that you may recognize your sin and his grace. Then fight with sin, as 
the first eight chapters here have taught. Then, when you’ve come into the 
                                                        
1186 WA DB 7.23.23-5, LW 35.377-78: Also sehen wyr das dise drey Capitel auff das eynige werck des 
glawbens treyben, das da heyst, den allten Adam todten vnd das fleysch zwingen. 
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eighth chapter under the cross and suffering, this will teach you rightly of 
predestination in chapters 9, 10, and 11, how comforting it is. For in the absence 
of suffering and the cross and the perils of death, one cannot deal with 
predestination without harm and without secret anger against God. The old 
Adam must first die before he can suffer this thing and drink the strong wine. 
Therefore beware that you do not drink wine while you are still a suckling. 
There is a limit, and a time, and an age for every doctrine.1187 
 
When the disciple has become a real theologian through suffering and the cross, when 
he has begun to grow up into Christ by sharing in his bitter passion and death, he is 
finally ready to drink this strong wine. Indeed, once a chosen soul has borne the cross 
all the long way through Rom. 1—8, predestination has morphed from a terrifying 
riddle into a deep well of evangelical comfort: an elixir of grace to gladden the battle-
scarred soul. For predestination is nothing but the promise of a love that is steadfast 
and a grace that is strong: stronger than my own flesh, stronger than all the forces of 
hell marshaled against my pitiful little soul. Paul, a well-tried man, wants the amici 
crucis to know that salvation has been taken entirely out of their frail and treacherous 
hands, and put into the merciful, faithful, strong hands of God. “For we are so weak 
and uncertain (vngewiss) that if it depended upon us, not even a single person would 
be saved; the devil would surely (gewisslich) overpower us all. But since God is sure 
(gewis)—his predestination cannot fail, and no one can withstand him—we still have 
hope against sin.”1188 Near the end of de servo arbitrio, Luther reiterates the confession 
of the embattled saint whose despair has given way to hope’s quiet confidence in the 
unshakable purpose of God: 
I frankly confess that, for myself, even if it could be, I would not want free 
choice to be given me, nor anything left in my own hand by which I would be 
able to endeavor after salvation; not only because in the face of so many 
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adversities and dangers, and assaults of devils, I could not stand my ground 
and hold fast my free choice (for one devil is stronger than all men, and on 
these terms no man could be saved); but because, even were there no dangers, 
adversities, or devils, I should still be forced to labor in constant uncertainty 
(perpetuo in incertum), and to beat my fists at the air. If I lived and worked to 
all eternity, my conscience would never become certain and sure (certa et 
secura) as to how much it must do to satisfy God. Whatever work I had done, 
there would still be a scruple as to whether it pleased God, or whether he 
required something more. The experience of all the self-righteous proves that; 
and I learned it well enough myself over a period of many years, to my own 
great hurt. But now that God has taken my salvation out of my choice and 
received it into his, and has promised to save me, not by my own work or 
performance, but by his own grace and mercy [cf. Rom. 9:16], I am sure and 
certain (securus et certus) that he is faithful and will not lie to me, he who is so 
powerful and great that no devils and no adversities can break him or pluck me 
from him. “No one,” he says, “shall pluck them out of my hand, because my 
Father who gave them, is greater than all” (John 10:28-9). Thus it is that, if not 
all, yet some, indeed many, are saved; whereas, by the power of free choice 
none at all could be saved, but we all would have perished in the one man. 
Furthermore, we are certain and sure (certi sumus et securi) that we are 
pleasing to God, not by the merit of our works, but by the favor of his own 
mercy promised to us. And if we work too little, or badly, he does not impute it 
to us, but with fatherly compassion pardons and corrects us. This is the 
boasting (gloriatio) of all the saints in their God.1189 
 
The core Augustinian doctrines are all present and accounted for: destruction in Adam 
(… in unum omnes perderemur); election by grace to salvation in Christ; the non-
imputation of those flaws which remain in the redeemed, and God’s fatherly 
correction of the same; the saints’ wholehearted “boasting” in this gracious God alone. 
So too are the more characteristically Lutheran emphases on conscience, certainty, 
scruples, devils, and the promise of grace. But here these components are fused 
together and recast in a manner that evokes Paul’s boast of certain triumph at Rom. 
8:31-39 and opens the door to John 10:28-29 as the matter-of-fact claim of the tried, 
tested, steadfast, stumbling little believer in Christ.  
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It comes to this: for weary, devil-clobbered, flesh-lugging souls, seemingly 
stuck in Rom. 7 forever with no hope of escape, predestination is not the cause of 
Anfechtungen, but the remedy. For it assures the saints that not even their worst and 
nearest enemies—viz., their own selves—are able to cast them out of the affections of 
their Father. He knew far better than they did that they were sinners when he chose 
them by grace, and he will not let them go now that the battle for holiness has begun 
to bring the depth of their sinfulness to light. For—to switch now to the apostolic 
first-person—he is for us, and has bound himself to us in a covenant of love and grace 
as steadfast as the perfections of his infinite being. No one, not the devil, not my own 
warped will, is strong enough to pluck me out of his hand. If this is true—and the 
gospel promises me that it is—then there is hope! That, Luther knew and on occasion 
let on to, is what the biblical doctrine of predestination and grace is all about: the 
thrilling hope—as potent to cheer the sorrowing heart, and to rouse and refresh it for 
battle, as the best of wines (cf. Ps. 78:65, 104:15)—that God is irrevocably for me as my 
Father, that he fights for me, and that nothing, neither tribulation, distress, 
persecution nor death, life, angel, ruler, present, future, past, etc., will ever separate 
me from his strong love in Jesus Christ (Rom. 8:31-39).  
 What then of my dogmatic correction? I think Luther’s nuanced pastoral 
theology of assurance, carefully tailored to each of the four settings in life that I have 
set out, is quite wise. Pearls ought not to be cast before swine, and surely assurance of 
election (as Thomas Watson probably wrote) is a precious jewel in the Christian’s 
crown. Faithful, untroubled disciples do well to be patient in well-doing and to make 
use of the means of grace in the Church. The artful pastor does all in his power to tear 
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the severely afflicted soul off of his self, point him to Christ alone, and let 
predestination shine from his wounds. And the battle-weary pilgrim, in view of the 
promised land but without hope of reaching it in his own strength, casts himself upon 
the eternal purpose and promised faithfulness of God. In this last respect, it’s hard to 
see how Luther’s “spirituality of predestination” differs in any real way from the 
Reformed doctrine: grasping hold of texts like Rom. 8:31-9 and John 10:27-30 in 
extremis, Luther’s ancient Augustinian wine begins to burst its skins and call for fresh 
ones instead. What I propose, then, is that the Reformed spirituality which Luther 
himself, in this fourth pastoral situation, occasionally adumbrates be outfitted with 
the Reformed dogmatics which is able to sustain it for the long-haul. I lack the space 
and the skill required to do this doctrine justice, and point you to John Owen’s 
masterful exposition and defense of it in his 1654 The Doctrine of the Saints’ 
Perseverance Explained and Confirmed. But I do wish to conclude this book by 
gesturing toward the way this sturdier dogmatics of election, grace, and perseverance 
is profitable for afflicted, Lutheran souls. 
 The doctrine itself is established on the firm foundation of texts that Luther 
did not exposit as often as he might have. In addition to Rom. 8:31-39 and John 10:27-
30, these include especially the promises of the new, eternal covenant of grace, life, 
and peace found in Isa. 44:2-3, 54:10, 61:1-8, Jer.31:31-4, 32:37-41, Ezek. 16:60-63, 34:11-31, 
36:22-29, 37:1-28, and Hos. 2:19-20, as well as NT passages like Heb. 8—10, Gal. 3:6—
5:1, and Eph. 1:3-14 which announce the realization of this promised grace in Jesus 
Christ for the edification and consolation of the freeborn filii promissionis. In them all, 
the twofold blessing of forgiveness and holiness, justification and life, are bound up 
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together, promised, realized, proclaimed, and given in Christ by his Spirit, all of it 
being the gracious outworking in time of the Father’s eternal purpose of love for his 
beloved. Therefore Isaiah and Paul, John and Jeremiah do not hesitate as Augustine 
and Luther tend to do. Quite plainly, and in all simplicity and truth, the prophets and 
apostles teach the Church: in love, the Father graciously chose to redeem, adopt, and 
preserve us for himself forever, and sent his dear Son to see to the purchasing of the 
riches of this grace by his blood and his Spirit to lavish these riches upon the 
ransomed people of God. Luther, I have argued, adamantly insists on the 
inseparability of grace and gift, and sometimes (especially against radical Lutherans) 
takes the further step of urging their causal interconnection. But the prophets are not 
so modest: “The mountains may depart and the hills be removed, but my steadfast 
love shall not depart from you, and my covenant of peace shall not be removed, says 
the LORD, who has compassion on you … No weapon that is fashioned against you 
shall succeed, and you shall confute every tongue that rises against you in judgment. 
This is the inheritance of the servants of the LORD, and their righteousness from Me, 
declares the LORD” (Isa. 54:10 & 17).  
Of course, all Augustinians agree that in regards to the elect, the covenant of 
peace cannot and will not be broken: for “God’s firm foundation stands, bearing this 
seal: ‘The Lord knows who are his’” (2 Tim. 2:19). The question is, can the sojourning 
saints know that they are his, viz., that they in fact belong to God in Christ by virtue of 
this covenant and grace? Paul thought so, for the all-conquering note of triumph at 
Rom. 8:31-39 is based on the sober dogmatics of v. 30. The predestined, the called, the 
justified, and the glorified are not discrete sets of persons, but the Beloved herself, the 
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Church. The saints, therefore, are free to rest—and to rejoice—in the assurance that 
God loved and chose them in Christ before the foundation of the world, that he will 
faithfully preserve them by his great grace, and that at the last he will bring them to 
glory. Or is it better for the called and justified to waver about the promises of God? 
Should they hedge their bets, and put some degree of trust (however slight) not just in 
God’s faithfulness to them, but in their own faithfulness to God? Perhaps, if not in 
one’s holiness per se, at least a little stock should be put in that heroic faith which 
defies the “hostile” God himself, refuses his threatened refusal, and demands that he 
remain true to his word? I know a man in Christ who once read magnificent lectures 
on Gen. 32, and entertained this kind of folly about himself. But as I have shown 
above, at his best (that is to say his very weakest) moments Luther knew better, and 
rejoiced in the promise of a salvation that is by grace alone from first to last.  
So did holy Asaph. For the consolation of the saints, he confesses that when his 
soul was embittered and his heart pricked, he was not pious but brutish, ignorant, and 
beast-like toward God. “Nevertheless,” he sings to the Lord, “I am continually with 
you; you hold my right hand; you guide me with your counsel, and afterward you will 
receive me to glory” (Ps. 73:21-24). Why, Asaph, do you fancy this? For in the agony, 
did not your heart cast off all hope in God? Didn’t you just admit frankly that you 
consented to your despairing flesh, and gave up? Or did you keep up faith in the 
gospel even when you behaved like a beast toward the Lord? Were you wrestling with 
him then by steadfast faith in the promise, refusing to let go of him until he blessed 
you? Admit it, Asaph: in the time of trial, your heart failed you! “Indeed my friends, 
not only my flesh but my heart too failed me; but no matter, for my heart is not the 
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strength of my heart; God is the strength of my heart, and my portion forever” (Ps. 
73:26). Or have you not learned to pray your Psalter? 
The steps of a man are established by the LORD, when he delights in his way; 
though he fall, he shall not be cast headlong, for the LORD upholds his hand … 
For the LORD loves justice; he will not forsake his saints; they are preserved 
forever; but the children of the wicked will be cut off (Ps. 37:23, 28) 
 
As for you, O LORD, you will not restrain your mercy from me; your steadfast 
love and your faithfulness will ever preserve me (Ps. 40:11) 
 
Love the LORD, all you his saints! The LORD preserves the faithful (Ps. 31:23) 
 
You are a hiding place for me; you preserve me from trouble; you surround me 
with shouts of deliverance (Ps. 32:7) 
 
Though I walk in the midst of trouble, you preserve my life; you stretch out 
your hand against the wrath of my enemies, and your right hand delivers me. 
The LORD will fulfill his purpose for me; your steadfast love, O LORD, endures 
forever (Ps. 138:7-8) 
 
To this true and living God, whose promise is faithful and whose grace abounds 
because his love is strong, be endless glory now and forever. Amen.  
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